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2HOW SKETCHES WORK:
A Cognitive Theory for Improved System Design
ABSTRACT
Evidence is presented that in the early stages of design or composition the
mental processes used by artists for visual invention require a different type of
support from those used for visualising a nearly complete object. Most research
into machine visualisation has as its goal the production of realistic images which
simulate the light pattern presented to the retina by real objects. In contrast sketch
attributes preserve the results of cognitive processing which can be used
interactively to amplify visual thought. The traditional attributes of sketches
include many types of indeterminacy which may reflect the artist's need to be
"vague".
Drawing on contemporary theories of visual cognition and neuroscience this
study discusses in detail the evidence for the following functions which are better
served by rough sketches than by the very realistic imagery favoured in machine
visualising systems.
1. Sketches are intermediate representational types which facilitate the
mental translation between descriptive and depictive modes of representing visual
thought.
2. Sketch attributes exploit automatic processes of perceptual retrieval and
object recognition to improve the availability of tacit knowledge for visual
invention.
3. Sketches are percept-image hybrids. The incomplete physical attributes
of sketches elicit and stabilise a stream of super-imposed mental images which
amplify inventive thought.
4. By segregating and isolating meaningful components of visual
experience, sketches may assist the user to attend selectively to a limited part of a
visual task, freeing otherwise over-loaded cognitive resources for visual thought.
5. Sequences of sketches and sketching acts support the short term episodic
memory for cognitive actions. This assists creativity, providing voluntary control
over highly practised mental processes which can otherwise become stereotyped.
An attempt is made to unite the five hypothetical functions. Drawing on the
Baddeley and Hitch model of working memory, it is speculated that the five
functions may be related to a limited capacity monitoring mechanism which makes
tacit visual knowledge explicitly available for conscious control and manipulation.
It is suggested that the resources available to the human brain for imagining non-
existent objects are a cultural adaptation of visual mechanisms which evolved in
early hominids for responding to confusing or incomplete stimuli from immediately
present objects and events. Sketches are cultural inventions which artificially
mimic aspects of such stimuli in order to capture these shared resources for the
different purpose of imagining objects which do not yet exist.
Finally the implications of the theory for the design of improved machine
systems is discussed. The untidy attributes of traditional sketches are revealed to
include cultural inventions which serve subtle cognitive functions. However
traditional media have many short-comings which it should be possible to correct
with new technology. Existing machine systems for sketching tend to imitate non-
selectively the media bound properties of sketches without regard to the functions
they serve. This may prove to be a mistake. It is concluded that new system
designs are needed in which meaningfully structured data and specialised imagery
amplify without interference or replacement the impressive but limited creative
resources of the visual brain.
Jonathan Fish, 20th February 1996
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PREFACE
The Origins and Evolving Purpose of this Study.
The subject matter of this research was chosen after a discussion between
the author and Professor Stephen Scrivener, who was then on the staff of the
Human Computer Interface Unit at Leicester, but who moved almost immediately
afterwards with Professor Edmonds to Loughborough University. Stephen knew
from our correspondence that I had a background in both Natural Science
(Biochemistry and Computing) and Fine Art (painting) and that I had a special
interest in Art and Science relationships. I was at that time teaching Computing,
Visual Perception and Colour Science to undergraduate students of Fine Art and
Fashion design. At the time of our first meeting I was interested in designing new
more meaningful computer data structures for drawings. However my attention
was drawn to one particular topic on a list of possible research problems that
Stephen had drawn up. It started "Artists and designers often complain that
Computer Systems make it hard to be vague". Because sketches are often vague
drawings, I agreed, without fully realising what I had "taken on" that I should
research the design of improved sketching systems for artists. I had hoped that I
would only have to spend at most a year's preliminary study into just exactly what
a sketch was (I had only the haziest of ideas). I would then be free to devote the
rest of my research time to implementing and testing some new software ideas for
a drawing system which would "allow artists to be vague", whatever that might
mean. Hopefully my ideas on new data structures for drawings would then come in
useful. I mention this in the preface, to answer the possible criticism that I have
"shirked" the task of the actually testing some of the implications of my theoretical
ideas in machine software. In fact I am an enthusiastic computer graphics
programmer and it was only the realisation that truly innovative and useful
software for artists will only be possible when we have a better understanding of
how sketches interact with cognition that prevented me from trying my hand at
implementing some of the many "sketching system" ideas this study has suggested
to me.
So it was, at first, a disappointment when I discovered how little helpful
research or literature was available on the sketch. It became clear that because
sketches are incomplete representations which assist and interact with an artist's
private thoughts, any understanding of their function would mean studying the
mental processes available to artists for visual thought and invention. It was also
clear that there would be no easy solution to the problem of finding machine
representations and algorithms to manipulate the hidden subtleties of sketch
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attributes. Stephen gave me a lead by pointing out Ernst Gombrich's article
"Leonardo's Method of Working out Compositions". This paper and many of
Gombrich's other writings, with which I was already familiar, became a starting
point for my enquiries. I acknowledge a great debt to the insights of Ernst
Gombrich into the nature of representation in art. However his most relevant
essays, and his unequalled book "Art and Illusion" were written in the sixties.
Since then a minor revolution has occurred in the study of the "visual brain" and a
great deal more relevant published research into the mechanisms of visual
cognition is now ripe for application to the visual arts and (in my opinion) to the
breath-taking possibilities of machine image handling. Thus I have had to study (as
a scientist and artist but not as a qualified psychologist) a huge literature on visual
cognition, including perception, object recognition, imagery, attention, working
memory, creativity and the neuroscience that is increasingly beginning to support
these topics. It dawned on me gradually that the task of applying recent progress in
these subjects to the visual arts in order to understand the mysterious attributes of
untidy sketches was far too great a task for one thesis. Reluctantly I was persuaded
that the task of actually implementing a system or part of a system would have to
take second place to that of achieving the prerequisite for designing such a system -
a plausible theory as to "How Sketches Work". I then believed and still believe
that without at least a theory of sketch attributes it is impossible to design
appropriate machine systems to replace the humble sketch book. I had also
concluded from my experience of teaching that there was something fundamentally
wrong with the design of existing machine sketching (paint) systems for artists,
powerful and fascinating though such systems can be. I put their design faults
down to a lack of any explicit theory about the functions they support and the
consequent attempt to simulate "blindly" traditional media - a design philosophy I
call for reasons explained in Chapter 9 the "Imitation Bronze" approach.
Thus this study is unashamedly theoretical. Its claim to original content
depends mainly upon the ideas and hypotheses (such as those at the beginnings and
ends of Chapters 3 to 7) which are derived from the investigation of some
consequences of applying cognitive psychology and neuroscience to the visual arts
and to the media - traditional and new - currently available to support visual
invention. However because cognitive science is in such a state of debate and
uncertainty I have been forced, in order to frame a theory of the sketch, to choose
between rival theories of cognition and to explain, with reviews of the evidence,
my reasons for doing so. In addition to the hypotheses directly concerning sketches
I have offered hypotheses or models with more general implications for cognitive
theory. Thus on at least three occasions I have felt justified in going beyond the
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published literature in order to document a theory or at least a theory variant of my
own. I found this was necessary to support my five cognitive "hypotheses" of
sketch function. However I have no right to make any strong claims about the
general applicability of these theory variants except in so far as they help to explain
the cognitive properties of sketches. These theories for which I claim some
originality are mentioned in the review of contents which follows.
I find to my alarm that I have been influenced by over 1070 books and
papers on art theory and cognitive science. The examiners will be relieved to learn
that I have managed to reduce the final number of references to a bibliography of
about half that number. Nevertheless a great proportion of the text reviews the
work of others. I felt this was necessary to support the hypotheses (numbered one
to five) I was presenting and I have throughout tried to keep in mind the ultimate
purpose of the research - to improve computer systems for artists. Thus besides
supporting a theory of the sketch, the cognitive psychology is intended to provide
useful "relevance pointers" for other visual system designers who are not
psychologists. All the ideas which are not my own I have acknowledged and
carefully referenced. Whenever possible I have quoted (briefly) in italics some of
the actual words of an author whose ideas are important to my central thesis. In
some cases this includes ideas with which I do not agree but which have been
influential in the design of machine visualising systems (Chapter 4).
An important part of the research consisted in simply looking at the
sketches (and writings when available) of artists and designers. Clearly the subject
matter demands illustrations. I would have liked to have used several hundred
illustrations of published sketches. For practical reasons I settled on a mere 38.
Because I have frequently had to refer to the same sketch in different places in the
text the illustrations are placed together behind the bibliography. I make no
apology for discussing sketches by Fine Artists and by Designers under the same
headings. I do this not because I wish to underestimate the great differences of
purpose and method in the different visual arts but because I am claiming that in
the early stages of visual invention there are similarities of sketch function common
to all the visual arts which are important, interesting and in need of a better
understanding.
Three short papers have already appeared summarising some of the ideas
behind this research (Fish and Scrivener 1990, Fish 1991, 1994). However this
text is the first attempt to give substance to those early versions of the theory and
to document it in more detail.
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Overview of Contents
The text is divided into nine chapters and sub-sections classified in decimal
notation. It is not always easy to force the products of a massively parallel
processor (the brain) into the serial straight-jacket of prose. Chapters 3 to 7
describe logically parallel strands of thought and are interdependent. I have tried to
cope with this by making numbered cross-references to previous paragraphs.
Occasionally however I know I have erred by repeating myself as an idea
introduced in say Chapter 4 is developed in Chapters 7 and 9. I apologise for these
lapses.
The core of the thesis is summarised by the following five hypotheses about
sketch function which are discussed in Chapters 3 to 7 respectively :-
Hypothesis One. (Translation of Representational Type)
Sketches have attributes which make them intermediate between depictive
(picture-like) and descriptive (language-like) representations. Such attributes are
used to facilitate the bidirectional translation between descriptive and depictive
modes of thought.
Hypothesis Two. (Inventive or unexpected perceptual retrieval)
Human perception and object recognition processes evolved to enable
accidentally impoverished stimuli fast access to long term memory for perceptual
completion. Sketch attributes exploit such unconscious processes providing
memory search and retrieval cues that improve the availability of tacit visual
knowledge for invention.
Hypothesis Three. (Support for superimposed mental imagery)
It is proposed that sketches are percept-memory hybrids. The incomplete,
physical attributes of sketches act as a stimulus for percepts which invite
completion from memory and imagination. This results in the generation of
transient mental images which after a matching process are transformed and
spatially superimposed upon an internal representation of the sketch.
Hypothesis Four (Selective attention to Visual Components)
Sketches amplify inventive thought by isolating and representing separately
those attributes of visual experience that are of special relevance to a particular
task. This assists the user to attend selectively to a limited part of the task, freeing
otherwise shared components of cognitive capacity and reducing the complexity of
preparatory visual processing.
Hypothesis Five. (Conscious monitoring of visual thought)
Sequences of sketching acts support the conscious awareness of one's own
cognition. This assists creativity, providing voluntary control over highly practised
mental processes which can otherwise become stereotyped. Unforeseen percepts
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from untidy or accidental stimuli can elicit unconscious processes which break the
mould of habitual thought, whilst a temporal record of recent ideas makes it easier
to change one's mind at appropriate stages.
Chapter 1, "What is a Sketch?" limits the scope of the subject matter to the
class overlap between three kinds of representation - those which represent two
dimensional views of real or imagined objects, those "used for imagining
something else" and those which possess certain "privileged" attributes of untidy
indeterminacy (the "vagueness" mentioned in Stephen Scrivener's quotation). I
further limit the subject by considering only sketches intended to represent
appearance and thus to thought processes used in art and design where imagined
appearance is of primary importance. This last requirement is often inseparable, of
course from sketch attributes in which function and appearance overlap. Although
mostly common sense, the discussion which follows is necessary in order to put
sketching in its functional context. I discuss two examples of sketching in practice,
one from fine art and the other from design, to illustrate briefly how sketches are
used
Chapter 2 explores the origins and nature of the indeterminate attributes of
sketches mentioned in Chapter 1. It summarises the history of the influence of
Leonardo's recommended use of deliberate indeterminacy to "rouse the mind to
new inventions" in the Trattato, and includes a section on the rather surprising
influence of photography on sketch style. The absorption of sketch attributes into
exhibited Fine Art "to enhance the beholder's share" towards the end of the
nineteenth century is also briefly discussed. I consider this relevant because it helps
us to understand how sketches work and to understand why the style of much
clever but over determinate "pseudo realistic" computer graphics is alien to the
interests of many artists who feel an affection for this long tradition of imaginative
understatement. The Chapter owes a debt to the work of others, especially Ernst
Gombrich and Aaron Scharf. However the point that Leonardo's recommendations
about indeterminacy imply two separate functions - visual concept innovation and
visual refinement of an existing idea is my own extension of Gombrich's treatment.
The application of Black's distinction of three kinds of indeterminacy to sketch
attributes may also be a "find". The treatment of the importance of sketch size as
an attribute related to size in biology and later in chapter 6 to research on global or
local precedence in selective attention is my own.
Chapter 3 considers the evidence for Hypothesis One. The chapter
originally included a long section on the nature of representation which I decided
had to be cut. I take it for granted following Palmer (1978) that the concept of a
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"representation" is only meaningful as part of a "representational system" which is
an ordered triple of the represented world, the representing world and an
interpretive process which can map one onto the other. The discussion considers
several complications to the "analog" versus "propositional" debate and makes
some new proposals. Under the influence of the philosopher C. S. Pierce I
consider that the way in which a representation is generated is almost as important
to sketch theory as how it is interpreted. Before reading Pierce I had conceived a
distinction between "semantically" and "non-semantically" generated
representations but later gave way to Pierce's related notion of "contingent" and
"non-contingent" representations. The idea of treating descriptive (a term I prefer
to "Propositional") or depictive (preferred to "analog") representational types as
instances within a multidimensional continuum (or within a prismatic conceptual
space) with intermediate types such as sketches having a special function of
"catalysing" type translation, is my own. I have of course acknowledged a debt to
others here especially to C. S. Pierce and to psychologists such as Stephen Palmer,
but the "continuum" treatment with the inclusion of a "sparsity - richness"
dimension is my own. I really do not know if the significance of intermediate
representational types for mental type translation has been seriously discussed
before. The idea is mentioned briefly in Fish and Scrivener, 1991.
Chapters 4 and 5 discuss evidence for two further but related functions of
sketches summarised by Hypotheses Two and Three. Chapter 4 examines the
hypothesis that "Leonardo type" indeterminacies exploit automatic recognition
mechanisms which give the user inventive access to her or his unconscious visual
memory (Hypothesis Two). It includes a discussion of the relevance of the three
main classes of picture perception theory to sketches. I give reasons for preferring
a "late construction" theory of picture perception in contrast particularly to James
Gibson's "invariant pick-up" theory. The value of different theories of recognition
to an understanding of sketch attributes is then reviewed. Both Hoffman,'s and
Biederman's theories of "recognition by parts" (which are related) are used to
explain how sketch incompletions may trigger automatic but useful memory
retrieval mechanisms. The evidence for and explanatory value of the theory of
context schemata is also discussed in relation to sketch indeterminacies. Finally I
suggest a further stage to traditional accounts of perception as a process of "going
beyond the information given".
Chapter 5 discusses in some detail the background evidence for Hypothesis
Three - that sketches are hybrid images, partly sensory information from the eyes
and partly superimposed imagery generated from memory. I review the
experimentally determined properties of mental imagery within the context of a
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model proposed by Kosslyn and Schwartz and consider the evidence that imagery
is an important mental tool for visual invention. The hybrid-image theory of
conscious perception is developed as a variant of Marcel's "late-construction"
theory of perception. (Chapter 5) The idea of a hybrid between a percept and a
superimposed mental image is not new and I have reviewed and fully
acknowledged the precedents of this idea. The idea that mental images owe their
origins to perceptual completion has been hinted at by Kosslyn and others but not
developed in the way I have attempted here. Nor, I claim have the evolutionary
implications of the hybrid-image theory of perception been pursued before. Every
"hint" I have found that others are thinking in the same direction I have quoted and
acknowledged. The idea that normal percepts are late spatial hybrids between
stimulus information and an unconscious mental image seems so obvious to me that
I would not be surprised if it has been suggested before though I have not come
across any clear statement of it in my reading. However the model mechanism for
hybrid-image formation with a triple buffer and selective "gate" and the
comparison with binocular fusion or rivalry is entirely my own idea. I also claim
to have noticed some rather elegant hybrid-image explanations, based on this
model, for well known experimental results in perception and imagery. Amongst
other fascinating relevant "finds" which fit the hybrid-image model are the work
showing the non-reversibility of mental images of ambiguous drawings (Chambers
and Reisberg, 1985) (the percept component is needed) and the PET studies by
Kosslyn et Al. (1993) showing that both perceptual and mental imagery versions of
a common task activate the same parts of topographically mapped primary visual
cortex and that incomplete or confused visual stimuli activate these visual parts of
the brain more than their completed counter-parts. A discovery which surprised its
authors.
Chapter 6 discusses the different types of selective attention that sketch
attributes support according to Hypothesis Four. Although I know of no systematic
treatment of sketches in this context, the idea that sketches support selective
attention seems to be too obvious not to have been thought of before. However I
believe this chapter contains some real inter-disciplinary "finds" about sketch
function that invite further research. One is the relevance of Garner's distinction
between Integral and Separable perceived dimensions to the attentional needs of
artists. Another is the published work on the ability to attend selectively to
different spatial frequencies and the close resemblance of some sketches to spatial
frequency filtered images. Yet another is the f scinating series of papers
investigating the factors which influence global or local precedence in perception
and attention. This relates to the problem of how the visual system decides that
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certain arrangements of stimuli constitute an "object" and my theory that sketch
attributes can be used to bias the visual system into selecting the candidate "object"
within a hierarchy of possible structure according to interest. Coincidentally this
work provides a useful extra piece in the jig-saw puzzle raised in Chapter 3 about
how an artist or designer determines the appropriate "size" for a sketch.
Chapter 7 examines the theory that sketches and the act of sketching
support the users' conscious awareness of their own thought processes (Hypothesis
5). But why, (the reader may ask) should they need such visual support? This was
the most ambitious and difficult chapter to write since I knew that in discussing
consciousness I was treading on ground that has long been regarded as taboo in
cognitive science. Recently however the climate has changed, as I show in my
review of a number of theories of "consciousness" and of the distinction between
automatic and voluntary mental processes. The debt that this chapter owes to
authors such as Johnson-Laird, Norman and Shallice, Marcel and to Baars is fully
acknowledged. Drawing on the theories of these authors but with a different
emphasis I develop the idea of consciousness as a "Cognitive Monitor" which
records the initiation and the consequences of cognitive acts for mental "back-
tracking" and control. If this hypothesis about consciousness is not entirely new, I
believe that at least the discussion of its application to the theory of the sketch and
the specification of what it must do is new.
The idea of documenting such a possible function of sketching came from a
number of diverse sources such as a remark by Philip Rawson (1969) that one
should always be able to tell where a drawing began and ended ("Why? and How?"
I asked) and an idiosyncratic little essay by Douglas Hofstadter entitled "On the
Seeming Paradox of Mechanizing Creativity". Hofstadter points out the importance
of conscious awareness for mastering those over-learned unconscious habits of
thought that so often inhibit inventiveness. It seemed obvious that original
invention presupposes the ability to remember consciously a chain of thought and
to back-track in order to try new directions in a conceptual hierarchy of
possibilities. How do sketches support this type of short term episodic memory and
how might this support be improved ? This led therefore to the need to include
some discussion of the nature of creativity and the relative roles that controlled and
automatic patterns of thought play in it. Whilst acknowledging (with quotations)
my debt to the literature on "Creativity", especially the little book by Margaret
Boden (1992), I have outlined some sketch relevant ideas of my own on this
subject as well.
Chapter 8 discusses the inter-dependencies between the five proposed
functions of the sketch with the purpose of finding some common unifying
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principle worthy of the title "A Cognitive Theory of the Sketch". The attempt is
not very successful. Perhaps this is because contemporary knowledge of the brain
and of those cognitive processes I am claiming are crucial to an understanding of
the sketch are still in such a rudimentary state. I take some comfort also from
Minksy's (1985) suggestion that perhaps the search for a unified principle to
explain cognition is simply "physics envy". After examining and rejecting the
possibility that mental translation is a unifying principle of sketch function I prefer
instead the possibility that all the five functions are related by the way they support
the Cognitive Monitor. This is posited to control and monitor as slave systems the
components of the Baddeley-Hitch-Logie model of working memory (summarised
in Logie 1995). When this cognitive system is used for manipulating imaginary
objects I call it metaphorically the "Inner Artist" which has as slave systems an
"Inner Hand" (Mental image generator) an "Inner Eye" (Covert attention), an
"Inner Sketch-Pad" (Spatial memory) and for descriptive thought an "Inner Voice"
and an "Inner Ear" (Verbal working memory components). I am careful to avoid
the infinitely recursive "homunculus" trap suggested by the "Inner artist"
metaphor. This is really posited to be a limited capacity neural mechanism which
can control and record a wide range of other processes used for descriptive and
depictive visual problem solving. It is envisaged purely as an operating system,
very complex and poorly understood but in no sense a Cartesian "mind within the
brain". It is activated automatically and without awareness by certain types of data
inconsistency which may occur during the continual processes of comparison
between new sensory information and stored knowledge. The reason why the
creative brain needs the perceptual support of untidy sketch stimuli is that the
cognitive resources available to this "Inner Artist" evolved not to invent novel
imaginary objects but to use memory in order to respond quickly and appropriately
to confusing or unexpected stimuli from real objects. Sketches are artificial
substitutes for such confusing or incomplete "real" events which awaken the "inner
artist". This is the nearest to a unified theory of the sketch I can develop. The
temporal sequence of real events is important. That is why the Inner Artist expects
the sequence of sketch actions to be so also.
Chapter 9 discusses some implications of the above Cognitive Theory of the
Sketch, incomplete though it is. The chapter is really an invitation to others to test
the theory and to examine how new media can be used to improve on the ancient
and, surely, very primitive medium of paper and pigment. The theory provides
good reasons why many artists and designers continue to use sketch pads and
pencils in preference to powerful but inappropriate machine "paint" systems in the
early stages of visual invention. However it also suggests that paper and pigment is
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far from an ideal sketching medium and that in many respects it provides rather
poor support for the Inner Artist. I therefore outline as a broad framework a
possible improved sketching system as a "Mind-Machine Synergism" in which
machine processes and internal data structures are designed specifically to support
not the media bound attributes of the sketch (as in the "Imitation Bronze"
approach) but the five cognitive functions of the Inner Artist. This includes a
collaboratively generated "Structure Map" of the sketch subject matter and
machine assisted mechanisms for implementing the one to many mappings implicit
in the different types of "vagueness" represented by sketch attributes. I am well
aware of the difficulties in implementing such a system but consider that it
signposts some quite realistic targets for further research.
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A Note on Typefaces.
I have deviated slightly from normal practice in the way I have used
typefaces. "Italics" are used inside quotation marks, not for emphasis, but to
indicate that the text is an exact quotation by another author from a reference
given. This allows me to use normal typeface inside quotation marks for
hypothetical questions, metaphors (i.e. expressions not to be taken literally) and for
when I am quoting another part of this text. I have used underlined text, rather
than the usual italics, for special emphasis of a word or phrase of the kind that one
normally makes in speech by intonation, to clarify one's meaning.
Bold typeface is used for words or phrases which have a specialised or
technical meaning which is explained either in the accompanying text or in a
reference which has just been quoted. Bold typeface is also used for Chapter and
Section Headings which are, I hope, easily distinguished from technical terms.
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1. WHAT IS A SKETCH?
"The process of drawing is before all else the process of putting the visual
intelligence into action, the very mechanics of taking visual thought. Unlike
painting and sculpture it is the process by which [artists or designers] make clear
to [themselves], and not to the spectator, what they are doing. It is a soliloquy
before it becomes communication." (after Michael Ayrton, 1959 with "an artist"
altered to "artists or designers" and "himself" altered to "themselves").
1.1 The Problem of Definition.
Even when restricted to the visual arts, as here, the word "sketch" is
difficult to define without loss of usefulness. When defined too strictly many words
lose part of their meaning in ways which damage their power to communicate or to
assist in thought about the ideas with which they are associated. One way by which
such words acquire their meaning is by reference to a family of naturally occurring
instances of a vague class linked often by a common origin. This can result in a
network of overlapping "typical" attributes which are not necessarily possessed by
every exemplar of the set. "Sketch" (and "to sketch") are examples of such words.
A definition may cover typical sketches but there are always cases which defy the
definition. The very fact that a word is hard to define suggests that it refers to
something poorly understood and stimulates thought about the nature of the object
or concept to which it refers.
For example the word "sketch" is commonly used to refer to those rough
drawings made by artists to represent the general outline of a preliminary idea.
However a study of working practice shows that, whilst sketches often represent
the outlines of visual structure without the detail they may also do the reverse and
represent the details of a part without the structure (e.g. see Picasso's studies for
Guernica, documented by Arnheim (1962)). Moreover colour studies with little
drawing are often made by painters which can equally well be called sketches.
Moreover, sketches are just as widely used by sculptors, and designers or, for that
matter, by anybody who wishes to think or communicate visually..
For the purposes of this thesis I limit the meaning of the word "sketch" to
include only two-dimensional visual representations of some real or imaginary
scene or object. Thus models and maquettes used by designers for purposes similar
to the sketch are not included. A non-figurative painting cannot be a sketch but a
representation of a non-figurative painting can be. Also excluded here, are works
using incompletion and ambiguity intended for exhibition rather than as ideas for
further development (ruling out the Oxford dictionaries last sentence). However the
attributes of such works are of relevance, due to their historical links with similar
1. What is a Sketch ?	 24
attributes in real sketches. I am further limiting my attention to sketches which
represent or are primarily concerned with visual appearance as opposed to the
representation by visual means of the structure or function of something. There
exists a fuzzy continuum of sketch types from those which might be used (typically
by engineers or scientists) to think visually about a mechanism or function and are
not concerned with the appearance of what is represented to those which are only
concerned with appearance. The majority of sketch types probably fall between
these two extremes, with visual appearance forming a part but not the whole of
their content. For example, sketches made by architects of the ground plans and
elevations of buildings explore the implications of spatial relationships for human
use simultaneously with appearance. In sketches for the decorative arts appearance
is the primary but not the only function. Thus a Fashion designer may use the same
sketch to think about and represent the visual profile of a garment and the non
visual spaces between the users body and the fabric (Illustration VI). Here I will
concentrate on sketches whose function is to represent the possible visual
appearance of something as seen from a particular viewpoint. In other words they
will be viewer-centred representations (as defined by Marr, 1982). It is necessary
to distinguish conceptually sketch functions which represent visually thought about
non-visual ideas as diagrams often do, from those which concern thought about the
visual appearance of what is represented. This does not mean that it will always be
easy or even possible to separate these two types of function in individual sketches.
So this enquiry will be limited in scope not only to a subset of a subset of the set of
visual objects which can legitimately be called sketches, it will also be limited
within this subset to only those attributes which concern visual appearance. The
reason for this constraint is that I believe that progress in understanding how we
perceive, recall, manipulate and generate the appearance of real or non-existent
objects within the mind, is central to understanding sketches. Cognitive psychology
has proved to be a fertile source of ideas to explain what would otherwise be
mysterious attributes of familiar sketches. I shall also claim that ideas suggested by
this investigation of sketches have implications for existing theories of visual
imagery and perception.
As already mentioned, the sketches discussed here are limited to two-
dimensional representations of objects or scenes as seen or imagined from a
particular view point. It is necessary to further distinguish such sketches from other
viewer-centred images such as photographs, drawings made for their own sake and
paintings. The interesting constraints on meaning are those which determine how
sketches differ from more finished and permanent kinds of visual representation.
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Three possible, fuzzy "semantic descriptions" of the word "sketch" are
listed below.
1. Sketches are representations used to assist in the visualisation and mental
manipulation of some unfinished or imaginary object. Unlike other drawings,
illustrations, or photographs which can be valued for their intrinsic merits, sketches
should only be understood and valued in relation to the objects they represent and
the ideas to which they contribute.
2. Sketches are drawings, colour studies or illustrations which possess the
attributes of untidyness, incompletion and ambiguity. They typically give the
appearance (often false) of spontaneity and often occur in multiple series related to
a common subject matter. In comtemporary art these attributes are valued for their
power to suggest in the mind of the viewer visual content which is not explicit.
3. Sketches are representations used to assist the creation and experimental
manipulation of an unfinished or imaginary object. They accomplish this by virtue
of privileged attributes which may appear superficially to be superfluous or
unhelpfully untidy. However, these attributes have concealed cognitive functions
which amplify the users capacity for visual invention.
The first meaning above, attempts to isolate a function or set of typical
functions which is unique to sketches and which distinguishes them from the other
types of representation mentioned. This description concentrates attention on the
working practices of artists and how sketches are used. The second meaning
attempts to define the sketch in terms of its characteristic attributes. This approach
assumes that whilst sketches may share some of their attributes with other
representations such as non-sketch drawings, illustrations, maps, diagrams etc.,
they also possess some distinguishing typical attributes not usually found in other
types of representation. I shall refer to these candidate defining attributes of the
sketch as "privileged" sketch attributes. As hinted earlier I have used the word
"typical" repeatedly to indicate that I regard both these approaches as leading at
best to fuzzy semantic descriptions rather than clear definitions. The third hybrid
description of what a sketch is encapsulates those properties of sketches that are of
special interest to this study. It represents, of course, only a subset of the possible
meanings. This adopted meaning has many conceptual flaws. However it serves the
ultimate goal of the study, which is to design new machine sketching systems
genuinely useful to artists and designers. Treating artists sketches as images which
serve a particular function leads to the study of how artists work and think. How is
a new visual object conceived, manipulated, refined and completed? Treating
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sketches as images with particular attributes leads to the study of the images
created by artists, what features they possess and how they can be classified. What
are the privileged attributes of sketches and how did they originate? The third
hybrid description leads, in addition, to the study of the relationship between the
functions of the sketch and the attributes it possesses. This relationship is far from
clear. The familiar attributes of sketches are constrained not only by function but
also by time and skill and by the limitations of the traditional media with which
they are usually associated. Many of the attributes have evolved gradually over
centuries of trial and error by many artists. They possess cognitive functions the
origins of which are hard to trace and which may work by mechanisms that their
users themselves do not understand. This is exactly the problem which must be
faced by the designers of new sketching media.
1.2 The Problem of Defining Function.
The first meaning, in terms of a defining function seemed appropriate to me
at the start of this research. A sketch, I thought, could be any visual representation
which was used in the design or invention of something else. True sketches were of
interest only to the extent that they helped their user conceive, create and refine
the object to which they referred. This had the advantage or eliminating those
objects sometimes called sketches in museums, as for example the Oxford
Dictionary's "a drawing or painting of unpretentious nature". However it
gradually became apparent that this description was inadequate. It is difficult to
circumscribe the possible functions of the sketch. It is clear that there are other
secondary functions which although they may be less use in characterising the
sketch may be impossible to separate from the primary function. Thus besides the
private and personal function of assisting the visual thought of their user, sketches
have two other functions.
1. Sketches may be used for recording visual information and visual
thought for later use even though this use may be unspecified. They may also be
stored to record stages of one design or composition for specified later use in a
different task. Whilst the primary function is concerned with a task immediately
active in working memory, the recording function must support long term
memory.
2. It is clear also that especially in design, sketches are used to
communicate visual ideas to others. However it does not follow that because
sketches record a private dialogue within the user's mind they must also be useful
for communicating to others.
Both communicating and recording functions are logically distinct from the
private visualising function even if they are often combined with the latter in
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practice. It may be due to a limitation of traditional media that these two additional
functions should so often be mixed with the primary purpose of sketches. It is
therefore important to separate the three functions conceptually and to consider to
what extent their requirements may conflict with one another. However convenient
it may be to use rough sketches for all three functions at once it may prove
advantageous with new media to separate them. The attributes which best assist the
generation of visual ideas are not necessarily those which best record or
communicate these ideas. It may then be necessary to distinguish more clearly and
formally the "visualising sketch" from the "recording sketch" or the
"communicating sketch". However at present, in sketches as commonly used by
artists and designers, several functions are confused and it is premature to attempt
to define the sketch by function alone. Moreover it is impossible to constrain
meaningfully the possible attributes of "sketches" from a definition of function.
This is because we need a better understanding of the subtle mechanisms by which
sketch attributes interact with their users' minds.
1.3 The Problem of Defining Attributes.
The second description of the sketch in terms of special or privileged
attributes avoids the problem of the mixed function of many sketches. However,
although an attribute definition may be useful for museum keepers and art lovers it
seems quite inappropriate as a guide-line for designing new sketching systems.
Moreover it is very difficult to select from the many typical and familiar attributes
of sketches those which are obligatory. Possible distinguishing attributes may be
divided into two groups, (a) those associated with the sketching medium and the
way sketches are generated and (b) those associated with the media-independent,
culturally understood meanings of sketch attributes. (A distinction understood by
Leonardo when he compared drawing to poetry see 2.1)
Sketches are usually, but not always smaller than other images. The media
on which they are usually produced is cheap and portable. The vast majority are
made on paper with pencil, crayon, ink or water-colour. However painters
traditionally make working studies, called sketches in oil paint on canvas.
Commonly, sets of sketches, often related to the same subject, are collected
together in "sketch books". The crucial and inter-related questions raised by the
traditional media of sketches are
- To what extent are the desired attributes of the sketch constrained or
handicapped by the medium?
- To what extent have the medium and its properties been influenced or
selected by the desired attributes of the sketch ?
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Typical visual attributes are listed below.
- Sketches are commonly drawings and use lines to represent form. The
lines used have a number of culturally acquired meanings. Arnheim (1974) has
distinguished three :-
Object lines which are perceived as one-dimensional objects (or lines in the
thing represented)
Hatch lines usually in parallel clusters, which are used either to represent
shadows or the shape and orientation of contiguous surfaces.
Contour Lines where a line embracing an area is seen as enclosing a visual
object. Arnheim refers here to the segregation of simple images into figure and
ground, much investigated by the Gestalt psychologists (Koffka, 1938, Kohler,
1947, Ellis, W. 1938). However it is necessary to subdivide such lines into
different types. For example contour lines may represent the "self-occluding
contour" (profile) of a three-dimensional object or they may represent edges of
adjacent surfaces at different orientations within an object or they may represent
the boundary of a region of contrasting colour within a common surface.
A detailed discussion as to how lines represent is beyond the scope of this
study. However the question will be referred to again within the context of sketch
perception.
Not all sketches are drawings. Sketches can also be paintings or colour
studies with no lines and only vague indication of form (e.g. Turner's colour
sketches, (Illustration XXXV).
- Sketches produced early in the process of design or composition may have
superimposed written notes. Although this attribute is an important clue to sketch
function it does not distinguish sketches from diagrams and scientific illustrations
(Illustrations IX, XIV, XXIII).
- Most of the attributes which can claim to be special to sketches are forms
of visual indeterminacy, many of which appear, perhaps misleadingly to be
accidental.
Indeterminacies of under-representation
For example
- Incompletion, where the drawing fades away to an empty space or a
contour line is missing, fragmented or only suggested (Illustration X)
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- Limitation of the visual attributes, features or parts which are represented.
Some attributes or features of the represented object or scene are emphasised and
represented in more detail than others which may be represented vaguely or not at
all (examples to be discussed later).
Indeterminacies of over-representation
for example
- Multiple alternative contour lines ("pentimenti")
- Suggestive scribbles and cross-hatching
- Confused smudges and incomplete erasure
- Blobs and accidental flow patterns of paint or ink
- Mysterious dark shadows (e.g Leonardo's "sfumati")
(see Chapter 2 for examples and discussion)
When these and other attributes of sketches are considered without
reference to their possible function or to their historical origins it is difficult to
distinguish those which might be genuinely intrinsic to sketches and those which
are accidental and unimportant or even undesirable consequences of the context in
which sketches are generated and the traditional media used to create them.
In this preliminary listing of functions and attributes I have tried to avoid
the temptation to suggest sketch attributes from observed functions or to deduce
functions from observed attributes. I shall now consider what attributes sketches
and sketching systems might be expected to possess if their primary functions are
those I have suggested.
1.4 Experimentation and the Need to Visualise in the Arts.
The primary functions of the sketches discussed here are to visualise a
nonexistent object or to predict in advance the visual consequences of changes to
an existing object. The two functions are frequently combined as when one
imagines a non-existent object and then also attempts to imagine the effects of
changes to that object. Sketching is not essential to the creation of a work of art or
visual design. The designer "R.T." for example claimed never to sketch and so
also do a small minority of Fashion designers (Bates et Al, 1988). Painters also
frequently work directly on the canvas without preliminary studies. In order better
to understand the role of visual monitoring in the creation of visual objects it is
worth considering briefly how new visual objects might in principle be created
"blind" without alteration until at least the late prototype or detailed refinement
stage of development.
It is conceivable that a set of rules for design or composition might be so
rigorous that they can be applied systematically without any need to visualise the
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designed object before it is finished. In the visual arts of Western Culture today,
such a way of working is rare. Exceptions can be found, for example in the work
of the "Systems" artists of the nineteen seventies, who applied rules involving
number systems to the structural composition of abstract paintings. However such
rules usually included an element of surprise or randomness and it is not clear that
advance visualisation was not used to select from the large number of
compositional permutations such number systems typically generated. (See The
"Chance and order" drawings by Kenneth Martin, K. 1975). (Another exception is
Harold Cohen's sixteen year old expert system "Aaron". Using only a few random
parameters (sometimes only one) this program uses Cohen's rules to generate non
interactively an infinite possible number of drawings. Cohen described Aaron as a
"program designed to investigate the cognitive principles underlying visual
representation" (Cohen 1974). Until Cohen publishes in detail his "rules" it will
not be clear how far he has succeeded in his objectives. It is certainly an ambitious
and interesting attempt by an artist to code explicitly knowledge related to personal
visual style.(see Illustration XXXVII and Chapter 9.3))
The difficulty of generating interesting visual art or design by any form of
rule, however sophisticated the knowledge on which it is based, is linked to
cultural context. In ancient Egyptian tomb painting for instance the descriptive
function of visual representational appears to have been strictly defined (Abbate
1972). The style of representation, similar in some respects to Egyptian
pictographic writing, was constrained by culturally imposed standards, equivalent
to rules. Despite its frequent beauty, Egyptian art allowed little scope for stylistic
novelty or individuality. Both Egyptian and medieval Islamic art (Critchlow 1976)
were constrained by visual conventions determined by the philosophy and the
cultures they served. The religious art of both cultures demonstrate that freedom
from cultural constraints and individuality of style are not essential for the
development of durable and memorable art. In contrast to the relative permanence
of earlier cultures, our own post-renaissance Western culture is in a state of
accelerating change, perhaps to its own detriment. This can be traced to the growth
of knowledge and the technology which results from such growth. Arnold Hauser
(Hauser 1951, volume 4, Chapter 4) writing of the effects of technology on
impressionism made an ominous deduction. "For the rapid development of
technology not only accelerates the change of fashion, but also the shifting
emphases in the criteria of aesthetic taste; it often brings about a senseless and
fruitless mania for innovation, a restless striving for the new for the mere sake of
novelty." and a sentence later "The continual and increasingly rapid replacement of
old articles in everyday use by new ones leads however to a diminished affection
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for material and soon also for intellectual possessions, too, and readjusts the speed
at which philosophical and artistic revaluations occur to that of changing fashion."
Whether one agrees with this evaluation of the effects of technology or not, it is
clear that the degree to which an artist or designer needs to visualise in advance the
multiple possible appearances of an object before it is finished, is greatly increased
by the need to experiment. This need in turn is determined by the degree to which
the context within which an artist works, causes her or him to value individuality
and novelty in a work as opposed to those tacit values acquired by learnt tradition
and cultural context. The need to experiment is also dependent, of course, on the
type of art that is practised, and in design by the client and the market. It is often
easier commercially to design by precedent, modifying existing successful
prototypes, than to indulge in a time-consuming search for visual originality.
Another consideration is the degree to which the tacit expert knowledge possessed
by artists, as the result of experience, can be applied automatically to new but
related problems and used to decrease experiment or visual manipulation.
Whether or not the word "experimentation", when applied to the visual
arts, has a similar meaning to its use in the sciences, is a question discussed by
Gombrich (Gombrich 1982, Chapter 9 "Experiment and Experience in the Arts").
He concludes that the word cannot be applied in the visual arts exactly as it is in
the sciences due to the problem of how the products of such experimentation might
be assessed. However there is a sense in which artists may claim to be
experimenting. Gombrich makes the point that historically the meaning of
experiment in the arts depends upon the variety of functions and the variety of
cultures that an art has served. When an artist manipulates perceived or imagined
appearance, this is a kind of experimentation which differs from that of science in
that the criteria for assessing the results are private and rarely explicit. The need
for this form of experiment depends upon the task and its cultural context. The
higher the value placed upon originality and invention and the lower the value
placed upon past experience or stylistic convention, the greater is the need for such
experiment with continuous refinement and correction.
1.4 Three Visualizing Methods for Experiment in the Arts.
The commonest working method used in fine art and in those types of
design where appearance is critical, consists of visual experiment (as described
above), in a series of stages, by a process of gradual development by step-wise
refinement with repeated back-tracking when a line of thought is discarded.
Typically an initially vague idea is constrained by privately imposed propositions
and, in design especially, by criteria defined by the function and imposed by the
clients. However carefully conceived the initial idea, the number of possible
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alternatives in the early stages of visual thought will be enormous. Therefore
continuous visual comparison is necessary in order to select from the many
alternative ideas and modifications of ideas that are possible. Three ways of doing
this are available to artists
1. The visual object itself (or a prototype of the object) can be roughly
fabricated, manipulated in stages, altered, completed, destroyed and recreated
whilst it is continuously inspected. This is a popular image of the fine artist at
work in the studio or before the motif. It is obviously only possible if the medium
in which the work is created is easily manipulated and relatively cheap. Painting in
oils is the obvious example. Paint can be easily scraped off while wet and replaced
or painted over when dry. A painting can be developed in stages on the canvas in
such as way that the artist's attention is drawn either to global structure (broad
washes and loose outlines) or to fine detail. This way of working out an idea
directly on the canvas, became fashionable with the Impressionists who painted in
front of the subject with the object of capturing spontaneous and fleeting visual
experience. It may also be slow and laboured. Emile Bernard, watching Cezanne at
work saw him carefully place a single brush stroke of paint on his painting, stare at
the painting intently for twenty minutes, then very carefully scrape the brush stroke
off (Perruchot, 1961). Clay is another medium which has the properties necessary
for rapid manipulation and alteration. A potter for example can test many shapes of
pot at the wheel. Not only can changes of profile be quickly adjusted but a skilled
potter can throw many related pots in a few minutes for visual comparison. Indeed
speed is necessary as the clay becomes too soft and wet to hold its shape unless
manipulated quickly.
It is clear that visual experiment by manipulation of the desired object
itself, is limited to a few specially adapted media. The scope of this limitation
expanded dramatically during the industrial revolution which brought about the
much discussed separation between the designing and the making of our cultural
artifacts (Lawson, 1992). When a visual prototype is too large and expensive or
when the designed object is intended for industrial manufacture then this method of
"experiment by making" is impractical. A painter would think twice before
working on a large mural without having already completed many preliminary
visual experiments and decisions (see Picasso's "Guernica", Arnheim 1962). It is
prohibitively expensive for an architect to "experiment" by erecting large buildings
only to see them torn down and rebuilt. When this happens it is a disaster. A large
sculpture in marble cannot be made in many versions in order to select the best
design. However, even when the chosen medium is designed for easy
manipulation, it must be noted that direct visual experiment on a single object is
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not an easy way of working. Consider for example Cezanne's single brush-mark
experiment mentioned above. In some respects it resembles a scientific experiment.
Cezanne compares his "sensations" (his own word) before and after making a
single change, holding all other factors, which might influence this visual
sensation, constant. In a scientific experiment however there would be for
comparison, in addition to the manipulated object, a control object in which
everything is kept exactly the same except for the variable of interest. In other
words Cezanne should have had at least two identical paintings for comparison.
Since this is impractical the comparison necessary for making every small spatial
or chromatic "before and after" decision must rely upon the vagaries of memory.
2. The second method by which artists and designers can conduct visual
experiments on non-existent objects is simply to use visual imagination. The
capacity to form mental images of remembered or imagined objects and to
mentally rotate, re-scale, recombine their parts and manipulate them in other ways
has been widely investigated in the last twenty years (see Chapter 5). Interesting
research has been done on the possibilities of using mental imagery to invent new
visual objects (Finke and Slayton, 1988, Finke, 1990). However there is
astonishingly little recent published work on the role of mental imagery in the
visual arts. In a review entitled "Imagery in the Arts" Lindauer (1983) reports that
most studies of imagery in artists agree that "sketches are tried out in the mind's
eye before they emerge onto the canvas" (Cohen, 1976). In studies based on
interviews most artists reported that they had such images both in real life and in
their work (Henderson and Lindauer 1976, Bates et Al, 1988). It is therefore safe
to assume that artists use mental imagery regularly to assist in visual decisions in
both the early inventive stages and the later development stages of visual creation.
The point at issue however is how far it is possible for an artist to rely on his or
her mental visualising with "the mind's eye". The ability to form mental images
and their vividness varies widely between individuals (Marks, 1972, Kosslyn et Al
1984). However most people report that their mental imagery is difficult to hold, is
limited in clarity and field of view and is often vague or lacks detail (Kosslyn,
1980 see 5.2.7). It has also been shown that it is difficult to form a mental image
of attributes of a previous percept that were not consciously attended to (Reed 8z,
Johnsen, 1975, Kunen 8z, May, 1980). In short there is a limit on the ability to
mentally control and manipulate an imagined object. It is especially the unexpected
interactions and relationships which occur in actual perception, which are likely to
be missed in a mental image. For example startling colour contrast and after-image
effects occur in colour perception (see Albers, 1971), which do not occur in mental
images (Finke, 1980, 1989, Finke and Kurtzman, 1981b). It is necessary to
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perceive conjunctions of real colours in order to detect the unexpected subtleties of
colour contrast effects. Moreover, as will be discussed later, accidental and
unexpected form or colour, which results from the vagaries of physical media,
stimulates inventive discovery for the very reason that it is outside mental control.
In many ways, the advantages and disadvantages of visual manipulation by
perceiving physical media are complementary to those of mental imagery.
Relationships perceived in real vision are vivid, detailed, stable and accurate. The
skilful manipulation of physical media enables the discovery of unexpected visual
relationships impossible with imagery alone. On the other hand the use of physical
media for controlled visual comparison is either prohibitively slow or too difficult.
In contrast mental manipulation is as fast as thought and unconstrained by physical
limitations. But it is fleeting and a sequence of mental manipulations cannot be
easily recorded. They must be remembered, and human memory is notoriously
fickle. It is clear that perceptual and imagery manipulation need each other. To
manipulate a physical medium without imagining in advance the myriad
possibilities that need never be implemented would be useless. Cezanne's single
brush-mark could have been selected from about ten million noticeably different
colour shades (Judd and Wyszecki 1963). At twenty minutes each it would take
380 years to try out all the possibilities of a single brush-stroke. Even when tightly
constrained to a small range of shades and to the already determined spatial
structure of the composition, the number of possible permutations of the many
brush-strokes which make a painting is astronomical. Similar limitations apply to
the experimental testing of small variants of a line made while drawing. It must be
assumed that, like other artists working directly with a physical medium, Cezanne
imagined and rejected many hundreds of brush-strokes for every one that he
actually "tested" on the canvas. These would be fleeting images quickly forgotten.
Some Fashion designers claim that, once they have seen and handled a
fabric, they can mentally visualise a complete garment in three-dimensions without
sketching or modelling toile (Bates et Al 1988). Despite the rare claims made by a
few however, it is difficult to believe that inventive and authoritative art or design
is often created by manipulating images in the mind only, without simultaneous
testing the ideas with perceived representations.
3. Despite the sparsity of direct evidence, there are strong a priori grounds
for believing that it is the interactive combination of both perceptual experiment
and mental imagery that most often leads to visual invention. Thus the third and
most practical method of creating new visual objects is a compromise forced upon
artists by the difficulties of manipulating prototypes and the frailty of mental
imagery. A special purpose representational system is needed which can be
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manipulated easily and fast enough to keep pace with visual thought. Ideally this
system should allow the simultaneous combination of imagery and perception in
harmonious collaboration (See Chapter 5). Such a system must be easier and faster
to manipulate than actual prototypes of the objects for which it must substitute,
whilst at the same time it encourages, clarifies and amplifies the users private
mental imagery. Some of the attributes needed by the medium of such an
representational system can be deduced from this requirement.
For instance the ideal the medium should
a. - be cheap and easily obtained
b. - be portable and robust because visual thought occurs in many places
and contexts.
c. - allow the fast creation of multiple images due to the large number of
visual concepts and modifications of visual concepts that may need to be
considered.
d. - allow the easy erasure and alteration of images.
e. - be easy to use and to learn to use.
f - not interfere with the user's main cognitive task and its related imagery
and percepts.
g - support the easy storage and recall of large numbers of related images
h - support the simultaneous viewing for comparison of many related
images.
i - record the stages in the generation of a visual object or ideas for them so
as to allow easy control of backtracking and correction.
j - record verbal or descriptive modes of information as well as depictive
representations and implement and convenient system of relating the two (labelling
the structure depicted, see Chapter 3.5).
The traditional and still most widely used medium for such a function is the
paper sketch-book with drawing instruments such as pencils or pens and combined,
when colour is needed, with crayons or paint. This medium fails to meet all the
proposed requirements. Indeed it seems at first sight that the requirements are in
irreconcilable conflict. The paper sketch-book meets requirements a and b. It is
cheap and portable (per image), provided of course that very large images are not
needed. It meets requirements c. and e. provided the user is able to draw well
enough to support her or his visual thought. Requirement d. is not very well
catered for. Pencil and charcoal lines can be erased partially using a rubber but
ink, crayon or water-colour only with great difficulty. It meets requirement e.
provided again that the user can draw. I shall discuss requirement f. later. Here I
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will merely note that whilst the ordinary pressure sensitive pencil is good in some
respects, in use hand and pencil must interfere with part of the user's view of the
drawing. Paints and palettes cause cognitive interference by dividing attention
(Chapter 6). Requirement g is partly met. Sketch-books are easy to store but unless
their user has implemented a system of indexes, which is unlikely, the retrieval of
a partly remembered earlier sketch may be tedious. Requirement h is met quite
well but at a cost to requirement g. Many pages of a sketch-book can be torn out
and pinned together on a wall or spread on a table top. This is an advantage of
paper and pencil over the single screen displays used by affordable machine
sketching systems. The pages of a sketch-book provide a crude way of meeting
requirement i, only as far as whole sketches record stages of the design or
composition progress. However paper has no memory and it is obviously
impossible to record in detail the within sketch sequence of decisions. Rawson
(1969) argues that in drawings by skilled draughtsmen the marks themselves
contain sequential information. He claims for example that he can usually tell by
inspection where a drawing started. This is not equivalent to a detailed sequential
record. The reasons why such a record may be desirable will be discussed later.
Finally the sketch-book meets requirement j. but only crudely. As already noted
artists frequently write scribbled notes on or beside their drawings. The connection
between the written note and a sketch part must be indicated by a line or arrow
which naturally interferes with the depictive part of the drawing.
Thus as a visualising medium, paper and pencil or the sketch-book though
obviously convenient and widely used have many short-comings. They score about
five out of ten for my suggested requirements.(for a and b, - 2 points, half points
only for c, e, f, h, j, g,). However the points they lose on - fast manipulation and
information recording - are important. Computer sketching and image processing
systems have the potential at least to score much more highly on these points.
Existing design specific "paint" systems (used as a medium for sketching in the
early stages of design) score highly on c, d, g, but lose on h and score less well on
the others. However, as I shall argue later, improved design resulting from a better
understanding of sketch function could radically improve this score. As portable
visual computers become cheaper and more powerful, the quality of imagery and
the capacity for fast manipulation, improved image storage and detailed event
recording continually improve. As a visualising medium, even in the very early
stages of visual invention, the computer is surely destined to out-perform paper in
almost every respect. (Admittedly requirement h is hard to meet. Cheap, very large
area, thin display systems may come in the near future).
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Why then is the humble sketch-book still in such wide spread use? Why are
computer systems only used, on the whole, by artists who specialise in computer
art and by designers mainly for the later illustrative and marketing stages of design
(Scrivener and Clark, S. 1992, Makirinne-Crofts et Al 1996). The reason is only
partly that existing systems (in 1995) are too expensive and inconvenient to use. A
more profound reason lies in the fact that the design of sketching systems in such a
new medium raises questions about the cognitive functions of sketch attributes
which have never been convincingly answered. How do the marks made in the
traditional sketch represent their subject and how do they interact with
representations in the brain of their user? Clearly, with sketching as described
above, the medium is not the "message" (McLuhan 1969). If the representational
system is medium independent it should be possible to transfer it to an improved
medium without losing any of its crucial attributes. In other words system
designers could adopt the "black box" approach to mental processes, assume that
the user knows best what type of representational system to use and simply imitate
the sketching attributes in a supposedly more powerful and flexible medium. This
is the "idiot slave", "partitioned" approach to C.A.D. characterised by Negroponte
(1977). According to this approach, all the user's thought processes are outside the
province of the sketching system and its design. It is simply a medium which acts
as a "tool-box" with which the user can implement his or her desired imagery as
flexibly and perfectly as possible. Such an approach to the design of sketching
systems in a new medium, only makes sense if the medium independent attributes
of a visualising representation can be fully distinguished from those attributes
which arise either accidentally or intentionally from the medium in which they are
generated and manipulated. Unfortunately this is not the case with traditional
media. Although it is clear that the sketching medium of paper and pencil or paint
does not determine the representational system and its meaning, it constrains and
enriches the functional attributes of the sketch in ways that are familiar but poorly
understood.
In view of the deficiencies of paper as a medium for the fast manipulation
and recording of images, it would be easy to jump to the conclusion that many of
the characteristic attributes of paper sketches are undesirable consequences of an
inadequate medium. Is not the incompletion and sparsity of many sketches,
attractive as it may be, a simple consequence of the difficulty of hand and eye to
generate percepts on paper which can keep pace with thought? Are not hazy or
multiple contour lines an undesirable consequence of the tedious difficulty of
erasing the unwanted lines? Are not wobbly lines an undesirable result of a wobbly
hand trying to control lines intended to be straight or perfect curves? Are not
1. What is a Sketch ?	 38
untidy smudges and ambiguous scribbles caused by the users impatience with an
imperfect medium? When water-colour on paper flows over the contour of a shape
which is intended to be coloured, is this not a flaw in the medium of
representation?
In short, it appears at first sight that many of the characteristic attributes of
sketches are a hindrance rather than a help to sketch users who need a clear and
accurate vision of the effects of their experiments on the appearance of an
imagined object. What the artist or designer needs, according to this argument, is
to produce as quickly and as early in the design process as possible, detailed,
accurate and completely realistic images. If it is impossibly expensive, difficult and
slow to manipulate life-size replicas of the object itself, then surely, the next best
alternative is to manipulate ersatz ("virtual" is the term in vogue) objects. However
where these are images of an imaginary object then the hypothetical ideal medium
must emulate by precedent and calculation the light pattern which would fall upon
the retina were such an object to be illuminated and placed in front of the user.
Since photographs (including their descendants film and television) are the cultural
images closest to this, the thoughtless term "photographic realism" is sometimes
used for this ideal. So great is the potential of computer image handling systems
for interactively manipulating the multiple appearances of three dimensional objects
that the question "need artists and designers sketch at all?" may well be asked. In
other words is it not possible and desirable to substitute detailed machine assisted
realism for the clumsy drawings and hazy mental imagery inherited by tradition
from the pre-computer age? This is not a completely vain question. So far the
"photographic realism" school for the design of CAD systems has had things all
their own way. A new generation of increasingly realistic, design specific
visualising systems are already in common use. The discussion of such systems and
their possible improvement must be deferred to Chapter 9 after a theory of sketch
function has been presented.
We need first to investigate how traditional sketches represent real or
imaginary objects and by what mechanisms they may assist visual thought.
Sketches are only a tiny, visible component of a much richer private dialogue
which artists and designers conduct in their minds. To understand the functions of
the sketch it is necessary to consider what kinds of representation and mental
process are necessary. It is also necessary to ask what resources are available in the
brains of visual artists which enable visual "thought". These resources are
enormous, but they are certainly limited. Their limitations arise, I will argue, from
the recentness in biological time of the cultural need to imagine future man-made
objects and the consequently "improvised" nature of the neural resources available
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to the brain of an artist for this purpose (see Chapters 4 , 5 and 8). What are these
limits and how can they be better supported by the new media and technologies
now available to our culture?
As a preliminary, it is useful to examine the historical origins of some
sketch attributes and to illustrate briefly how sketches are used in practice. Then I
shall attempt to use contemporary theories of cognition to develop plausible
hypotheses about how "privileged" attributes of sketches serve their visualising
function. This is the approach which I consider most appropriate for this study.
For there is a gap in our current understanding of sketches and other visual
representations which is handicapping the way we design and use new visual
media. I have tried to make a bridge across this gap in understanding without
losing sight of the practical objective. The unprecedented image handling capacity
of computers poses a problem for the design of sketching systems for the visual
arts which has not yet been solved. Before machine functions can be properly
designed it is necessary to understand the relationship between the familiar
attributes of sketches and their function. For these attributes are constrained and
modified by the nature of the traditional media used by artists - pencils, pens,
brushes, crayons, paints, inks paper, canvas etc. They are also constrained by the
hurried, casual and private nature of many sketches. Despite this, when skilfully
used, their untidy attributes have the power to excite the imagination in ways that
other types of image cannot emulate. It is therefore not at all clear to what extent
or by what mechanisms the "privileged" characteristics of sketches are essential to
the visual purposes of the sketch or to what extent visual thought is handicapped by
the constraints of the medium.
1.5 Sketching from the Motif and from Imagination.
Most figurative artists draw and colour continually from real scenes and
objects and this activity is often referred to as "sketching". Designers may also
sketch from motifs as a source of ideas. However when designing a visual object
which does not yet exist, designers and artists alike can draw only upon
imagination, memory and of course the sketch itself. Thus the difference between
sketching from the motif and sketching from imagination appears to be
fundamental. Compared to perception visual memory and imagination are vague
and ephemeral yet unconstrained. A drawing from the motif can be corrected with
new information for as long as desired by using the eyes. Nature provides precise
constraints but also surprises of a different nature from those available when
sketching from imagination. Because it is biased by expectation or remembered
prototypes, drawing from memory tends to be less surprising (and thus less
interesting) than drawing from nature. Artists sometimes refer to this as "false"
1. What is a Sketch ?	 40
versus "true" drawing (Ayrton, 1957). However he difference in "sketching" from
the motif and from imagination is much less clear. If the purpose of drawing from
nature or a motif is simply pleasure or to gather information for unspecified later
use then it is not fulfilling the primary function of the sketch. Two questions
should be asked before deciding whether or not such activity counts as "sketching".
The first concerns the method of information collection. If the purpose (of
sketching from the motif) is purely information gathering then would not
photography or video serve the function better? Will future landscape painters, for
example, abandon paper sketching from nature and instead take video camera and
portable computer image analysers to record at high speed the scenes of interest
and at the same time manipulate the digitised images to extract and simplify the
spatial and chromatic material of interest. Such systems, already in use, will soon
be affordable by most artists or designers. When that happens what possible
advantage could sketching by perception with paper and pencil (or stylus and tablet
for recording by perception does not rule out electronic media) have for this
purpose?
The question is based on false assumptions. Whilst photography and other
automatic recording methods have since Impressionism had many uses to artists,
they cannot compete with or replace drawing by visual examination. Even if an
artist states that when sketching she or he is collecting information, there are at
least two crucial hidden functions of the drawing act. The type of perception
necessary for drawing must be learnt and whilst drawing artists and designers are,
throughout their professional lives, continually and perhaps unconsciously
developing their perceptual skills. Artists draw to amplify their perception of the
motif. Perception is a very complex and largely unconscious process of extracting
meaning from the mosaic of colours and luminances before the eyes. A drawing
contains the carefully selected partial results of this processing. Such visually
extracted information has meaning and value to the artist's purpose which is
completely lacking in the unprocessed array of luminances recorded by the camera.
A second, related cognitive function of sketching "from nature" may be equally
important. In order to design or compose new visual objects an artist draws upon a
huge remembered store of visual sources which can only be collected by visual
experience. Throughout a life-time this visual knowledge becomes more
sophisticated and more specific to an artist's individual style. This unconscious
long term store of remembered shapes, structures, compositions and colour
relationships will have many sources. However there are reasons for believing that
the ability to store and recall information over long periods depends upon the
meaning and depth of processing that the information has received (Craik, F. &
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Lockhart 1972, Craik, F. 1977, Baddeley 1990). Drawing (and colouring) during
difficult perception is exactly the type of processing that might be expected to build
up a necessary store of visual knowledge. If the hand and eye co-ordination needed
for drawing from the motif has these two cognitive functions, then it follows that
they cannot be replaced by "passive" machine image handling, however powerful.
This is relevant to art education. A worrying possibility is that future machines,
designed to make drawing easier or even unnecessary, might stunt the growth in
students of visual capacities they need to acquire but do not understand.
The second question concerns the extent to which "sketching" from a motif
is purely perceptual. It is certainly often the case with fine artists at least (e.g
Turner, Bonnard) that drawing (or colouring) from nature is as much concerned
with the planning and manipulation of a future work as it is with information
gathering. In this case the sketch function of invention and experiment is as
important as it is when sketching is entirely "from imagination". The difference is
that, although unconstrained by nature, the sketch image can also draw upon and
be refreshed by the image upon the retina. Photographic evidence of the freedom
with which Constable and Cezanne (amongst others) manipulated the visual
structure of real landscape motifs for compositional purposes, is given by
Gombrich (1962). In this study, I will treat only this manipulative and visualising
way of working from the motif as true sketching.
1.6 Sketching in Context.
1.6.1 "Les Demoiselles d'Avignon": A Fine Art example.
Most of Picasso's best known works were painted in the studio. Much of
the composition of his very innovative painting was developed by direct
manipulation on the canvas. For example, Arnheim has documented in detail the
development of his "Guernica" on and off the canvas (Arnheim, 1962). However
Picasso, a brilliant draughtsman, also sketched copiously in preparation for major
paintings. This example has been chosen to illustrate the context of sketching in
fine art because of the historical importance of this particular painting and because
of the influence that Picasso himself has had on other 20th century artists. It is also
interesting because of the length of the time he devoted to sketching and planning
the painting (many months) and the brevity of the time that he spent in actually
executing it (a few days).
"Les Demoiselles d'Avignon" (Illustration XIII) was probably conceived by
Picasso in 1906, during a brief stay in Catalonia, as a large figure painting in a
new style. After months of work on drawings and studies in which he filled eight
sketch books (Glimcher, 1986) he painted the large eight foot square canvas in
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only a few days during the spring of 1907 (Penrose, 1962). The painting, with its
revolutionary way of portraying human figures, was influenced by Egyptian art,
Catalonian medieval frescoes and (almost certainly) by African sculpture. It is
important because it represents a turning point in the development of Western
painting, anticipating the later invention of cubism by Picasso and Braque. The fact
that Picasso spent so much longer thinking about and planning the painting, with
many small very private sketches, than in its execution is significant. It indicates
that, despite the sparse, skeletal nature of most of the sketches and the absence in
them of colour, Picasso must have used the sketches to develop a clear mental
picture of the painting before he lifted his paint brush. Thus the private, cognitive
nature of sketching and the need for a theory of mental representation to explain
them is confirmed. On one sketch-book, Picasso actually wrote in large letters "Je
suis le cahier" ("I am the sketch-book") painting around the printed word
"CAHIER" and writing decoratively the words "Je suis le above. Although the
meaning of this is ambiguous I think Picasso meant "My Mind is the Sketch-Book.
These marks are merely reminders and entry points to my private mental imagery".
As usual with surviving examples of an artist's private sketches, the exact
temporal sequence can only be guessed. However they can be arranged in a sort of
tree with early sketches showing the layout of rough but conventional figures
gradually being replaced by a clearer composition and figures closer to the final
inventive geometry. Many of the sketches are thoughts about the global
composition with signs of mind changing leading to back-tracking and a new
branch on the tree.(see Robert Rosenblum in Glimcher, 1986). For example an
early sketch shows a male figure entering from the left. Another one shows this
being crossed out. Later sketches show further simplifications. Interestingly, as the
sketches approach the final composition they become more skeletal and sparser.
Does this imply that as the mental idea becomes clearer the sketch need be less
detailed or that attention is becoming more specific? I will discuss later the grounds
for believing that sparse segregation of specific visual attributes may assist
selective thought. Other sketches show Picasso experimenting with the geometry of
individual figures including some which were used in the final painting. This
parallel series illustrates a point discussed in Chapter 2 that we cannot assume that
all visual composition passes in simple stages from global structure to local detail
the reverse process may occur as well. (See Illustrations XI & XII).
The sketches for "Les Demoiselles" illustrates a typical working practice of
composing by successive refinement in stages. The early conceptual stage is
followed by a long period of visual gestation, with hazy ideas about a new way of
representing form becoming gradually clarified by mental trial and error with many
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sketches as the chief tool. The final spatial composition and the colour structure
seems to have been worked out amazingly quickly on the canvas. It is of course
wrong to assume that all artists work in this way. There are probably as many
ways of inventing in Fine art as there are artists. In this example Picasso clearly
used his early sketches to think about form, with colour decisions being made
later. Turner's colour sketches on the other hand often indicate the reverse
sequence with colour thoughts initially preceding and over-riding those of form
(Illustration XXXV). This may relate to the individual way in which different
artists construct a painting. Picasso commonly drew before using colour (see
Clouzot's film "Le Mystere de Picasso"). Dufy often used the reverse process, that
of outlining the structure in washes of colour and of then later drawing on top to
define the form (Cogniat, 1970). However the method of at first thinking
separately about different elements of a complex composition, which are only later
manipulated into a unified whole, is common.
1.6.2 The "Yamazaki Serving Collection": A Design Example.
In Fine Art the somewhat haphazard and private nature of sketches reflects
the fact that both the motivation and the constraints on fine art are generated
privately and only represented implicitly in sketches. In design on the other hand
the constraints are often explicit and likely to reflect the fact that many of the
design constraints and part of the motivation are imposed externally by clients or
the market. Although a designer's sketches have similar inventive functions to
those of Fine artists, it is also likely they will be used to communicate design ideas
to clients or management. The "Yamazaki serving Collection" has been chosen to
illustrate sketching in this context. (Illustrations XIV, XV, XVI). It is a collection
of stainless steel tableware designed in 1981 for the Japanese manufacturing
company Yamazaki by the British designer Robert Welch (Illustration XVII,
Crawford, 1983 Welch, 1986). Yamazaki who manufacture stainless steel were
hoping to break into the American market, under their own name, for the first time
and they needed a launching range of table-ware. Traditionally, stainless steel has
only enjoyed prestige in the United States as a material for cutlery. Recently,
however the American public has come to see the virtues of a material which, if
highly polished in manufacture, can look like silver but which costs less and can go
in the dishwasher. Hence the brief set out by Katherine Vockings, the director of
Marketing at Yamazaki Tableware Inc. The designs had to be highly polished, to
look like silver. They had to be distinguished in appearance so that they could take
the place of traditional silverware on the American table. They also had to be
modern in feeling, for the market was believed to lie between the ages of twenty
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and forty. During the seventeen months when the Serving Collection was on his
drawing board, Robert Welch produced hundreds of drawings. This example is
appropriate because sketches played an especially important part in it. Welch
conceived the idea early on of using spiral flutes on his designs to capture the
brilliant reflections which he knew were a valuable characteristic of highly polished
steel. However it proved impossible to make models of the pieces in shiny metal to
assist his clients to judge their effectiveness. The drawings had to do all the work.
Only the cream jug and sugar bowl were modelled fully. Most of the other pieces
were accepted on the basis of drawings and a wooden model. At this stage Welch
was in competition with four other designers. The trays, being impossible to
simulate were accepted as technical drawings. Here we see sketches being used at
several overlapping stages of the design process. There is a crucial first statement
of the design problem and Welch's conceptually clear but visually vague ideas
about its solution. There then follow rather vague early sketches, covered with
written notes, which perfectly illustrate the need to preserve in the representation
multiple alternatives. Even a very precise design concept can have a one to many
mapping to its visual representations. As Welch clarified his ideas, the drawings
gradually became less ambiguous and were sometimes sent to the clients,
accompanied by wooden models. Finally two metal prototypes were made by hand,
by Welch's assistant, and a series of much more finished drawings sent to the
clients for approval. These show skilful use of ink, chalk and wash to suggest the
surface reflections so hard to model. (Illustration XVI) They are not "realistic" in
the computer graphics sense of the word but elicit in the viewer's "mind's eye"
vivid imagery of the finished product. This exploits, at a late stage, the same
imagery processes in the client's mind that the attributes of early sketches exploit
in the designer's mind. That they achieved their purpose is shown by Katherine
Vocking's reply
"Dear Robert,
I have had these lovely renderings on the wall since they arrived. However I
think you should have them back for your permanent file. They lent inspiration and
urgency and now that the project seems on target, they should go home."
Illustration XVII shows the final result.
1.7 Summary and Conclusions.
The word "sketch" has a meaning which is evolving. It refers to a natural
class of visual representations with an indeterminate boundary. Sketches can be
defined to be any visual representation used for modelling or thinking about
something else. Alternatively they can be defined as visual representations which
possess, and are valued for so doing, attributes of indeterminacy such as
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incompletion, untidyness and ambiguity. Such attributes demand a greater
cognitive contribution from the viewer than those of other types of representation.
Without claiming to define the sketch, this study will focus on two-dimensional,
viewer-centred images which belong also to two classes of visual representation,
namely representations that are used for visualising something else and which also
possess the attributes of indeterminacy outlined above. They are thus untidy or
indeterminate, views of imagined appearance, valued not for any intrinsic merit,
but for their usefulness in the creation of something else. This is regarded as a
crucially interesting subset of all the images, studies and models which are
sometimes called "sketches".
Two tasks with which we commonly associate sketching can be summarised
as
1 - Facilitating the invention and manipulation of imaginary objects
2 - Facilitating the imaginary manipulation of existing objects
It is the purpose of this study to examine how the special attributes of
sketches assist the mind to perform these overlapping functions. This is an essential
precondition for the design of improved sketching systems and media.
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2. SKETCH ATTRIBUTES AND THEIR INFLUENCE.
"Confused things rouse the mind to new inventions"
Leonardo da Vinci "Treatise on Painting"
2.1 Three Kinds of Indeterminacy.
Typical "privileged" attributes of sketches have already been listed in
Chapter 1. These can be summarised by saying that they are all types of visual
indeterminacy. It has been argued that indeterminacy is a necessary component of
visual experiment by successive refinement. However the indeterminacies are of
many different kinds and we need a system for classifying them which might help
to put constraints upon their meaning. However this is very difficult. The
indeterminacies of interest are sketch representations which have a one to many
relationship with the possible visual appearances of that object. This reflects an
artist's need to "vague" or, more precisely, to preserve the right not to limit
prematurely the number of visual options. Such indeterminacies are partial and
their limits are hard to define because their meanings are unpredictable and
dependent upon context. However their value to invention springs not only from
their unpredictability but also from the constraints upon them which successively
limit the range of their meanings. In skilled hands, the indeterminacy of a sketch is
a controlled indeterminacy with implicit constraints well understood by their user.
Pomerantz and Kubovy (1986) attempt to apply the theory of information to the
perceived components of pictures. According to these authors the information
carried by a component of a line drawing is inversely related to its predictability.
However this fact is of little value to a theory of the sketch unless we know the
dimensions of complexity of a sketch component and the number of represented
meanings to which it may refer. Pomerantz and Kubovy (1986) discuss the
difficulty of applying information theories of perception to a scribble. "For
example, it is impossible to assess the complexity (or information load) of a
scribble drawn on paper without knowing the dimensions along which the scribble
was free to vary, or in other words, what alternative scribbles might have occurred
instead of the one actually produced. Scribbles seem quite complex perceptually,
and indeed they are hard to encode, describe, copy and remember. Scribbles are
ill-defined patterns produced with very few constraints. Thus every scribble has a
large number of alternatives and so carries a high information load. But unless the
few constraints that do exist can be stated precisely, the exact information load (or
uncertainty) of scribbles is infinite, since with no constr ints an infinite number of
scribbles can be generated.". The constraints on scribbles in sketches are provided,
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only implicitly, by their context within the sketch and the mental "set" or visual
knowledge of the sketch user (see Chapter 4).
Black (1937) distinguishes three notions of partial indeterminacy which
have been discussed recently by Herbert Toth (1994) in relation to fuzzy set
theory. As a start (and it is only a start) it may be useful to see how Black's
distinctions apply to the indeterminate attributes of sketches.
2.1.1 Generality
According to Black (1937) this "is constituted by the application of a
symbol to a multiplicity of objects in the fields of reference." The meaning of a
generality is clear even though it has many exemplars. Written notes on sketches
have this kind of indeterminacy. It is a mistake to suppose that a verbal proposition
about a design is necessarily vague even though it has a one to many (often
infinite) mapping to its visual alternatives. Thus Millet's "green rushes" and
"stones set on top of each other" are not vague because they specify definable sets
(Illustration XXIII). They constrain visual form without specifying its fine detail,
as is necessary in the early stages of composition by successive refinement.
Generalising or categorising (I will argue) is an essential component of the visual
thought that accompanies the sketch, even though it is not necessarily explicitly
represented.
2.1.2 Ambiguity
This is "the association of a finite number of alternative meanings having
the same (phonetic) form" (Black 1937, Toth 1994). Visual ambiguity is most
useful in the early stages of composition when a limited number of alternatives are
possible. Some of the Leonardo type one pentimenti are of this kind. Multiple
contours elicit specific alternative images which may belong to different categories.
Robert Welch's fuzzy representation of the grooves of his serving dish (Illustration
XIV) were intended to represent two alternative types of profile. Here the
ambiguity is clarified by the added note. A much more drastic ambiguity of
category may also occur in both perception and visual invention (compare
Illustrations II and XXXI).
2.1.3 Vagueness
Black (1937) distinguishes Vagueness from Generality and Ambiguity as
follows. "It is characteristic of the vague symbol that there are no alternative
symbols in the language, and its vagueness is a feature of the boundary of its
extension, and is not constituted by the extension itself"  Examples of vagueness in
the sketch are missing or fuzzy contours, blurred or unspecified backgrounds,
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overflowing or unspecified colour and low resolution of form. A vague sketch
attribute by this definition is one in which the defining boundary of its possible
representational meanings is itself indeterminate. It is not enough that it should be
general or ambiguous.
2.1.4 Discussion
The Black definitions of Generality, Ambiguity and Vagueness were
conceived in relation to symbols and it is not clear that they are as meaningful
when applied to the depictive elements of sketches (see Chapter 3). It is clear that
the three type of indeterminacy are not mutually exclusive and that they frequently
occur in inseparable combination. Thus the sketch of a figure in illustration XXII
has generality as it specifies a class of figures, it has some ambiguity about the
possible positions of the limbs and there is much vagueness of visual detail.
However the distinction could be important in choosing the right questions to ask
about sketch functions. It is easy and probably common to confound the three
meanings in working practice as "Vagueness". For example when a designer
complains that a certain visualising system makes it "hard to be vague" (Scrivener
and Edmonds, 1980, Makirinne-Crofts et Al. 1992) we should ask does she/he
refer to the fact that
1. Visual Generality is hard to record
2. Ambiguity is hard to represent
3. Fuzzy visual extension (Vagueness) is difficult to represent ?
All three indeterminacies are important to sketching but have different
implications for the design of machine data structures and processes.
2.2 The Origins of Sketch Indeterminacies.
The indeterminacy in sketches may be manifested by under-representation
as in visually segregated, sparse or incomplete drawings. It may be manifested in
over-representation as with multiple contours (pentimenti), incompletely erased
alternative forms and densely untidy backgrounds. It may be manifested by tolerant
representation as when colour is allowed to overflow the linear boundaries of a
represented surface. As already suggested, such indeterminacy arises from the need
to preserve varying degrees of uncertainty in the early stages of visual
composition. However artists have not always tolerated the untidy indeterminacies
which are now so familiar in their working drawings and colour studies
(Gombrich, 1966a). Before the Renaissance, medieval European artists prided
themselves on the skill and tidy accuracy of their working drawings and studies. In
some respects the standards used to assess such studies were similar to those which
are implicit in the design of contemporary machine CAD systems. The anecdote of
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Giotto drawing a perfect circle at his first attempt when the king of Naples asked
for a token of his skill, is well known (Vasari, 1878). Today a child can emulate
Giotto using any cheap C.A.D. system. Whilst it is harder to draw by hand a
perfect circle than a wobbly, imperfect one it is the opposite for the programmer of
a CAD system. Perfect lines and geometric shapes are easily programmed because
they are plotted from a mathematical formula using the screen co-ordinates.
Imitating a hand drawn circle is much harder. Villard d'Honnecourt's "Swan"
given by Gombrich as an example of medieval drawing, has a clean and perfect
outline with no evidence of adjustment or error correction (Illustration I). Its
placing on a page with another unrelated drawing suggests indeed that it had the
function of a sketch, but unlike sketches by later artists there are no untidy breaks
or indeterminacies in the definition of the contour. This is also a quality
encouraged in computer "paint" systems as it is necessary for the application of
colour using the "flood-fill" facility. With this, as all CAD users know, the
slightest break in a contour, even a microscopic one, leads to the colour leaking
out and flooding the background. Thus whilst the tidy application of colour is
much easier by machine than by hand, it has as its prerequisite very tidy drawing.
The medieval concern for tidiness and perfection is related, Gombrich
implies, to cultural conventions which valued the formula of the pattern-book and
encouraged apprentices to learn by copying exactly the works of his masters
(Gombrich, 1952, 1966b). Drawing served a different purpose then, when the
artist was so much guided by tradition and pattern. This is further historical
confirmation of the a priori point deduced in Chapter 1 when discussing the need
for visual experiment. "Where invention is not expected and demanded of the
artist, emphasis must be on his facility in mastering the 'simile', the formula, and
fumbling will therefore be frowned upon" (Gombrich, 1952). It is remarkable how
rarely untidy corrections occur in pre-fifteenth century working drawings. As a
rule if a medieval artist had doubts about which formula to adopt for a composition
he preferred to begin afresh.
According to Gombrich it was Leonardo da Vinci, perhaps the most
influential draughtsman of all time, who first advocated the deliberate use of
indeterminacy in the sketch. Leonardo gave two reasons for recommending what
Gombrich argues is a revolutionary change in established workshop practice. The
first is explained by comparing the painter to the poet. "Now have you never
thought about how poets compose their verse ? They do not trouble to trace
beautiful letters nor do they mind crossing out several lines so as to make them
better." (Leonardo, 1270). Gombrich interprets Leonardo as meaning that painting
like poetry is a product of the mind and that to "lay stress on tidiness of drawing
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execution is just as philistine and unworthy as to judge a poet's draft by the beauty
of his handwriting". However, if this is really what Leonardo meant, (it is not
clear from the Treatise quotation) then it is an unconvincing point. A sceptic could
point out that there is a crucial difference between the draft of a poem and a
working drawing. The handwriting does not matter in the draft of a poem because
poetry is made of symbols (words) the meaning of which is unaffected by the style
of their execution. They need not even be visual, they can be read aloud, and
although a good reading is preferred to a bad one, the poem remains the same.
"Poetry concrete" excepted, no-one claims that the quality of a poem is affected by
the medium in which the words are presented. With a working drawing, however,
the execution is part of its form and can alter the meaning and quality of the
finished work it represents. This does not imply that poems cannot also be
"sketched" with many early crossings out and multiple alternatives forms.
However it is the words, found or suggested, which matter in the unfinished poem
not the handwriting. Nevertheless, there is a sense in which drawing resembles
poetry, which is what Leonardo really meant. Both drawing and poetry can have
an ambiguity or vagueness which is intrinsic to their purpose. This only becomes
clear in relation to the second and much more interesting reason for Leonardo's
advocacy of the indeterminate.
Leonardo's second and main point is that incompletion and indeterminacy
in a sketch can stimulate the mind to invent new visual form whilst preserving
multiple options for detail to be resolved later.
"For you must understand that if only you have hit off such an untidy
composition in accordance with the subject, it will give all the more satisfaction
when it is later clothed in the perfection appropriate to all its parts. I have even
seen shapes in clouds and on patchy walls which have roused me to beautiful
inventions of various things, and even though such shapes totally lack finish in any
single part they were yet not devoid of perfection in their gestures or other
movements." (Leonardo, 1270)
Leonardo is really making two points here, although they are
interdependent. These twin functions of indeterminacy, the arousal of visual
invention and the deliberate use of vagueness or incompletion to avoid premature
decisions are confused in Leonardo's Treatise, but they deserve to be
distinguished. The first is most useful in the early conceptual stages of visual
composition and is characterised by the unexpected, almost accidental relationship
between the indeterminate percept and the new meaning or visual idea it elicits. I
shall argue later (Chapter 7) that unexpected sensory experience has the function in
creative behaviour of shaking the visual brain out of over-learned habitual
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processing patterns. The second use of indeterminacy occurs in the post-conceptual
stages of visual creation. This is when the general content and structure of a
composition is decided but not the details of form and colour. The sketch user at
this stage frequently feels the need to represent aspects of his design or
composition incompletely or with varying tolerances, preserving some options
whilst determining others. The first use in sketching can be more general than the
second and discoveries made through it may find unexpected applications in other
works. There is a parallel here between a distinction implicit in Leonardo's
working methods and a distinction made today between two methods of computer
soft-ware design. In "top-down" design the objectives and global structure of an
individual program are defined early and the modules of which it is composed are
written later specifically to serve that initial structure. In "object-orientated" design
it may sometimes be useful to proceed "bottom-up" writing important modules or
routines early before global structure has been determined. If flexible and portable,
such modules can save work, and be used repeatedly in future programs, the
functions and structure of which is still unknown. By analogy artists and designers
usually work "top-down" on the composition of a specific commission. At other
times, though, they will work "bottom-up" exploring visual ideas later to be used
as components of works the structure and content of which is still unknown. See
for example Picasso's experimental sketches of figures used later in "The
Demoiselles d'Avignon" (Illustrations XI,XII).
In the first role suggested by Leonardo, indeterminacies help their user to
imagine completely new visual ideas, amplifying invention and originality. The
indeterminacies in this case may be random and have a purely accidental
resemblance to the invented image.
"I shall not refrain from including among these precepts a new and
speculative idea, which although it may seem trivial and almost laughable, is none
the less of great value in quickening the spirit of invention. It is this: that you look
at certain walls stained with damp or at stones of uneven colour. If you have to
invent some setting you will be able to see in these the likeness of divine
landscapes, adorned with mountains, ruins, rocks, woods, great plains, hills, and
valleys in great variety; and then again you will see there battles and strange
figures in violent action, expression of faces, and clothes, and an infinity of things
which you will be able to reduce to their complete and proper forms. In such walls
the same thing happens as in the sound of bells, in whose strokes you may find
every named word which you can imagine." (Leonardo 1270)
and "For confused things rouse the mind to new inventions" (ibid)
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Leonardo is careful to emphasise that this use of the indeterminate is no
easy trick for would be painters. It requires skill and it is necessary that the artist
should possess a detailed visual knowledge of the objects and parts which the
indeterminacies evoke. "But see to it that you first know all the parts of the things
you want to represent, be it those of animals, of landscapes, of rocks, plants or
others." It is clearly implied that the richness and quality of the visual invention
provoked by his indeterminacies is proportionate to the visual erudition and
experience of the user. "The mind of the painter" he wrote "should be like a mirror
which is filled with as many images as there are things placed before him" (from
his notebooks, MacCurdy 1938)
In the second role the indeterminacies are necessary to allow the
preservation of options during the gradual refinement of an idea already conceived.
"Sketch subject picture quickly and do not give the limbs too much finish:
indicate their position, which you can then work out at leisure"
and
You will first attempt in a drawing to give to the eye an indication of the
intention and invention which you first made in your imagination, then proceed to
take away and add till you are satisfied, and then let draped or nude models be
posed in the manner in which you have arranged the work; and see to it that they
accord in measurement and scale to perspective so that there should be nothing in
the work that is not in accord with reason and natural effects".
Here Leonardo is advocating the method of visual composition by gradual
refinement from global composition to local detail. He criticises artists who
prematurely give determinate outlines to picture parts for once such a painter has
given "a beautiful and graceful finish" to these parts he will think it damaging to
change them. "and these people do not deserve the slightest praise in their art".
As an example of Leonardo's use of indeterminacy to "rouse the mind to
new inventions" Gombrich (1966a) gives a Study for the Battle of Anghiari, an
amazing confused sketch of men fighting on horse-back (Illustration II upper).
Gombrich believes this may have inspired the completely different study, for
Neptune (Illustration II lower). The Neptune study is known to have originated
from the time when Leonardo was working on the Battle of Anghiari.
There are many, well known examples of Leonardo's drawings where
deliberate pentimenti (multiple contours, confused smudges etc) are used to allow
varying positions of limbs or picture parts or to suggest movement. However
Gombrich quotes one extreme example which although it is borderline, belongs to
the second category of indeterminacy for refinement, rather than the first (my
claim not Gombrich's). This is the "Study for the Virgin with St Anne" which is so
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dense with multiple pentimenti that the central region is completely black
(Illustration III). Yet Leonardo knew his "parts" so well that he could visualise the
multiple arrangements of limbs implicit in this confusion and select from them as a
tracing on the reverse side of this drawing shows.
The distinction between these two uses of indeterminacy is only one of
degree, for both use indeterminacy to suggest multiple alternatives, although at
different stages in the creative process. Also implied but not explained in
Leonardo's recommendations is the inverse notion that early, visual detail and
finish may actually impede invention by making it harder to visualise the effects of
alterations and changes.
Leonardo's fame and his influence over the working methods of Western
artists was widespread. Botticelli and Raphael are thought to have altered their
sketching style under his influence. Where the preparatory sketches of influential
artists have survived in bulk, (e.g. by Rubens, Rembrandt, Goya, Delacroix and
Turner's colour sketches) they show all the indeterminacies Leonardo advocated
and more. Mostly the indeterminacies are of the second type used for development
rather than conception. Leonardo's influence cannot usually be proved, and may in
any case have been indirect. It is also possible that the humanist idea of "progress"
in art (Gombrich 1966b) and the rising interest in visual experiment, led many
artists to discover these attributes for themselves. Compare Rembrandt's study for
the "Rape of Ganymede" with the finished painting (Illustrations XX & XXI).
Leonardo would surely have approved.
There exists in addition a minor tradition in painting where the influence of
Leonardo's first type of indeterminacy is also used. According to Kenneth
Clark(Clark, K. 1939), Goya used the method of looking at random stains to
furbish his imagination. It is easy to believe this in relation to the late paintings
though I have found no further evidence. The superb sketch of a crowd scene
(Illustration XXII) has all the hall marks of deliberate Leonardo confusion. One
perceives in this with the "mind's eye" a number of figures in seething movement,
but in exactly how many and in what positions and stances is different each time
the drawing is examined.
The use of this method was made explicit in a system for composing
landscapes invented between 1780 and 1785 by the English artist Alexander
Cozens who published his method in a book (Cozens, 1785). Cozens belonged to
the classical tradition of artificial but realistic composed landscapes. In his work
and that of his son the tradition of Claude, Rosa and Gaspard Poussin was
transformed into an English mode. Although Cozens is usually regarded as only a
minor artist his work influenced both Constable and Turner. Constable actually
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copied sketches from Cozens in his note-books (Marqusee, 1977). These artists
influenced in turn the French Impressionists and hence the mainstream of European
painting.
Cozens described the accidental discovery which lead to his "blotting"
technique in these words -
"Reflecting one day in company with a pupil of great natural capacity, on
original composition of landscape in contradistinction to copying, I lamented the
want of a mechanical method sufficiently expeditious and extensive to draw forth
the ideas of an ingenious mind disposed to the art of designing. At this instant
happening to have a piece of soiled paper under my hand, and casting my eyes on
it slightly, I sketched something like a landscape on it, with a pencil, in order to
catch some hint which might be improved into a rule. The stains, though extremely
faint, appeared upon revival to have influenced me, insensibly, in expressing the
general appearance of a landscape".
Having found that this helped his student greatly, Cozens developed his
"blotting" technique into a systematic set of rules for inventing landscapes. The
starting "blots" were not completely random. In his book he recommends the
reader to "Possess your mind strongly with a subject" and then with black ink and a
paint-brush to "make all possible variety of shapes and marks upon your paper,
combining the disposition of the whole to the general subject in mind". A piece of
tracing paper is then placed over these marks and a landscape sketched out with a
fine pencil using the blots to stimulate the imagination (Illustration IV). Cozens
claimed that he discovered the method, before he was informed that "something of
the same kind had been mentioned by Leonardo da Vinci" in his Treatise on
Painting. However "it may easily be imagined how eagerly 1 consulted the book"
which tended to "confirm my own opinions". It is clear that he had read the
Leonardo passages carefully before writing up the method.
Another more recent artist who explicitly used and was influenced by the
Leonardo type 1 indeterminacy was Max Ernst. In a way of working he called the
"frottage" Ernst used artificially generated marks to suggest figurative and often
fantastic imagery (Spies, 1968). He commonly started by making pencil rubbings
of all manner of patterns and textures obtained at chance from the objects around
him. He then developed these according to the imagery they suggested (Illustration
V). Ernst's own account of his discovery of this method is revealing -
"On August 10th 1925, 1 was seized with an unbearable visual need to
discover the technical means whereby this theory of Leonardo 's is clearly worked
out in practice. It began with a ... childhood memory, in the course of which an
imitation mahogany board in my bed played the part of optical provocateur in a
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daydream. On a rainy evening, I found myself in a hotel on the French coast when
I was gripped by an obsession that made me stare excitedly at the deeply grooved
cracks in the floorboards. I decided to yield to the symbolism of this obsession. To
sustain my potential for meditation and hallucination, I made a series of sketches
on the floorboards by arbitrarily placing a few sheets of paper on them and then
began to rub them with a black pencil. When I closely scrutinized the sketches thus
made - 'the darker areas and other, delicately lit half-dark areas' - I was amazed
at the sudden intensification of my visionary capabilities and the hallucinatory
result of the contrasting pictures." (Spies, 1968)
The discovery that certain types of visual indeterminacy can have such a
powerful visionary effect is not due to solely to the influence of Leonardo's genius.
A similar technique was discovered and used earlier and independently in the East.
The Eleventh century Chinese artist Sung Ti is reported to have criticised
the paintings of a colleague for their "want of natural effect" and recommended the
following course: "You should choose an old tumbledown wall and throw over it a
piece of white silk. Then morning and evening you should gaze at it until, at
length, you can see the ruins through the silk, its prominences, its levels, its
zigzags, and its cleavages, storing then up in your mind and fixing them in your
eyes. Make the prominences your mountains, the lower part your water, the
hollows your ravines, the cracks your streams, the lighter parts your nearest
points, the darker parts your most distant points. Get all these thoroughly into you,
and soon you will see men, birds, plants and trees, flying and moving among them.
You may then ply your brush according to your fancy and the result will be of
heaven not of men." (Quoted by Marqusee, 1977).
In an excellent analysis of the nature of drawing technique, Philip Rawson
(1969) describes the "blob" (or splash) as intrinsically representing the element of
hazard in drawing. Some styles he writes, exile hazard and the blob completely.
Others cultivate it deliberately. The "p0-mo" technique of the Chinese ink-painters
of the Sung dynasty' and later Chinese and Japanese periods developed the use of
"spilled ink" as a deliberate stimulus to invention. The Sesshu, "spilled ink"
landscape (Rawson, 1969) goes further than the Cozens blot since indeterminacies
remain as the "beholder's share" in the finished drawing, whilst Cozens make its
clear that his blot indeterminacies are strictly for the artist's use only.
2.3 Indeterminacies in Fine Art; The Beholder's Share.
The Sesshu illustration alluded to above introduces a third role for
indeterminacy which is not limited to the sketch. The functions of indeterminacy in
finished art are not identical to those in sketches. However they are relevant to the
discussion of sketch practice because attributes of painting which we now take for
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granted have their origins in the sketch and have in turn influenced sketch style.
Without understanding this function, the sceptical computer system designer might
suggest that although like most of us, artists may see faces and figures in the stains
on walls or the dying embers of a fire these images are usually too vague and
limited to find applications in design. The deliberate use of such a stimulus is the
activity of an unrepresentative minority of artists who have unusual powers of
vivid hallucinatory, imagery. She or he might further argue that an advantage of
modern computer aids to visualising over traditional media, is that it offers the
potential to replace the user's own vague and often weak visualising powers with
vivid and detailed source imagery, drawn perhaps with some unexpected
randomness from a large pictorial data-base. Will not such systems when fully
developed with "photographic realism" become a powerful alternative aid to visual
invention making the ancient, splash, blot and scribble completely out of date?
Perhaps, but it would be very foolish to attempt to design such invention eliciting
systems without first considering the role that indeterminacy has traditionally
played in figurative art and without investigating the meaningfulness of the
"photographic realism" concept. For the history of figurative art, until photography
at least, is also the history of the attempt to create "realistic" illusory
representations of visual experience. This shows, (Gombrich 1962), that acceptable
realism in man-made images relies heavily both upon cultural convention and the
beholder's tacit knowledge of the visual world and the objects represented.
Gradually, from the post Leonardo Renaissance onwards, forms of visual
suggestion by indeterminacy became admired and absorbed into the mainstream of
European painting. Vasari, commenting on the later "broken colour" style of
Titian, noted how crudely daubed and separated brush-strokes were executed in
such a way that "one sees nothing at close quarters, though they look petfect from
a distance." (Vasari, 1878). This became an admired ability of many later painters
of quality. Velasquez for example used especially long brushes to keep his distance
from the canvas. His biographer, Palomino, remarked that his portraits "are
unintelligible from close quarters but miraculous seen from afar" (quoted in
Gombrich 1962). In the hands of such artists such controlled use of indeterminacy
was an intuitive way of achieving a kind of realism which is impossible by greater
attention to fine detail. It works, as was realised by the time of Reynolds
(Gombrich, 1962), because the viewer unconsciously superimposes memory
images of the subject over the brush-marks provided he is far enough away not to
see their boundaries clearly. Thus portraits painted in this manner would seem to
have an illusory memory based likeness to relatives of the sitter and probably
looked slightly different to each viewer.
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However it was not until Impressionism that the dividing line between the
privileged indeterminacies of working sketches and finished paintings was truly
blurred. The vigorous landscapes painted before the motif by Constable and now
much admired for their own sake, were because of their rough untidyness, intended
only as coloured sketches to be finished in full detail in the studio. They were not
intended for sale and were valued at only a few pounds after his death. (Compare
the sketch for the "Hay Wain " now in the Victoria and Albert Museum with the
finished painting). It appears to have been Manet who initiated the Impressionist
doctrine that "a picture must be frankly stamped with the spontaneous character of
a sketch" (Wilenski, 1944). The Impressionist insistence on painting directly from
the motif and the high value they placed on an effect of accident in the composition
also helps to blur the distinction between the sketch and the finished painting. It is
due mainly to the Impressionists that, as noted in Chapter 1, the meaning of the
word "sketch" is no longer clearly definable in terms of either its function or its
attributes. According to Gombrich (1962) the beholder's share was increased in
Impressionism because the viewer must from a distance perceive the suggested
form and light "across" and despite the brush-marks whereas the brush-marks of
the late Titian or Velasquez assist the viewers imagery by their direction and
shape. Since Impressionism, this type of tacit dependence on the viewer has been
taken for granted in much figurative and semi-figurative painting. A painting by
Frank Auerbach (Circa 1960) in the Tate Gallery viewed from a few feet is simply
a meaningless abstraction of deeply furrowed white, grey and pinkish brown paint
piled 1 - 2 inches thick. Seen from a distance it becomes a reclining nude with
strange solidity and volume. A supreme example of such controlled exploitation of
the beholder's imagery is the Monet "IVympheas" paintings in the Orangerie, Paris.
If viewed close to one sees in these thin washes of graduated colour superimposed
with rough and tangled or widely separated brush-marks of more saturated colour.
From further away one experiences strong illusions (hallucinations?) of water
rippling and of light being reflected on water whilst at the same time of looking
through water into another world.
The Impressionists sought total objectivity and the innocent eye in their
attempts to capture fleeting patterns of light upon the retina. This claim, remarks
Gombrich, is at variance with the subjective visual knowledge on which their
paintings rely. But surely there is no paradox here. In searching for a true
description of visual experience, the Impressionists discovered that it was only by
combining a selective objectivity with the indeterminacy of nature, that the artist
can evoke the viewer's unconscious memory images. It is the mysterious
combination of the beholder's subjective visual memory and a skilfully constructed
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objective percept, which creates the "impression" of changing, reality in
"Impressionism".
520 years after the publication of Leonardo's "Treatise" we still do not have
a detailed or convincing theory to explain the evocative and "hallucinatory" effects
of visual indeterminacy which Leonardo recommended as an aid to invention and
which has been used to such effect in art. In his "Art and Illusion" Gombrich
(1962) refers to the theory of "projection" which was applied by psychologists
when they used, for example, the Rorschach ink-blot test as an aid to
psychoanalysis (Rorschach, 1942). In this diagnostic tool, patients are asked to
inspect a standard set of bilaterally symmetrical abstract blots and to say what they
suggest or resemble. It is hoped that their responses will reveal to the analyst
unconsciously repressed sources of their anxiety or neurosis. However the
projection "theory" with its implication that a visual memory is somehow projected
onto the perceived blot explains little that Leonardo could not have surmised
himself. It is obvious of course that the "projection" cannot be taken literally, since
conscious percepts are the subjective experience of neural activity in the visual
cortex of the brain. Crucial questions remain about how this supposed combined
percept and projected memory is represented in the mind and what processes
generate and use it. For example
Why and how does a confused indeterminacy elicit such "projected"
imagery more strongly than a blank sheet of paper for example or closed eyes?
How is projected imagery used in the generation and refining of visual
ideas?
Does its use require special and rare talent or can it be developed by
anyone?
Should we be educating our students in its use, and if so how?
Lastly, should not the users labile and often vague imagery be
advantageously replaced by the "virtual reality" of future machine systems?
It is clear that these and other questions central to the design of improved
visualising aids are questions about human cognitive capacity and the possible
processes of visual thought available to artists and designers. They will be
addressed later.
2.4 Photography, Realism and the Sketch.
The invention of photography by Niepce and Daguerre in France and by
Talbot in Britain, during the 1820s was officially announced at the French
Academy of Sciences in 1839. Its influence on the history of art has been well
documented by Aaron Scharf (1968). At the time that its possibilities first became
familiar to artists one of the most fashionable styles of painting resembled
2. Sketch Attributes and their Influence. 	 59
photography in some respects. In France between 1850 and 1859 a school of
"Realism" advocated extreme pictorial objectivity of the kind to which the camera
seems ideally suited. Some artists saw the camera, with its capacity to capture
quickly fine nuances of tonality and minute details of surface texture, as a
dangerous competitor. Others, who saw their livelihoods threatened including
many of the miniature portrait painters turned to photography themselves. The
more far-sighted however saw photography as a liberating tool which could be
used discretely (and often secretly) to broaden the information gathering function
of the sketch. Courbet is known to have used photography extensively though he
very rarely copied directly from them. His "Burial at Ornans" scandalized visitors
to the 1850-51 Salon who saw in it the objective "ugliness" of the daguerreotype.
The Fashionable "realism" was the false realism of Classical Idealism where
behind the illusion of life-like realism lies the artist's careful filtering out of all un-
wanted aspects of natural motifs.
So does the comparison with very objective painting confirm the idea that
the photograph represents the pinnacle of representational realism? This certainly
seems to be the implication behind the contemporary use of the term "photographic
realism" as a desirable goal for computer graphics. The answer to this question
depends upon whether the term realism means true to the image as a pattern of
light focused upon the retina or true to the image as it is consciously experienced in
perception. However as was understood before the turn of the century, by science
(Hering, 1964 (original 1874), Chevreul, 1839, Helmholtz, 1910 (original 1870))
and by perceptive artists (Scharf, 1968) that for both form and colour these two are
quite different. Thus we are not normally conscious of the extreme effects of
perspective on the retina (a halving of size with a doubling of distance). Before we
are aware of "seeing", the brain compensates for the resulting distortion of size,
shape and parallelism, by inferring the causative changes of distance and
orientation and constructing for conscious experience a scene in which objects
preserve their constant shape and colour (e.g. Gregory 1970, Zusne 1970, Beck
1972, Rock 1983 see also this text 4.2.1). A photograph records the transitory and
unprocessed mosaic of luminances as they are focused on a human retina. However
unlike the image on the retina, most photographs are not viewed with the eye from
the single unique camera position which is the only position from which the
perspective is optically "correct" (i.e resembles that on the retina). This can result
in the most "unreal" distortion. The problem of the dependence of perspective on
exact eye position was understood in the Renaissance When Brunelleschi first
demonstrated the new perspective, he arranged for the picture to be viewed
reflected in a mirror, as seen from behind the surface it was painted on, through a
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hole drilled in the vanishing point, thus ensuring that the eye position was correct
and could not move (Vasari, 1878). Computer "Virtual reality" systems update the
Brunelleschi demonstration with simulated movement and stereoscopy. In 1892
after half a century of debate on the causes of photographic aberrations of
perspective, Streintz (Scharf, 1968) published three photographs taken of the same
street scene and landscape from the same position using three different lenses of 6,
25 and 73 degrees angle of vision. The three perspective views (as Alberti and
Brunelleschi could have predicted four centuries earlier) are completely different.
The closer the effective foreground of the motif to the lens the greater will be the
exaggeration of perspective scale in the photograph. This type of exaggeration,
impossible with the eye, can be manipulated for visual effect in the cinema. Both
Italian Renaissance painting (White, 1987) and modern Virtual Reality (Gray,
1992) present an artificial perspective by calculation. The photograph records
perspective directly from the physical world. This is a distinction too easily
forgotten in machine assisted imagery.
Even "objective" painting from the motif preserves, in subtle ways, the
"conclusions" of tacit interpretation and recognition processes within the brain of
the user. Delacroix, who used photographs extensively as source material,
understood this intuitively. Scharf demonstrates that when one compares the posed
photograph of a nude which Delacroix used for his "Odalisque" of 1857 the painter
deliberately elongated the fore-shortened thighs and other aspects of the
photographic pose which would have been unbelievable in the painting (Scharf,
1974. illustrations on page 124) Delacroix wrote in his essay of 1850 "The
daguerreotype is only a reflection of the real, only a copy, in some ways false just
because it is so exact... The eye corrects" (Scharf, 1974 page 120)
There is a sense in which the photograph is more real than the painting,
simply because its viewer knows or presumes that it has been generated by direct
uninterpreted contact with the light reflected from its motif (see Chapter 3). The
subtleties of tonality and surface texture in a good photograph are often valued, in
a good photograph because they are, like nature, so unpredictable and
unimaginable. This type of objective realism, "optical" realism, was close to some
of the stated objectives of the Impressionists. Because the light pattern of the
photograph is so detailed a record of the light reflect from real objects, it appears
at first sight to have attributes completely incompatible with the sparse or confused
and subjective indeterminacies of the sketch. It is therefore rather surprising to find
that indeterminacy and incompletion in early photographs were important
influences on Impressionism and hence indirectly on modern painting. These
attributes were doubtless regarded as short-comings of early photography.
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Nevertheless, the history of their influence shows that photography can have
cognitive functions in the visual arts which has nothing to do with objective
realism, but which are complementary to those of the sketch.
The first and most obvious indeterminacy in early photographs is that like
drawings and pen and wash sketches they are monochrome. 1 will argue later that
separation of tonality from chromaticity make its easier to attend to, to perceive
and to appreciate tonal relationships. In fact, until the invention of the
panchromatic film at the beginning of the twentieth century, the relative tonality of
different colours was badly distorted. Colours of the longer wavelengths (red and
yellow) were rendered too dark in relation to blue and violet. Contrasts of tonality
in the finished print, often had to be artificially manipulated during development
(another source of unreality). Despite these known indeterminacies, the subtle
tonality which is so much easier to perceive in a monochrome photograph had a
direct influence on the method of describing form in painting by directly applied
tonal relationships. Manet, a pioneer of Impressionism used this method
impressively and Scharf (1974, pages 62-75) has documented in detail how this
technique was influenced by photographs. Without photography Manet's famous
"Execution of the Emperor Maximilian" would have been impossible. Yet Manet
rarely copied directly from photographs. Rather he used them as source material
just as pre-photography history painters used their sketches from models. Thus the
use of photography for tonal information is using the camera not for its realism,
but for its image processing qualities as an aid to visual awareness and tonal
decision taking, a point that I shall develop later. Wilenski (1945) has made a
vitriolic attack on 19th century "photographic" tonal painters including, amongst
others John Singer Sargent, whom he accused of mindless duplication of many of
the tonal faults of photography. He justified this in part by his emphasis of the
need in figurative painting for perceptual intelligence in the description of form as
opposed to the mechanical transcription of tone values as if by an eye without a
brain. Wilenski singled out for example the merging of two visual objects into one
which sometimes occurs by the "blind" translation of photographic tone into paint.
His criticisms seem absurd if applied to Manet's discriminating use of photography
as a source of otherwise unavailable visual information. What would he have
thought however, of the "blind" simulation of surface reflection and shadow used
by contemporary machine solid modelling systems?
Blurring was another type of indeterminacy caused by technical deficiency
in the early photograph which gave it an affinity with the sketch in stimulating
invention in painting. There were two sources of blurring in the early
daguerreotypes and calotypes. One, known as "halation" occurred on glass plates
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when light penetrating the emulsion strikes the uncoated side of the glass and is
reflected back through the emulsion from behind. The other is caused by
movement which was especially obvious in the early days before the development
of fast "instantaneous" film. Corot's famous blurred trees seem to have originated
in this way (Illustration XXXIII). He is known to have been friends with a
photographer, Adalbert Cuvelier. Scharf (1974, page 93) illustrates a blurred
landscape signed "A.C. 1852" which is attributed to Cuvelier and has a striking
similarity to Corot's painting of that time. At his death over 300 photographic
plates were found in Corot's studio. Though these are now lost, Scharf provides
convincing evidence of the role that photography played in the development of his
characteristic style which anticipates Impressionism. Photographic blurring of
objects caused by movement generated other forms of visual invention. Early
photographs of street scenes are strangely empty, the figures do not register. Later
they appear as strange blurs or smudges (Scharf, 1974). The many pedestrian
figures and their movement which Impressionist street scenes conjured into the
mind's eye are represented similarly with skilful and sparse blurred marks. A good
example is Pissarro's "Place du Theatre Francais in the Rain" painted in 1898 and
now in the Minneapolis Institute of Arts (Rewald, 1991 page 121). Such figurative
suggestion is so familiar in painting today that it is easy to forget that it was a new
discovery which Pissarro's contemporaries found hard to accept.
The influence of photography on 20th century painting has been widespread
and profound. It is natural that a painter such as Richard Hamilton, who is so
interested in the popular imagery of our culture and whose work seems to comment
on the nature of representation should remark that "I sketch with photographs"
(BBC 2 "Painting with Light" 1986). He now works extensively with Quantel's
electronic image handling system, "Paint Box" collaging together popular icons in
unexpected ways. His work and the work of many other painters in the history of
figurative art demonstrates the value of photography to complement, in often
unexpected ways, the indeterminacies of traditional sketches as aids to visual
thought. There is no doubt that the power and convenience of photography and its
derivatives, film and television, have caused it to have a pervading influence on the
way we perceive and think visually. Despite this, history suggests that
photographic attributes may not provide good criteria for assessing the "realism" of
a representation. Faith in the veracity of a photograph depends upon the fact that it
is contingent upon the light reflected by the objects it represents. If this is its claim
to "realism", then the term "photographic realism" applied to machine processed
images which lack such contingency is a contradiction. Whether it is justified to
regard real photographs as sketches depends upon their unique attributes and how
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they are used. It is the rather unexpected use of their indeterminacies rather than
their "realism" which gives them a functional affinity to sketches as defined here.
2.5 Sketches and Written Notes.
Sketches by both fine artists and designer frequently contain written notes.
At the early stages of visual composition there are certain to be many ideas about
the projected work which are either too vague or too general to be given visual
form. Sometimes the notes are scribbled on a note-book page opposite the sketch,
sometimes they are written on the sketch itself as labels or attached to a sketch part
with an arrow.
An obvious use of the note is to provide information which cannot be
represented in the sketch medium. Painters sketch drawings are often accompanied
with notes about colour. Many of Turner's notebooks in the British Museum
consist of tiny spidery outline drawings accompanied with such colour notes
(Wilkinson, 1975). The drawing by Millet "A Heath" (Illustration XXIII),
obviously a study for a projected painting, contains the following notes written on
the parts to which they refer:-
"cleared patches, tillage, rye on the heights, roughly cleared land, most of
the stones set on top of each other, broom, green rushes" and below :- " cleared
and ploughed land having a thoroughly Celtic look".
But such notes are not simply signs of the limitations of the medium. They
are often firm propositions which limit without fixing the scope of multiple
options. Colour notes such as "pale green" refer to many hundreds of possible
colours. To represent the colour at that stage with paint might force an unwanted
premature decision. It can also be assumed that phrases such as "Celtic look"
conjured multiple images in Millet's mind which he could project upon the sketch.
Not surprisingly written notes are commoner in sketches by designers than
by fine artists. Designers usually have many verbally represented constraints and
they must often communicate their own pre-visual concepts to clients and
colleagues. Thus sketches by Fashion designers typically contain notes about
fabrics and about detail for pattern cutters. Illustration IX shows Karl Lagerfeld
thinking to himself both verbally and visually at the same time. Early sketches by
Robert Welch for stainless steel table ware, (Illustration XIV) contain notes about
specific alternative structures (such as the profile of surface grooves) and also
annotated diagrams about manufacture.
It must be admitted that artists sketches often contain no writing at all.
However it seems likely that in the early stages of co riposition there are always,
non-visually implemented thoughts about the projected work which are associated
in memory with the sketch and which have a similar function to written notes.
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Thus Vincent Van Gogh describing an unfinished painting to Theo wrote "Another
canvas of size 30. This time its just simply my bedroom, only here colour is to do
everything, and giving by its simplification a grander style to things, is to be
suggestive here of rest or of sleep in general." (Roskill, 1963). There is no need to
record such private descriptions on the sketch as they are easily remembered
concepts, instantly aroused in the artist's mind by the sketches they generate.
Discussion of the function of written notes is continued in Chapter 3.
2.6 On Being the Right Size.
One of the most familiar forms of indeterminacy in the sketch is uncertainty
of visual structure due to the fact that the sketch is usually much smaller than the
object that it represents. Even when the size of the represented object is specified
(as in a Mondrian sketch with labelled measurements, see Stoichita, 1979 page 17),
generality and vagueness are introduced by the fact that the difference of scale
between representation and represented introduces the "problem of the model".
The intimate dependence of functional structure upon size is well illustrated in
biology where the relation between size and structure is a fundamental principle of
evolution (Haldane 1928),. If an organism changes its size but not its form, its
volume increases with the cube of its height whilst its surface area only increases
with the square. As larger species evolved, drastic increases in complexity were
necessary to increase the ratio of surface area to volume in all organs to preserve
their function. An analogous but visual relationship exists in art and design. In
three dimensions, if a designed object doubles in size the ratio between its volume
and its surface also doubles, with visible consequences. It looks heavier and less
tactile. In two dimensions the length of lines and associated edges of shapes
increase in proportion to the width of a drawing, whilst the area of the shapes and
their associated colour increases with the square of this width. Increasing the area
of colour or tone in relation to the edges where two or more colours make contact
must be expected to have dramatic effects upon colour appearance. The importance
of a reproduced drawing being the correct size in order to perceive and understand
it is emphasised by Rawson (1969).
Understanding this fact intuitively, artists sometimes insist on sketching to
the scale of the represented work. Thus mural painters commonly sketch to scale
on the wall surface itself, in a labile medium which is painted over later. Matisse
prepared full scale sketches for his decorations of the chapel at Vence (Diehl,
1958). He drew outlines with charcoal on the end of a pole to preserve a correct
view point. However in the early stages, artists and designers are mostly content to
make sketches smaller than the works they represent. For visualising large objects
the requirement of fast and easy manipulation is incompatible with size equivalence
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for both existing traditional and computer media and is presumably more
important. It can be noted however that small sketches, produced early in the
compositional process, usually differ in important ways from later, more detailed
visualising aids. The very indeterminacies and omissions of detail already noted
may have size indeterminacy functions. The artist may intuitively recognise that,
for example, edge to area relationships can be adjusted by successively adding
more colour edges/detail as sketch size approaches reality. Some sketches have an
implicit built in scale based on a well known and familiar scale of the object
represented. However this is not the case for unfamiliar or non-figurative design. It
may even be the case that the scale of the finished work is itself indeterminate. The
indeterminate represented size of a sketch frame may facilitate the use of "the
mind's eye" to experimentally imagine scale changes, or to predict the
consequences of scale correction. Fine artists can often make later real size related
surface to volume or edge to area adjustments by direct manipulation on canvas or
clay. Where this is not possible, as in the design of manufactured objects, full scale
models may be used. The manipulation of "toile" garments by Fashion designers
and the use of full scale wax models by car body designers are well known
examples. The fast manipulation of detailed, full scale, late stage representations is
a possible objective for "Virtual Reality" systems. Detailed understanding of the
visual consequences of size changes as an idea progresses from sketch to model
and to full scale prototype will depend upon the medium and type of design.
The whole question of size in relation to sketch function is given further
significance in Chapter 6.9 in relation to the way a sketch may bias the way we
perceive and attend to object structure.
2.7 Discussion and Conclusions. •
This chapter is an attempt to review what is already known or can be
deduced from what is already known about the privileged attributes of sketches. I
have introduced Black's distinction between three kinds of indeterminacy -
generality, ambiguity and vagueness in the hope that it will prove applicable to
sketches and sketching systems.
The historical origins of sketch indeterminacies in Western Art can be
traced partly at least to Leonardo's "Treatise on Painting" and his famous
comments on the value of visual "confusion". However the fact that a similar
parallel tradition exists in Eastern art of also using perceptual indeterminacy to
stimulate invention, is evidence that the use of such deliberate untidyness is not
only an invented tradition of style but also a repeatable discovery made
independently by several artists. This is consistent with Cozens' claim that he made
the "discovery" of his blotting method before he had read Leonardo.
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I have claimed that Leonardo's sketch indeterminacies are of two kinds,
those used for "rousing the mind to new inventions" (type a) and those used for
refining an existing idea (type b). Applying Black's distinctions, the Leonardo type
a indeterminacies are clearly ambiguous since they can evoke a radically new idea.
The type b indeterminacies (in the position of a limb for example (Illustration
XXVIII)) are perhaps better classified as indeterminacies due to generality. A
degree of vagueness must be assumed to exist in both types of indeterminacy. How
much vagueness a sketch component possesses however, would be expected to vary
greatly with its context and its meaning to the sketch user. It remains for future
researchers to determine to what extent these three aspects of indeterminacy in the
sketch are separable in practice.
In order to better understand the nature of such indeterminacies it is useful
to explore the way in which they have, since impressionism become accepted and
admired in Fine Art. Attributes originally used in preparatory studies to enhance
the artist's own invention were progressively transferred to finished works to
enhance the "beholder's share" by similar mechanisms. Impressionist and post-
impressionist figurative painting is a useful source of information for sketch
theory. The role that deficiencies in early photography may have played in this
process proves that photography was not used only for enhancing figurative
realism.
In documenting briefly the frequent occurrence of written notes on
sketches, I am preparing the ground for the translation function of the sketch which
will be discussed in Chapter 3. Clearly written notes are frequently used to record
an indeterminacy of the generality type. Such notes are not necessarily vague but
they may simply stand for many visual options which the sketch user wishes to
preserve.
One further type of indeterminacy of sketch representation - that of size - is
rarely discussed. Here I have drawn a parallel with the influence of size upon
biological structure which I have used in teaching and which I am convinced from
personal experience is relevant to the visual arts. However the physical effects of
size (such as the ratio of shape area to shape edge) are complicated by the way a
sketch is perceived and attended to. This problem is addressed again in Chapter 6.
In conclusion, the history of working practice in the arts shows that many,
but not all, types of indeterminate sketch attribute have had cognitive functions
valued, but not well understood, by their artist users. The theory of mental
"projection" quoted by Gombrich (1962) is incomplete and now dated. It is now
time to explore the possibility of using contemporary theories of cognition and
Recording Ideas LCommunicating Ideas
Functions of the Sketch
AMPLIFYING VISUAL
THOUGHT AND INVENTION
Function 1 Function 2 Function 3 Function 4 Function 3
Translation
of Type
(Chapter 3)
Perceptual
Retrieval
(Chapter 4)
Supporting
Imagery
(Chapter 5)
Selective
Attention
(Chapter 6)
Monitoring
Thoughts
(Chapter 7)
DIAGRAM I
All the five hypothetical functions of the sketch are ways of amplifying visual thought
and invention. However they are interdependent in other ways that are not yet clear.
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neuroscience to explain in more detail how sketch attributes might assist visual
thought.
Diagram I outlines the functions of the sketch as a hierarchy, in which the
primary function, "Amplifying Visual Thought and Invention" will be treated as
comprising five component functions presented as hypotheses in the next five
chapters. How these five hypothetical functions may be inter-connected is
discussed in Chapter 8. The secondary functions of the sketch, "Recording Ideas"
and "Communicating Ideas" although mentioned in Chapter 1 are outside the scope
of this thesis.
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3. SKETCHES AND REPRESENTATIONAL TYPE.
"Good representation then is a release from intellectual bondage. " Jerome Bruner
(1979)
3.1 Introduction
Hypothesis One states that "Sketches have attributes which make them
intermediate between depictive (picture-like) and descriptive (language-like)
representations. Such attributes are used to facilitate the bidirectional translation
between descriptive and depictive modes of thought."
In order to think about complex or imaginary objects and events, we need
an appropriate way of representing to ourselves the objects we are interested in and
their constituent parts. Bruner, (1979) believes that successful learning and
problem solving depend upon the quality and appropriateness of the
representational systems used. It has also been shown that theories about the way a
problem of reasoning is represented mentally, can account for the type of errors
subjects make when attempting to solve it (Johnson-Laird, 1983). Representation is
equally important to visual invention. There is a analogy between sketching and
learning mathematics.
"I have been struck repeatedly by the economical significance of a good
mode of representing things to oneself... The crutch provided by a matrix that gets
all the combinations out of the head on to paper or the blackboard makes it
possible to look at the group structure as a whole, to go beyond it to the task of
seeing whether it has interesting properties and familiar isomorphs." (Bruner 1990,
page 26)
3.2 Description versus Depiction : Defining the attributes.
The distinction between images, which are recognisable because they are
"imitations", and symbols such as words which are based on imposed conventions,
has been discussed in semiotics ever since Plato (Eco 1976, Gombrich 1982a). But
these most familiar types of representation are only examples of a more general
distinction which has been discussed by psychologists and philosophers as the
distinction between "analog" and "propositional" (or "Fregian") forms of
representation.
The term "analog" is often used to mean representation by some analogy or
similarity between the represented and the representing worlds. Unfortunately the
term is a bad one. It can be confused with the common use in engineering
measurement to mean continuously variable as opposed to discreetly variable as in
"digital" (as is assumed by Baddeley, 1990, page 98). In the context of
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representational type "analog" does not mean this. Therefore I prefer the almost
synonymous word "depictive" Kosslyn (1980,1983).
As Paivio (1986) has pointed out, propositional theories of cognitive
representation do not always make it clear whether the postulated propositions are
the representational primitives used by the mind itself or whether they are simply
being used as descriptions of such postulated representations. If the former then it
seems clear that there are symbolic ways of representing visual objects in which
relations and hence truth values are not explicit (for example sign systems in
diagrams). The term description is used here in a broader sense than "proposition"
which is simply one type of descriptive statement.
The most familiar examples of descriptive systems are verbal and of
depictive systems are pictorial. However any attempt to show that a particular
example of a representational system is purely depictive usually fails (see for
example Goodman 1968, Wollheim,1977). Similarly descriptive systems, such as
writing, can be shown to have had a partly depictive ancestry, traces of which
remain. (For example the letter "A" originally depicted a bull's head). As I argue
here, the distinction can only be understood in terms of continuously varying
clusters of descriptive or depictive attributes which representational systems may
possess. Despite this the descriptive/depictive distinction is usually discussed as if
it were a clear dichotomy. For example Kosslyn (1980, 1983) in connection with
his work on mental imagery compares a descriptive (Propositional) representation
of a ball on a box (ON(BALL, BOX)) to an outline drawing of a ball on a box.
Kosslyn then lists seven differences to characterise the description/depiction
distinction.
1. The proposition uses discrete symbols (for the relation and its objects)
which cannot be subdivided meaningfully. On the other hand, in the drawing the
"symbols" can be arbitrarily broken (half a ball, one corner of the box etc).
2. There are different types of symbol in the proposition (e.g a relation
symbol is different in kind from an object symbol). On the other hand, (Kosslyn
claims) there are no distinct types of symbol in the drawing. For example there is
no explicit representation of the relation "on" which is simply implicit from the
position of the ball and box in the drawing.
3. In a descriptive proposition the symbols are arranged according to a set
of rules (a grammar) which is not the case in the drawing.
4. The description is abstract. That is it can refer to categories of objects
and relations, and it is amodal (not tied to one mode of perception only). In
contrast the drawing is concrete. Different attributes of an object such as size,
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shape and position cannot be represented separately. It is also modal, i.e.
associated only with one mode of perception (vision).
5. The descriptive proposition is unambiguous (a crucial difference from
natural language) whilst the drawing is ambiguous and open to differing
interpretation.
Finally Kosslyn offers two "crucial" properties which he terms privileged
because they are exclusive to depictions.
6. Depictions can only exist in a medium which "functions as a space".
This space may be physical such as a piece of paper or it may be functional as is a
computer bit-map corresponding to a raster display.
7. The other privileged property amounts to a claim of spatial
correspondence between the represented and the representing worlds. "Every part
of a depiction corresponds to a part of the object represented".
Although this account draws attention to interesting attributes of
representational type, it is not convincing as a definition of the underlying nature
of the descriptive-depictive distinction. For example a study of drawings from
different cultures and of the differences between adult and child drawing suggests
that drawings do indeed use symbols (Arnheim, 1974, Deregowski, 1973, 1977,
Willats, 1977, 1984, 1985). It is probably true that symbols are more discrete in
the proposition than in the drawing and that the rules governing their use are more
formal and restrictive but the distinction is relative rather than absolute. This does
not mean that Kosslyn's suggested differences are not helpful in clarifying the
nature of visual representation but it does suggest that the examples chosen do not
belong to disjoint sets.
Other authors have attempted to isolate a single distinguishing characteristic
from which the other differences are derived. Shepard (1981, 1982, 1984) has
emphasised the idea of "isomorphism" (similarity of structure) as the
distinguishing characteristic of analog (depictive) representation. He distinguishes
Primary isomorphism such as the spatial and chromatic similarity between a
model and the object it represents from Secondary isomorphism. He claims that
whilst it is obviously impossible for the brain to use Primary Isomorphism (a green
object cannot be represented by something green in the brain) Secondary
Isomorphisms which preserve functional characteristics of time and space in the
physical world, are quite feasible. Palmer (1975b, 1978) finds this distinction
unclear and unconvincing. He himself has emphasised the distinction between
Intrinsic and Extrinsic representation. Propositional (descriptive) representation
represents by making external references which must be known. "whatever
structure there is in a propositional representation exists solely by virtue of the
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extrinsic constraints placed upon it by the truth-preserving informational
correspondence with the represented world". Most of Kosslyn's first five attributes
can be regarded as corollaries of this. In contrast, the representing information of
analog (depictive) representation is intrinsic because it is contained within the
structure of the representation itself. Moreover "Whatever structure is present in an
analog representation exists by virtue of the inherent constraints within the
representing world itself, without reference to the represented world".
Perhaps the clearest attempt to summarise the distinction is Sloman's
description of correspondence or non-correspondence between the represented
and the representing (Sloman 1975). Sloman uses the term "Fregean" to refer to
representation by propositions or descriptive symbols. "Roughly, in a complex
Fregean symbol the structure of the symbol corresponds not to the structure of the
thing denoted but to the structure of the procedure by which the thing is identified
or computed". In the analogical (depictive) case however "There must be at least
some correspondence between the structure of the thing represented and the
structure of the representation." (Sloman, 1975). This overlaps with Palmer's
extrinsic/intrinsic distinction but is not exactly equivalent to it. Thus the structure
of a sentence depends upon the history of the language and the way it is intended to
be read, but not upon what it represents. But it also depends upon the reader
having access to an external vocabulary of word meanings. The structure of a
picture represents by correspondences which exists between it and the objects
represented. Information contained within the picture may be extracted from such
correspondences without external reference by the viewer's visual system.
A final distinction which is also a corollary of the different ways in which
information is extracted from depictive and descriptive representations is the
difference between implicit and explicit information (Finke, 1989). The
information in a depictive representation is only implied by the isomorphism or
correspondences and must be extracted by visual processing. The information in
descriptive representations (such as propositions or mathematical equations) is
made explicit by their external reference. As far as visual cognition is concerned
the distinction is between the raw optical data projected as a pattern of luminances
on the retina and the explicit description derived by the brain. This is extracted by
complex analysis and is enriched with stored knowledge of the categories of objects
and scenes depicted (the extrinsic component).
To the probably endless debate about a distinction I believe to be central to
the nature of sketches, I wish to make the following contributions.
1. Most of the authors quoted above treat the depictive/descriptive
distinction as if was a simple dichotomy. However the examination of cultural
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representations shows that purely depictive or descriptive types are rare (if they
exist at all) and that most representational systems fall along a rough continuum
from very depictive to very descriptive systems with many intermediate types.
Language has a small but significant depictive component, photographs a
significant degree of external reference (a descriptive component).
2. Depiction and description are best characterised as distinguishing
variable attributes of a particular representational system rather than the
representation as a whole.
3. Although most commonly used systems fit a linear continuum in which
depictiveness decreases as descriptiveness increases, they are not necessarily
mutually antagonistic in this way. Using the terminology suggested by J.J.Gibson
(1937) in relation to dimensions of perception, descriptiveness and depictiveness
are best treated as two semi-independant "intensive" dimensions rather than a
single "oppositional" dimension. Intensive dimensions can vary in quantity
independently of each other. Oppositional dimensions on the other hand counter-act
each other so that as one increases the other must decrease. According to Hering's
theory of colour, redness and greenness are oppositional but whiteness and
blackness are intensive (Hering, 1964). It is possible for example to label a
depictive illustration in such a way that its descriptiveness increases without
decreasing its depictiveness. I suggest that it is due more to cultural convenience
than to theoretical necessity, that most familiar systems of representations fall
along a continuum in which as descriptiveness increases so depictiveness decreases.
It may be useful to term systems with a high combined total of descriptive \
depictiveness as Dense Representations as distinguished from Sparse
Representations with a low combined total of descriptive and depictive content.
Egyptian tomb painting and 3-D medical models would be classed as "dense";
algebraic equations and unlabelled drawings as "sparse" using these terms. I
believe that the distinction has a special relevance to theories of cognitive
representation. These must be much richer or "denser" than the relatively sparse
cultural representations, such as writing and drawing which are used to support
them.
3.3 Indices, Icons and Symbols: The Sagacity of C.S.Peirce.
A hundred years ago C.S. Peirce was interested in the nature of meaning
which he showed depends not only upon a sign and a referent but also upon an
"interpretant" by which he meant a representation of the world in terms of which
the "sign-referent" relationship is mediated (Peirce 1960, Bruner 1990). Peirce
distinguished three representational types, the "Index", the "Icon" and the
"Symbol" by the way their constituents were related to what they represented. The
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relation between the Symbol and its referent depends upon the existence of a rule-
governed system or "language" that determines it position within a system of signs.
"Description" defined here is equivalent to systems of Peirce's Symbols. The Icon
bears a "resemblance" relationship to its referent and so is roughly equivalent to
our "Depictive" representation. It has to be mentioned however that more recent
theorists have shown the concept of resemblance or "similarity" in cognition is
difficult to pin down (Palmer 1978, Treisman 1986, Tversky, 1977), hence
Sloman's substitution of "correspondence".
The Index which Peirce treats as a separate type, represents by being
"contingent" upon its referent as "smoke is to fire". The signs within the
representing world of an Index system are related to the represented world by
cause and effect. This is really a another way of saying that the Index is non-
semantically (non-cognitively) generated. The importance of distinguishing Indices
from Icons, or rather index like attributes from Icon like attributes in the design of
sketching systems lies in the impartiality of the information provided. Indices
provide evidence (and this includes useful surprises), about the physical reality of
the objects they represent. The example of photography has already been discussed
in relation to its historical influence on sketch attributes (Chapter 2). It is now
possible with computer systems to generate Icons which can successfully
masquerade as Indices. This raises questions about the value of "realism" in visual
images and how we distinguish the genuine index from its imitative relative.
At first glance Peirce's tripartite division, if accepted, seems to discredit the
whole idea of a simple continuum of types. We seem to be dealing with a
triangular conceptual space (or a prism if we include my suggested dense \ sparse
dimension). However I believe a simple continuum from very depictive to very
descriptive remains a useful if approximate ordering system for those
representational types which can be used for visualising purposes. My reasons are
as follows :-
1. It is difficult even to imagine a representational system which is purely
contingent (i.e an Index). As a near example we might consider how an X-ray
diffraction pattern could be used to represent the structure of a molecule. This
certainly does not resemble the molecule and its crystal structure on which it is
contingent. However by Sloman's criterion it has a correspondence (indirect and
without resemblance), with its referent and hence has a type of depictiveness.
Indices and Icons are not disjoint sets.
2. Visual recall is indirectly contingent upon the object perceived, encoded
and stored. A degree of contingency is arguably present in most and perhaps all
types of depictive representation including the most imaginatively generated ones.
Sketches and Representational Type
	 74
Drawing from the motif is an act partly contingent upon the light pattern falling on
the retina and partly upon non-contingent cognitive processes. Sketching from
imagination may sometimes seem to be without any contingency from the imagined
objects represented. However imagination depends heavily upon visual memory.
As Thomas Hobbes (1651) argued, we can create images of novel objects because
we have seen the component parts at one time or another, "As when from the sight
of a man at one time and a horse at another, we conceive in our mind a Centaure"
(Hobbes, 1651). However memories are faulty and continually altered upon recall
by our expectations and stored schema (Bartlett 1932). Thus there is an unknown
and indirect contingent (index) component even in representations constructed from
imagination.
There is also a semantically generated (non-contingent) content in all useful
contingent representations. The meaning and information content of the most
impartial photograph is dependant upon its context and the way its view point is
selected by the photographer. New technology has created a whole range of
contingent (index) representational types for medical and scientific purposes. (For
example - X-Ray photography, electron and ultra-violet microscopy, infra-red and
radio astronomy, nuclear magnetic resonance imaging of body tissues etc).
3.4 Visual Representation: A Continuum of Type.
It is worth considering briefly what alternatives are available within the
continuum of type, in order to decide where sketches belong in this untidy
continuum of intermediate cultural types. A list of examples from the very
depictive to the very descriptive are described briefly below (paragraphs 3.4.1 to
3.4.12). The continuum is complicated the added contingent/imaginary and
sparse/dense dimensions. I have based position in the continuum upon
depictiveness, with descriptiveness usually but not always increasing as
depictiveness decreases. The sum of depictive and descriptive attributes rather than
their ratio determines the sparsity \ density attribute.
3.4.1 Replicas and Examples.
The most depictive type of representation is an exact replica. A replica can
qualify as a representational system if it used as a prototype or example. A replica
is an unique object which represents a class of future objects, typically preceding
manufacture by mass production. Exemplification (or partial replication) might
include swatch-books of materials, samples or component-parts. According to
Goodman (1968), exemplification is a mode of symbolization, but as he later
points out this depends upon the extent to which "reference" is intended.
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3.4.2 Working Models and Simulations.
The next level contains a number of parallel representational types. A
detailed working scale model of a car is a theoretical type rather than a practical
possibility. As soon as size correspondence is sacrificed, functional isomorphism
becomes impossible. This is the "problem of scale" discussed in Chapter 2. If the
model included labels, notes, handbooks etc then it is a mixed type which descends
the continuum. "Virtual Reality" systems aspire to model appearance at this level.
3.4.3 Static Three-D Models
Scale models and wax-works have no temporal depictive correspondences.
They cannot simulate events. They are designed to duplicate as closely as possible
the unprocessed light pattern presented by the surfaces of real objects. In the late
stages of design there is sometimes a conflict between the need to manipulate and
the desire for detailed depiction. Labelling and written speedications can make tl-iis
representational system denser. Car designers still build life-size clay models of
new designs. Here it is worth noting that isomorphism of appearance only
("resemblance") is classified high in the depictive sequence as it is not combined
with other non-isomorphic references.
3.4.4 Holograms, Television and Photography.
High in contingency, this class of cultural representation exhibits
correspondence of optical (light) structure. Cylindrical holograms have the highest
degree of light correspondence because they preserve in the form of wave
interference patterns information about the light reflected from objects in many
directions. The holographic plate is a good example of the distinction between
correspondence and "resemblance". Although it contains much more detailed
spatial information than a photograph its abstract pattern of lines has no
resemblance to the object it represents until the light pattern it encodes is re-created
by special viewing conditions (usually with a laser). Television and photography
(moving or static) encode only a tiny sample of the luminous information, that
which happens to be reflected in the direction of the camera lens. This sacrifices
the third dimension and destroys spatial correspondence. The correspondence of
the photograph to the scene represented is the correspondence of projective
geometry, where for example, real relative size and apparent relative size, due to
differences of distance, are confused under the umbrella of visual angle.
3.4.5 Figurative Art and Animated Graphics.
Lower in the continuum are all representations in which cognitive processes
are explicit in both generative and interpretive processes. Within this class there is
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however a wide range of degrees of depictive correspondence between what is
represented and what is used to represent. Modern portrait sculpture, representing
form without colour, clearly uses suggestion as does most portrait painting. Most
theorists now agree that cultural convention plays an important role in the way that
painting represents. (Gombrich, 1962).
3.4.6 Line Drawings and Illustrations.
As has been repeatedly pointed out, the lines used in drawing have no
existence in the retinal images projected by real objects. Linear biological
illustrations or engineering drawings of automobile structure preserve different
types of spatial isomorphism with the represented objects but include non-
isomorphic sign systems. Artists' drawings on the other hand are typically much
freer in the variety of meanings which may be assigned to lines.
It has been shown that very young children who have never been shown
line drawings before, are able without difficulty to recognise the objects and scenes
they represent (Hochberg and Brooks, 1962). One explanation of this otherwise
strange finding is that line drawings access an internal cognitive representation
created by the brain during the early edge extraction stages of visual processing
(Frisby 1979, Marr and Hildreth, 1980). The "self-occluding" contour lines used
in drawings make a good example of a genuinely intermediate depictive/descriptive
type. Their shape has a direct correspondence ("natural isomorphism" Palmer
1978) with the shape of the object represented but \\ne  t\-\ickz\ess Us a =maw,
which is descriptive and does necessarily correspond to any part of the object
represented. Another example of a genuinely intermediate component might be the
line representing the combined head and body in children's "tadpole" drawings
(Willats, 1985).
As the result of an interesting study of the drawing methods of children,
untrained adults and art students, Pratt (1984) has concluded that the viewer-
centred "accuracy" (i.e representational isomorphism) of drawing from nature is
related to the level of perceptual analysis that is available to the drawing maker.
The lower the level of perceptual analysis the more depictive and "view-specific"
the drawing. Further, Pratt claims that the description first available to a would be
draughtsman is at the highest descriptive level and that access to lower levels
(needed for view specific representation) involves learning to descend through the
intermediate levels. This provides a further clue to the difference between
depiction and description.
Besides the optional use of labels and codes referred to above, illustrations
in books have explicit reference to the accompanying text, which in turn can refer
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back to the illustrations. Since the text is itself a descriptive system dependent upon
external reference to meaning, it may be necessary here to distinguish direct and
indirect types of external reference. Gombrich (1982a) draws attention to the
intermediate status of posters and comics. He suggests that the relative amount of
learning necessary to use a representational system may be a criterion for assessing
the advantages of intermediate depictive / descriptive types. The success of comics
is due to the advantages they offer to the learner. The comic strip provides a series
of related images which support each other. Such drawings are depictive but
supported not only by the words in "balloons" but also by easily learned sign
systems such as "streaks" indicating movement, stars in front of the eyes and
question marks indicating pain or puzzlement.
3.4.7 Sketches
Tentatively I place artists' sketches somewhere inbetween linear illustrations
and maps or diagrams. Their indeterminacies and incompletions ensure that they
are less depictive than drawings or linear illustrations, but that they are more
depictive than maps and most diagrams, because they are viewer centred and
correspond more closely in this sense with appearances. When they contain added
verbal notes and labels, they are (like maps) mixed depictive and descriptive
systems. Sketches which are drawings also possess intermediate depictive /
descriptive components, such as lines used to represent figure-ground contours.
Colour can be either descriptive (ie coded) or depictive depending on how it is
used. It can also be, (as in post-impressionist painting), depictive in one dimension
(such as value) and symbolic in another (such as hue). Many of the characteristic
incompletions and indeterminacies of sketches are intermediate representational
components which facilitate descriptive to depictive translation. Thus pentimenti
can depict a number of related edges corresponding to different examples of a
possible object silhouette viewpoint. Sketches viewed in isolation are sparse
representations and small alterations in the ratio of depictive to descriptive
attributes will make them move up or down in the continuum. Thus their exact
position is variable.
3.4.8 Maps and Diagrams
In the conventional map, two spatial dimensions parallel to the ground are
represented depictively. Distances and directions are implicit and must be extracted
by visual scanning or measurement. Heights represented by contour lines are
equivalent to a number of maps superimposed. Topographically placed symbols
provide descriptive encoding. A map of interest as an analogy, is the "War chart"
with moveable flags and markers placed upon it o represent the changing states of
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a battle. Here the chart has the function of a depictive spatial medium to assist the
visualising of spatial relationships of mobile descriptive information. Each flag
makes descriptive reference to fire power, division strength, velocity etc. In
principle such a system of representation can be hierarchic to any depth. The
descriptive flags may point to secondary depictive maps which in turn can possess
topographically specified descriptive pointers. The hierarchical labelled map is a
plausible candidate for the type of mental representation used by visual working
memory which is specifically supported by the sketch (see Chapter 4)
A spatial isomorphism can be either discrete or continuous. An example of
a discrete isomorphism is a pixellated raster display. Once the correspondence
between spatial location in the represented and the representing worlds is limited to
discrete fields of view then the mapping may be between spatial fields with
different size ratios of represented to representing fields. Thus a street map may
include a "blow-up" of a densely crowded town centre. Street widths are usually
grossly exaggerated to allow printed names etc.
Neither is it necessary to preserve isomorphism of inter-locational direction
and distance, unless the purpose of the map is to allow these attributes to be
extracted by spatial measurements. Electronic-circuit diagrams and the famous
London Underground map assist the interpretation of connectivity by sacrificing
isomorphism of direction and distance. Perhaps it is a general principle of cultural
visual representations that they facilitate cognitive processes (in low capacity short-
term memory) by eliminating or simplifying the irrelevant (see Chapter 6).
Diagrams usually preserve a deliberately limited and specified
isomorphism. Characteristically the preserved isomorphisms are those of
relationships, such as "connected to", "part of" etc. Those components of vision
which are least relevant to the content of a diagram are used symbolically. For
example colour can be used symbolically in a diagram depicting spatial structure,
whilst spatial arrangement can be symbolic in a diagram depicting colour (as used
in charts of colour classification systems). There is evidence that the symbolic use
of space to represent non-spatial quantitative dimensions is used unconsciously in
solving mental problems (Moyer & Bayer 1976).
3.4.9 Pictorial Notation Systems, Graphic Signs.
There is, perhaps, a gap in the proposed visual continuum somewhere
between diagrams and natural language. Labelled diagrams, for example, are
mixed representational systems where words and depletive spatial or connectivity
systems co-exist in an uncomfortable compromise. Evidence for genuine continuity
between pictorial and visual verbal systems can be found in the pictographic
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origins of writing and non-viewer centred modes of illustration as used, for
example, in ancient Egypt of the ninth to eighteenth dynasties (Gregory, 1970).
Modern types at this level abound in science and technology. An example is
the molecular structure diagram with topologically depictive bond representation
combined with symbolic atoms.
3.4.10 Natural Language
Language is the classic descriptive system with extrinsic rules of formation
and learned rules of meaning. Hockett (1960) has proposed a number of such
defining criteria. Human infants and animals species without language can
recognise and categorise objects in ways which suggest that much stored visual
information must be represented descriptively in the brain (Sutherland, 1968, see
also Chapter 4) . Although there are good reasons for believing that descriptive
information encoded for recognition must be non-verbal, it may be that language is
necessary to make such visual description accessible to consciousness. To explain
the facts of language comprehension and production despite its many ambiguities
and context dependencies Chomsky (1957, 1965, 1980) has proposed a
transformational grammar in which comprehension involves transforming the
surface structure of language to a cognitively represented deep structure in
which the ambiguities have been removed and from which the meaning is
extracted.
The relevance of theories of language representation to the sketch is shown
by the written notes which often accompany artist's sketches and by the sketch
function of translating verbally (propositionally) expressed ideas into depictive
form. It is interesting that natural language, in distinction to more formal notation
systems, shares many of the characterising attributes of sketches.
For example :-
1. The meaning of both verbal phrases and sketch line segments is often
context dependant.
2. Both natural language (e.g poetry) and sketch components may be
enriched by ambiguity.
3. Both sketch and natural language comprehension may require mental
completion from memory.
4. Both representational systems are strongly dependant for their meaning
upon poorly understood knowledge systems (semantic memory).
Because of these shared characteristics, language is an appropriate
descriptive partner to the depictive components of sketches. It will be argued in
Chapter 4 that some sketch attributes depend for their meaning upon a one to many
Sketches and Representational Type	 80
mapping from their depictive ambiguities to an analogous descriptive "deep"
representation of object structure.
3.4.11 Pure Notation Systems.
According to Goodman (1968), neither pictures nor natural language
qualify as pure notation systems. He has proposed five stringent requirements
which are most nearly met by musical notation.
1. Firstly, all examples of characters in a notation system must belong to
disjoint sets.
2. The second syntactic requirement according to Goodman is that the
characters must be "finitely differentiated".
The remaining three requirements proposed by Goodman are semantic.
3. No character in a notation system can be ambiguous.
4. Different characters must have "semantic disjointness". That is the
disjoint sets representing characters must refer to equally disjoint sets of elements
in the represented world ("compliants").
5. The final requirement for a notation system is "semantic finite
differentiation". "For any two characters K and K' such that their compliance
classes are not identical, and every object h that does not comply with both,
determination that either h does not comply with K or that h does not comply with
K' must be theoretically possible".
Goodman argues that pictures are descriptive symbol systems (although of
an impure kind) so he would not agree with their position here towards the
depictive end of a depictive to descriptive continuum. His definition of a pure
notation system is a conceptual ideal which is rarely if ever met in practice.
Certainly sketches and most diagrams would fail on both the syntactic and semantic
requirements. Natural language fails on the ambiguity requirement but even if it
did not if would fail on semantic disjointness.
3.4.12 Mathematical Symbol Systems.
Mathematics is linked to language by propositional calculus (Russell, 1903)
thus reinforcing the idea of a cultural continuum of representation with poorly
defined boundaries between types. It is also the most abstract and the most capable
of extension and generalisation. It is probably true that all descriptive theories of
representation aspire to the condition of mathematics because mathematical
description is so firmly based on explicit premises and explicit demonstrable
deductive argument. Russell (1903) defined pure mathematics as the "Class of all
propositions of the form p implies q where p and q are propositions....". For
instance, the history of geometry suggests that there may be analogies to be found
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between the processes used by the biological visual system for extracting abstract
and categorical descriptive information from retinal images and the historical
evolution of mathematical systems for proving and describing spatial relationships
(Bronowski 1973, Kline 1954).
3.5 Intermediate types as Translation Systems.
Because the most familiar representations of our culture tend to be
polarised, as pictures or language, at the two ends of the continuum (Arnheim
1970), it is natural to conclude that depiction and description are independent
modes of representation. I have attempted to characterise the difference and to
show that there is a continuum of intermediate types in which the distinction is less
obvious. I now wish to propose that depiction and depiction are inter-dependant
attributes, both of which are necessary components of any useful representational
system. All the representational types in the above continuum depend for their
interpretation and usefulness upon cognition. Words, the most prototypical of
descriptive systems, depend for their meaning as much upon the mental images
they evoke as upon other words (Paivio 1971b, 1986). If mental images are
depictive (as argued in Chapter 5) then writing when used to assist visual thought
has a greater depictive component by association than it appears to have on paper.
There is also evidence that logical inference may depend upon the use of depictive
prototypes and mental models (Johnson-Laird 1983). Description used to represent
categories often depends upon the ability to mentally generate typical exemplars of
the depictive possibilities which are implied. Depictive possibilities must be
scanned and analysed to extract new and perhaps unexpected, explicit descriptive
information. Such descriptions can in turn to used to modify or to generate anew
further depictive information.
In considering in principle how descriptive information about objects,
scenes and events can be mapped back into depictive form, it is important to
distinguish different levels of description. Jackendoff (1983) has argued
persuasively that many types of word meaning depend upon mentally stored
representations of spatial and three-D structure used for visual recognition. He
proposes that the translation of representational type which allows us to "talk about
pictures" or to visualise the meanings of words occurs by shared visual and
linguistic access to a high level "conceptual" information structure (Jackendoff,
1983, 1992).
In machines used for image manipulation, an analogous hierarchy of
descriptive levels exists. At the lowest level, (I will call it the "array level") that is
used by the computer "bit-map" or raster display, we can divide an image up into
small elements, and assign each one propositional symbols representing colour and
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position, or (as in maps) address pointers to separately stored object descriptions.
At other levels, visual structure may be described incompletely using, for example,
a coordinate system normalised for size, position and orientation or describing
some structural relationships but not others (as in G.K.S graphics systems,
Hopgood et Al. 1983). It is possible to depict such descriptions (i.e. translate)
using conventions to sample the multiple alternatives they define. When such
descriptions define or modify explicitly visual or spatial structure, I will term this
the figural level (following Goldschmidt 1992). Shape grammars (e.g.
L,eeuwenberg 1982) fit a low version of this level. At higher levels, description
may be used to categorise the objects to be depicted or make statements about them
in ways which imply visual structure, but only indirectly. Here a mapping (from
scratch) to depiction is impossible without adding information by indeterminate
invention or from outside sources. However some constraints at this level may be
used interactively to re-depict or re-describe an existing representation. I will term
this the conceptual level. Applied to sketching the three levels constitute an untidy
classification with many intermediate types. But then untidyness is a principal
characteristic of sketching!
Sketches resemble maps of visual appearance in some respects but are
unlike them in others. They resemble maps in their intermediate status containing
spatially depictive representations combined with descriptive labels, codes and sign
systems (Fish and Scrivener, 1990). They differ from them in their untidy
indeterminacies and their fluidity. This is a consequence of their function of
assisting visual invention. Because maps are shared representations used for
communicating shared information they must be clear, tidy and conform to agreed
conventions. In contrast a sketch is usually unique and personal. Every sketch
differs from every other sketch because its function as a "cognitive catalyst" is
unique and specific to a projected invention. In art and design the "reactants"
(starting constraints) may be known but the end products are not and the nature of
the cognitive "reaction" to be catalysed is obscure. The untidiness of the sketch, as
already suggested, is necessary to its function. But perhaps the most significant
difference is the extent to which sketches in contrast to maps rely upon and interact
with invisible cognitive representations within the brain of the user. Their sparsity
and disordered untidiness only make sense if we assume that they are only the
representational "tip of an iceberg" (see chapters 4 and 5). Sketch-books are simply
collections of fragmentary traces (cognitive "footprints"), providing evidence of a
much wider and richer cognitive dialogue conducted with - n the mind of their user.
The mental images and propositions which form the conscious component of this
internal dialogue are known only in memory by the artist. The nature of the
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representations available to the brain for visual invention can only be inferred from
the experimental data of cognitive psychology and neuroscience.
3.6 Cognitive Representation: Is there also a Continuum of Type?
To what extent does the cultural continuum of type mirror an analogous
continuum of type within the brain? What can cognitive science infer about the
cognitive representations which form such a important component of the sketch?
3.6.1 The Neural Medium.
At the lowest level of analysis all forms of representation within the brain
are neural. Until recently, discussions of representational type in cognitive
psychology would omit completely any attempt to map theories of representation
onto known neurophysiology (eg Palmer 1977, Rumelhart & Norman 1985,
Johnson-Laird 1983, Paivio 1986, Kosslyn 1978, Jolicoeur & Kosslyn 1983,
Pylyshyn 1984). This is due to the influence of functionalism. It is often assumed
that issues of representation are most fruitfully discussed independently of the "low
level" questions of medium or physical implementation. However there are now
signs of a thaw in this attitude. Useful cross-fertilisation between neuroscience and
cognitive psychology is occurring (LeDoux & Hirst 1986, Kosslyn and Koenig,
1992, Kosslyn 1994, Crick 1994). Psychologists discussing mental representation
are now beginning to quote findings in neuroscience as evidence (Ullman 1989,
Tarr & Pinker 1989, Kosslyn 1994). This may be the only approach which can
resolve some long standing controversies. Anderson, J. (1978) for example has
argued that it may only be possible to distinguish depictive from descriptive
theories of mental imagery at a physiological level. Even if this is not correct
(Hayes-Roth 1979), it is becoming increasingly necessary to ask how a theory of
representation could in principle be consistent with known properties of the visual
pathway within the brain.
This is particularly true in considering what it can mean to say that some
forms of mental representation are depictive (analog). It is much easier to see how
the brain can represent descriptively. The elements of any representation within the
brain must be constituted from the electrical signals by which neurons
communicate with each other, by their state or readiness to send such impulses and
by the way they are connected. It is through their synapses that neurons
communicate with each other. These are finely branching microscopic junctions
with other neurons which communicate by passing chemical transmitter substances
across minute gaps between terminal "boutons" from the sending cell and the
membrane of the receiving cell. The pattern of connectivity of the neurons is
determined not only by the detailed neuroanatomy of the brain but also by the
Sketches and Representational Type
	 84
varying and adaptive physiology of the synapses. There are about a 100,000
million neurons in the brain each of which may make upto 20,000 synapses with
other neurons. When a neuron receives synaptic signals from other neurons, a
graded potential develops which must reach a threshold value before it in turn fires
a chain of impulses to other neurons. Some synapses are excitatory increasing the
graded potential, others are inhibitory, reducing it. Thus the output from an
individual neuron is the result of a summing effect of positive and negative signals
from other neurons. Recordings from single cells in the neocortex of the primate
brain have shown that the processing of visual information from the eyes is
subdivided into specialised parallel pathways within which much sequential
processing takes place. Within the cortex there are now believed to be twenty four
or more "computational maps" of the visual field (Kosslyn and Koenig, 1992). The
visual cortex is divided into at least six distinct layers of neurons. At right angles
to these, organised columns of cells are found, which each respond to a different
part of the visual field, its receptive field. In order to function as the medium for a
depictive representation however, such maps would have to be associated with the
appropriate information extraction and scanning processes. To date the physiology
of such processes remains obscure.
In area V1 of the primate brain, the first cortical area to receive signals
from the eyes and the best studied, the cortical columns map the visual field of
both eyes with uniform columns of cells which respond to colour and to lines or
edges at different orientations (Hubel and Wiesel 1977 1979, Hubel et Al. 1978).
Although the columns are uniform in size and structure, the size of their receptive
fields varies, being smallest where they map the central foveal region of the retina
and larger for the periphery thus reflecting the variation of resolution of the visual
field when the eyes are fixated. It is tempting to suggest that these columns of cells
"represent" edge orientation. However Hubel and Wiesel are careful not to make
this claim remarking only that they demonstrate early stages in the analysis of the
retinal image. This early stage cortical map has also been shown to encode in
parallel upto nine different spatial frequencies (Maffei & Fiorentini 1977). (The
significance of this for theories of the sketch is discussed in chapters 5 & 6). Maps
receiving information later in the visual pathway are specialised for processing
different visual attributes. Thus V5 is specialised for movement analysis and V4
for colour and perhaps form. The processing of spatial position, movement and
attentional orientation appear to be separated from that of colour and object form
or identity (Hubel & Livingstone 1987, Livingstone 1988). The reason why there
are so many spatially organised maps of the visual field in the cortex has been
discussed by Cowey (1981). He suggests that the maps reflect an efficient
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processing division of labour for each point within the visual field. The maps are
organised in such a way as to minimise the number of long connections (axons)
between neurons since these are inefficient and biologically "expensive" in
resources. If there were too much processing to be done within any one receptive
field the neural columns within a single map would become overcrowded and
require longer connections to communicate with their neighbouring columns. Thus
the adjacent columns within a cortical map contain those neurons which need to
communicate with each other most frequently.
An influential idea to explain learning and memory is the cell assembly, a
closed loop of cells which continue to signal after the initial stimulus has ceased
and in which repeated stimulation causes permanent changes in the excitatory
capacity of synapses (Hebb 1949, Jusczyk & Klein 1980). In Parallel Distributed
Processing (PDP) theories, representation is supposed to be distributed throughout
a net in such a way that the output is a matrix sum of the inputs. PDP models of
recognition and learning have excited interest because they demonstrate properties
which are hard to model in other ways, such as graceful degradation and the
capacity for completion when elements are missing. However it is still not clear
whether the fundamental unit of visual representation is the neuron itself (or the
neural column) or the synapses that it makes. The evidence from neuroscience is
very complex and deserves a more detailed treatment than it can have here.
However the point is that what is now known is about the brain's physiology is
consistent with the possibility of a continuum of representational types from the
partially depictive labelled map (spatial location represented depictively with object
attributes descriptively) to abstract descriptive representations of concepts and
categories by either neuron clusters or localised PDP networks. The significance to
the sketch of the modularity in the visual pathway will be discussed in Chapter 6.
3.6.2 Different Approaches.
Most of the debate about mental representation has been at the functional
level. This is the level at which it is thought to be meaningful, for example, to
implement computer models of cognitive representations. At this level, as Paivio
(1983) has pointed out, there are at least three different sub levels of meaning to
"mental representation" which are often confused. At one level we may be simply
referring to the conscious percepts and memories of cultural representations. In this
sense there must be, by definition, a mental continuum corresponding to our
perception of the cultural one. This is almost the level of meaning of Paivio's own
"Dual Code" theory. This proposes that language and images are independent
parallel "symbolic" encoding systems used for memory and thought (Paivio,
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1971b, 1983). Although they can operate independently the two systems are also
interconnected and can influence each other in many ways that Paivio has
researched. He has shown for example that concrete nouns are more strongly
associated with mental images than abstract nouns in memory experiments.
At another level, theories of mental representation can be theories about
how best to represent the hypothetical mental representations for modelling
purposes. It is not always clear in this context what propositional theories of
cognition mean. Are they simply used as notational devices for describing mental
representations or do they refer to the form of the representations themselves. To
me, only the former meaning makes sense, when theorists refer for example to
Structural Descriptions as nodes connected by "non-verbal" propositions (Palmer,
1977)
It is the intermediate level of representation, how images and language are
themselves represented and whether there is a continuum analogous to the cultural
continuum which concerns us here. Paivio himself has adopted Morton's
"Logogen" theory of language representation as an underlying representational
theory of language and proposes that an analogous symbolic unit the "imagen"
may underlie mental images. This does not help resolve the question of how
depictively images are represented. Nor does Paivio discuss the possibility that
intermediate representational types may be used for translation purposes. The two
systems are simply "interconnected".
3.6.3 Cognitive Depiction.
Some theorists believe that all representation within the brain is best
described as propositional (ie descriptively) and that there cannot be depictive or
analog representations. The debate which is now twenty five years old has centred
around the possible depictive nature of mental images. The evidence and arguments
can only be briefly summarised here. Clearly at one level, - the response pattern of
the neural medium - the propositionalists (Pylyshyn 1973, 1975, 1981, 1984,
Anderson, J. 1983, Simon 1972, Hinton 1979) must be right. Cultural depictive
representation may reflect light patterns which resemble the light patterns reflected
by real objects. However within the brain colour and luminance can only be
represented by patterns of neural activity which is surely not depictive in Shepard's
first order sense (Shepard, 1982). Spatial correspondences are preserved in the
cortical maps mentioned above. Unfortunately these cortical maps are not in
themselves evidence for the existence of the functional depictive representation of
space. It does not matter that there is no physical isomorphism between, for
example, the size and shape of the retinal image and the size and shape of the
Sketches and Representational Type
	 87
corresponding cortical maps. However to show that such maps function as
depictive representation of space it would be necessary to show that there are
processes (perhaps some neural equivalent of visual scanning) which use the
connectivity relationships between the cortical columns, in say area V1, to extract
and make explicit new descriptive information, which is only implicit in the
response pattern encoded in a cortical map. Until such processes are discovered,
the physiological status of cortical maps as depictive representations is purely
speculative. However the known physiology certainly does not preclude the
existence of neurally encoded representations of visual structure, which function as
spatial media, from which descriptive information can be extracted. The theoretical
grounds for believing that both perception and mental imagery depend upon
representation within such spatial arrays is very persuasive (see Chapter 5).
Evidence that percepts and images share representational resources is
provided in Chapter 5.
3.6.4 Cognitive Description.
There is little controversy that the brain stores and manipulates information
represented symbolically. Functionalists who believe this is the only form of
cognitive representation have already been referred to. Johnson-Laird (1983) cites
Craik's three cognitive processes of human reasoning in symbols.
"1. A 'translation' of some external process into an internal representation
in terms of words, numbers or other symbols.
2. The derivation of other symbols from them by some sort of inferential
process
3. A 'retranslation' of these symbols into actions, or at least a recognition
of the correspondence between these symbols and external events, as in realizing
that a prediction is fulfilled". (Craik, K. 1943).
However it is not clear that, as Pylyshyn did later, Craik, K. used the word
"symbol" to rule out spatial arrays which represent by correspondence between the
represented and the representing. Here I use "descriptive" to mean representation
without such correspondence. (Some authors use "symbol" in a sense which could
include spatial arrays).
We use language (and other cultural symbols) privately as well as socially
to represent and process visual concepts and categories which must be represented
descriptively. The huge literature on this subject is beyond the scope of this study.
I have mentioned, only briefly, Chomsky's theories of how language structure is
represented, Morton's "logogen" theory of language generation and access (Morton
1969 1979) and Paivio's "dual code" theory (Paivio 1971a 1986). (See also Schank
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& Nash-Webber (1975)). It is interesting to speculate that language is the means by
which humans make unconscious descriptive information available for voluntary
manipulation. Information, that is, which is represented and processed
automatically in non-verbal animals. Although language is used for descriptive
representation, it does not follow that its representation in working memory is
descriptive. We use spatially depictive images of words and symbols when we
think and the "inner voice" - auditorily depictive images of verbal sounds - when
we reason (Baddeley 1986).
3.6.5 Intermediate or Mixed Types and Cognitive Type translation.
Most theories of perceptual processing are (implicitly) theories of depictive
to descriptive translation. How do the early pre-conscious stages of vision capture
and then represent, from momentary retinal information, the perceptual invariants
of size, shape etc? In his influential computational study of early visual processing
Marr asks the question when does vision "go symbolic" (Marr 1982). His widely
quoted representational structures were
1. The "Primal Sketch" which represented the early two-dimensional
results of extracting edges, blobs and bars.
2. The "21/2 D Sketch" which represents the orientation and depth of
surfaces from one view-point, a Viewer-centred representation. This is the
representation of a scene which is implicitly available to conscious attention.
3. A Three-D object centred representation.
Marr's theoretical representational systems form an interesting series,
postulated as stages in the visual processing of objects. The primal sketch and the
21/2D sketch can both be considered as being at about the level of labelled maps in
the continuum discussed above. The crucial transition occurring, according to
Marr, before a recognition match, is from a viewer-centred coordinate system to
an object centred coordinate system. In so far as this is a change away from
correspondence with the image on the retina but towards an abstract description of
the three dimensional object, it is a depictive to descriptive shift. However the
transition in perception is not necessarily simply one of depictive to descriptive
translation, although it is often described in these terms. As will be discussed
Chapter 4, there are grounds for believing that conscious percepts are late
constructions in which descriptive information in semantic memory is used to
enhance rather than replace their depictiveness. This reverse translation process is
explicit in the Kosslyn model of mental image generation. The possible role of a
matching reverse translation of type in perception has been little considered.
Marr's object centred theory of recognition (Marr & Nishihara 1978) was based on
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a multi-level hierarchy of generalised cones. Although this tackled the theoretical
problems, evidence since been provided that the brain uses viewer-centred
representations as well as object centred for recognition. (Palmer et Al. 1981,
Jolicoeur & Kosslyn 1983, Humphreys & Quinlan 1987, Pinker 1984a). Ullman
(1989) has proposed an interesting intermediate type for object shape recognition,
the "Pictorial Description". This overcomes some of the objections that are
usually made to template matching (ie spatially depictive) theories of recognition.
Ullman envisages spatial structure of objects represented in a depictive map but
normalised for position, size and orientation. He then considers the computational
problems of aligning such a match. This leads to problems only if purely depictive
representations are considered. However Ullman considers the possibility that
abstract descriptions (obtained by part decomposition) could be added at spatial
points. The resulting scheme is attractive and is consistent with the finding that
spatial location and object detail are processed in different regions of the visual
cortex.(Van Essen & Maunsell 1983, Mishkin et Al. 1983, Ungerleider 1985).
Tarr and Pinker (1989) suggest two possible representational alternatives for object
recognition to the Marr and Nishihara object centred proposal. Objects could be
represented in a single canonical orientation, so that mental rotation operations are
necessary to transform an input shape before input and memory are compared.
Alternatively shapes could be stored in a set of representations each corresponding
to a different orientation. They present experimental results which suggest a hybrid
hypothesis in which there are stored multiple views, but that transformation of the
input shape is necessary to find a match either with the nearest stored orientation or
with one at a canonical orientation. Palmer et Al. (1981) have presented evidence
that such "canonical" perspective views of objects are views that encode the most
information and produce the fastest recognition response times.
We can now speculate on two ways in which the special attributes of
sketches might facilitate the early and involuntary stages of visual perception
recognition.
1. Sketch contour lines and other marks may provide fast, pre-processed
access to early representational stages of perception, which extract edges and figure
/ ground relationships etc. (as suggested above see Frisby 1979).
2. Sketch components may exploit stored prototypical views of objects and
contain descriptive labels which facilitate alignment and matching processes with
stored "pictorial descriptions" in long term memory.
Thus unlike photographs and other realistic images sketches despite their
sparsity preserve the results of earlier cognitive processing which can be exploited
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by the visual system. The unproven assumption here is that this facilitation releases
some cognitive resource for visual invention.
Probably more important to sketch function are the consciously controlled
translations of type which occur when sketching. One example of depictive to
descriptive translation, curve tracing, has been investigated by Jolicoeur et Al.
(1986). These workers investigated the time taken by subjects to determine whether
or not a small marker, such as a cross, lay on or off one of two irregularly folded,
bending lines. They found that the response times where linearly related to the
lengths of the lines even when exposure times were too brief for eye-movements to
be possible. The results are consistent with an internal "covert" scanning
movement of attention on a neurally represented spatial medium, necessary to
convert implicit depictive information to a descriptively explicit form. Ullman
(1984) has described a number of other such operations which might plausibly be
used to extract descriptive spatial relations from early depictive visual
representations. Examples are "inside / outside" relations, "abstract shape
qualities" and "open-endedness". He further suggests that these operations might
be assembled into "visual routines" which operate on a base representation to
generate a sequence of temporary "Incremental representations". Here we see the
idea of representation as a dynamic structure. His later idea of Pictorial
Descriptions, might be structured this way, with a 21/2D spatial map acting as a
base representation for increasingly developed descriptive labels connected to
locations at different degrees of resolution. It is easy to see that many higher level
spatial descriptions of interest to artists and designers are also extracted as they
study their sketches. Those who accept the depictiveness of mental images point to
exactly analogous operations believed to operate internally (Finke & Shepard 1986,
Finke 1989). An example, quoted by Paivio (1971b), is how we answer the
question "How many corners are there on a block letter E?". Most people report
that they have to generate an image of the letter and then sequentially count the
corners. The "mind's eye" at work again.
Nothing demonstrates the interdependence of depiction and description
better than the evidence that people use (and need) depictive representations to
solve problems of propositional reasoning. In an extensive program of research
Johnson-Laird (1982 1983), has deduced that people use Mental Models when they
perform logical reasoning tasks. He distinguishes mental models from propositions
and mental images. Mental models according to Johnson-Laird are incomplete
"structural analogues" of part of the world. They are clearly depictive in our sense.
Mental images Johnson-Laird suggests are perceptual views of mental models. The
assumption that is most relevant to the intermediate nature of sketches is that "the
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semantics of the mental language maps propositional representations into mental
models of real or imaginary worlds" In other words propositional representations
are interpreted with respect to mental models. In effect he has also concluded,
though by a completely different path to mine, that description and depiction are
interdependent. It is not clear how depictive Johnson-Laird's mental models are
assumed to be. Logically it would seem most efficient to preserve in the model
symbolic representations for non-critical elements. In this case they would be
intermediate types with similar descriptive-depictive catalytic properties to those I
have outlined. It would be interesting to know whether he would agree that
versions of Ullman's "Pictorial Descriptions" are ideal components of his mental
models. Here I suggest that sequences of sketches related to individual visual
concepts can be thought of as visual reasoning analogues of Johnson-Laird's mental
models.
3.7 Evidence for Sketch Mediation of Type Translation.
Most design or fine art projects start with propositional constraints, vague
descriptive ideas and no doubt some internal imagery of varying degrees of
vividness. Indirect evidence that sketches mediate the translation of descriptively
represented concepts to depictive form and back from such tentative depictions to
new description, is provided by the written notes often found on sketches
themselves. However as we have already seen this does not mean that the
descriptive concepts implicit in sketching are necessarily verbal, only that words
are the dominant means available to make non-verbal figural description available
to others. A good design example is Robert Welch's fuzzy representation of the
projected grooves on his serving vessel, with the bifurcating arrow pointing to two
possible groove profiles. The often fleeting and unrecorded process of descriptive
to depictive translation has here been captured by the designer's note (Illustration
XIV). In Fashion design as well, early concepts are usually descriptively
represented, and early sketches often densely larded with notes (Illustration IX).
The one to many descriptive to depictive mapping is well illustrated by a sketch for
an Opera Cape by the designer Charles James (Illustration VII). The notes indicate
that James, C. saw the garment as either single or double breasted, with or without
a collar and either 5/8ths or 7/8ths length. The fashion designer Jean Muir (1984)
saw the translation of "concept" to "shape" as the most important part of the design
process.
"I happen to find the working out of these shapes more interesting than
thinking of the ideas in the first place"
"During the making of a collection, I constantly scribble the shapes at home
in the evening to see what I'm getting, or where they can lead. In the end I have
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masses of rough drawings. This is my way of hopefully making certain that I have
explored all the possibilities of shape in terms of ideas - suitability of cloth -
seasonal needs - enough diverse shapes to suit different figures etc."
There is every reason to believe that Fine artists are also involved in
descriptive to depictive translation whilst sketching. Often however, the mentally
represented descriptive notes are only implicit and must be inferred from published
conversation and letters (Roskill 1963, Goldwater and Treeves 1976). Ingres
drawing described by the Ingres museum as "Nude with four left arms" (Illustration
XXVIII) shows literally the one to many mapping implicit in the need to translate a
general proposition into depictive alternatives for comparison.
A famous exception was Delacroix who once had ambitions as a writer
(Pach 1937). His notebooks from North Africa contain masterly drawings and
colour studies densely surrounded by written descriptions of the scenes he is
recording. The depiction seems to amplify the description which is in turn
developed by reference to the depiction.
There are only a few systematic studies of sketching in practice.
Goldschmidt (1991) has made an interesting study of sketching by architects. She
refers to sketching as "interactive imagery" and distinguishes two forms of
reasoning whilst sketching as "seeing as" and "seeing that". "Seeing as" refers to
pictorial or figural reasoning and "seeing that" refers to nonfigural reasoning or
arguments about the entity being designed. In a later paper (1992) Goldschmidt
prefers the terms "figural" and "conceptual". She reports protocol studies (see
Newell and Simon 1972), in which seven experienced architects and one
architecture student participated in a specified library design problem whilst their
"thinking aloud" was recorded. The protocols (recorded thought and sketching
acts), were parsed into design "moves" defined as coherent, detectable design
operations. "Moves" were themselves analysed further into "Arguments" which
are reasoning acts leading to a design move. Her results show frequent alternation
between "seeing that" and "seeing as" whilst sketching or contemplating the
sketch. Goldschmidt agrees that her use of "figural" ("seeing as") and "conceptual"
("seeing that") overlaps with the terms "depictive" and "descriptive" as used here
and to which she referred (Fish and Scrivener 1990). However her distinction is
not the same as ours, in that "figural" does not necessarily exclude mental
descriptions of visual structure and it is not clear that mentally depictive reasoning
(Johnson-Laird referred to above) is excluded from her "conceptual". It must also
be remembered that protocol analysis has been criticised on the grounds that the act
of introspection and verbal report may change the nature of the internal processes
to which they refer (Evans, J. 1980). Despite these provisos, Goldschmidt's
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valuable studies are consistent with the descriptive to depictive translation
hypothesis.
Further suggestive evidence is provided by Scrivener and Clark, S. (1992)
in which they discuss the results obtained from a program of research intended
primarily to investigate the nature of collaborative design at a distance, using
remote terminals with a shared work space and with visual and auditory contact.
They discovered that "sketching acts" (distinguished on the basis of timed pauses
and recorded automatically), reflected meaningful components of the sketch
structure. Sketch acts could be classified into those which were depictive, (eg
object drawings), those which were descriptive (eg alphanumeric notes and labels)
and those which they termed "split acts" in which depictive and descriptive
information is realised in a "single burst of activity". "The results suggest that
descriptive acts normally accompany drawing acts in sketching". The authors
conclude that "a drawing act in sketching is not an attempt to represent a solution
as such, rather it is a notational device that helps its creator to reason with
complex and labile mental structures." Further inferences about the nature of such
structures will be made in the next chapter.
3.8 Conclusions concerning Representational Type.
1. Artists' sketches belong to a continuum of depictive to descriptive
representational types which vary from those in which highly concrete and specific
information is conveyed implicitly by an isomorphism or correspondence with
what is represented, to very abstract and general information represented by
explicitly defined symbol systems and rules of interpretation.
2. Sketches are intermediate between the two extremes, being roughly more
descriptive than pure drawing and more depictive than scientific diagrams or maps.
Reference to a complete range of representational type is necessary to distinguish
sketch components which show attributes genuinely intermediate in the depictive-
descriptive continuum and global sketch attributes which arise from the mixing of
components belonging to other systems, either higher or lower in the continuum.
Examples of mixed depictive descriptive components are illustrations, in which
written notes or numerical measurements are attached by marker lines to spatially
depictive positions.
3. Sketching shares with drawing, painting, and creative writing the
property of semantic symmetry (my term) since cognitive processes of equal
importance are used (in a feed-back loop) both for their generation and
interpretation. (This property contrasts with the semantic asymmetry of machine
processed photographs and other representations which are less semantically
generated than interpreted.)
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4. It is proposed that an important function of the class of intermediate and
mixed representational types to which sketches belong is depictive-descriptive and
descriptive-depictive translation. These processes are used in a feed-back loop to
support visual invention. However the two processes can be asymmetric with
respect to the sources (internal or external) and levels (concrete/local or
abstract/global) of the information they alter, remove or add.
5. Many of the characteristic properties of the "sketch class" of
intermediate representational types, such as "context dependence", "external 
reference but without explicit rules", and the presence of indeterminacies leading
to multiple interpretation or cognitive completion, show that they must be regarded
as incomplete representational systems. Any understanding of their cultural
functions will require a theory of the mental (cognitive-neural) representational
systems of which they are only a small, though more visible component. The
attributes of sketches are only understandable as a supplementary component of a
huge system of mental representation, both conscious and unconscious with which
their visible components interact. Chapters 4 to 7 attempt to unravel some of these
processes further.
6. Theories of cognitive representation which may underlie the visible
characteristics of sketches and which have been proposed at different levels of
analysis, from neural medium to cognitive function are, on the whole, consistent
with the "type translation within a continuum" theory of sketch function. I will
claim that the advantages posited by Ullman for Pictorial Descriptions, (clearly an
intermediate type) for his "matching by alignment" theory of recognition, seem to
have equally tangible advantages for theories of visual thought and invention.
The debate about whether or not mental images can be depictive is filled
with too many misunderstandings to be any longer fruitful. Once the physiological
plausibility of neural structures acting as functional depictive systems is established
the argument collapses. just as depictive theories cannot function without
descriptive interpreters, so descriptive theories ultimately require depictive
representation to be meaningful. Even Pylyshyn, probably the most consistent
"proposition only" theorist, admits that word meanings (and by implication other
descriptive representations) must at some point invoke perceptual (depictive) input
to avoid circularity (Paivio 1983 Pylyshyn 1984).
The problem of finding a non-humunculus theory of the mind's eye still
casts its shadow over any simplistic theory of mental depiction. It is less often
pointed out that a similar paradox must be resolved with propositional (descriptive)
theories. How can visual structure be represented by propositions if there is no
inner mind to interpret the propositions ? This problem is addressed in Chapter 7.
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7. The visible attributes of most published sketches and the few available
experimental studies of sketching, suggest that sketches function at the interface
between continuously interacting descriptive and depictive thought processes. The
realisation that depiction and description are interdependent suggests that sketching
is used to turn vague descriptions and sparse depictive imagery into continuously
richer ("denser") combined descriptively labelled depictions and depictively
interpreted descriptions.
3.9 Summary
Theses conclusions are summarised in the first hypothesis about sketch
function.
Hypothesis One
Sketches have attributes which make them intermediate between depictive
(picture-like) and descriptive (language-like) representations. Such attributes are
used to facilitate the bidirectional translation between descriptive and depictive
modes of thought.
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4. SKETCH PERCEPTION AND RECOGNITION.
"Heard melodies are sweet but those unheard are sweeter"
John Keats "Ode on a Grecian Urn" 1820
4.1 Introduction
Hypothesis Two states that "Human perception and object recognition
processes enable accidentally impoverished stimuli fast automatic access to long
term memory for perceptual completion. Sketch attributes exploit such unconscious
processes providing memory search and retrieval cues that improve the availability
of tacit visual knowledge for invention."
Chapters 4 and 5 address the issue of how sparse, untidy or confused sketch
attributes amplify invention in the two ways suggested by Leonardo. It is suggested
that biological processes which evolved for analysing, recognising and completing
naturally impoverished stimuli are exploited by sketches for a different cultural
purpose. The cognitive mechanisms likely to be involved are here conceived as
divided into two stages. In the first phase automatic perceptual processes group
sketch components into candidate objects which are then used with other automatic
processes as "look up" keys to long term visual memory. If the keys are
incomplete (e.g fragments of contour) or ambiguous and confused then it is likely
that the search and match processes used for recognition will unearth more "buried
treasures" from long term memory than do tidier, less ambiguous or more
complete representations. This chapter examines the extent to which existing
theories of picture perception and object recognition support this idea.
In the next chapter a second phase of this process will be proposed. It will
be suggested that candidate recognition matches lead to transitory percept
completion by spatially superimposed mental imagery. These two phases provide
two distinct but related functions - perceptual retrieval and perceptual completion.
The first phase is based primarily upon access to stored descriptive representations.
The second phase involves the mental generation of spatially depictive
representations. The mental representation of the sketch percept is viewed as a
descriptively labelled 21/2D spatial array (3.4.7 & 3.6.5).
4.2 Sketching and Theories of Perception.
4.2.1 The Classical Problems of Perception
Before discussing a perceptual function peculiar to sketches, it is worth
considering how theories of picture perception in general can be applied to
sketches. Such theories are themselves heavily influenced by which of several
schools of thought about the nature of perception their authors espouse.
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The problem for theories of perceptual organisation is that of explaining
how the perceptual experience of a meaningful three dimensional world of
segregated objects and events is constructed from the apparently inadequate
information provided by the flow of images presented to the retina. The retinal
image is a rather poorly formed two dimensional array of luminances and
chromaticities. Because it is a flat projection from a three-dimensional world,
information available in the retinal image about an object, confuses real size with
projected size (which changes with distance from the eye), and confuses real shape
with projected shape which changes with orientation. (Gregory 1969, Kaufman,
1974, Wilding, 1982). Moreover, useful colour information about an object (its
surface spectral reflectance) is not given explicitly in the retinal image, since
information about local luminance and chromaticity does not distinguish surface
reflectance from the colour and intensity of the illumination (Beck 1972).
Despite this, the visual system is able, in natural scenes at least, to
distinguish object size and shape from object distance and orientation and object
surface reflectance from surface illumination, providing remarkably valid
perceptual experience. Thus visual experience is the end result of cerebral
processes which extract the "invariances" of three dimensional objects from
fleeting stimulus information (For theoretical reviews see Bruce & Green 1986,
Gordon 1989). The many "accidental" variances in the image caused by vagaries of
view-point and illumination, although of interest to artists, are mostly irrelevant to
the biological functions of recognising and interacting with three dimensional
objects. So in representing and manipulating stationary views of imaginary objects,
the brains of artists must exploit visual mechanisms which have evolved for
responding to real objects of survival value in the natural environment of our
hominid ancestors. These mechanisms, which extract the "constancies" of the
three-dimensional world, discount or under-represent in visual consciousness many
of the view dependant features of vision that are of interest to artists.
Only a very small central region of the retina, the fovea, receiving light
from a visual angle of about 2° is capable of high resolution colour vision. Away
from the fovea the retina is progressively less able to distinguish detail and colour
although it remains sensitive at low resolution to movement and to low contrast
stimuli. For this reason the normal viewing of a sketch consists of brief fixations of
small fields of interest lasting 200-300 milliseconds followed by sudden
unconsciously computed jumps to new fixations points ("saccades") (Yarbus,
1967). There are two separated classes of signal which can be detected arriving
from the eye, a transient, fast signal sensitive to low contrast and a slower signal
sensitive to detail and colour. There is evidence that during a saccade the transient
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low resolution signal is suppressed, probably because it would generate erroneous
signals about movement (Burr et Al. 1994). It is likely that the transient system is
used to select regions of interest and to drive the eye to new locations for more
detailed processing (Schiller 1985). Despite this we perceive sketches like real
scenes as integrated wholes. Thus any theory of sketch perception must explain
how the brain is able to integrate a scattered sequence of saccadic fovea]
"snapshots" and interpolate briefly remembered detail for parts not fixated. This
point has been emphasised repeatedly by Hochberg (1968, 1980, 1984) and in used
in his theory of picture perception referred to below.
Rock (1983) has classified the variety of theoretical approaches to
perception into "stimulus theories" and "constructive theories". The latter he
subdivides again into "interaction theory" and "cognitive theory". These three
classes are roughly synonymous with the "Gibsonian", the "Gestalt" and the
"Helmholtzian" schools of thought.
4.2.2 The Gibsonian Theory of "Direct Perception" and its Influence.
Stimulus theories attempt to explain perceptual performance in terms of a
detailed analysis of the information provided to the senses (the "stimulus"). The
most influential and complete of such theories is J.J. Gibson's theory of "Direct
Perception" (Gibson 1950, 1966, 1971, 1979). Gibson and his followers assume
that the nervous system responds to this information directly in ways which explain
the structure of perceptual experience. Gibson's achievement has been to show the
richness of the optic information available in natural, "ecologically valid"
conditions. In his theory perception is an active process of exploration in which the
nervous system responds directly to "higher order" stimulus relationships which
are sufficient to define the "invariants" of real objects and scenes. The Gibson
school denies the importance of either memory or stored mental representations in
perception. Gibson placed great emphasis on the fact that in normal perception we
receive a dynamic family of changing views of objects and scenes in which certain
relationships remain constant. The information "picked up" by the visual system is
not that contained in static retinal images but in those relationships which can be
shown to remain invariant in the changing pattern of light as we move our heads
and bodies and as objects come in and out of view. As Marr (1982) has stated,
Gibson asked the "critically important question, How does one obtain constant
perception in everyday life on the basis of continually changing perceptions 7".
According to Marr the fatal shortcomings of Gibson's analysis was that he failed to
realise that the detection of physical invariants is an information processing task
and that he "underrated the sheer difficulty  of such detection".
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Gibson's experimental work drawing attention to the importance of such
factors as perspective, texture gradients, the horizon line, movement parallax etc in
explaining the perception of three dimensional surfaces (and no doubt some of the
attributes of sketches) deserves respect. However, as a contribution to the
understanding of sketch attributes, there is a serious problem with the theory of
direct perception. Many of Gibson's claims are incompatible with the theory
presented here which relies unashamedly upon a "stored representation" account of
perception. Gibson dismissed such "mind's eye" theories of perception as old
fashioned "mentalism" and the theory that we "project" memory images onto
indeterminate stimuli even as "mischievous nonsense" (Gibson, 1979, page 282). It
is possible to answer Gibson's claim that only "direct perception" has ecological
validity by pointing to the ecological necessity for early man to make fast
perceptual decisions in conditions of transitory, poorly illuminated, camouflaged,
or partly concealed object stimuli and the evidence that attention limits the capacity
to process all the information available to the eyes. But an even stronger refutation
of this negative aspect of "Gibsonism" emerges when efforts are made to suggest
how such higher order "pick-up" might be implemented by the brain (Marr 1982).
Shepard in a series of papers (1975, 1981, 1982, 1984) has tried to reconcile his
theory of internally represented "secondary isomorphisms" with the Gibsonian
invariants and "affordances". "Although I agree with Gibson that the brain has
evolved to extract invariants under favourable conditions, I also presume that it
has evolved to serve the organism under less favourable conditions of night time,
obstructed and spatially or temporally limited viewing and even of structural
damage to the brain itself' (Shepard, 1984). Unlike Gibson, Shepard believes that
the nature of internal representations was the crucial issue for the understanding of
perception.
The theory of "Direct" perception (Gibson 1979) and the denial of any role
for attention, memory and internal representation is so different from the theory of
sketches proposed here that it would be tempting to skip any discussion of the
Gibsonian school. However this is impossible due to the influence (and potential
future influence) of his theories on the design of visualising systems (Smets, 1992).
Gibson's theory has also been influential in theories of picture perception (Hagen
1981 1982 1986). Pictures, especially sparse indeterminate ones present a problem
for direct perception theory. For pictures, even very realistic ones like photographs
do not contain any of the movement based cues to object invariances which Gibson
maintained were important. Moreover, the information provided by gradients of
texture, shadow and linear perspective and by exact relationships to the ground
plane and the horizon may be present in photographs, but are missing in most
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sparse or untidy sketches. Gibson's own theory of picture perception, on which he
wrote repeatedly, has changed during his life (Gibson 1971 1979, Hagen 1981).
Originally he proposed that pictures, "re-presented" the array of light presented to
the retina by real objects. "A picture is a surface so treated that a delimited optic
array to a point of observation is made available which contains the same kind of
information that is found in the ambient optic arrays of an ordinary environment"
(Gibson 1971). In other words they succeeded to the extent that they mimicked
photographs. This theory hardly accounts for the sketch attributes discussed in
Chapter 2. Later he modified this view and claimed that they capture aspects of the
"Invariant information" available in the ordinary environment (Gibson 1979). This
later theory was never explained in detail and it has been left to one of his disciples
- Margaret Hagen, to develop from Gibson's theory of stimulus invariances what
she has called a "Generative theory" of picture perception. Briefly, Hagen
suggests that although a particular perspective view in a picture may be ambiguous
in theory, it belongs to a "generative set" of views which are known to, and can
be generated by, the viewer. "The static information in a perspective picture may
in this light be regarded as the frozen presentation of a single aspect, one instance
generated by a rule, and therefore perceivable by any possessor of generative
percepts." (Hagen 1981). The psychological availability of such generative rules is
shown, Hagen claims, by the facility with which novel views of objects and scenes
are perceived in pictures even by small children. In framing her Generative theory
Hagen claims to be closing the gap between Gibsonian theories of pictures and
other theories which assume a crucial role for memory and "unconscious
inference". However there is no admission that novel views of objects might be
generated, not only from perspective rules, but also from images created internally
from representations of remembered objects. "All visual experience will be in
accord with the rules of ecological geometry. An object of a particular form looked
at from a particular place will have a particular appearance, and it does not
matter that this particular appearance was never beheld before. It is generated by
the projective rules which govern the appearance of things. The particular
application of these rules with regard to specific objects and events does not
require the laborious association of experiences from the past." This aspect of
Hagen's theory is in contrast with the theory to be proposed here.
4.2.3 The Gestalt School and its Influence.
The Gestalt school of psychology which flourished in the 1920 and 30's
was pioneered mainly by Max Wertheimer, Kurt KoffIca and Wolfgang Kohler.
Their writings and those of their disciples have left a lasting influence on theories
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of perception, more by the phenomena they described (such the "Laws of
Perceptual Organization" and the principle of "Pragnantz") than by their theories
about how this might be implemented in the brain (see Kofflca 1938, Kohler 1947,
Ellis, W. 1938). The latter have been overtaken by contemporary neuroscience and
need not be discussed here. Gestalt psychologists emphasised the organisation of
perceptual experience into "wholes" with "emerging" features which could not be
understood, they believed, by an analysis of the component parts. Wertheimer's
paper demonstrating the ways by which perceived elements are involuntarily
organised according to the rules of proximity, similarity, good continuation,
closure and common fate is directly relevant to one of the functions of the sketch,
that of manipulating disparate units of form and colour into a single visual whole.
Their documentation of the properties of figure ground separation is also important
to the visual arts. The Gestalt psychologists proposed laws of perceptual
organisation such as the principle of "Pragnantz" or simplicity which they
believed were innate. The Gestalt psychologist often used simple line drawings to
illustrate their proposed "laws" and thus their work is incidentally relevant to
sketches. Koffka's classic (1938) chapter on Figure and Ground relationships
could almost be taken as part of a description of sketch attributes. For example he
pointed out that when an outlined shape is seen as figure, the contour line is always
perceived as belonging to the figure. The figure he found is more complex than the
ground, the texture clearer, the colour more saturated than the ground. Whilst
more recent research has confirmed many of the Gestalt school's findings, theories
about their significance have changed. It now appears likely that the "laws of
organisation" reflect the conscious products of early automatic, and "pre-attentive"
stages of visual processing, used to extract edges, surfaces and candidate objects
for further processing (see Chapter 6). This, at least, is the interpretation favoured
here. Gestalt theory however fails to account for the fact that in addition to
perceiving "emergent features" and "integrated wholes" we must be able to
perceive and attend to segregated image components. Because they never
developed a plausible theory of object recognition Gestalt theory fails to explain
how inventive imagery is elicited by sketch indeterminacies.
Rudolf Arnheim (1966, 1970, 1974) has made a comprehensive statement
about the relationships between Gestalt psychology and art. He has studied the
connection between Gestalt laws and visual composition and form perception in
painting and drawing (1974). He has gone rather beyond the Gestalt theories in his
notion of the "visual concept" which he uses to explain the way pictures represent.
Arnheim's "visual concept" of an object "conceives of the object as being three-
dimensional, of constant shape, and not limited to any particular projective aspect"
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(1974). In adults and artists the visual concept "embraces the multiplicity of its
appearances, the foreshortening, the slants, the symmetries and asymmetries, the
partial concealments and the deployments, the head on flatness and the pronounced
volumes" (Arnheim 1970). In Arnheim's theory of pictorial representation the
image is considered to be an expressive equivalent of an object not a "snap shot of
it". Further, objects must be represented from (one of) their most characteristic
viewpoints in order to successfully accomplish this equivalence. According to
Arnheim, certain projective views of any object contain what he called "Renvois"
that is references which point beyond a given view to adjacent ones. The difficulty
of interpreting uncharacteristic views is shown in the well known joke drawings, "a
giraffe's neck passing a window" or "a Mexican riding a bicycle". Whilst it is true
that an artist or designer may occasionally have cause to sketch an imagined object
from an uncharacterstic view, very few such views occur in published sketches
(e.g. Picasso (Glimcher and Glimcher) 1986, Welch 1986, St Laurent 1987).
Experimental support for Arnheim's theory is discussed later (4.3.5).
4.2.4 Hehnholtz's Theory of "Unconscious Conclusions".
It is an implicit (though perhaps unacknowledged) fact that both the
Gibsonian and the Gestalt approaches to perception assign to neural physiology
very complex but unexplained information processing tasks. In the Gibsonian
school this task is the "picking up" of higher order invariances from the changing
flow of the "ambient optic array". Their metaphor of "resonance" in which the
nervous system is compared to a tuned radio circuit appears to absolve the
psychologist from any need to consider how visual information might be
represented internally. In the Gestalt approach the task of an innate and largely
automatic, physiology is not so much to pick up structure already present in the
optical environment but to add structure to the unstructured stimulus before it
reaches conscious awareness. Thus the Gestalt school is more concerned in
describing the results of innate visual processing of stimuli. Both schools
emphasise the determinate aspects of perception. In contrast the Helmholtzian
approach emphasises the indeterminate probabalistic aspects. Helmholtz, the father
of this approach, likened conscious percepts as the "conclusions" of unconscious
inferences. In a much quoted chapter of his Treatise of Physiological Optics he
refers to how an astronomer may compute the distances and positions of the stars
using a knowledge of optics. "In the ordinary acts of vision this knowledge of
optics is missing. Still it may be permissible to speak of the psychic acts of
ordinary perception as unconscious conclusions, thereby making a distinction of
some sort between them and the common so-called conscious conclusions. And
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while it is true that there has been and always will be, a measure of doubt as to the
similarity between the results of the psychic activity in the two cases, there can be
no doubt as to the similarity between the results of such unconscious conclusions
and those of conscious conclusions." Thus what we experience when we see is not
given to us by the stimulus (as the Gibsonians claim) but has meaning and structure
added to it by some inferential process. Richard Gregory one of the strongest
supporters of the Helmholtz approach has developed the idea by making a detailed
comparison between perceptual inference and the inferences of science (Gregory
1970, 1973, 1980). Irwin Rock (1983) has also made a strong case for visual
processes which resemble reasoning. He distinguishes, "form construction" which
he says occurs by a process of description from "problem solving" which is used
to resolve ambiguous stimuli and "unconscious inference" proper where
perception reflects a rational solution to an indeterminate stimulus based upon
"assumptions" about the real world. A moderate Helmholtzian view is also taken
by Julian Hochberg (1968, 1981, 1984). Hochberg has emphasised the dependence
of perception upon stored representations. His studies, showing how object
percepts can be mentally completed from incomplete line fragments viewed
sequentially through holes, is relevant to the problem of how very sparse sketch
components are recognised. The problem with unconscious inference theories is
that the nature of consciousness and therefore of the difference between
unconscious and conscious inference is left unspecified. Helmholtz's disciples
would recognise that "unconscious inference" is distinguished from ordinary
inference in that it occurs without voluntary control and that it is not subject to
much conscious knowledge about the object perceived. Thus illusions and other
non-veridical perceptions persist in their appearance even when the subject has full
knowledge of their non-veridical nature. In contrast conscious inference must
surely take all the known facts into account before framing a hypothesis. It is
important to note Helmholtz's own caution in the quoted sequence above - "there
will always be a measure of doubt as to the similarity between the results of the
psychic activity - in the two cases". Should this doubt not cause one to insert the
words "as if" before unconscious inference accounts of perception? Another
possible criticism is that unconscious inference accounts say nothing about how
perceptual "conclusions" are represented. The term "inference" suggests a
propositional or descriptive reasoning process. However if, as I have argued in
Chapter 3 percepts have a strongly depictive component then how is that
component derived by inference? An unconscious inference theory might explain in
the "Hidden Man" demonstration (Illustration XXXII) why the flat black shapes
can be descriptively categorised as a head but a further theory is needed (in my
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opinion) to explain the depictive change that is experienced when a pattern of flat
shapes suddenly becomes a three-dimensional head and shoulders. Despite these
reservations, the Helmholtzian approach has the most to offer of the three schools
for the understanding of sketch attributes. Because Helmholtz's disciples believe
that perceptual experience is under-specified by normal stimuli they are naturally
interested in illusions and in the way we perceive ambiguous and incomplete
images. They have a vested interest in being able to explain how impoverished
stimuli such as pictures can be so rich perceptually.
As Gregory remarked (1970 page 32) "Pictures have a double reality.
Drawings, paintings and photographs are objects in their own right - patterns on a
flat sheet - and at the same time entirely different objects to the eye. We see both a
pattern of marks on paper, with shading, brush-strokes or photographic grain, and
at the same time we see that these compose a face, a house or a ship on a stormy
sea. Pictures are unique among objects; for they are seen both as themselves and
as some other thing, entirely different from the paper or canvas of the picture.
Pictures are paradoxes." If this is true of pictures then indeterminate sketches are
even greater paradoxes for in them we see not one stable "other thing" but many
changing things. Two paragraphs further on Gregory makes a comment which can
be developed in terms of the depictive - descriptive translation function of sketches
(Chapter 3). "Perhaps man's ability to respond to absent imaginary situations in
pictures represents an essential step towards the development of abstract thought.
Pictures are perhaps the first step away from immediate reality, and without this
reality cannot be deeply understood." (Gregory 1974). Later in the same work
Gregory discusses how writing may have developed from pictures and pictographs,
which perhaps indicates the direction this earlier thought was taking..
Julian Hochberg' "Mental Structure" theory of picture perception is also
Helmholtzian in tone and perhaps comes closest to this thesis in explaining the
nature of sketches, although it is tantalisingly incomplete. In agreement with
Gregory, Hochberg believes that "The fact that pictures appear to the viewer to be
so similar to the things they represent, although they are so different physically, is
a major fact that any theory of perception must confront" (Hochberg 1980). He
then goes own to argue with numerous examples, that pictures display the
operation of mental structures -
"that is of visual knowledge, not given in the stimulus display, about the
physical properties of objects and of their spatial relationships. If that is true,
where do the structures come from? Why should we have these abilities, if direct
response to information in the visual stimulus array that is presented by the world
normally suffices for veridical perception ?
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The answer to that puzzle, I believe, is that pictures are not unique in being
ambiguous and incomplete: The objects of the real world, as they are glimpsed
within each momentary glance, are usually partially hidden from sight, and are
ambiguous and incomplete as far as usable stimulus information is concerned... I
believe that mental structures of sensory expectation are developed to bridge the
successive glances at the world; that the difference between realistic pictures and
the scenes they represent may be negligible to the momentary glance; and that
pictures therefore draw upon mental structures normally developed in the service of
seeing the real world".
4.2.5 The Ideas of Ernst Gombrich.
Ernst Gombrich's theories of picture perception have already been referred
to. In his erudite description of the historical relationship between style and culture
in figurative art, he presents a theory which is broadly Helmholzian. Thus what we
see in a painting or sculpture depends both upon cultural convention and upon the
unconscious hypotheses we frame about what is represented. These in turn cause
the viewer to unconsciously "project" his or her hypotheses upon the indeterminate
components of the works we are looking at (Gombrich 1962, Chapter 4). How this
is possible is explained by the theory of "projection" used by Rorschach when he
invented his ink blot aid to psychoanalysis. Rather paradoxically Gombrich also
gives credence to Gibson's theory of direct perception (Gombrich 1982b).
Gombrich is the only one of the above authors who specifically addresses the
problem posed by the deliberate use of indeterminacy to stimulate invention either
as a private working method or to increase the beholder's share of the finished
work.
4.2.6 Perception as a Multi-Stage process: Towards a Synthesis
I have attempted to summarise the most widely adopted stances on
perception together with their consequences for picture theories for two reasons.
Firstly I want to show that theories of the design of new sketching systems
can be influenced, in crucial ways, by which of the rival theories of picture
perception is adopted. For example, the Gibsonians believe that the information
necessary to explain perception is available and "picked-up" from the flow of light
presented by the environment with no necessary involvement of knowledge or
memory. It follows from this that generating realistic imagery which mimics the
changing light patterns presented to the eye by real objects, is the natural way to
assist artists to visualise imaginary objects. It is therefore not surprising for
example, that Professor Smets should entitle the presentation of her laboratory's
interesting work on very realistic imaging systems for designers "The Theory of
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Direct Perception and CAD in Virtual Reality" (Smets, 1992). Unfortunately, there
was no time at the symposium at which she delivered the above paper, for me to
question her on this point ("Virtual Representations for Design and Manufacture"
Coventry University, 1992). However it is clear from the title and contents of her
paper that her approach towards visualising systems for designers is strongly
influenced by, or even based on, Gibson's theory. The adoption of a theory of
unconscious inference or mental structure would support a contrasting approach.
As Hochberg and other theorists believe, perception is forced by the limited
capacity of saccadic integration, foveal attention, etc to interpolate by inference or
expectation the unnoticed components of a scene. It follows that very detailed
over-complex imagery may distract automatic attentional processes from what is
relevant or important (see Chapter 6) and hinder inventive processes of mental
completion.
Secondly, none of the above theories of picture perception is sufficient to
explain the "privileged" attributes of sketches. All the existing theories leave
unanswered questions about the nature of the representations or physiological
processes which the brain uses to interpret sketch attributes and to interactively
generate from them new visual ideas.
The constructive or positive aspects of the three schools of thought about
perception are not mutually exclusive. More recently attempts to model perception
and cognition as information processing (e.g. Marr 1982, Watt 1988, Rumelhart et
Al. 1988, Humphreys & Bruce 1989) and recent ideas in visual neuroscience
(Hubel & Livingstone 1987, Kosslyn & Koenig 1992, Zeki 1993, Milner &
Goodale, 1995) suggest the possibility of a new synthesis using parts of all the
above theories. Thus Gibson's study of the higher order variables in natural stimuli
may indeed help us to understand how the brain acquires conceptual knowledge
from novel stimuli. However this does not mean that all the ecological information
available to the visual system, is actually used by the visual system (as Gibson
claimed), as the eye quickly samples a visual scene with a few fragmented glances.
It is surely true that even granted the richness of the information available in
natural scenes, knowledge and experience normally provide important
enhancements of perceptual experience. The gestalt laws of perception may prove
to be revealing consequences of important but early, pre-recognition, "bottom-up"
processes which derive from the retinal images a structured representation
containing candidate objects. This temporary representation is then subjected to a
second phase of "top-down" processing in which an automatic search occurs for a
match between the partly structured early representation and stored representations
in the same format in memory. Recognition is fast. It is at this second stage that it
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is plausible to postulate an inference-like filter to constrain what would otherwise
be a laborious memory search. There are two ways in which object, scene or event
probability might result in perceptual experience which resembles inference. Firstly
innate visual mechanisms are likely, by natural selection, to reflect unchanging
expectations in the natural environment, such as the effects of gravity on objects
and movement and the most frequent distributions of illumination and texture on
the ground plane. Secondly, visual experience since infancy must have caused the
construction of organised priority lists in memory of the most likely objects and
events to be anticipated in different contexts. If this priority is constructed in a
sufficiently adaptive manner then perceptual "conclusions" as if an unconscious
inference has occurred might result.
Thus the stance taken here is that conscious percepts are a synthesis from
many specialised visual processes and that sketch components trigger such
processes, many of which are automatic and unconscious. The evidence that
perceptual experience refers to a late construction in a multi-component component
process of visual analysis, with many parallel and sequential stages, is persuasive.
The studies by Marcel (1983a 1983b) on backward masking seem to prove, at least
for word perception, that both memory access to the shape of a word and memory
access to the meaning of a word, occurs before we are conscious of seeing the
word at all. Marcel displayed a pattern mask at varying intervals after a briefly
displayed word. Having found with each subject what interval (termed the SOA,
"Stimulus Onset Asynchrony") allowed a 60% correct identification of the word, he
then reduced the SOA to the point where his subjects told him they could not see
the word at all. However when asked to guess which of a list of words was similar
to (a) the shape of the target word or in another experiment to (b) the meaning of
the target word, they consistently guessed (statistically) correctly much more often
than chance. Thus information about shape and meaning appeared to be accessed
before perceptual awareness. A fascinating point is that as the SOA becomes
shorter and masking is greater, first visual awareness is lost, then word shape
perception and finally word meaning. This order is the reverse to that which would
be expected by "bottom-up" processing theories, since earlier masking would be
expected to interfere with earlier stages of processing which surely must progress
in the order - "analyse form, look up meaning, construct conscious percept".
Marcel's explanation is that visual information only becomes conscious (and hence
a "Percept") when all the different separately processed components can be
successfully integrated. This reverse order of masking then perhaps makes sense if
masking interferes with the construction of the late percept. In this process word
meaning could be accessed and held in a temporary store before word shape is re-
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used for the final integration. This interpretation may be wrong, but it is consistent
with the many other experiments which have shown that briefly displayed,
incomplete or ambiguous percepts are modified in subjects' reports to agree with
their semantic expectations (Carmichael et Al. 1932, Vernon M.D. 1970).
Marcel's late construction theory is important to picture perception because of the
distinction I have already drawn between semantically and non-semantically (ie
"contingent") generated representations. Photographs and computed photographic
simulations present or fabricate uninterpreted information similar to frozen retinal
images. Sketches like drawings and paintings present information which has been
selected from the structured and semantically labelled internal representation of
conscious percepts or visual memories. Thus contours, figure ground relationships,
scene structure and implicit meaning are presented as already given to a visual
system, designed by evolution to extract these features from much more complex
natural stimuli. However the "late construction" theory does not necessarily imply
that the proximal (projected) sizes and shapes of objects are not available to artists
when they sketch. It is true that the results of object perception and recognition
usually means that we see familiar objects as preserving their size as their distance
changes, but as Kaufman (1974) has pointed out there appear to be two modes of
perception depending on how we attend to the information provided by our eyes.
Thus normally when I am driving I see the car in front of mine as its normal size
and am very aware of its distance. However by switching attention it is also easy to
see that the height of the image of the car is smaller than that of my wind-screen
wipers. This dual mode of perceiving is perhaps especially developed in artists and
designers. It may be part of the answer to Gregory's "paradox" of picture
perception where we perceive the plane of the picture and the proximal sizes of
sketched objects, whilst simultaneously perceiving the represented distances and
the intended object constancies (although these are more dominant in real views).
Perhaps the best parts of these rival theories of perception can be reconciled
by assigning to each a different phase of this multistage process. None of the above
theories of picture perception offers a convincing theory of sketch attributes.
However there are elements of insight in each, to which the present theory owes a
debt. Especially useful is Hochberg's comment that picture perception does not
rely on special cognitive processes, but that it uses "Mental structures" which
evolved not for pictures but to enable the biologically adaptive response to
ambiguous and incomplete stimuli in the real world. In order to develop this idea it
is necessary to ask the following questions.
1. How are sketch components represented for perception?
2. What type of memory representation might they interact with ?
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3. What sort of memory matching process is used ?
4. What type of process might enable the mental completion of sketches?
How is it distinguished from a recognition match ?
4.3 Sketches and Object Recognition.
4.3.1 How Sketches Exploit Recognition Mechanisms.
In so far as sketches are private representations primarily of value to their
creator, it might appear that there is no recognition problem. In generating lines,
hatching, colour washes etc the artist usually knows what these marks are intended
to represent before they are made. So she or he can hardly fail to recognise what
they signify. This misses the point. As we have seen, the sketch marks are there to
assist their user to imagine new visual structure and this implies perceiving
unexpected relationships and meanings in the marks made. According to
Hypothesis 2 sketch attributes exploit recognition mechanisms which evolved for
the perception of accidentally, impoverished stimuli in the real world. If some of
those recognition processes are involuntary and automatic then sketch components
may have besides their intended meaning unintended, unexpected and sometimes
useful perceptual consequences. It is the automaticity of recognition that causes the
untidy pentimenti in Leonardo's sketch for the Battle of Anghihari to suggest,
unexpectedly, Neptune rising with his horses from the sea (Illustration II). As I
shall argue later (7.4) novel retrieval permutations from unconscious memory may
be an important component of visual inventiveness.
The term recognition refers to a cluster of functions which have in common
the implicit association of stimulus derived visual information with information in
memory. At the lowest level of sketch structure the artist recognises simple shapes,
curves and colours associating them, perhaps unconsciously with remembered
contexts. These shapes and colours are normally organised by the visual system
into particular two dimensional patterns representing possible objects separated
from their backgrounds. Visual recognition evolved to recognise three dimensional
objects in three-dimensional space and may discount view-specific position, scale,
orientation or colour (Sutherland, 1968). For this reason, I suggest it is difficult
for painters and designers to make marks on two dimensional surfaces which do
not have three-dimensional connotations. Theories of recognition attempt to
account for the fact that we can recognise the same object from any view point,
even though many of these view points will produce novel two-dimensional
projections on the retina. However in sketches many of the stimulus cues, believed
to be used by the visual system to infer three-dimensional structure in real scenes,
are always missing (e.g. movement parallax, retinal disparity) and others are often
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missing (e.g. gradients of shadow, gradients of texture and perspective projected
from the correct view point). But in addition, recognition is the ability to
categorise a represented object in many different ways. This type of recognition
surely demands a hierarchy of semantic associations in long term memory. These
three visual achievements, pattern recognition, object view recognition and object
categorisation are usually but not necessarily linked. Thus one may recognise the
shapes made by a tree without realising that it is a particular tree one has seen
before. One may recognise a tree as a particular one without knowing what kind of
tree it is. One may recognise a tree as an oak tree, or just a tree, or just as a
strange plant, even though much of its shape and many of its features are
unfamiliar. Finally there is the ability to give verbal labels to the tree and its parts
which in turn is used to access linguistically represented knowledge. Humphreys et
Al. (1988) suggest a multi-component stage model for picture recognition
supported by neuropsychology and the results of "priming" experiments. They
suggest that three processes of visual recognition occur in cascade (i.e. the second
stage starts before the first has finished). Early bottom up visual processing derives
a view-point dependant object description (such as Marr's 21/2D sketch). The first
stage of recognition, "Perceptual Classification" compares this early
representation with stored descriptions of object appearances. The second stage,
"Semantic Classification" concerns recognising the function and categorical
properties of an object. The third stage "Naming" associates the object and its
parts with verbal labels. This is an interesting proposal which seems to provide
scope for top down semantic influences upon ambiguities encountered at the
perceptual stage. Thus tentative semantic "hypotheses" may be available in cascade
before the earlier perceptual classification is complete. As these authors have also
pointed out there are, almost certainly, many different routes to object recognition
depending upon the recognition task, its context, the degree of object familiarity
and the type of information which characterises an object category.
The following theories of recognition are sometimes presented as
competitors. In my view this is a mistake. It is more likely that each theory
captures different aspects of the complex processes available for the perceptual
recognition of sketch components.
4.3.2 Feature theories
Feature theories of recognition assume that objects have local features
which can be detected directly by the nervous system. Candidate features are
usually assumed to be simple geometric properties such as vertical and horizontal
lines, curves, angles, corners etc.(Selfridge et Al. 1960). In its simplest form a
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recognition match consists of comparing a weighted list of object features in long
term memory with the relative activation strengths of the feature detectors. Some
approaches assume that objects have certain invariant features which are common
to all their views (Pitts et Al. 1947). Others point out that some objects may
possess a unique "landmark feature" which allows identification of an object at any
orientation (Humphreys and Quinlan, 1987). The trouble with feature theories is
that if features are assumed to be simple, then many different objects possessing
the same features are not distinguished. If the features become complex, then the
problem is deferred until we know how the features themselves are recognised.
Thus in sketches of figures an eye might be considered to be a landmark feature for
a face, but such a degree of specificity would multiply the number of feature
detectors required to astronomic numbers. It makes sense to assume that feature
detection is only one component of more complex recognition processes.
4.3.3 Structural Descriptions
Structural Descriptions are theories of representation based on the premise
that the common properties of object views and object categories consists of the
structural relationships between the parts. At least two kinds of Structural
description have been proposed.
The first is purely symbolic, consisting of nodes representing object
features linked by non-verbal propositions expressing the relationships between
these nodes. This attempts to solve the problem as to how we recognise so easily
novel exemplars of objects which occur in a multiplicity of shapes and colours.
Thus the letter "T" is represented by an approximate vertical line and an a
horizontal line linked by propositions stating how they are connected. If such
descriptions were coded in hierarchical nets with the "part" nodes at one level
being linked to further subordinate descriptions the system becomes potentially
very powerful. Since only defining relationships need be represented, tolerances
can be provided and default values given for variables provided by object and
scene schemata (Minksy 1975). Palmer (1975a, 1977) has developed this idea,
suggesting structural descriptions for simple shapes such as cubes and abstract
linear figures. He provides converging evidence to support this framework in a
series of experiments using simple stick figures, studying how people perceive and
rate as "natural" object parts, and on the time taken for a mental synthesis of
spatially separated parts into unitary figures. The difficulty with such purely
descriptive theories is that they would have to be immensely complex to describe
natural objects such as human figures (see Palmer's descriptive cube 1975).
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Another form of "Structural Description" assumes that the spatial structure
of an object is represented in a coordinate system after the extraction of an axis or
frame of reference. The term "coordinate system" is here used loosely to mean any
system of representation in which object spatial relationships are referred to by
relative distances and directions within a single frame of reference. In terms of the
depictive descriptive continuum discussed in Chapter 3, coordinate systems are
intermediate types in which the descriptive elements include the rules for
translation to depictive elements by a mapping into a real or imaginary spatial
medium. A question which has been debated is whether such long term
representations for recognition use an object centred reference frame or a viewer-
centred one (Jolicoeur & Kosslyn 1983). Marr and Nishihara (1978) proposed an
object centred representation, using an hierarchically structured coordinate system
of generalised cones around longitudinal axes. Thus a human figure is represented
globally around a single vertical axis, and in increasing detail, by subordinate axes
for trunk, head, arms and legs. An arm can be represented by jointed axes for
upper arm and fore-arm and hand. A hand has separate sub-ordinate axes for
fingers etc. The Marr and Nishihara model is elegant and carefully thought out. Its
hierarchical structure addresses the problems of the need to represent the structure
common to high level and lower level shape categories allowing for successive
refinement. The authors claim that it can be derived from Marr's viewer-centred
"21/2D sketch" (Marr 1992), using natural constraints, by a mechanism they term
the "image space processor". They rejected viewer-centred representations
primarily because of the large number of views which they believed would have to
be stored for each object.
4.3.4 Theories of Recognition by Components
An interesting class of theories attempt to explain how an object's structural
description might be derived from invariances cued by typical object views. These
suggestions are relevant to sketch theory, because they have been applied to object
recognition from contour profiles and to incomplete line drawings (see Illustration
XXX). They are also useful because they address the problem of how we recognise
objects which present incomplete contours and parts because they are partly
obscured by other objects, as is often the case. I will suggest that this capacity for
recognition from incomplete information is exploited in sketches for a secondary
cultural purpose.
Hoffman, D. and Richards, M. (1984) suggest that the visual system
decomposes object shapes into parts at regions of concavity along the visible object
contour. Contour lines in sketches fit Marr's classification into: (1) contours that
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define an object's silhouette or surface discontinuity ("self occluding contours")
(2) contours that mark a change in orientation of a surface and (3) contours that
mark the edges of a shadow or change of reflectance within a surface. (In sketches
lines are of course also used for non-contour purposes such as representing shadow
and texture). It is the first of these contours which are considered by Hoffman, D.
and Richards, M.. According to their theory part boundaries are defined by a rule
which exploits a uniformity of nature termed "transversality". This regularity
occurs because "when two arbitrarily shaped surfaces are made to interpenetrate
they always meet in a contour of concave discontinuity of their tangent planes".
Thus the profile of a face divides naturally into nose, lips forehead etc according to
this rule. The authors conclude that the visual system exploits transversality to
categorise objects parts as one of the regularities of nature which underlies the
inference of parts from images. These parts can then be used for building an object
description for recognition. The theory has the merit that it can help to explain how
we are able to recognise object silhouettes when part of the silhouette is hidden
behind another object.
Starting from similar premises Biederman (1987) has developed a theory in
which the input image is segmented at regions of concavity into 36 kinds of simple
volumetric components such as blocks, cylinders, wedges and cones. These are
then used as primitives to derive structural descriptions of objects which are
invariant for position, size and orientation. Hummel and Biederman (1992) have
implemented a computer neural net program to illustrate the theory. This uses line
drawings of simple imaginary objects to derive representations which can be used
to recognise the same objects from any view point, size or position. However it has
yet to be shown that Biederman's model will work with drawings of natural objects
such as human figures which present more complex problems. In support of this
theory Biederman and Cooper, E. (1991b) have investigated the recognition of line
drawings with partly deleted contours. Such incomplete or missing contours are
often found in sketches (Illustration X). They found that when contours are deleted
in such a way as to leave regions of concavity (corners and edge terminations)
intact object recognition is still easily achieved. However when an identical degree
of contour deletion includes the concavities posited to define part boundaries then
recognition is difficult or impossible. They showed further that contour deleted
images of the first (completable) type primed recognition for the complementary
image. (consisting of the missing contour segments). They conclude from this and
other priming experiments that contour deleted images provide evidence for
representations intermediate between the input contour view and a structural
description of the relationships between the posited "geons".
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4.3.5 Object Position, Size and orientation.
A key issue for theories of sketch recognition is how the stored
representations used for recognition achieve independence from the three irrelevant
metric variables of viewed objects - position, size and orientation. It would be
grossly inefficient for the brain to store multiple representations of every familiar
object in every position, size or orientation in which we are able to recognise it.
The possibility favoured by proponents of structural descriptions is that the stored
representation used for recognition matching is in a form which is invariant for
position, size, orientation and view-point. In a series of papers Biederman and
Cooper, E. present evidence based upon the effect of priming (prior exposure of
the object stimulus) that the representation used is independent of position in the
visual field, independent of a reflection about the vertical axis, independent of size
and independent of orientation (Biederman and Cooper, E., 1991a, 1992
Biederman & Gerhardstein 1991).
Whilst there is little reason to doubt the fact that object recognition is
position invariant there is some apparently contradictory evidence suggesting (in
some kinds of recognition at least) that prototypical views and normalised sizes
may require a matching process which must be preceded by preliminary size
scaling or mental rotation of one of the two representations.
The clearest evidence for size scaling and mental rotation is provided when
the task is to match two simultaneously presented shapes. Thus the time to specify
whether two random polygons are the same is monotonically related to the
difference in size, suggesting that the match must be preceded by a size equalising
process (Bundesen & Larsen 1975, Larsen & Bundesen 1978, Bundesen et Al.
1981). The famous results on mental rotation (Shepard & Metzler 1971, Shepard &
Cooper, L. 1982) demonstrated under many conditions a monotonic relationship
between the time to make same or different responses to simultaneously presented
views of three-dimensional shapes and the angular orientation difference. The fact
that the inferred rotation occurred equally fast in depth as in the picture plane
suggests that subjects must have been able to form a three-dimensional
representation of the abstract shapes used. The tasks in these experiments differ
from normal recognition in that the matching does not implicate long term
memory. Unlike the contrasting Biederman and Cooper, E. results where the task
was the categorical recognition of very familiar objects, these matching
experiments used either unfamiliar shapes or attributes such as handedness, which
it has been argued, require rotation because they are not represented in orientation
independent form (Shepard & Cooper, L., 1982). Unlike categorical recognition,
such transformations for simultaneous comparison are usually assumed to be
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related to conscious image manipulation in short term memory. In a later study
Larsen and Bundesen (1978) produced evidence for a different process of size
scaling, for pattern and character recognition, which is faster and, according to the
authors, is a scaling operation used for matching stimulus patterns against
representations in long term memory. Jolicoeur & Landau (1984) found strong
systematic effects of orientation in the identification of letters and numbers.
However the effects are much smaller than those found in the mental rotation
experiments, suggesting again a different process. In another series of studies
Jolicoeur (1985) found systematic effects of orientation in the time to name line
drawings of natural objects. However with practice the effect of orientation
reduced considerably, presumably because unusual orientations were being learned.
Another result indicates that novel depictions of a known class of objects may be
identified by a process of mental rotation. Corballis (1988) has suggested that an
initial frame independent description of an object's shape is sufficient to access a
stored representation of that shape in long term memory. Once it has been
categorised, its axis and orientation can be determined and mental rotation then
used to determine other features such as its handedness.
Thus the evidence suggests that different types of matching and
representation may be used for different kinds of object recognition.
Neuropsychology provides clear evidence for the distinction between object
recognition based on a direct match with long term memory and object matching
which uses transformation processes by mental imagery. Using previously
published cases Farah (1984) collected eight cases of patients with brain damage
who could perceive and recognise objects whilst having a deficit in image
generation. They could not describe or draw objects from long term memory and
denied having visual imagery. A further 13 patients showed the reverse
dissociation. They could detect draw and describe objects but they could not
recognise objects presented.
There is evidence that the long term representations used for visual
recognition include viewer-centred representations despite the apparent
disadvantages. Thus Jolicoeur and Kosslyn (1983) provide converging evidence
that both viewer-centred and objected centred representations are used for learning
and recognising novel three-d. stick figures. Rock and DiVita (1987) found that
after viewing novel three-d. wire objects their subjects showed substantial view
dependence in their subsequent ability to recognise these objects. This was
according to the authors the result of a failure to achieve an object-centred
representation.
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If as the evidence suggests, object recognition frequently depends upon a
match with stored view dependent representations, then a key question is how are
objects recognised from so many different viewpoints? Arnheim's theory that
pictures exploit characteristic views or "renvois" has already been mentioned
(4.2.3). Support for the idea that certain views contain more information than
others and may act as recognition prototypes is provided by Palmer, Rosch and
Chase (1981). These authors used three converging measures to rate what they
called the "Canonicalness" of small models of familiar objects. These were (1)
subjective ratings of 'goodness' of different perspective views, (2) the perspective
from which people first imagine a common object and (3) the perspective from
which they choose to take the best photograph. They then demonstrated that highly
Canonical views (measured as above) are identified more quickly than others with
response latencies being a monotonically decreasing function of canonicalness.
Finally, the same authors showed that the rated canonicainess of a perspective view
could be predicted from (1) the visibility of information about the object in a given
perspective view and (2) the subjective importance of that information for the
identity of the object. Thus their results support the idea that there are certain
perspective views which make more information for perceiving and recognising an
object than others. If only a few prototypical views of an object are represented in
memory then it is presumed that objects seen from other views would have to be
mentally rotated until they matched one of the stored views. The alternative theory
is that so many different views of every object are represented in memory that little
transformation of orientation need precede the matching process. Tarr and Pinker
(1989) have attempted to distinguish between these two options. They examined
the effects of practice on learning to recognise a number of novel stick figures at
different orientations. Their results were consistent with a hybrid between the
mental rotation and the multiple view point hypotheses. They suggest that viewed
shapes are transformed to match the nearest or the most canonical of multiple
stored views. The authors also suggest that for very familiar shapes mental rotation
may be much faster or unnecessary because many views have been learned, as is
perhaps the case with disoriented letters and numbers (Corballis et Al. 1978,
Corballis 1988). Evidence is also provided from mental imagery. There is
neuropsychological evidence that the long term representations used for recognition
are the same as those used for generating a mental image (an important finding
which will be referred to again). Thus Martha Farah described four cases of brain
lesions resulting in content specific impairments in the ability to recognize objects
(Farah, 1988b). In all cases there was a parallel matching content specific
impairment in imagery ability. Pinker et Al. (1984) found that subjects could not
4. Sketch Perception and Recognition 	 117
visualise in one step the appearance of a three dimensional object from an arbitrary
viewing angle. Instead they visualise it in some "canonical" orientation then
mentally rotate it into the target orientation. These two results combined, provide
further support for the existence of stored view dependant representations. Lastly it
should be mentioned that Perrett et Al. (1985) have found a range of separate
clusters of neurones in infero-temporal cortex of the macaque monkey which are
sensitive to specific views of heads and faces, profiles, full views, half views and
even rear views. Perrett et Al. (1991, 1994) have shown that although there are
cells tuned to a range of different perspective views certain views such as the full
face and full profile were much more strongly represented than others.
Interestingly the neurophysiological evidence for the importance of particular head
views parallels the importance of different views in behavioural studies. Thus there
is converging evidence from different sources that Arnheim's intuition that artists
and designers exploit "renvois" to assist pictorial recognition is well based. This
does not however rule out the co-existence of object centred descriptive systems
though the nature of these is still disputed. Besides the view specific cells in
monkey inferotemporal cortex, there are also some cells which are view point
invariant to individual faces. Perrett et Al. (1994) suggest that such view
independent cells are formed by combining the outputs of view-specific cells. They
also suggest that the coexistence of different types of stored representation reflects
the requirements of different types of visual task. Thus when the viewer must reach
out to grasp an object, a viewer centred frame of reference which specifies
orientation is appropriate. In other tasks categorical recognition which is
independent of view point is more important. In most sketches the contour of
objects and the spatial shapes made by specific views are important and I would
expect painter's sketches especially to depend upon view-specific mental
representations of objects and scenes. Sketches of objects for three-dimensional
design however would be more likely to prime stored object centred
representations of the Marr\Biederman type. readers are invited to survey the
sketches illustrated to decide for themselves the truth of the hypothesis that rough
sketches exploit prototypical views of objects or object parts to stimulate the
imagination.(e.g. Illustrations IX, X, XI, XIV, XX, XXIX, XXXIV).
4.4 Does Sketch Recognition include a Depictive Match ?
"Template" theories of object recognition postulate the spatial alignment of
a perceived object shape with a stored candidate shape, followed by the
computation of the degree of overlap between the two. Unlike structural
description theories, recognition is assumed to include a matching process which
depends upon correspondences of spatial position between the parts of two
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representations. Such theories imply partly depictive representations which can be
mapped into a spatial medium such as a neural array. Template theories of
recognition have usually been considered implausible on the grounds of
inefficiency (Neisser, 1967 Pinker 1984). However criticisms of alignment
matching theories have often been "tilting at a straw man". A template match at an
early stage of visual processing, in which an image is represented as an array of
luminances and colours, would require such an impossibly large number of stored
shapes to account for the recognition of multiple views and exemplars of object
categories, as to be unworkable. Such a process has never been seriously proposed.
Clearly alignment matches would only be applied to higher level spatial maps in
which many candidate feature such as contours and figures have already been
extracted. As many authors have pointed out it is difficult to see how such a
matching process could account for the ability to recognise previously unseen
examples of object categories such as trees, with infinitely variable projected
shapes. Also as Pinker (1984) has pointed out it has problems with three-
dimensional shapes and with an unstructured part of an image containing more than
one object. However template theories are more plausible when they are assumed
to apply to pre-processed representations, in which candidate objects have already
been segmented into parts and normalised for position, size and orientation. The
evidence presented above that multiple view dependent representations can be
learned and used for recognition, combined with the evidence that transformation
operations are sometimes used in shape recognition, makes a role for template
matching more likely.
Ullman (1989) has described a model for shape recognition by alignment
using semi-depictive "pictorial descriptions". He has shown mathematically that
spatial alignment of two-dimensional views is possible provided three
corresponding alignment points can be identified. He suggests that these might be
prominent, easily identified features which most objects possess. In this approach
the recognition process is divided into two stages. The first determines the
transformation in space that is necessary to bring the viewed object into alignment
with possible object models. The second determines the model which best matches
the viewed object. Like Biederman's contrasting model Ullman's has been
implemented by computer (Huttenlocher & Ullman 1987). Thus it can claim to
increase the feasibility of template matching without, of course, demonstrating that
such a method is actually used by the brain. One point that Ullman's model makes
clear, is that alignment matching can match spatial positions in a map-like
representations where spatial locations are used not to represent unprocessed
primitives such as luminance and chromaticity (as in an real image), but labels to
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pre-processed part descriptions. This is one of the advantages of combining
depictive maps in a spatial array with descriptive parts. It is possible to imagine
such an intermediate representation to be hierarchically structured, with spatial
locations indexing both categorical structures and coordinate descriptions of parts,
which could themselves be expanded by further mapping onto the array to provide
extra detail as needed (my interpretation of an earlier suggestion by Palmer
(1978)). The perceptual components of sparse sketches could then be acting as a
spatial memory "look-up" system near the "trunk" of such a depictive-descriptive
tree. Thus lines identified as trees in Millet's "Curtain of Trees" (Illustration
XXIV) provide spatial pointers to descriptions in memory of missing branches and
twigs. The snowman's face with stones for eyes and a stick for a mouth looks like
a face because its provides spatial markers to detailed mental descriptions of
familiar facial features (see also "fruit faces" in Palmer, 1975b). (In Chapter 9 I
suggest that it would be rewarding to include such intermediate information
structures in an improved machine sketching system).
Ullman does not mention another component of visual processing which
might be used to facilitate recognition matching by spatial alignment. The visual
system uses, in parallel, nine or more band-pass spatial frequency channels in the
early stages of image analysis. Their physiological responses have been studied in
area V1 of the visual cortex. Here organised columns of neurons responsible for
processing a limited region of the visual field are divided into layers which respond
to different spatial frequencies and which have in consequence overlapping
receptive fields of different sizes (Georgeson 1979, De Valois et Al. 1982). If such
spatially organised frequency channels are also available to those other cortical
regions responsible for high level vision then template matching might be
facilitated by matching corresponding positions in sequence starting with low and
proceeding to higher frequencies . Such a process would allow varying degrees of
tolerance in an alignment match and an early rejection of bad matches. Watt (1988)
has suggested a similar sequence of spatial frequency matches for position finding
and grouping processes in low level vision. The existence of alignment matching is
implicit in the hybrid-image theory of the sketch discussed in 5.3.7.
4.4.1 Categories versus Exemplars.
As mentioned earlier, recognising sketch components may involve the
assignment of a candidate object to a category and also the identification and
elicited retrieval from memory of a specific example of that category. There are
grounds for supposing that the visual system uses different types of representational
system for these two kinds of recognition For example patients with a cerebral
4. Sketch Perception and Recognition 	 120
deficit known as prosopagnosia can often recognise a familiar person's face as a
face but are unable to identify whose face it is.
Prototype theories suggest that we use idealised patterns based upon an
average structure of many exemplars to recognise categories. Experiments have
shown that for recognising families of abstract patterns (Franks and Bransford
1971) or diagrammatic faces (Reed, 1972) people find it easier to recognise a
variant of the family which is closer to the prototype than a less typical example
even though they have never been shown the prototype.
Relevant to sketches is a theory of face recognition which suggests that,
once a face encoding has achieved a match with a stored prototypical face average,
an individual's face is identified by how far it varies from this prototype in a
multidimensional space of facial parameters (Valentine & Bruce 1986, Bruce,
1988). Brennan (1985) has used a similar model to explore the nature of
caricatures in a computer model. She has encoded a number of faces from frontal
photographs as 186 corresponding co-ordinates scaled so that they have matching
x, y values for the pupils of each eye. Her "caricature generator" works by
exaggerating the differences between encoded points in an individual face and in a
prototype formed by calculating the average co-ordinates of all the faces. It has
been shown that caricatures generated in this way as line drawings are recognised
more quickly than veridical line drawings of the same faces (Rhodes, Brennan &
Carey, 1988). Although such "super-recognition" attributes are most obvious in
political cartoons they are used in more subtle ways in artists' sketches to
emphasise important features. Note for example the exaggerated body length and
necklines in Fashion sketches (Illustration VIII).
Theories of object category representation are important to sketch function
because in the early stages of visual thought a "natural" perceptual device is needed
to assist the mind to imagine many possible exemplars of a tacitly represented
object class.
4.4.2 Schemata: The Importance of Context.
The deliberate vagueness of typical sketch attributes means that their
context must play an even greater role in biasing recognition than it does in
perceiving less ambiguous stimuli. The speed of sketch recognition and the mental
ability to resolve sketch ambiguities are dependent upon a prior knowledge of the
sketch subject matter. The term "schemata" is frequently used to refer to stored
models of scenes and events, which can be used to anticipate the spatial positions
and semantic relationships between candidate objects and their parts (Bartlett 1932,
Palmer 1975a, Minsky 1975).
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In a series of studies, Biederman (1972, 1981 Biederman et Al. 1973) has
shown that the speed and error rate of identifying and finding familiar objects in
pictures, is greatly affected by their pictorial context. When pictures of familiar
scenes were jumbled, or an object was placed in an unlikely position, detection
speed was greatly increased compared to when the scene was coherent. A rather
startling finding was that selected objects in coherent scenes could be recognised in
too short a time to allow more than one saccadic glance. Thus scene schemata
appear to be activated with very briefly presented information. Biederman lists five
types of object relationships that might be recorded in scene schemata - support,
interposition, probability, position and size. (See Illustration XXX).
In a complementary study, Palmer (1975a) has demonstrated the influence
of the prior presentation of visual scenes on the identification of briefly presented
drawings of familiar objects. The number of correct responses and of confusions
with visually similar objects were related to both the context and the particular
target object presented. Palmer quotes Morton's (1969) "logogen" model of word
recognition as providing a good "quantitative fit" to his data. One of Morton's
suggestions, which has since been adapted to visual imagery (Paivio's "imagen"
theory, Paivio 1986), is that internal recognition units exist which have a threshold
for activation which is lowered by semantic contexts with which they are
consistent. Applied by analogy to sketches rather than words, ambiguous object
contour lines in the Leonardo Anghiari sketch discussed above (Illustration II) are
more likely to activate "Neptune rising" recognition units or "men fighting" units
depending upon the sketch schema unit currently co-active in Leonardo's mind.
Palmer (1975c) sees scene schemata as a natural development of Structural
Descriptions with characteristic objects linked by propositions expressing their
relationships. The difference between a scene schema and an object structural
description is one of degree, with a scene schema, of necessity, being more
tolerant and general. When a sketch centres around a single object then a schema
for an object category might be used to limit the number of more specific structural
descriptions.
Whether such scene schemata are as influential in untidy sketches as they
are in the neat drawings used by Biederman and Palmer deserves to be tested.
Illustration XXV shows Rousseau's "Twisted Tree" with a part misplaced and
Illustration XXVI shows the same drawing corrected.
4.4.3 Memory Retrieval
When applied to sparse or untidy sketches, the theories of object
recognition described above obviously depend upon poorly understood memory
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retrieval mechanisms. Sketch attributes, however impoverished, act as cues to the
retrieval of stored object information. There is a huge parallel literature on
"memory retrieval" (reviewed Baddeley, 1990, chapter 11), which has been largely
avoided here, because it is almost entirely concerned with accessing the meanings
and associations of words. However there is a fascinating analogy between the
theory of recognition by parts, combined with a later image completion process as
presented here, and Tulving's theory of "Synergistic Ecphory" (Tulving, 1983).
(According to Baddeley (1990) the term "ecpholy" is based on a Greek word
meaning "to be known". Tulving himself does not give the origins of his
neologism). It is used by Tulving to refer to a theory of episodic memory retrieval
(recalling memories of events) in which a retrieval cue is combined with the
unconsciously stored representation of an event to provide a hybrid "conscious
memory of certain aspects of the original event". Learning is assumed to
implement the storage in Long Term Memory of a "Memory trace" or "engram".
Recollection is postulated (in Tulving's model GAPs, short for General Abstract
Processing System) as a symbiotic process of interaction and constructive synthesis
("Synergy") between the retrieval cue and the stored engram. Tulving's theory of
episodic memory ecphory is relevant to Chapter 7 which discusses how artists
may consciously use and recall immediately past sequences of their private
cognitive acts. Here an interesting and possibly significant parallel between
theories of visuospatial memory retrieval and event recollection is simply noted.
(see also chapters 6 & 7).
4.4.4 Towards a Model of Sketch Recognition.
It is possible to conceive that the various and apparently contradictory
representational systems proposed for object recognition are elicited collaboratively
at different stages of the recognition process and for different purposes. Thus
- Sketch recognition starts by the automatic activation of a schema elicited
by the sketch title (if it has one) and knowledge of the subject matter. The schema
biases the selection of candidate object types and object parts and their anticipated
spatial relationships.
- Incomplete object components and candidate features, mainly lines seen as
fragments of contour are used to elicit, to construct and to match stored Structural
descriptions of object categories.
- Object prototypes are used to elicit more precise spatial relationships for
object type matches (e.g a face, a chair etc). It is possible that at this stage the
representations are low resolution coordinate systems. For discussion and evidence
concerning the distinction between categorical spatial relations (left hemisphere)
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and coordinate spatial relations (right hemisphere) see (Kosslyn et Al. 1989, 1992,
Kosslyn and Shin, 1994). Matching here might be accomplished by comparing the
nodes of descriptive trees attached to recently processed and to permanently stored
object attributes.
- Object exemplars are recognised or searched for. At this stage matches
will be tested between contour components and prototypical object views (renvois
Arnheim) as suggested by Palmer et Al. (1981) and Tarr and Pinker (1989). The
matching process proposed here is more complex, using an intermediate depictive-
descriptive type - the descriptively labelled spatial map. This may require
preliminary orientation and size transformations to match the spatial components.
There is now evidence (perhaps inconclusive) that stored structural prototypes are
used for recognising categories (left hemisphere) and coordinate systems for object
exemplars (right hemisphere) and that they are represented separately in different
parts of the brain (Kosslyn & Shin 1994).
Where such a matching process fails, either because an atypical view is not
represented in memory, or because certain attributes of interest (such as
handedness) are not represented, then further mental transformations of size,
orientation and part permutation may be necessary to facilitate a match with
memory.(Kubovy & Podgorny 1981). It is not clear whether such transformations
(if they occur) use the same resources and processes used for voluntary mental
imagery. I suggest they do. The fact that such posited transformations occur much
faster than when imagery is used to match two simultaneously presented shapes
(Jolicoeur 1985, Corballis 1988) may perhaps be explained by different degrees of
automaticity used in the two tasks. Sequential matching between a remembered and
a displayed shape is faster than simultaneous matching of two displayed shapes.
The evidence is consistent with the view that confused and untidy sketch
attributes stimulate creativity because they elicit the automatic recognition
matching processes in a set of nested search loops, which activates many more
components of long term visual memory than would either a complete and
unambiguous image or a very sparse one.
Although such a "top-down" sequence, from schema to exemplar to specific
view, seems the most likely direction for sketch recognition, the reverse "bottom-
up" sequence can play an important role in invention. Ambiguous or incompatible
possible object contours can cause the search for a new sketch schema. It is posited
that, during the act of sketching, unconscious processes which evolved for
recognising real world objects are being pressed into service by problematic stimuli
to support invention. Incomplete or ambiguous sketch parts, whether they are
coded as Hoffman, D. "part boundaries" or Biederman's "geons" will often prime
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a prototype or object cluster with many exemplars in memory. Once the
recognition system has "zeroed in" on the appropriate region of long term store I
suggest that a phase of mental image generation may be facilitated with repeated
automatic and sometimes unsuccessful attempts to resolve ambiguities by alignment
matching (Illustrations II, III, XXII).
4.5 Discussion: Three ways of Going Beyond the Information Given.
Sketch attributes exploit for creative purposes cognitive routines which
evolved in our hominid ancestors for completing impoverished real world stimuli.
It is argued by at least one school of thought that the perception of normal real
world objects must also constantly interpolate or "fill in the gaps" left by
inadequate visual information. Rival theories about how such cognitive
interpolation is implemented are linked to the question of at what stage or stages in
the visual process stored knowledge and "inference like" processes are used to
construct a percept. For this reason visual perception and recognition are advisedly
discussed together, as inter-dependent aspects of a common process. To a "neo-
Helmholtzian", perceptual completion is part of a single continuous inference-like
process comparable (apart from its automaticity) to conscious thought. The phrase
"beyond the information given" in the section title is a quotation from Bruner to
whom perception is an act of categorisation (Bruner 1957) and is implicitly
continuous with cognition.
Widely discussed examples relevant to the sketch, include the so called
"cognitive contours", better referred to as an "illusory surfaces", investigated in
detail by Kanizsa (Kanizsa 1976, 1979, Kanizsa et Al. 1982). Kanizsa has argued
persuasively that such interpolation processes are not easily explained by an
inferential or recognition process (Kanizsa 1979). Like the gestalt Laws of
Perceptual Organisation "amodal" completion is part of the pre-processing which
provides the "data" given by vision to further processes which include recognising
and also perhaps unconscious reasoning. Kanizsa argues that there are two ways of
"going beyond the information given" in perception. The first, the "primary
process" extracts contours, surfaces and candidate objects and interpolates (without
reasoning) object parts as if they were partly occluded. The "secondary process"
which is another way of "going beyond the information given" includes recognition
and reasoning upon the products of the primary process. We experience the
missing contours in Matisse's nude (Illustration X) clearly but in a less vivid way
and without the contrast enhancement of the Kanizsa cognitive contours. Thus it is
imagined contours rather than Kanizsa's "subjective" contours which are the more
common device in sketches for stimulating inventive shape perception. Although
these two processes may be concurrent and interdependent, Kanizsa argues that the
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distinction between "seeing" and "thinking" needs to be preserved. In sketching the
interdependence between two forms of perceptual completion is clear, since in
sketching the artist is repeatedly "thinking" descriptively about a spatially imagined
object and then imagining novel spatial and chromatic consequences of such newly
derived descriptions, in a recursive loop (Chapter 3).
Although the Kanizsa distinction between completion by "seeing" and by
"thinking" is useful, it does not go far enough. I argue here that, in order to
account for the perception of impoverished stimuli found in sketches, we must
distinguish at least three ways of "going beyond the information given". This arises
from the distinction between depictive and descriptive modes of representation
which may be implicit in Kanizsa's writing but is never clarified.
4.5.1 Pre-Conscious Visual Interpolation.
A set of Primary processes organise and structure the visual input in ways
which includes the partial and sometimes faulty completion of candidate objects
and surfaces. In pictures especially the end results of these processes are often
available to consciousness in a depictive form, even if no familiar objects are
recognised and even if such interpolations conflict with the inferences from
recognition (Kanizsa and Gerbino 1982) These processes also result in the
construction of unconscious descriptive (symbolic) representations of the image (as
proposed by Marr). This stage, sometimes called "low level vision" uses the innate
processes which have been acquired by evolution in adaptation to the properties of
three-dimensional space, with the constraints of gravity (giving selective
preferences for vertical and horizontal axes) and the ground plane.
A crucial processing requirement, possibly occurring in cascade with phase
two, is the distinction of spatial perception from the recognition and categorisation
of objects. The layout in egocentric space of the positions, sizes and orientations of
candidate objects is needed to comprehend movement, to guide reaching and
grasping and for visual search. In the sketch such spatial perception is used, I
suggest, to imagine such movements. As discussed above the detailed recognition
of objects is complementary to this. It demands the perception of those attributes
which are independent of such spatial metrics. The distinction between spatial
perception and object recognition is reflected in the dorsal and ventral visual
processing routes in the neocortex (see Chapter 5).
4.5.2 Descriptive Enrichment by Knowledge and Inference.
A set of secondary processes access long term memory, resulting in various
degrees and kinds of recognition (Section 4.3). This provides a much richer
representation of the sketch components by linking objects parts and features to
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stored semantic knowledge of scenes and objects in descriptive form. Although this
process will have greatly enlarged the descriptive components of the percept it
cannot by itself account for the spatially depictive enrichment of the percept which
occurs after recognition (e.g when we recognise the face in the well known
"Hidden man" demonstration (Illustration XXXII, Porter 1954)
4.5.3 Spatial Superimposition of Generated Imagery.
In order to synthesise a spatially complete percept, after recognition and
descriptive inferential processes have occurred, I suggest a third type of enrichment
of the perceptual representation occurs. This is distinguished from both Kanizsa's
"primary interpolation" and from the "secondary" processes of memory retrieval
for descriptive labelling and "unconscious inference". To assist spatially oriented
responses, depictive images are generated from stored memory and spatially
superimposed upon the final percept. Evidence that imagery is used in this way, to
assist the perception of partly occluded objects, is presented by Cave & Kosslyn
(1989). How such a third way of "going beyond the information given" might have
become adapted to sketching is the subject of the next chapter.
These three stages of "going beyond the information given" can be related
to the depictive descriptive continuum, discussed in the Chapter 3, and considered
as perceptual equivalents of the representational translation processes I claimed
were important to sketching. In the first stage unstructured depictive retinal
information is structured into tentative objects, without reference to memory.
Ambiguities such as those caused by occlusion, may be resolved by innate "wired
in knowledge" of the physical environment and of visual probabilities acquired by
Darwinian natural selection. At this stage the processing amounts to depictive to
descriptive translation, which in turn can have descriptive to depictive
consequences (Kanizsa contours, perceptual groups, figure and ground etc). The
second stage is depictive to descriptive translation by access to schemata and
structural descriptions in memory. The third stage, in which I suggest mental
imagery may be used, is a translation of descriptive information acquired by
recognition which is then used to complete the spatial structure of the perceptual
construction of conscious awareness. An implication of this late construction
theory, which will be referred to in the next chapter, is that conscious percepts
must be represented in a temporary storage medium. There is evidence (see
Chapter 5) that incoming perceptual information has access to long term memory
before it is held in working memory (Logie, 1995). If, as I shall argue, conscious
percepts, are dependent upon and perhaps coincident with representation in such a
short term memory then theories of visuospatial working memory and of image
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generation are integral components of "late construction but early memory
retrieval" theories of perception. The perceptual representation of the sketch is, I
suggest, a temporarily stored representation of the sparse but richly encoded marks
on paper, combined with a fluctuating hierarchy of depictive imagery, spatially
labelled with descriptive structures retrieved from long term memory. The former
provides a skeletal context and support for the latter.
The evidence discussed in this chapter supports a second hypothesis about
sketch function
4.6 Conclusion: Hypothesis Two.
Human perception and object recognition processes enable accidentally
impoverished stimuli fast automatic access to long term memory for perceptual
completion. Sketch attributes exploit such unconscious processes providing
memory search and retrieval cues that improve the availability of tacit visual
knowledge for invention.
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5. HOW SKETCHES COMBINE PERCEPTION WITH IMAGERY.
"I prefer stories told on the Radio to those on Television because the pictures are
better"
Small girl interviewed for the B.B.C. circa 1976
5.1 Introduction
Hypothesis Three states that "Sketches are percept-memory hybrids. The
incomplete, physical attributes of sketches act as a stimulus for percepts which
invite completion from memory and imagination. This results in the generation of
transient mental images which after a matching process are transformed and
spatially superimposed upon an internal representation of the sketch."
It is argued that the processes used by the brain to create and transform
mental images have had part of their evolutionary origins in the need by our
hominid ancestors to complete from memory the perception of naturally occurring
stimuli, impoverished by poor illumination, brief duration or partial concealment.
Sketch attributes are viewed here as an adaptation, by cultural evolution, of such
innate mechanisms for an inverse function. Artificially impoverished stimuli are
deliberately or unconsciously created to elicit imagery which assists the planning
and invention of imaginary or future objects and events. Due to its origins,
inventive mental imagery needs perceptual support.
In this chapter the evidence that sketches are percept-memory hybrid
images which support the generation and mental manipulation of mental images for
invention is examined.
It will be argued that sketches support mental imagery in two ways. One of
these is appropriate to the later stages of composition, when imagined parts are
used to experiment with those undecided details necessary to refine the more
certain outline of an idea. The other, in which the imagery is less constrained, is
more applicable to the early inventive stages of visual design (see Chapter 2). In
both functions it is posited that a variable region of this combined map of spatial
location is available to focal attention. To this is ascribed the function of
connecting location to stored component descriptions used for generating new
depictive image parts. In turn the modified hybrid map may be used for encoding
and re-encoding new structural descriptions and so completing an iterative
processing loop. Thus, skilfully used, ambiguous or incomplete sketch attributes
assist creativity by stimulating the visual system to generate a stream of spatially
super-imposed mental imagery. This proposal is supported by evidence about the
nature of mental imagery and the way that it interacts with visual perception.
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5.2 Mental Imagery and Sketch function.
5.2.1 Imagery as a Medium for Visual Experiment.
In Chapter 1 preliminary reasons were given for believing that artists use
mental imagery as a method of experimenting with visual appearance. In the last
twenty years there has been extensive research and debate about the nature of
mental imagery. Here I will briefly review the evidence for those imagery
properties most relevant to the visualising functions of the sketch. For reviews see
(Kosslyn 1980, 1981, 1983, 1987, 1994, Finke 1980, 1985, 1986, 1989, Pinker
1984a).
By definition mental images are experiences which introspectively resemble
percepts but are generated from memory rather than information from the eyes.
Historically mental images have been compared to faint percepts resulting from the
memory of past visual experience (Kosslyn 1980 chapter 11). However unlike the
perception of objects (or pictures of objects) physically present mental image parts
can be generated, transformed, manipulated, and combined in new arrangements at
speed. These properties are exactly what a visualising medium for art or design
requires. The similarity to perception is important because visual invention is
concerned with predicting and manipulating the appearance of hypothetical objects
from particular view-points. The need to manipulate the structure of such
appearances at speed without the penalties of having to use a physical medium to
do so is a consequence of the astronomically large number of permutational
possibilities which visual experiment implies (Chapter 1). As Kosslyn remarks
"Because of the kinds of transformation we can bring to bear and the kind of
representation an image is, we can use our imagery as a simulation of possible
(and perhaps of impossible) transformations in the world. Thus imagery as an aid
to thinking about the consequences of given actions, is a crutch to help us devise a
plan for reaching some desired state of affairs." He goes on to remark that "in
addition to serving some role in concept learning, reasoning and pattern
recognition imagery may well serve to make unconscious thoughts and desires
manifest in consciousness, as Freud and others have maintained." (Kosslyn, 1980
page 456). A point to which I will return later (Chapter 7).
Unfortunately a third class of imagery properties greatly reduces many of
the advantages of the first two. Besides being functionally similar to percepts and
flexibly transformable in conscious memory, visual images are often vague,
difficult to form and hard to maintain, fading quickly and needing constant
refreshment (Kosslyn et Al. 1983, Kosslyn and Shin 1994). Moreover the
vividness with which subjects are able to form and inspect their images varies
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widely (Galton 1883, Marks 1972). For these reasons mental imagery requires
perceptual support.
5.2.2 The "Spatial Array" Theory of Imagery.
Historically a wide range of theories have been used to explain the
functions and mental representation of imagery (for critical review see Pinker &
Kosslyn 1983). However the most detailed and best supported by evidence is
Kosslyn's "array" theory (Kosslyn 1980). This has been partly implemented as a
computer model (Kosslyn and Shwartz 1977) and developed by Pinker (1980).
Because the array theory has the greatest explanatory adequacy for sketch function
it is the one used as a framework here. This does not imply however, that all
details of the theory are to be accepted without reservation. The theory which has
been developed at the level of representation and process for "high level parsing"
of visual cognition distinguishes the following components of imagery :-
1. Visual representations stored in long term memory are used as a source
of information for imagery generation. In the Kosslyn and Schwarz model these
are assumed to be propositional representations and also coordinate data used to
preserve spatial structure. However there is evidence (Chapter 4 & Farah 1984)
that the representations used for mental image generation are the same as those
used for recognition. It follows that all the types of representational distinction
postulated to explain recognition (Chapter 4) are equally relevant to mental image
generation (see Kosslyn et Al. 1992). Thus Kosslyn & Koenig (1992) distinguish
two kinds of representation of spatial structure, categorical (left hemisphere) and
coordinate (right hemisphere). They also distinguish between prototypical 
representations of object categories from exemplar representations. By permutating
the different possible long term memory sources, Kosslyn & Shin (1994) deduce
that 24 different types of mental image are theoretically possible.
2. The "Visual Buffer" is posited to be a short-term array format medium
of limited capacity in which images can be generated and transformed. For several
years it was not clear how Kosslyn's "visual buffer" was related to the
"visuospatial sketch pad" posited in the Baddeley and Hitch model of working
memory (Baddeley 1986, Baddeley & Hitch 1974, Baddeley et Al. 1984). Recently
however the two independent lines of research have converged and work by Logie
et Al. (Logie 1986, Logie & Marchetti 1991, Logie 1995) throws new light on the
role of working memory in mental imagery.
3. A Generation Process is also posited, which can retrieve visual
information from unconscious long term memory and create, sequentially,
component by component, percept-like, semi-depictive representations which are
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mapped onto the visual buffer. The generation process is believed to convert
unconsciously stored long term representations - "structural descriptions", object
centred prototypes and exemplars represented as co-ordinates etc - to a view
dependant spatial representation. It is thus a perfect example of the descriptive to
depictive translation processes discussed in Chapter 3.Kosslyn posits a Refresh 
process, linked to image generation, which is necessary to regenerate sketch
components which fade in the sequence in which they were generated. In the
original model (Kosslyn 1980) image refreshment was supposed to occur within the
buffer by reactivation of image parts as they are scanned or inspected. Kosslyn and
Shin (1994) admit that "refresh" is a poorly understood component of the model
and that it is uncertain whether it involves regeneration from long term memory or
in situ reactivation of fading parts.
4. A set of Inspection Processes which are able to extract, organise and
relate information which is only implicit in the spatial array, making it explicit and
communicating it to other cognitive systems. The visual buffer is assumed (as
already discussed) to be analogous to a labelled map with descriptive information
about objects linked to spatial locations. A limited region of the visual buffer is
assumed to be available in an "Attention window" for conscious access and
detailed processing. Image inspection requires a spatial scanning operation similar
to the movements of covert attention occurring in perception (Posner 1980 &
Chapter 6). Also required is a mechanism for recording scanning distances and
directions and the capacity to sequentially access and record descriptive
information stored at specific locations. "Inspect" is clearly an attempt to model
the introspective experience of the "mind's eye" when we use mental imagery to
answer questions. Paivio (1971b) gives the illustrative example of answering the
question "How many corners does a block uppercase 'F' have ?". Most people
report that they have to mentally scan a mental image of the letter counting the
corners one by one as they do so. Kosslyn believes that he has dispelled any
"Infinitely recursive homunculus" problems raised by introspective "inspect"
experiences by simulating image inspection in his model by machine pattern
searching algorithms on a computer array. However, personally, I am not satisfied
that such searching processes, however sophisticated, are an adequate description
of the mental inspection experience. Missing, is an adequate process account of
two crucial components of the mind's eye" - volition and conscious awareness. I
discuss this difficult unsolved problem of psychology in Chapter 7.
5. A set of Transforming Processes are used to manipulate the contents of
the visual buffer. The best known and widely researched of these is mental 
rotation. In the seminal studies of Shepard and Metzler (1971) and Shepard and
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Cooper, L. (1982) the time to match or mismatch differently oriented shapes is
linearly proportional to the angular difference in their orientation. The rotation of
three dimensional objects (drawn in perspective), implied by the data from these
and other workers, occurs as fast when it is in depth as when it occurs within the
plane of the projected view. This implies that subjects can rotate stored three-
dimensional models created from two-dimensional views. Other forms of
transformation include changes of size (Bundesen et Al. 1975, 1981) and the
synthesis of new shapes and patterns, by translating, rotating and combining
separately imagined parts (Finke & Slayton, 1988, Finke, 1990).
This multi-component model is supported by a wide range of experimental
performance data, the interpretation of which is to my mind persuasive (Kosslyn
1980, 1983, 1987, 1994, Finke 1989) but to some authors controversial (Pylyshyn
1975, 1981, Hinton, 1979). More recently Kosslyn has up-dated his model to make
it consistent with new research in neuroscience and neuropsychology (Kosslyn,
1994). Whilst the early model was based upon a computer analogue, the later
model is mapped more closely to visual pathways in the brain.
The model (in outline) is also supported by an analysis of individual
differences in imagery tasks designed to separate its different components (Kosslyn
et Al. 1984). Further, a careful study of selective imagery deficits resulting from
brain damage, provides evidence for separate neurological resources for at least
three of the postulated imagery components (Farah, 1984, 1988b). Thus there is
evidence from patients with cortical lesions that image generation is mediated by
the left posterior hemisphere (Farah 1985a), whilst movements of spatial attention
in perception and imagery is dependant upon a visual region in the right parietal
cortex (Bisiach & Luzzatti 1978). There is also evidence of selective damage to
long term image representation and to the ability to "inspect" mental images.
5.2.3 Similarities of Structure between Images and Percepts.
Finke has researched and repeatedly reviewed the ways in which images are
functionally "equivalent" to percepts (Finke 1980. 1985, 1986, 1989). Briefly he
has argued that such similarities occur only at what are believed to be the "higher
level" visual processes or those occurring in the later central stages of visual
processing. Thus a finding, quite important to the arts, is the failure to duplicate
colour contrast effects in imagery (Finke 1986), whereas other types of visual
illusion thought to have a less peripheral cause have been duplicated in imagery
(Wallace, B. 1984).
Studies by Finke and Kosslyn (1980) and by Finke and Kurtzman (1981a,
1981b) seem to show that the size and shape of the field of view and the way in
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which acuity and spatial frequency discrimination vary within this field are
equivalent in perception and imagery. In the former experiments, the ability to
discriminate a pair of visual dots against a screen as they became progressively
further from the fixation point was compared with a similar pair of imagined dots
seen against the same screen. In the 1981 experiments a similar procedure was
used to map the imagery field using horizontal and vertical gratings of different
spatial frequencies.
These results are discussed separately by Kosslyn (1980, 1983) and Finke
(1989) as evidence for the equivalence of the spatial medium of perception and
imagery. However some qualifying points are necessary.
1. The experiments purport to measure the size, shape and resolution of a
single point of the visual field with gaze fixed in a single direction. Thus they
suggest an internal retinotopic map, with highest resolution in the foveal direction,
which is shared by visual and by imagined information. This cannot be the whole
of Kosslyn's visual buffer, however, since one can perceive and imagine a wider
field by integrating successive saccadic glances (Hochberg, 1982, 1984, Jonides et
Al. 1982). It is useful here to distinguish the visual field with fixed gaze from the
field with eye movements only, and the even wider "head field" with both eye and
head movements as in normal vision (Sanders, 1963).
2. The experiments with both imagined dots and gratings were performed
with eyes open, staring at a visual screen and fixation marker. Thus it can be
argued that they measure the field of resolution of a hybrid visual and imagined
image within a shared neurological medium.
3. Further experiments, reported by Kosslyn and Finke (Finke 1989),
measured the visual angle at which imagined shapes are reported to overflow their
imagined field of view. The results suggest that there is a roughly circular
"window of attention" for mental imagery which is smaller than the total field of
imagined view. It is further suggested by Kosslyn (1980, 1994) that this window of
attention mirrors visual attention having a finite capacity in which its spatial size
decreases with higher resolution.
There is evidence that the internal representations of percepts and mental
images have a similar structure. This is a necessary but not sufficient requirement
for the hypothesis that mental images are used to complete impoverished percepts.
For example Shepard and Chipman (1970) compared peoples judgements of
similarity of the perceived shapes of U.S. states with their judgements of similarity
based on memory. A multidimensional statistical analysis revealed good correlation
between the two with types of similarity clusters suggesting that the visual shapes
compared in memory have similar visual features to those observed directly.
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Similar results have been reported with familiar faces, numerical symbols and
colours (reviewed Finke & Shepard, 1986). The latter case is particularly
interesting since it has been shown that even subjects with colour vision
deficiencies (protanopia and deuteranopia) construct the same standard colour
circle based on imagined colour similarities that is produced by normally sighted
subjects using visual judgements. Further studies showed that these results could
not be easily explained in terms of an ordered search through descriptive
statements.
Podgorny and Shepard (1978) compared the distribution of attention to
letter forms in perception and imagery. In the perceptual condition the letter forms
composed by filling squares of a grid were displayed with the grid and then
immediately followed by a small probe spot. In the imagery condition subjects
were instructed simply to imagine the letter forms projected on the grid. Subjects
mean reaction times to decide whether the probe fell on or off the letter form
varied in the same way across probe locations and types for the imagined and for
the actually presented letters. The results are not easy to explain in terms of
Pylyshyn's suggested "tacit knowledge" or experimenter bias (see Chapter 3).
Podgorny and Shepard explained their results in terms of a sub-structure of
horizontal and vertical bars possessed by both the perceived and the imagined
forms. Shorter reaction times occur when the probe falls on or near more than one
sub-component. I must point out that these experiments too, could be judged to be
experiments with hybrid images in which the image components are stabilised by a
constant perceived grid.
Further evidence that mental images have a similar substructure to percepts
has been provided by Reed and Johnsen (1975). As the gestalt psychologists
showed it is easier to perceive certain "good" substructures in an abstract pattern
than others. For example it easier to perceive a Star of David as two large
overlapping triangles or as an hexagon surrounded by six small triangles than it is
as three overlapping parallelograms. Reed and Johnsen found that the parts which
were easiest to detect in a mental image of such patterns were those detected in a
corresponding percept or which matched an original structural description of the
pattern before it was imagined.
5.2.4 Spatial Scanning of Images.
Some of the evidence that both percepts and mental images can be spatially
scanned with an internally represented "window" of attention has been briefly
discussed already in Chapter 3 as part of the evidence for depictive representations.
The implication behind the experimental data is that percepts and mental images
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are represented in a spatial array in view dependent format but with three
dimensional depth also represented (as in Marr's "2 1/2D sketch"). In the words of
Finke (1989 page 61) "The spatial arrangement of the elements of a mental image
corresponds to the way objects or their parts are arranged on actual or physical
swfaces or in an actual physical space". Like maps images preserve metric spatial
information (Kosslyn 1975, Kosslyn, Ball & Reiser 1979).
Pylyshyn (1973, 1975, 1981) in a series of papers has criticised the
experimental basis for the spatial array theory of mental imagery. He claims that
the results of experiments on the time to scan distances in remembered maps, for
example, could be equally well explained by subjects using their "tacit knowledge"
of scanning times for real maps. These criticisms have been addressed in
experiments by Reed, Hock & Lockhead, (1983) who compared the times to scan
different remembered patterns such as spirals with the times to scan the same
patterns when actually displayed and with other subjects' estimates of the times to
scan the same patterns. They found that while the relative scan times corre2ated
well with the scan times for the same patterns when actually perceived, they
differed in important ways with subjects' advance estimates as to what the relative
scanning times would be. This weakens the "tacit knowledge" criticism.
In addition to the experiments already mentioned where subjects are told to
scan an image, image scanning has been shown to occur spontaneously in order to
extract explicit information represented only implicitly. For example Finke and
Pinker (1982) investigated subjects ability to determine whether a small arrow
pointing in an unexpected direction was pointing to one of a pattern of previously
seen (but now absent) random dots. Even though imagery and image scanning was
never mentioned the subjects response times increased linearly with increasing
distances between the arrow and the dot.
These and other results are paralleled by evidence for covert (ie w2thout
eye movements) orienting of attention (Posner 1980, Tsal 1983) and the curve
tracing results of Jolicoeur et Al. (1986) also referred to in Chapter 3.
An interesting finding in relation to chess perception has been described by
Church and Church (1977). They found a linear relation between the time taken to
decide whether the King was in check and the spatial distance between the relevant
pieces on the board. Interestingly the implied scanning was faster for horizontal or
vertical checks than for checks along the diagonal. This may have had something
to do with the representation of the chess board which in this theory has a similar
function to a sparse sketch, i.e. it is a percept which supports mental imagery.
Experiments on scanning provide evidence for the three-dimensional nature
of the mental imagery medium. In a series of experiments by Steven Pinker (1980)
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subjects learned the locations of five small toys suspended in an open box. With
eyes closed subjects were then told to imagine a small black spot moving rapidly
from object to object. Scanning times were proportional to the three-dimensional
distance between the objects. However Pinker also showed that people could
imagine the scanning of a two-dimensional perspective projection of the objects. In
this case scanning times were proportional to the two-dimensional projected
distances. In other experiments Pinker and Finke (1980) showed that subjects were
able to correctly discover unexpected emerging two-dimensional perspective
patterns between similar remembered objects by imagining the rotation of the space
in which they were suspended.
It is clear that mental scanning is an important process for extracting and
making explicit geometrical and topological relationships within an imagined object
or scene. If, as the evidence suggests (Kosslyn 1980, Kosslyn et Al. 1983), mental
images fade and must be refreshed, then a plausible function of the sketch is to
provide stable percept landmarks to support the mental scanning of labile images.
Mental scanning must be assumed to be performed frequently whilst artists or
designers are sketching. For example in visual composition it frequently happens
that one selects first the desired end points of a possible object contour. In order to
decide whether such a contour line will end at the desired point an image must be
generated and directionally scanned before the pencil is moved.
5.2.5 Image Inspection.
A problem which has traditionally been highlighted by critics of array
theories of imagery (Pylyshyn, 1973 1984, Dennett 1981) is how we can "see"
objects and their attributes in images without positing an infinitely recursive inner
visual system. The answer provided by Kosslyn (1980, 1994) is that imagined
objects are inspected by using the same mechanisms that are used to inspect an
object during perception. During perception the visual buffer contains more
information than can be processed at any one time. The literature contains much
evidence showing that we can shift attention covertly (without eye movements)
across space to selectively process limited regions of the visual field. There appears
to be a "window" of attention which can be adjusted to take in limited regions of
the visual buffer (Larsen and Bundesen, 1978, Treisman & Gelade, 1980). This
attention window appears to exhibit a "scope/resolution trade-off" (Shulman &
Wilson, 1987b, Humphreys and Bruce, 1989). Experiments by Navon (1977)
suggest that we typically encode the global properties of an object before its
details. Kosslyn further suggests that because of this trade-off, visual encoding of
the overall shape of an object will often be of low resolution. Thus to "see"
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(visualise) a specific part clearly one will have to activate additional stored
representations. Kosslyn assumes that image inspection involves the same
separation between spatial and visual object processing that is shown in perception
(discussed below). Thus a different sub-system may be used to image and attend to
object details from that used to shift attention and scan mental images. This part of
the Kosslyn model may be controversial, but it is broadly consistent with a model
proposed by Logic (1995) for visuospatial working memory (discussed below) and
with ideas suggested by Crick (1994).
There are other limits on image inspection which are important to sketch
function. Chambers and Reisberg (1985) showed that a figure that is ambiguous
when perceived, can lose its ambiguity in a mental image. Thus an outline drawing
that can be seen alternately as either a rabbit or a duck, (Illustration XXXI b), is
no longer ambiguous when imaged. The same was found for the "Necker " cube
which does not show the usual spontaneous orientation reversal in imagery. The
explanation usually offered for this (Brandimonte & Gerbino, Logic 1995), is that
the perceived figure is automatically encoded descriptively labelled, so that only
one of the possible descriptions can be used for image generation. The hypothesis
outlined here suggests a slightly different explanation. The ambiguous drawing is
an incomplete skeletal structure which elicits the superimposition of two kinds of
mental image. It is the image component of the hybrid which determines how the
drawing is recognised and it gates out any re-encoding in memory of the
ambiguous parts of the drawing. Thus the percept changes by activating different
mental images. When a mental image is generated without the percept, essential
subtleties of the original drawing are not available.
This hybrid image explanation of the frequent non-ambiguity of mental
images differs slightly from that offered by Reisberg and Chambers themselves.
However their interpretation is consistent with the one above and has similar
implications for sketch function. They report experiments (1991) to support their
view that one can find targeted shapes in an imaged outline pattern only when the
target shape is compatible both with the imaged geometry and with "how that
geometry is organized and understood". This is compatible with the theory posited
here that mental images consist of descriptively generated, spatial maps "looking
for" impoverished stimuli. They have been generated from descriptive information
in memory and are already structured by further links to descriptive hierarchies.
Thus Reisberg and Chambers term "image understanding", which (they explain)
includes perceived organisation such as orientation and figure-ground segregation,
can be interpreted to refer to perceptually acquired descriptive structure. Images
they suggest have an important role in thought by initiating a chain of further
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images based on descriptive "resemblances". However they cannot be ambiguous
(i.e re-interpreted) because unlike percepts they lack "the neutral stimulus with
which perception begins". Here I wish to extend this argument in two ways,
1. If the primitive function of mental images is to complete impoverished
stimuli then image restructuring in the absence of the appropriate stimulus match
would be counter productive. Thus there may be a Darwinian reason why it easier
to re-interpret outline drawings (eliciting new unintended images) than to re-
interpret intended images. (But see Brandimonte & Gerbino, 1993 below).
2. The Structural re-interpretation of images is an important component of
visual invention. Reisberg and Chambers (1991) provide useful (and overlooked ?)
insight into the need by artists to support their mental imagery with neutral,
ambiguous and unexpected stimuli.
5.2.6 The Transformation of Images and Mental Matching.
The classic study of mental rotation was conducted by Shepard and Metzler
(1971). They presented their subjects with two perspective line drawings of three-
dimensional objects which were at different orientations and were either identical
in shape or mirror-images of each other. The mean time to determine whether or
not the two shapes were identical was directly proportional to the amount of
angular rotation which would be necessary to bring the two shapes into viewer-
centred perspective congruence. This is true even if the imagined rotation would
have to be in depth. The results are very robust and have been studied in great
detail. Cooper and Shepard (in Shepard and Cooper, L., 1982) obtained similar
results indicating mental rotation in matching rotated letters, numbers, random
two-dimensional shapes and drawings of hands. To show the analog nature of the
posited rotation the same authors performed experiments in which subjects were
asked to start rotating an imagined shape. At some undetermined point during the
mental rotation they were shown a test shape and asked to determine as quickly as
possible whether or not it matched the imagined shape. The reaction time was
fastest when the orientation of the test shape matched the expected orientation of
the imagined shape calculated from a predetermined rate of mental rotation for that
shape. Evidence for mental transformations of size, also to perform simultaneous
shape matching, is provided by Bundesen & Larsen (1975) and for successive
matching with a remembered shape by Larsen and Bundesen (1978) as mentioned
in Chapter 4.
The implication of these results is that a form of "template" or spatial
correspondence matching is necessary between corresponding views of shapes
when recognition or matching by features, parts or descriptions fails (see appendix
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to chapter 4 of Shepard & Cooper, L. 1982). However the theory that images
originated as the top-down component of percepts (Waltz, 1979) suggests another
related function for mental rotation and size scaling. If an impoverished or partly
obscured perceptual stimulus is to be completed by mental imagery then the image
component must be translated. rescaled and mental!y rotated in order to
superimpose it to the percept. 
5.2.7 Mental Image Generation and Maintenance.
In the original Kosslyn and Schwarz model, images were supposed to be
generated from two kinds of data in long term memory, (1) Lists of propositions
about objects and part relationships and (2) Stored coordinates. These two types of
information were posited to be used to position and map the structure of a viewer-
centred image onto the "cells" of a limited capacity, and limited resolution spatial
array. More recently Kosslyn (1994) has clarified this view to take account of later
theories of recognition (see Chapter 4). Thus an object shape and detail encoding
system is distinguished from the spatial location encoding system (Kosslyn &
Koenig 1992), a distinction I discuss below. Moreover the spatial system is posited
to consist of a separate categorical-relation encoding system and a coordinate
location-encoding system, (Kosslyn et Al. 1986, Kosslyn et Al. 1992).
Image generation is not a simply a process of the retrieval of intact images
from long term memory. Rather images are constructed from object and part
descriptions and from the spatial encoding systems mentioned above. It has been
shown for example that complex scenes take longer to image than simple ones
(Beech & Allport 1978, Kosslyn 1980). Farah & Kosslyn (1981) compared the
time taken to image subjectively large versus very small images of the same simple
or complex objects. In earlier experiments Kosslyn (1980) had found that it took
longer to generate large images of familiar objects than small ones. However Farah
and Kosslyn found to their surprise that when subjects were given a mental part
verification task (to check that they had generated an accurate image) it actually
took longer to generate the small images than the large ones. They had expected to
find a speed advantage for generating small images because small parts and details
would be omitted, since resolution constraints of the buffer would make their
generation difficult. However they were forced to conclude that, if motivated,
subjects can with effort and extra time increase the resolution of the buffer to
image the smaller parts. Kosslyn et Al. (1983) posit that generating an image of an
object occurs in stages, in which an object "skeleton" with part locations is
generated first followed by superimposed parts as and when more detail is
required.
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A series of experiments have demonstrated that mental images are generated
in parts that reflect the structure of a stored description, and that it takes more time
to generate an image with more parts. In one set of experiments (Kosslyn et Al.
1983) subjects were shown geometrical patterns which could be seen either as
several small adjacent shapes (a "tiling pattern") or as a smaller number of larger
transparent overlapping shapes. They were given verbal descriptions of the patterns
and then asked to memorise them. The mean times to generate mental images of
the patterns was linearly related to the number of constituent shapes and also to the
type of verbal description used when they were first seen. Other experiments
instructed subjects to mentally construct images of animals, which were presented
in varying numbers of part drawings on separate pages of a booklet. After
memorising six of the drawings presented in this way, subjects were asked to
image named animals. To the authors surprise there was a linear relationship
between the time to image an animal and the number of parts in which it had been
first presented. It appears that although subjects mentally fused the separate parts
of the drawings this fused image was not the memory teptesentation used ‘atei iol
generating an image but rather the separately perceived parts. This result is
consistent, I think, with the "late conscious construction but early access to
recognition memory" theory of perception I supported in Chapter 4. It also seems
to dovetail with theories of recognition by parts (Hoffman, D. & Richards, M.,
1984, Biederman, 1987). One of the functions of image generation relevant to the
sketch may be to synthesise or to re-synthesise, objects or scenes from separately
stored parts, in order to encode new relationships in long term memory. The
implication is that such a fusion of already encoded visual parts cannot occur
without semi-depictive mapping onto a limited capacity spatial array. Again,
implicit in the methodology (but not mentioned by the authors), is the use of
percept-image hybrids in the initial mental construction process. Further
experiments by the same authors showed that the ease of imaging depends upon
how much material is included in each imaged unit and on how difficult it is to
locate where the unit should be placed relative to the existing portions of an image.
In another series of studies Kosslyn et Al. (Kosslyn 1980 page 106-107)
showed how the Gestalt laws of grouping could influence memory encoding and
image generation time. Thus subjects were asked to mentally image a uniform
matrix of letters described either as "three rows of six" or as "six columns of
three". Generation time was longer for the "six columns of three" than for the
other description even though the images generated were identical. The conditions
were varied in such a way as to show that stored verbal/abstract information can be
used in conjunction with depictive information in the generation process. I note
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with satisfaction, in Kosslyn's description of these experiments another example of
tacit, undiscussed hybrid imagery. In the tachistoscope "descriptions were written
at the very bottom of the card, leaving plenty of room to image the array". So
when imaging with eyes open from written percepts there must be "room" for the
imagery to be superimposed (see below).
In a modification of the Podgorny & Shepard study described above,
Kosslyn et Al. (1988) asked subjects to generate an upper case letter on a screen
after cueing by its lower case equivalent. They measured the times to decide
whether two small projected probe X marks were on or off the imaged letter.
Decision times increased with the complexity of the imaged letter forms. They also
depended upon which segment of the imagined letter the probes fell. The results
suggested that different parts of the letter are generated at different times in
sequential order. Subsequently they showed that this sequential construction of
image segments mirrored the order in which segments of the letters are normally
drawn. If this discovery can be shown to be general and include other objects, then
it could have interesting implications for theories of the sketch. For example when
an artist draws a new object he may be encoding it in sequentially structured parts.
This sequence may in turn influence the way he imagines it before drawing it again
in a later sketch. In a sketch with incomplete parts are the first components of the
drawing sequence the most effective recognition primes for imagery completion?
Kosslyn's studies suggest that image parts continually fade with time and
must be refreshed to maintain them. Thus a limit on the generation of complex
images is the effort required to maintain the fading early image parts (Kosslyn
1980, Kosslyn et Al. 1983). If the visual buffer is a shared resource used for short
term visual memory, then this finding is expected from studies of short term visual
retention (Phillips and Christie, 1977a, 1977b). Little is known about the nature of
image maintenance. It may be that allocation of attention to parts of the buffer
during scanning or inspection may itself re-activate the image (Kosslyn, 1980,
Logie, 1995). Alternatively the image generation mechanisms may simply be
continually re-activated.
Recently Farah et Al. (1988) and Kosslyn et Al. (1993) have presented
evidence that there are two types of imagery, one that is generated by allocating
attention to mentally "draw" a pattern and one that is generated by activating stored
visual memories. According to these authors the attention allocating form of
imagery is more effective when combined with visual input from the eyes.
Presumably vision provides a spatial framework which supports working memory
in recording the pattern mentally "drawn" upon a spatial ground. In the theory
presented here spatial imagery and object imagery were originally interdependent
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and have only become separable in recent evolutionary history. It is assumed that
the attentional imagery system evolved to locate real object or scene positions in
need of superimposed memory completion. Later the brain learned to record
movements of the attentional imagery system for mentally generating new patterns
upon a perceived object or surface, without necessarily invoking stored object
descriptions. Here it is suggested that, whilst sketching, attentional imagery and
memory retrieval imagery are used collaboratively, in keeping with the "labelled
map" analogy discussed in Chapter 3.
In most of the experiments described above, images were generated
voluntarily (following instructions) with the awareness of the subjects. As Kosslyn
and Shin (1994) have pointed out however the possibility of automatic unconscious
image generation is not ruled out. It is surely a common experience that mental
images simply "arrive", resulting in awareness (and sometimes control) of the
products of generation but not the generation process itself (see Pani 1992). This
possibility would mean that image generation is analogous to the processes which
allocate attention (see Chapter 6). There is evidence that the directing of visual
attention has two separate mechanisms of control, an automatic involuntary process
and a controlled voluntary process (Jonides 1981). Here I adopt as a working
hypothesis, the idea that image generation has two analogous modes of control.
This helps to explain the apparently involuntary image generation that accompanies
some kinds of visual stimuli and is used, I suggest, to provide "top-down" support
for the construction of conscious percepts.
5.2.8 Mental Synthesis and Invention.
The ability to use mental imagery transformations to visualise new objects
and make unexpected discoveries is obviously relevant to sketch function. Many
forms of image transformation are implicit in a series of diverse experiments
demonstrating how new images can be mentally synthesised from memorised visual
parts or from verbal descriptions.
Shepard and Feng (1972) showed subjects various flat patterns of six
connected squares that could be folded into a cube. The task was to decide as
quickly as possible whether two different marked edges of a square would meet if
the pattern were folded into a cube. The time required to make such decisions
increased linearly with the number of folds which would have to be made if a real
piece of paper of the shape displayed were actually folded into a cube. Moreover
again we can make the claim that the subjects may have been manipulating a
hybrid image since the flattened cubes were actually displayed so that the mentally
folded shape could have been assisted by partial superimposition of an image upon
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the flat patterns. Such evidence for the mental manipulation of perceived flat
patterns into imagined three-dimensional shapes, is relevant to the claims made by
Fashion designers, for example, that they can visualise the three-dimensional folds
and movements of a fabric in an imagined garment (Bates et Al.. 1988).
Thompson and Klatzky (1978) have shown that people can fuse in their
imagination the separately presented parts of a pattern in order to verify whether
the synthesised parts match a separate pattern presently afterwards. They found that
it was easier to fuse parts which resulted in simple closed forms than parts which
formed open and less integrated shapes. The response times (for equivalent
numbers of parts) were faster in the former case than the latter.
Finke, Pinker and Farah (1989) showed that people could detect emergent
patterns in a mentally synthesised image and reinterpret what the image represents.
The subjects followed verbal instructions to mentally combine (using rotation,
translation etc) familiar alphanumeric characters or geometric shapes. They were
then to report any new shapes or recognizable objects that emerged. When the
transformations had been performed correctly (as assessed by subjects' drawings at
the end of the trial) the "final pattern was recognised about two-thirds of the time.
However when the transformations had been performed incorrectly, the final
pattern was never recognised." This suggested they could not have used a strategy
based on descriptive knowledge.
Using similar methods, Finke and Slayton (1988) explored the ability to
make inventive discoveries. At the start of the trials subjects were shown a limited
range of familiar geometric shapes and alphanumeric characters. On each trial
subjects closed their eyes and a randomly selected collection of three of these
shapes were named. They were asked to mentally join or over-lap all three of the
named shapes in order to mentally construct any recognisable pattern or object
containing the three shapes. After two minutes they were told to write down the
name of any object they had imagined and then to draw it. A separate group of
judges assessed whether the drawings were recognisable from the names and if so
they rated them for creativity. In a later book Finke (1990) describes the results of
these and similar experiments in the use of mental imagery to invent new forms.
He also describes extended experiments to investigate the mental discovery of new
three dimensional objects. Finke claims that the use of "pre-inventive forms", that
is shapes selected for mental manipulation without any pre-determined objective,
can act as catalysts for creative problem solving.
Relevant to the design of sketching systems is some research by Anderson,
R. and Helstrup (1993). These authors showed that people could use imagery to
imagine the results of novel combinations of patterns as effectively as they could
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use drawings. Drawings helped to produce more combinations of patterns but not
more recognizable or creative ones. Unfortunately these authors did not investigate
the advantages or disadvantages of combining imagery with drawing.
There is considerable, if anecdotal, evidence for the role of mental imagery
in discovery and invention (e.g Miller, A. 1984, Shepard 1978, Shepard and
Cooper, L., 1982 pages 5-11). Einstein's claim to have had an insight into
Relativity theory by imagining what it would be like to travel on a beam of light is
often quoted. Kekule's discovery of the benzene ring after dreaming or imagining a
snake biting its own tail is also well known. Shepard also quotes as addictive
imagers, James Clark Maxwell, Faraday, Helmholtz and Galton. Further accounts
include Tesla's "hallucinatory vision" of the self starting, reversible induction
motor and James Watson's account of the contribution of imagery in his and
Crick's discovery of the structure of DNA. In fact in the book that Shepard quotes,
Watson (1968) describes how he manipulated cardboard cut-outs of the nucleotide
bases until he suddenly saw that an H-bonded "adenine-thymine pair was identical
in shape to a guanine-cytosine pair". Thus his imagery was supported by
perceptual aids.
For some unexplained reason most of the reported case studies of discovery
by mental imagery are from the sciences. One would certainly expect, as I argued
in Chapter 1, that visual mental imagery is a primary cognitive tool in visual arts.
Possibly the scarcity of accounts of mental imagery by artists compared to
scientists is the relative verbal reticence of artists about their thought processes.
Henry Moore has stated that a sculptor "must be an expert in visualising three-
dimensional form" and the sculptor James Suns reported that while lying on a
couch he planned his next sculpture and "manipulated the image around in his
mind. He saw it tumbling and rolling, took an arm off, put an arm on...".
(Samuels and Samuels, 1975). In one of the very few reviews of the use of
imagery in the arts, Lindauer (1983) is able to quote a number of surveys and
studies which purport to show the importance of imagery to artists. Thus
Hendersen in an unpublished study (Lindauer 1983) sampled 115 autobiographical
works by painters, musicians and writers from the eighteenth to the twentieth
centuries. She found 501 statements of various aspects of creativity. Of these 19%
were in an imagery category. Of these 46% were by painters with musicians and
writers tied at 27% each.
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5.3 How Sketch Percepts Support Images.
5.3.1 The Need for Perceptual Support: Preliminary Conclusions.
From the brief review above, it can be seen that mental image generation
and manipulation is probably an essential cognitive skill for invention in the visual
arts. Thus invention, in so far as it relies upon visual experience for its raw
material must draw upon the stored visual information discussed in Chapter 4.
However these are encoded by automatic processes that can only be inferred and
are accessed during recognition without voluntary control. Mental image
generation is the only known mechanism by which this vast store of visual
knowledge can be retrieved for visually depictive manipulation and mental
synthesis (Mandler, J. & Parker, 1976).
However because mental images fade quickly and are often limited in
resolution and detail they need perceptual support. This fact is given tacit support
by much of the imagery literature but only rarely given explicit recognition and
discussion. Thus many of the experiments discussed above were performed with
eyes open whilst looking at a marked screen or grid of lines. Farah introduces one
of her articles with a typical hybrid imagery task - imagining the layout of luggage
in the perceived boot of a car (Farah, 1988a). Kosslyn comments on the need to
"leave room on the screen for the image". In one experiment Kosslyn, Cave et Al.
(1988) found that subjects were faster to image letters on grids. "Presumably the
grids were a kind of crutch" and subjects were not forced to use "coordinate
spatial relations to construct the image". We can hypothesize that the contours in
sparse outline sketches support imagery by acting as a similar "crutch". Moreover,
if as Kosslyn suggests, the initial global shape generation in the image is low
resolution then the high resolution of a self-occluding perceived contour line would
appear to be an ideal partner. Used with skill an outline sketch may save resources
used for the "skeletal" generation and part location finding processes whilst clear
spaces allow "room" for fast testing of multiple alternative imagined parts and
details. Work by Kelly & Freyd (1987) on the extrapolation of imagined movement
from static percepts helps to explain how for example Toulouse-Lautrec is able to
suggest a rearing horse (Illustration XXIX)
Whether or not my explanation of the finding that reversible ambiguity is
difficult in imagery is correct, we can already understand more clearly the
deliberate use of confused and accidental percepts to assist invention (Leonardo,
Cozens, Ernst etc. Chapter 2). The confused stimulus for the hybrid-image must be
a percept and must be partly accidental to avoid mental dominance by a single
preferred encoding used for image generation. This does not of course conflict
with Finke's demonstrations of original invention by mental transformation. Here a
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new descriptive encoding is possible but only after synthesis from easily
remembered parts.
5.3.2 Evidence for Shared Neural Resources.
There is considerable convergent evidence that mental images use the same
neural structures within the brain that are used for visual perception. (See Farah,
1988a for a good review). One source of evidence comes from direct measures of
local cerebral activity.
Regional cerebral blood flow can be measured using injected radioactive
Xenon. Using this technique Roland and Friburg (1985) compared an imagery task
(imagining a walk) with a mental arithmetic task and a verbal task. The imagery
task showed a greater blood flow relative to the other tasks in three cortical regions
all of which are known to be involved in visual perception and to be anatomically
part of the visual pathway. Using SPECT (single photon emission computer
tomography) to measure regional blood flow, Goldenburg et Al. (1987) showed
high regional blood flow in visual cortex related to memorising high imagery
words compared to low imagery words. Subjects also showed higher blood flow in
the visual cortex (occipital, temporal and parietal lobes) when asked to listen to
high imagery statements compared to low imagery statements.
Event-related Potentials (ERPs) (Recorded by placing sensitive electrodes
on the scalp) have also been used to compare perception and imagery. Farah et Al.
(1988) asked subjects to image either an H or a T and then presented them with
random faint H or T stimuli. They found that imagery selectively affects the visual
ERPs to the stimuli. The effect was greatest in two visual cortical regions.
Kosslyn, Alpert et AL (1993) used positron emission tomography (PET) to
study localised blood flow in the brain during visual imagery. They found very
similar patterns of regional brain activity when analogous perception and imagery
tasks were compared. Amongst the various visual areas (including parietal cortex
associated with spatial vision and attention and Area TE probably associated with
object recognition) that they found to be activated was a region of occipital cortex,
probably area 17 shown by other PET studies to be retinotopically mapped in
perception (Fox et Al. 1986). This is an important finding because it suggests that
primary visual cortex, areas V1 or V2 the earliest visual processing parts of the
cortex are also activated by "top-down" information used in imagery. This paper is
especially interesting because its authors found that their primary perceptual task
(that used by Podgorny and Shepard (19 8) described above) activated primary
cortex less strongly (i.e. caused less regional blood flow) than the corresponding
imagery task. They speculate that the perception of clear unambiguous stimuli
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places less load on visual cortex than imagery because "edge detection and region
organising processes" operate less effectively when one must recreate a pattern
from remembered information which is typically incomplete. To test this
hypothesis, they repeated the experiment using deliberately noisy and indistinct
stimuli in the perceptual condition. This time they found that the perceptual task
increased cerebral blood flow in primary visual cortex just as strongly as it did in
the equivalent imagery condition. They state that these results (in agreement with
the theory presented here) suggest that "visual mental imagery may be used in
perception itself when one is faced with fragmentary input". In another set of
experiments they investigated the effects on regional blood flow in primary cortex
of imaging letter forms with the eyes closed so there could be no visual input. The
authors point out that the area active in occipital cortex whilst probably area 17
(V1) is also close to the border with area 18 (V2) which cannot be ruled out as an
alternative location. However both these regions are topographically mapped.
Tantalisingly, they do not mention the possible implications of this discovery for
the finding by Peterhans et Al. (1986) that cells in area 18 (V2) respond to
cognitive contours. Nevertheless there is now physiological support for the theory
that sketch indeterminacies exploit imagery mechanisms used by the human visual
system to complete impoverished stimuli.
Brain damage which disrupts visual perception disrupts visual mental
imagery in parallel ways. Lesions in the posterior occipital cortex can cause
hemianopia (blindness in a limited region of the visual field). Kosslyn, Cave and
Gabriel (1989) studied patients who had blind regions so that they could only see
objects which subtended a small visual angle. They found that their patients
showed a similarly limited imagery field when asked to image objects against a
screen and point to the edges of the imagined object. Farah et Al. (1992) used
Kosslyn's method (Section 5.2.3) to measure the visual angle of the mind's eye in
a female patient before and after unilateral removal of the occipital lobe of visual
cortex. Her results were also consistent with the claim that imagery and perception
are retinotopically mapped in a similar part of the brain.
A region in the parietal cortex is known to be associated with spatial
perception and shifts of visual attention. Damage to the right parietal cortex can
cause visual neglect of objects in the left half of the field of view. Patients do not
notice and cannot attend to objects in the left half of the field (mapped in the right
half of the brain) even though it can be shown that isolated objects can still be seen
there. Interestingly it can also cause lack of conscious perception of the left half of
objects even when they are scanned (Marshall & Halligan, 1988). Bisiach and
Luzzatti (1978) examined the imagery abilities of two such patients with unilateral
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visual neglect. They asked them to imagine the cathedral square in Milan, a place
well known to both. When asked to imagine they were standing on the steps of the
cathedral looking away from it and report what they could visualise, they only
reported shops and objects on the right. They reported shops and objects on the
other half of the square only when asked to imagine themselves facing in the
opposite direction (towards the cathedral). Other tests showed a similar parallelism
between visual and imaginable neglect. In a further study Bisiach et Al. (1979)
showed that unilateral neglect affects the ability to integrate and distinguish abstract
shapes when they are seen as a succession of parts through a slit in a screen. Their
results and similar ones obtained by Ogden (1985) suggest that parietal cortex is
the location for a spatial representational medium (or "Schema", Bisiach et Al.
(1979)) which is used to integrate and inspect (by attentional shifts) both percepts
and images.
Evidence that lesions causing content specific recognition disabilities also
cause a matching deficit in imagery ability has already been mentioned (Chapter
4). This evidence that recognition and image gemation dvavs o,NA the same stoTed
representations is important to sketch theory. It makes it likely that whenever a
sketch percept "part" is recognised, the memory information needed for image
superimposition is also primed.
Inferred image generation deficit is one kind of brain damage to imagery
which is not shared with perception. Farah (1988b) reviews eight such cases
showing that the predominant site of damage was the left occipital hemisphere.
Grossi et Al. (1988) report a case of a patient with a left occipital lesion who was
able to copy pictures and to match drawings of faces but not to draw a simple
object without a model. He could recognise objects even from unusual perspectives
but was unable to generate an image of an object not physically present.
5.3.3 Interaction between Perception and Imagery.
As might be expected if visual perception and visual imagery share the
same neural resources, incompatible or unrelated perceptual and imagery tasks
interfere with each other if they are in the same mode.
In a series of studies Brooks (1968) asked subjects to visualise a block
letter, scan the corners, and to respond "Yes" if the corner was on the outside of
the figure and "No" if it was on the inside. Brooks found that subjects responses
were slower if they had to respond by pointing to a printed word than if they had
to speak their response. This result contrasted with a complementary linguistic task
where subjects had to say whether or nor the successive words in a phrase were
nouns. In this task responses were slower if they had to respond verbally than if
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they pointed to a printed response. Brooks concluded that looking and pointing
compete for resources with the scanning of a mental image, whilst speaking
competes with thinking about a phrase. In another set of studies subjects had to
imagine placing numbers in a visualised matrix according to instructions about
which squares to use. Their retention of the matrix was worse if they had to read
the instructions than if they only had to listen to them. Baddeley et Al. (1975)
followed this up by showing that a concurrent perceptual-motor tracking task also
significantly disrupted by the Brooks matrix material although it had no effect on
the retention of a set of nonsense sentences. (These results are relevant to the
design of sketch system interfaces where pointing with a stylus to system menus
would be expected to interfere with the users' spatial images of their primary task).
Mode dependent interference between mental imagery and perception was
also demonstrated by Segal and Fusella (1970). They showed that sensitivity to a
visual or auditory signal is reduced by instructions to subjects to form unrelated
mental images, and that this reduction (measured by detection rate) is greater if the
image is in the same sensory mode than if it is cross-modal. Thus instructions to
form a mental picture of a tree reduced the visual detection rate of a small arrow,
more than instructions to imagine hearing, for example, a phone ringing. The same
instructions had an opposite effect on the ability to hear a harmonica chord played
into ear-phones. This time it was the acoustic imagery that had the greatest effect
on the stimulus detection rate. The authors suggest that their data support a model
in which interference depends upon the need to discriminate the internal
representation of a percept from a memory generated image rather than a simpler
channel competition model.
Interference between perception and imagery is certainly relevant to the
design of sketching systems. Indeed it is part of my thesis that some existing
machine visualising systems are likely to cause perceptual interference with the
users mental imagery. However, the main point of this chapter is the hypothesis
that, in skilled hands, sketch stimuli support mental imagery whilst avoiding
interference. In the above experiments the perceptual tasks were irrelevant to or
incompatible with the imagery task. Under what conditions can perception be used
to facilitate mental imagery?
The effects of image and percept compatibility were studied by Peterson
and Graham, S. (1974) who investigated the effects of compatible and
incompatible cuing, with and without imagery instructions, on the ability to detect
embedded pictures masked by visual noise. They discovered that compatible cueing
increased the detection rate of target pictures whether or not the group received
imagery instructions. Incompatible cueing was more effective in increasing errors
How Sketches combine Perception with Imagery.
	 150
with the imagery group than with the control group. Although these results are
open to more than one interpretation, they are consistent with the assumption that
the cueing generated a mental image which facilitated picture perception in
proportion to the degree to which the image and the picture were compatible.
There is evidence that faint percepts can be absorbed into a mental image,
sometimes without the subject noticing. Perky (1910) asked 24 students to form
mental images of familiar objects against a two-way mirror. Unknown to them, she
then gradually projected from behind a faint actual image of the same object. None
of her subjects noticed that a real image was present and attributed characteristics
of the real image to their mental images. Unfortunately these early experiments
were not well controlled for the effects of the task demand characteristics.
However better controlled studies by Segal and Nathan (1964) and Segal
(1971, 1972) also showed that faint visual percepts may be assimilated into a
mental image. For example, asked to image a city skyline, but shown a tomato
(inside a hood with a concealed projector), several subjects described the skyline
with a round sun behind it setting in a red sky. Segal (1972) interprets these, and
other results, as evidence that percepts can be fused with images and even that the
image may be constructed around an undetected physical signal.
Other experiments demonstrate that compatible mental images can facilitate
percepts. In a rather neat experiment, Martha Farah (1985) asked her subjects to
memorise and then mentally image either an uppercase H or a T. Whilst doing this
with eyes fixated they were given a forced choice detection task of similar 'H's or
'T's in random order. Farah found that the detection rate for either letter was
facilitated if the same letter had been imaged, and moreover that this facilitation
was dependant on the image and the stimulus letters being in the same position in
the visual field. The fact that the facilitation was dependant upon location suggests
(to me) that an alignment match between imaged letter and stimulus letter preceded
the formation of a percept-image hybrid. It was the increased saliency of the
hybrid which caused the facilitation. In a later paper Farah (1989) examined the
facilitation of small threshold stimuli which either fell on or off the mentally
projected image of a letter form. Stimuli falling on the image were detected more
often than stimuli falling off the image. When the facilitation was analysed in
terms of signal detection theory, it was found to consist only of criterion lowering
and not of enhanced sensitivity. Thus false alarm rates increased as well as hit
rates. Qualitatively, the effects of imagery in this experiment resemble the effects
of attention and not passive perception. Farah interprets her findings to support a
theory of Uric Neisser (1976) that mental images are "perceptual anticipations" or
"plans for the future pick-up of perceptual information". Strangely I cannot find
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support for her claim that Neisser (1976) linked this theory to attention or that it is
an attentional theory of imagery.
Another type of facilitation has been shown by Freyd and Finke (1984).
Subjects were presented with cross-shaped patterns consisting of a vertical line
bisected by a horizontal line that was slightly different in length. Their task was to
say which of the two lines was the longer. On half the trials subjects were asked to
imagine either an outline square or a diagonal cross centred over the two lines. The
sides of the squares were slightly shorter than either of the two lines. An actual
square displayed over the lines was shown to facilitate the line discrimination
making it easier to detect the difference. The results showed that the imagined
square also facilitated the discrimination of the line lengths whilst the X pattern did
not. This is clearly an experiment in the formation of a hybrid image although not
presented as such.
5.3.4 Evidence for Percept - Image Hybrids.
The above evidence that images can interfere with perception and that
perceptual acts can interfere with imagery tasks is persuasive. So also is the more
limited evidence that imagery can be used to facilitate perceptual recognition and
discrimination. However in order to strengthen the claim that untidy sketch
attributes, (as used by Leonardo and others see Chapter 2), support imagery, we
need evidence of image facilitation by percepts and that imagery can be combined
in spatial register with a percept. Very surprisingly there is much less experimental
study of perceptual support for such "projected" imagery. We have seen that
prominent work on imagery shows tacit recognition for perceptual support, without
clarifying its nature. Thus Kosslyn remarks on the "need to leave room for the
image" when subjects are following imagery instructions whilst viewing cards
containing written material. Similarly, Farah refers to the "hybrid" image of her
car boot. Moreover hybrid imagery is tacit in all experiments on imagery which
use perceived grids or screens.
An exception is a series of studies by John Hayes (1973) of imagery in
elementary mathematics, which has been neglected (or mis-reported) in most
relevant reviews (e.g. Kosslyn 1980, 1983, 1987, Farah 1985, Finke 1985, 1989).
Skemp's (1971) suggestion that mathematical notations promote the use of imagery
in problem solving led Hayes to explore the nature of such notation related
imagery in mathematics. In one study Hayes used protocol analysis to record his
subjects reported use of imagery. He gave his subjects cards containing diagrams
of elementary mathematical problems which they were asked to solve and then to
later report any imagery which they used. 17 out of 19 subjects reported that they
589
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used imagery to solve the problems and most that the images were superimposed
on the cards in the same plane as the stimulus symbols. In solving card 4 (below)
three subjects complained that the line drawn round the symbols interfered with
their imagery. One said that he had to mentally remove the "bars" to move the
symbols and two others felt constrained to move the symbols as if they were tiles
in a frame.
5 + Z = 9
Card 8 caused even more trouble
Subjects complained that there was not room on the card to place (mentally)
their answer. One subject reported that to solve the problem he mentally "scotch-
taped a piece of paper underneath to write the answer on"
In solving the cancellation problem
4.C.S.R
R.W.0
most subjects reported that they generated either two or four imagined slash
marks to cross out the two R's and C's. Three of the subjects said that they solved
the problem by examining the hybrid image thus formed and reading off the
unmarked letters (This agrees with my own introspection).
In the addition and subtraction problems most subjects worked from right to
left, processing each column in turn and storing the results as images. One subject
commented that the "important thing about generating imaginary figures is that
they stay while you move to the left to do more calculation". Three subjects
volunteered the fact that they had to read the answer quickly because the image
faded rapidly. Others said that they went back to "refresh" the image of the partial
answer before proceeding with the rest of the calculation.
These reports agree with the subjective experience that in sketching it is
important to omit denotational marks which may hinder imagery movement, and
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that it is necessary to leave space within the sketch for its imagery components.
Millet's "The curtain of trees" (Illustration XXIV) is a good example of a sketch
which generates imagery as much by what it omits as by the skeletal marks that it
contains.
In another study Hayes (1973) obtained more objective evidence that hybrid
images really are generated in spatial register with the supporting percept. He
noticed that European-trained subjects found a division problem was more difficult
by placing the 2 figure divisor to the left of the 3 figure dividend (as is usual in the
U.S. and the U.K. e.g. as 151673) because they had been trained to place the
divisor on the right (e.g as 673115). Hayes considered two models of the solution
process. In the first the subject generates an image in the familiar format and then
solves the problem using the generated (but not a hybrid) image by the usual
manipulation. In the second model the subject might solve the problem with a
hybrid image correcting the unfamiliar to the familiar format digit by digit. Thus
the effects of the unfamiliar versus the familiar format would, if the first model is
correct, be expected to be limited to the first stage of the solution process, whilst
the second model predicts that the effects would be distributed digit by digit
throughout the solution process. He tested this prediction with a group of 3
European and 9 American subjects each with 12 familiar and 12 unfamiliar 2 digit
into 3 digit division problems. The difference in the means of subjects times to
compute successive digits of the answers for the familiar and the unfamiliar
formats were distributed throughout the solution process confirming the hybrid
model. It is a pity that comparable studies, (perhaps using the Finke (1990)
methodology) on hybrid imagery in visual invention are not yet available.
It has already been suggested that sketches (e.g Picasso's studies for "Les
Demoiselles D'Avignon" Illustrations XI, XII) provide substitutes for Kosslyn's
posited image skeleton and thus reduce the cognitive effort for image maintenance,
whilst leaving space for fast image transformations. A possible analogy for this
function is the role of the chess-board and pieces in chess (Chase & Simon, 1973).
Most of the moves considered in a chess game are played only in the minds of the
players. According to Reuben Fine, a chess grandmaster who is also a
psychologist, chess skill depends upon making mental images of possible positions
(Holding, 1985). In a number of studies Chase & Simon compared chess players of
different strengths in their ability to remember chess positions, to perceive threats,
find good moves etc. They concluded that the thought of skilled chess players
relied upon "perceptual structures" which they retrieve from long term memory.
These perceptual structures are used to generate mental images which can be
superimposed upon the "external representation of the chess board". They
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conclude that "This capacity to construct an image combining perceptual structures
from internal memory with sensory features from external memory is probably one
of the very basic cognitive processes." They call the meeting point the "visual
vestibule". This is perhaps an intuitive 1973 anticipation of the "visual buffer"
(Kosslyn, 1980) or "visuospatial working memory" (Baddeley, 1986, Logie 1995).
One of the problems of "forward search" in chess is that in visualising the
position several moves ahead the unchanged actual positions of the pieces can
interfere with the attempt to imagine their new positions. It is easier to position an
imaginary piece upon an empty square than upon one already occupied by another
piece (see discussion of the chess "blind spot" in Kotov, 1971). One sometimes
sees chess masters in tournaments shielding their eyes from the board as they think.
This suggests that the board and pieces is a necessary but far from perfect crutch
for the "mind's eye". By analogy, some perceptual attributes of sketches (and other
visualising aids) may also cause unintentional image interference where facilitation
is needed.
The evidence available for hybrid imagery in sketching is circumstantial,
but I believe persuasive. This case would be stronger still, if it could be shown that
normal perception has an imagery component whenever it is impoverished or
ambiguous as suggested in Chapter 4. Does the hybrid image hypothesis have
explanatory value in normal perception?
5.3.5 "What" and "Where" in Perception and Imagery.
In Chapter 3 a case for the relevance to sketch function of the distinction
between spatially "depictive" and "descriptive" forms of visual representation was
made. It was also pointed out that there are many intermediate types of
representation such as the "labelled map" or "pictorial description" (Ullman,
1989). In Chapter 4 evidence was presented that both spatially mapped (depictive)
and descriptive (encoded parts and features) representations are used to perform
different types of recognition task.
This conceptual distinction can be related to evidence about the modularity
and division of labour within the visual pathways of the brain. Neural signals from
the retinae pass first to paired midbrain structures the Lateral Geniculate Nuclei
(LGN) on their way to the primary visual cortex. Here two types of cells, large
(magnocellular) and small (parvocellular) are neatly segregated in six alternating
layers. Responses in magnocellular layers are transient, sensitive to movement
(have a high temporal gain), sensitive to small luminance contrasts (high contrast
gain) but have a low spatial resolution (large receptive fields) and are insensitive to
colour. Cells in the parvocellular layer have lower temporal and contrast gains but
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much higher spatial resolution and carry colour information. There are at least 32
separate areas of the primate brain (mainly in the folded outer layer the neocortex)
responsible for visual processing (Braitenburg 1985, Van Essen 1985). Many (but
not all) of these contain organised columns of cells with receptive fields which
topographically map the retina. It is known that different visual cortical areas are
specialised for different aspects of visual analysis (see Zeki, 1993) although this
specialisation is imperfectly understood and there is much apparent functional
overlap. Moreover the cortex is subdivided into a least six functional layers (with
further sub-divisions) and in those visual areas which have been studied in most
detail there is a parallel segregation of function between layers (Hubel &
Livingstone, 1987). From the LGNs the signals pass to visual area V1 where the
retina is mapped at the highest resolution. Here, parvocellular and magnocellular
separation is preserved, in parallel, in different layers and a further division of
labour has been documented. Cells responding to moving edges and stereoscopic
depth can be traced to the magnocellular stream whilst those responding to oriented
edges and to colour but not edges (the cytochrome oxidase blobs) have a
parvocellular origin. V1 connects to V2 where these three streams are further
segregated. Livingstone & Hubel (1987) have collected psychophysical evidence to
support their contention that at least three separate visual channels are used for (a)
movement, depth and low resolution form (magnocellular path), (b) high resolution
form (parvocellular path) and (c) colour (parvocellular path). Livingstone (1988)
discusses how physiological properties of these three pathways explain aspects of
art. For example why it is possible to paint a good likeness in unusual colours,
provided luminance contrasts are preserved, whilst colour contrast at
equiluminance fails to provide pictorial depth. Relevant to the sketch is the
suggestion that colour which overflows the boundary of a form appears to be
attached to that form because cells in the colour channel have a lower spatial
resolution than those responsible for shape.
The magnocellular (M system) - parvocellular (P system) distinction
overlaps with a distinction based on the effects of localised brain damage in human
and non-human primates. It has been shown by Mishkin et Al. (e.g. Mishkin,
Ungerleider & Macko 1983) that lesions in the parietal cortex of the macaque
monkey disrupt the ability to spatially locate objects whilst leaving the ability to
recognise them intact. In contrast, lesions in the infero- temporal cortex damage
the ability to recognise objects whilst leaving intact the ability to locate and grasp
objects. A similar double dissociation between object recognition and spatial
perception has been found in human patients with lesions in the corresponding
parts of the cortex. Mishkin and his colleagues postulated two parallel visual
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DIAGRAM H
A diag ram showing neural connections between various visual regions of the macaque
cortex. Modules on the left roughly correspond with the "dorsal" or parietal pathway
and those on the right to the ventral or "recognition" pathway, but as can be seen there
are many cross connections as well (Modified from Van Essen 1985) (see text).
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pathways. One is Dorsal, the "Where" pathway concerned with spatial vision,
connects Primary cortex (V1) through areas V2, V3 and V5 (known to be
specialised for movement perception) to the parietal cortex where the visual cortex
is less well understood but is known to have separable functions related to visual
attention, spatial perception and spatial memory (Ellis, A. and Young, 1988). The
other a Ventral route, the "What" pathway, connects primary visual cortex through
V4, (shown to be important for colour vision), to inferotemporal cortex, a region
critical for object recognition.
Zeki (1993) (an authority who has pioneered the study of visual
specialisation within the cortex) has criticised, what he calls the "What and Where
doctrine". He points out that the visual cortex cannot be organised upon only two
such pathways. Zeki accepts that the magno and parvo pathways are concerned
with different attributes of visual processing. However he points out that they are
richly interconnected and that there are many more than two routes from V1 to
other visual areas. Moreover he claims that certain visual areas have both "What"
and "Where" attributes. For example areas V3 and V3A contain orientation
selective cells which are commonly "gaze-locked" (they respond only to a
particular orientation if the monkey is looking in that direction). Thus according to
Zeki, they would be classified for both spatial vision (where) and for form (what).
He himself summarises the evidence as indicating four pathways.
"We can therefore speak of two form pathways, one derived principally
from the M system, and much more concerned with dynamic form, and the other
derived principally from the P pathway and much more concerned with form in
association with colour. In addition to these, there is a principally M-derived
motion pathway and a principally P-derived colour pathway. There is ample
opportunity for the P and M signals to mix in the cortex, so that the input to the
specialised visual areas may consist of signals from either source." (Zeki 1993,
original in italics)
Diagram II shows the connectivity of some of the more important visual
regions of monkey cortex. The hypothetical "where" pathway (M-system) passes
from the eyes to V1 and then dorsally through V2, V3A, MT (movement), 7A
(spatial attention) to TF (in the frontal cortex). The hypothetical "what" pathway
(P-system) passes from V1 through V2, and diverges through VP, V4VA, and V4
towards a number of infero-temporal regions believed to be responsible for object
recognition and also to area TF. It is interesting that TF is close to a region
believed to be necessary for the conscious control of attention (Posner & Rothbart
1992 see also Chapter 6).
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Despite Zeki's reservations the terms "where" and "what" will be preserved
here for the following reasons. The distinction between the cerebral representation
of spatial structure in association with movement (used for orienting attention and
for guiding overt and imagined movement) and the representation of form in
association with colour (used for recognising and categorising objects) has
considerable explanatory value for the theory of sketches. However the terms
"what" and "where", as used here, are not intended to imply isolated processing
pathways but different, neurally implemented forms of visual representation. There
is convergent evidence that the dorsal "where" pathway includes one or more
topographical spatial maps which can be linked, possibly by movements of focal
attention (Treisman & Gelade 1980) to expandable hierarchies of descriptive
information about possible objects and object parts (the ventral "what" pathway).
For all well studied visual areas in the cortex the number of ascending neural
connections is matched by an equal number of descending re-entrant connections
(Braitenburg 1985, Van Essen 1985). It is amusing that originally neuroscientists
were puzzled by this and found it difficult to suggest functions for so many
returning connections. Edelman (1989) and Zeki (1993) have suggested that such
re-entrant axons are used for integrating separately processed visual attributes in
consciousness. The theory of perceptual completion and hybrid image formation in
sketches also requires the existence of such re-entrant connections. An elegant
advantage of having separate representations of spatial location and object form is
that it may facilitate fast preliminary movements of attention (Posner et Al. 1994)
to locations of interest (where system) without burdening working memory with
details about what is represented at each primed location until required.
There is evidence that the same modular distinctions found within the visual
system are mirrored by the mental imagery system, as predicted by the shared
resources hypothesis. For example Levine et Al. (1985) studied two patients with
impaired perception and imagery due to bilateral posterior cerebral lesions. One
who had impaired recognition for faces and animals and lacked colour vision
showed matching imagery deficits. The other had visual disorientation combined
with an inability to describe spatial relations from memory (spatial imagery
deficit). Thus "what" and "where" are dissociable systems in imagery as well as
perception.
Using similar evidence Farah et Al. (1988) argue for a similar dissociation
between "spatial" and "visual" imagery systems. In my opinion this distinction is
rather muddled. It is based on the premise that "spatial" cognition is not only
visual but multimodal since we can perceive space auditorily or by combined
movement and touch. There are two other sorts of evidence. One consists of
How Sketches combine Perception with Imagery.
	 158
evidence for imagery processes in the congenitally blind using tactile analogs of
visual stimuli. Thus the blind can perform mental rotation tasks (Carpenter et
Eisenberg 1978, Marmor & Zabeck, 1976), mental scanning tasks (Kerr, 1983)
and imagery mnemonic tasks (Jonides et Al. 1975, Zimler & Keenan, 1983).
Whilst this may well be due to the fact that visuospatial and tactile-spatial task
share resources it does not seem to me to justify a distinction between "spatial" and
"visual". It is possible that either, (a) separate visual and tactile spatial regions of
the cortex can perform analogous operations, or (b) that a shared resource which
evolved for high-level vision is intact and functional in some blind people and is
used for unconsciously visual-like imagery processes. Indeed some blind people
report imagery like experiences and can even paint using imagery (Finke, 1986,
1989).
Another type of evidence is provided by studies of the interfering effects of
spatial tasks on spatial imagery and of visual but non-spatial tasks on non spatial
imagery. Thus Baddeley & Lieberman (1980) (following up Baddeley et Al. 1975)
showed that the Brooks matrix task (which is disrupted by concurrent visual
tracking of a moving target) was also disrupted by concurrent tracking of an
auditory moving pendulum by blindfolded subjects. On the other hand performance
of the matrix task was not affected by a concurrent brightness judgement task.
They concluded that the Brooks matrix task drew upon a "spatial" rather than a
"visual" resource which is involved in spatial perception and also in motor-control.
In a series of studies Logic (1986) demonstrated that visual imagery tasks which
are not disrupted by concurrent tracking are disrupted by a concurrent visual task.
Logic used performance at a memory by association technique known as the "one-
bun pegword mnemonic" as a measure of non-spatial visual imagery (described in
Paivio 1971b). This is a technique for remembering lists of words based on
forming mental images of objects in unusual associations. Subjects were presented
with concurrent visual patterns which they were told to ignore as far as possible
whilst concentrating on remembering a list of words by the imagery method.
Concurrent visual patterns were found to disrupt recall of the words when the
imagery technique was used but had no effect upon recall using rote rehearsal. A
number of other studies (reviewed Logic 1995) have also demonstrated a
disassociation between the two types of interference.
The above evidence elegantly demonstrates a parallel distinction between
two types of visual and two types of imagery process. However I find the fashion
for referring to this as "spatial" and "visual" rather illogical. There is surely good
evidence that the spatial resources shared by visual perception and visual imagery
tasks are part of the visual system (even though they may also be used by other
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modalities). Surely also, the process of perceiving or imagining the form of visual
objects and patterns has a spatial component? Thus the terms "spatial" and "visual"
do not refer to disjoint sets. In the context of visuospatial working memory, Logie
admits that the distinction between "spatial" and "visual" is unclear (Logie, 1995
pages 77-79). He makes the interesting suggestion that the term "spatial" can be
interpreted to refer to a representation that involves movement in a broad sense.
This would include not only physical movement and imagined movement but also
movement planning and movements of attention or mental scanning.
I suggest that an single explanation for all the above distinctions lies in the
existence of the two different formats for representing visual information discussed
in Chapter 3. An array format, depictive representation of spatial structure lies in
the dorsal parietal pathway and a descriptive hierarchical representation of object
colour and form in the ventral, infero-temporal pathway. There is a necessary
connection between spatial depiction and movement because spatial depiction in an
array is the form of representation from which implicit distances and directions
between arbitrary locations can be extracted. Also movements of attention are
implicated in extracting implicit geometrical information from spatial arrays
(Chapter 3). As already discussed, the descriptive representation of object
attributes is necessary to explain object recognition, categorisation and abstraction.
Spatial tracking interferes with the Brooks matrix task because the latter requires
movements of covert attention and because both tasks compete for the same spatial
array. Visual patterns and irrelevant pictures interfere with the imagery mnemonic
tasks because both compete for a short term descriptive buffer in which object
attributes can be accessed but movement or spatial scanning is not possible. The
two systems are interdependent, with necessary connections between spatial
location and descriptive information making an harmonious combined descriptive-
depiction.
It is now possible to relate the hypothetical hybrid imagery function of
sketches to their intermediate depictive-descriptive status. Spatially represented
components of the sketch (which support overt scanning) will amplify and combine
with spatially represented components of the users imagery which support covert
mental scanning ("Where" system). Descriptive components of the sketch,
(principally object colour and form) will elicit and combine with descriptively
represented imagery components. Commonly both types of hybrid representation
will be interacting in the users mind during the acts of generating and inspecting a
sketch. However, as I shall suggest in Chapter 4 some sketches may differentially
support spatial (depictive) imagery whilst others differentially support object
(descriptive) imagery components.
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5.3.6 Working Memory and Mental Imagery.
A crucial cognitive resource for planning and designing imaginary objects
in the visual arts is an easily manipulated temporary memory system with fast
access. Involuntary temporary storage is implicit in the late construction theory of
visual perception. Voluntary temporary storage is necessary for reasoning and
imagining and for planning and monitoring overt motor activity such as drawing.
Psychologists have long distinguished such a working memory system from long
term memory containing stored knowledge about the world (semantic memory) or
of experienced events (episodic or autobiographical memory). In working memory,
information must be quickly accessed but can be discarded after a few seconds or
minutes. In contrast in long term memory, information may last a life time but
cannot be consciously manipulated and is not always easily accessed. Working
memory is necessary for both perceptual and imagery components of the act of
sketching. When drawing from a model the shape for an intended line must be
remembered whilst the eyes are transferred to the paper. When correcting a
contour whilst drawing, memory for either imagined or recently erased contours
must be available for comparison. To develop and correct a chain of visual thought
one must remember the immediately preceding stages of the chain.
The Baddeley and Hitch model of working memory has been developed as
the result of several years experimental study of memory capacity (Baddeley &
Hitch, 1974, Hitch 1980, Baddeley, 1986). The original model had three main
components which are distinguished by studies of performance. A general purpose,
modality independent, resource the Central Executive, used in reasoning and
planning is posited to be able to initiate and monitor a number of sub-processes
(Baddeley 1986). This is the least understood of the model's components, but is
similar in function and attributes to the "supervisory attention" control system
posited by Norman and Shallice (1980) in a theoretical model of voluntary and
automatic behaviour (discussed further in Chapter 7).
Two slave memory systems, co-ordinated by the Central Executive, are
postulated in the model. Most studied has been the articulatory loop, responsible
for the temporary retention of speech based material. There is evidence that it
consists of at least two components, a phonological or acoustic store and an
articulatory rehearsal system, a sort of "inner voice" which is used to refresh or
maintain verbal material in the phonological store. The evidence in support of this
part of the model is reviewed by Baddeley (1986) and Salame and Baddeley (1982,
1989). Relevant to the function of the written notes frequently found on artists'
sketches (see Chapter 2) is the evidence that the articulatory loop is used in reading
and verbal reasoning (Baddeley, 1986). This suggests another function for written
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notes. It is possible that despite their visual format some (not all) written notes
have the function of releasing internal visuospatial resources for more spatially
dedicated tasks. These two components are sometimes referred to as "the inner
ear" and the "inner voice".
The other slave component of working memory the visuospatial sketch-
pad (Baddeley, 1986) or simply visuospatial working memory (Logie, 1995) is
especially relevant to sketch function. For many years the Kosslyn model of mental
imagery and the Baddeley and Hitch model of working memory were developed
independently, using different types of evidence and making few if any references
to each other. It was therefore not clear to what extent Kosslyn's "visual buffer"
could be identified with "visuospatial working memory". Recently however Logie
has attempted to bridge this gap (Logie, 1991, 1995). As described in the
preceding section, there is persuasive evidence, based on dual task performance,
that visuospatial working memory has at least two sub-systems a "spatial" or
location memory and a "visual" or object attribute memory responsible for colour
and object form. However although he recognises that they share many features,
Logie is not convinced that the "visual buffer" is identical with "visuospatial
working memory". He quotes evidence that imagery generation and manipulation
is the responsibility of the central executive. Logie views Kosslyn's "visual
buffer" as "more like a workspace for visual imagery than a buffer as such". He
suggests that visuospatial working memory, by analogy with the phonological loop,
consists of a passive short term visual cache larger in capacity than the conscious
mental image and a spatial memory system "the inner scribe" which refreshes its
contents by active rehearsal or mental scanning. The visual cache idea makes sense
of Kosslyn's otherwise puzzling theory of the mental "window of attention" into
which parts of the image can be moved for detailed processing. For example, the
question "how is the image within the attention window refreshed?" is unanswered
(Kosslyn and Shin, 1994). If the visual cache suggestion is accepted, then sketches
may be viewed as supporting not only the currently conscious mental image but
also a larger short term memory in which overt eye movements are used to support
covert movements of attention to parts of the visual cache. Thus the superimposed
imagery components of the percept-image compound can be expected to fluctuate
in piece-meal fashion with spatial movements of attention.
A connection between the spatial (depictive array ?) component and
memory for movements has been demonstrated, which could be important to
sketch function. Thus in a series of experiments, Quinn and Ralston (1986) had
subjects move their unseen arms around a square matrix taped to a table,
concurrently with performing the Brooks matrix task. They found that movements
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which were incompatible with the mental movements used in the matrix task
interfered with retention of the matrix whereas compatible movements did not.
Compatible arm movements were those which mirrored in direction the instructions
in the Brooks task such as "In the starting square put a 1, in the next square to the
right put a 2, in the next square down put a 3" etc. Now, in normal sketching on
paper, movements of the pencil whilst drawing can be assumed to be compatible
with internal mental movements whilst the artist is considering a particular form. It
seems possible, that such movements of the pencil actually facilitate corresponding
movements of spatial thought. However with many computer sketching systems
forced arm and hand movements, to menu functions for example, are incompatible
with the users covert imagery and are thus likely to interfere with visual thought.
5.3.7 Towards a Model of Percept - Image Interaction.
5.3.7.1 Hybrid Images: A Global Outline.
It is now possible to outline a hypothetical model of percept-image
interaction within the sketch. Diagram III shows a global model of the processes
posited in the formation of percept-image hybrids (after Fish 1991). The model
may be criticised as too complicated. However it is difficult to imagine how
existing knowledge can be summarised more simply. In truth the model already
contains several simplifications of detail and an exaggerated symmetry. Here I
defend only its broad outline fully aware that it may contain faults or omissions of
detail. It is an attempt to relate the known attributes of sketches with the "late
construction" theory of perception, the Kosslyn model of imagery and existing data
on percept-image interaction. The model is intended to explore the hypothesis that
there is some symmetry (resulting from evolution and shared neural resources),
between visual perception and visual memory retrieval. This is reflected in the
diagram about the vertical axis. A different symmetry in working memory related
to that suggested by Logie (1995) between descriptive and spatially depictive
processes is reflected about the horizontal axis. In the diagram the ellipses
symbolise representational structures whilst the arrows and rectangular boxes
symbolise processes manipulating the information represented. Circles symbolise
combined representation and process systems. Two artificial and probably
exaggerated symmetries have been emphasised. On the far left of the diagram are
the cultural depictive and descriptive visual stimuli used in the sketch interacting
with hand and eye. These are symbolically mirrored on the far right by the
corresponding stored representations in long term memory. Here I should perhaps
have made the descriptive depictive distinction of non-verbal information clearer
and I could perhaps have incorporated KosAyn's distinction between categorical
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and coordinate representations of spatial structure. But that would have made the
model even more complex. Processes to the left of the central vertical axis are
stimulus derived visual processes divided (with Zeki's reservations in mind) into
dorsal route spatial and movement depictive systems (lower half of diagram) and
ventral route object attribute descriptive systems (upper half of diagram). Most of
the arrows are assumed to be physically implemented in the ascending, outwards
connections between specialised areas of the visual cortex. Diagramed to the right
of the central axis are corresponding representational systems derived from long
term memory, with again the lower half showing memory derived spatial
representations and the upper half memory derived object descriptions. These
processes are assumed to share cortical resources with the stimulus derived
processes and account for the existence in almost all cortical visual areas of the
rich descending, re-entrant connections. The whole of the large central circular
area of the diagram represents processes and storage components which are
assumed to be part of a multi-component "working" or cache memory system.
However only information which has passed the depictive and descriptive gates
(the two triangles in the diagram) can contribute to visual awareness and volition
(see Chapter 7).
Both percepts and images are simultaneously spatially structured and
descriptively interpreted. Thus there has to be a mechanism within the brain for
linking the separately resourced representations of depictive spatial layout and
descriptive structure. In the diagram I have followed the suggestion of Treisman
and Gelade (1985) and assumed that focal attention to objects and object parts,
provides one mechanism by which separately represented object attributes and
features become integrated at specific spatial locations (see also chapters 6 and 7).
However it is surely necessary to suggest also a mechanism by which important or
typical spatial-descriptive links are learned and re-accessed for fast perceptual
completion or image generation. For this reason Kosslyn and Koenig (1992)
suggest an "Associative memory" with this specific function. As the diagram is
already complex I have avoided adding yet another module. I suggest that some
kind of "associative memory" is implicit in the diagram where I have drawn
ascending and descending arrows between the long term memory representation of
descriptive hierarchies and "spatial memory".
5.3.7.2 Percept-Memory Comparison Buffers and Gates
Most of the relevant literature (eg Farah 1985, Kosslyn & Shin 1994)
attempts to explain the data on percept-image interference and facilitation by
assuming that images and percepts simply share resources. Whilst this might
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explain Farah's (1985) results on image facilitation of percepts, it does not explain
the interference data and offers no mechanism to control the proposed functional
construction of percept image hybrids. As Finke & Shepard (1986) have pointed
out, existing theories of percept-image interaction do not easily explain why
instructions to image sometimes causes interference with perception and sometimes
facilitate it. Moreover as Neisser (1976) has pointed out the shared "visual buffer"
hypothesis does not explain why we rarely confuse mental images with percepts.
For these reasons I suggest in the model the following refinement to the
shared visual buffer hypothesis. Instead of a single shared buffer I suggest that
memory derived and stimulus derived part representations are temporarily mapped
separately, side by side and in the same format, in special twinned Percept-Image
Buffers in short term memory. The two buffers are connected to Gates which feed
selected components of the two comparison buffers into a shared visual
Integration Buffer. Depending upon the results of a comparison between
corresponding components of the stimulus derived and memory derived buffers,
the gate will either suppress one or other component or - when memory image and
percept image match both spatially and descriptively - the gate will pass elements
of both forming a fused image in the Integration Buffer. I term this combined
structure of three physically interleaved representations a percept-image
"Comparison Buffer". Because the three representations in a Comparison Buffer
must share the same information format I suggest there must be distinct types of
comparison buffer corresponding to spatial (depictively mapped) and object
attribute (hierarchically descriptive) working memories located in parietal and
infero-temporal cortex respectively. In view of the evidence already mentioned
(Fox et Al. 1986, Kosslyn et Al. 1993, Farah et Al. 1992) that imagined and
perceived visual receptive fields are congruently mapped in occipital cortex (areas
V1 or V2) there is also the fascinating possibility that there might be a comparison
buffer in "primary" cortex. This would have the function of matching high
resolution object detail at the fovea with expanded stored information, provided by
the re-entrant connections, and of providing a pathway for integrating high-level
and lower-level spatial and object information (as hinted by Zeki 1993).
In the model I propose, an array structured 2 1/2D spatial "Comparison
buffer", houses percept (stimulus generated) and image (memory generated)
location maps. In the diagram I have tentatively drawn small "foveal" or "focal"
centred maps for detailed comparison within larger low resolution head field maps
(Sanders, 1963) formed by saccadic integration. This is roughly equivalent to
Kosslyn and Koenig's "attention window". The diagram shows only a logical 
structure. Physically the neuroscience suggests that these different types of spatial
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representation are anatomically separate (see Stiles-Davis et Al. 1988). The term
"comparison" is preferred to "matching" because the processes by which
compatibility between sketch percept and sketch image are determined cannot be
based only on forming a match. Initially (I suggest) landmark features are used to
perform Ullman type local alignments between sketch contour fragments and the
edges of candidate images, which have been generated and suitably transformed
from encoded descriptions pre-linked to corresponding locations of the two maps
(Ullman, 1989). It is suggested that the spatial comparison buffers have
overlapping receptive fields of different sizes, corresponding to parallel spatial
frequency filters as are known to exist in areas V1 and V2. The template fitting
process might then be facilitated by matching locations in sequential order from
low frequency to high frequency. Thus rough contour and position matches would
precede more refined ones. (A similar application of spatial frequency filters has
been suggested for visual position grouping algorithms by Watt (1988) and to
binocular matching (Arditi, 1986). The existence of independent spatial-frequency
tuned channels for binocular fusion and rivalry has been demonstrated by Julesz
and Miller (1975). See also Mayhew & Frisby 1980.
Where there are non-matching empty spaces in either the stimulus map or
the image map (weakly activated receptive fields), a search of the sketch schema
(activated in descriptive working memory) will elicit candidate image parts in the
complementary buffer. Thus the model assumes that a process that can compare
nodes in twinned descriptive hierarchies of scenes or objects is used in close co-
operation with the alignment test for compatibility between the spatial maps. The
corresponding twinned descriptive buffers are drawn separately in the upper part of
the diagram. It is posited that the descriptive image in the buffer is assembled from
long term memory by two possible mechanisms. In "descending" assembly, a
global super-ordinate sketch schema (or anticipatory hypothesis) is used to search
for associated sub-ordinate scene or object component parts. In "ascending"
assembly a sub-ordinate object or part is used to search for associated super-
ordinate objects or scenes (see "Recognition by Components" 4.3.4).
Thus according to the model two parallel and richly cooperative matching
processes are necessary to support the hybrid image theory of sketch perception.
Moreover there must be a fast and easily manipulated "map and pin" type link
between the spatial location maps and descriptive detail. The rich interconnections
between relevant parts of infero-temporal and parietal cortex is available for this
purpose. Such connections are not a problem for the model, but a necessity.
Probably the initial perceptual descriptive tree will be matched with its most likely
anticipatory schema from memory at their respective "roots". This scheme then
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becomes the global model which drives the location matching processes in the
spatial buffer. Mismatches at particular locations can then be resolved by looking
up alternative attributes in branches of the descriptive schema and re-matching
locations. As the spatial and hierarchical resolution of the two matching processes
increases, so the depictive and descriptive information converge with Kosslyn's
"categorical to coordinate" translation process being used to "zoom in" on detail in
the memory half of the spatial comparison buffer. The descriptive gate has the
function of keeping the hybrid (part perceived - part imagined) description
consistent. Simultaneously the gate in the spatial array buffer must resolve spatial
conflicts between image and percept even if the descriptions match. If different
descriptions are found at the same location the gate will select the most strongly
activated location. Normally this will be the percept and the weaker conflicting
image component will be inhibited. However where the image is very strong and
the percept component weak or confused the percept component may be gated out
(Perky 1910, Segal 1972). In ambiguous sketches, as the description oscillates, so
we may notice or not notice inconsistent components at some locations (the eye-
lash in Boring's "Wife or Mother-in-Law" figure is an example. (Illustration XXXI
a)). At a location where image and percept components match to a sufficient
degree the gate allows both signals to pass to the Integration Buffer resulting in a
fused percept-image part with combined signal strength. The resulting stronger
activation at that location accounts, I suggest, for the position dependent
facilitatory effects found by Farah (1985, 1989). The extra processing which must
precede the inhibitory gating out (blocking from awareness) of an inconsistent
image (or percept) part and the possibility of position dependant percept-image
competition for the integrative buffer explains the percept-image interference
results of Peterson & Graham, S., Segal and Fusella and others. Another function
of the gate distinguishes the comparison gating process from a relatively simple
recognition match. It must often happen that a spatial location is empty (ie.
inactivated in the map) in the sketch percept but not in the corresponding image
location or vice versa. In this situation I suggest that a relatively weak image (or
percept) signal will be uninhibited (no competing signal) and pass to the integration
buffer but remain relatively unstable. This has important consequences for the
function of blank spaces (as opposed to crowded ones) in the theory of the sketch.
Empty spaces in a sketch have the important function of providing "vacant spaces"
for image generation. However the model predicts that the images on such empty
spaces will be relatively unstable compared to those locked to sketch contour
fragments or other visual components with assigned descriptive labels.
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An unresolved problem in the model is that of determining what process
controls which parts of the Comparison Buffers are accessible to conscious
attention. In the normal perception of impoverished real world stimuli the theory
posits that we attend to the contents of the Integrative Buffers and may be unaware
of the involuntary image components of our perceptual experiences. Many image
attributes of sketches may be equally inseparable attentionally from their stimulus
frameworks - for example the three-dimensional volumes often suggested by
simple line drawings. Evidence that mental image generation can become
automatic with practice is provided by Pani (1982) (See also Chapter 7). However
when we consciously superimpose imagined forms upon sketch stimuli, voluntary
control is available for the image components at least and it seems likely that we
can switch attention at will between the contents of the three representations within
the Comparison Buffer. Conscious control of the gate seems less likely (see the
binocular rivalry analogy below). At least the triple structure of the proposed
spatial Comparison buffer answers Neisser's criticism that the shared resources
theory does not explain why we rarely confuse our percepts with our mental
images. We do sometimes confuse them, but only when we are attending to the
hybrid contents of the Integration buffer.
Although many details about how such Comparison Buffers might work are
obviously unclear I claim that the above model has greater explanatory adequacy
than simpler shared resources models such of those of Kosslyn, Finke, Farah and
others upon whose much quoted work it is built.
5.3.7.3 Plausibility: A Comparison with other Visual Gates.
The proposed gating mechanism with its triple representation buffer is a
variation of the "shared resources" hypothesis which (I claim) helps to explain the
experimental data on percept-image interaction and to provide a mechanism for
percept-image hybrid formation. However its physiological plausibility may be
questioned. What other types of high level visual gating does the brain perform and
do they illuminate by analogy percept-image interactions? In the above model, it is
implied that at least three (or more) specialised modules in the visual cortex, are
able to process memory derived signals from their re-entrant fibres simultaneously
with stimulus derived signals from the ascending fibres. Because, within a
particular processing module, the information fr m the two sources concerned
share the same visual attributes and format (spatial arrays or descriptive trees),
they may either compete (causing interference), or reinforce each other (causing
facilitation and fusion), depending upon their compatibility. Unfortunately the
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downwards (memory derived) component of this competition cannot be directly
observed. It is therefore of interest to examine as an analogy how the visual system
handles two spatially overlapping, but structurally separate, sources of visual
information which, although they are both stimulus derived, provide well
documented evidence of a similar combination of compatibility dependent rivalry
or facilitative fusion. Two examples demonstrating such a process have been
studied experimentally.
In the first example visual stimuli from two different sources are
superimposed, using a half-silvered mirror or video imaging techniques. Thus
Kolers (1972) designed a headgear with a half-silvered mirror which when he wore
it, superimposed the visual world in front of him and the visual world behind him
in his binocular field of view. Thus two incompatible scenes of similar contrast and
salience compete for attention. Kolers found that he could attend either forwards or
backwards with the unattended of the two scenes "disappearing". It was simply not
possible to perceive both scenes at once. Similar results have been reported by
Neisser & Becklen (1975) who demonstrated the ability to attend selectively to one
of two videotaped "games" in full visual overlap. These experiments provide
strong evidence for the "late construction" theory of conscious perception and
show that a gating mechanism must be available which can selectively suppress
from consciousness meaningfully segregated parts of complex scenes.
The other example is the well studied binocular rivalry or binocular fusion
which occurs when different images are presented to the left and right eyes. In
normal binocular vision the two eyes present slightly different laterally disparate
images to the brain which are then fused and the degree of disparity between
corresponding points used to compute stereoscopic depth. However retinal fusion is
a process distinct from stereoscopic depth perception. Different but similar images
presented to the two eyes can be fused to a hybrid image without added depth
perception and stereoscopic added depth can be obtained without fusion of the two
images (Anderson, B. & Nakayama 1994). Developing a discovery made by
Austin, A.L. in 1877 (see Ross 1976), Engel, E. (1958, 1961) studied the effects
of presenting two different faces, one to each eye, in a Wheatstone stereoscope
using over 100 subjects. For the majority of the subjects a hybrid fused face was
perceived. The binocular face was usually described as dissimilar to and more
"attractive" than either of its two monocular components. Although it would be
rash to push the analogy too far it is possible that further investigation of non-
stereoscopic binocular fusion will suggest further mechanisms for the unconscious 
completion from memory of impoverished stimuli. For example position dependent
Image-Percept facilitation suggests a neural mechanism analogous with that
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underlying the superiority of binocular over monocular performance in a host of
visual tasks (Blake, 1989). According to Blake, it is generally agreed that this
binocular superiority reflects the operation of a process of neural summation
between the two channels. By the analogy made here neural summation between
the stimulus and memory derived channels may account for some of the types of
image facilitation of perception and of stimulus facilitation of imagery. Another
problem which may be analogous with binocular fusion is that of finding the
corresponding parts between stimulus and image which as already indicated may
well be a Darwinian raison d'etre for mental rotation. When binocular matching is
assumed to use simple primitives (as in random dot stereograms) then the binocular
correspondence problem can only be solved using probabilistic constraints (Marr,
1982). However as Anderson, B. and Nakayama (1994) have pointed out
correspondence matching (eliminating the false targets) is much simpler if
structured high level primitives are used. In the model proposed here each
activated location points to a structured part description and matching these will
produce fewer "false targets" than would a correspondence process based on simple
luminances or even edge primitives (Marr and Poggio, 1979), Anderson, B. and
Nakayama (1994) show that information from half occluded parts (parts visible to
one eye only) is used at an early stage of the stereoscopic process suggesting that
structured primitives are indeed available for binocular fusion.
When incompatible stimuli are presented to the two eyes, either one image
is completely suppressed or a piece-wise rivalry occurs, with patches of the field of
view oscillating between dominance for the left eye or the right eye (Panum 1940,
Blake 1989). With incompatible, meaningful stimuli, the most expected or attended
stimulus can completely suppress that presented to the other eye. For example
Engel, E. (1956) showed his subjects a correctly oriented face to one eye and an
inverted face to the other. Subjects found the normally oriented face was dominant
and typically required several repeated observations to even notice the inverted
face. However there is evidence that despite its suppression from awareness, a
subliminal stimulus in the currently suppressed eye can still be visually analysed
(Walker, 1975). The suppressed stimulus may also cause interference with the
dominant field, especially if movement or change in one field causes attention to
waver (the "Cheshire Cat" effect, Duensing & Miller, B., 1979). The following is
part of a verbatim transcript from one of Engel, E. 's subjects "I see a boy - a boys
face, but there is something else there that I can't see. Something intelfering with
this". If this analogy is valid, then we would expect incidental, incompatible
percepts in sketching systems to similarly interfere with candidate images for
sketch hybrids.
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With semantically neutral stimuli, such as incompatible grids of oblique
lines, the period of dominance of one eye increases with factors such as greater
edge sharpness (Kulikowski, 1978), brightness, colour contrast, colour saturation
and movement (Levelt, 1965). If by analogy these factors are applied to percept-
image rivalry, then it must be expected that in most cases the stimulus derived
(percept) signal will be the dominant one. The evidence suggests that when
unmatched imagery is concurrent with perception, it is dimmer, less detailed and
more blurred than the percept (Kosslyn & Shin, 1994).
Fascinating physiological evidence that binocular rivalry is associated with
a neural gate which controls visual awareness has been provided by Logothetis and
Schall (1989). These authors trained monkeys to respond differentially to either
moving horizontal lines or moving vertical lines. When the horizontal lines were
presented to one eye and the vertical lines to the other the monkeys' responses
showed the same evidence for visual rivalry that is experienced by humans. The
response indicated that they "saw" either vertical or horizontal lines alternately in
sequence as one or other eye dominated. Logothetis and Schall then combined this
response study with single cell recordings from cells in visual area V5, a
topographically mapped part of visual cortex known to respond to direction of
movement. Over 200 cells were studied. They found that many horizontal
movement cells responded correctly whilst other "vertical" cells were
simultaneously responding to the other eye. However there was another set of cells
which appeared to respond only to the dominant eye, either horizontal cells to one
eye or vertical cells to the other, in a way which correlated with the monkeys
behavioural indication of which type of movement it was actually seeing. If the
brain gates visual awareness (see Chapter 7) between competing information from
the two eyes, then an analogous process for gating rivalry between images and
percepts is at least feasible.
From the analogy with binocular interaction, we can predict that the variety
and unexpectedness of the imagery component of sketches will increase with the
ambiguity and incompleteness of the sketch percepts. Very sharp high contrast
detailed stimuli whilst supporting one image are likely to suppress the formation of
others. Faint, blurred or confused stimulus sketch parts are more likely to facilitate
new or unexpected imagery.
A final point concerns the neuro-anatomical plausibility of the postulated
Comparison Buffers. If, as is suggested, Working Memory contains separate
representations of stimulus derived and memory derived images, as well as a
shared hybrid image, then why does the neuropsychological literature contain so
few examples of patients deficient in a perceptual ability but not the corresponding
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imagery ability or vice versa? The neuropsychological inseparability of
corresponding perceptual and imaging skills is after all widely quoted as evidence
for the single shared resource hypothesis. The analogy with binocular vision
answers this question. Corresponding receptive fields of the two eyes are mapped
in primary visual cortex in uniform columns of neurons side by side so that the left
half of the visual fields of each eye are exactly interleaved in the right occipital
cortex and vice versa for the right half of the visual field (Hubel & Wiese!, 1979).
In layer 4 the cells in a single 0.5 mm column responding to a small region of the
visual field are paired and monocular, that is one responds only to the left eye and
one to the right eye. In other layers the cells become binocular, responding equally
to the same visual field in both left and right eyes. There are also a series of cell
types which respond with varying degrees of dominance for one or other of the two
eyes. Thus there is physiological support for physically interleaved, overlapping,
computational field maps of the left eye, the right eye and a fuzzy series of fused,
hybrid binocular fields. As Cowey (1981) has argued it is likely that the cortex of
the brain is organised in such a way that cells which need to communicate with
each other frequently, are close together because long axons are biologically
"expensive". There are numerous other examples of such interleaved computational
maps. Well documented, are those in the cortex of the owl which correlate
separately sensed audio frequency and phase lag differences between the two ears
in order to locate and map the spatial positions of sound sources (Knudsen et Al.,
1987), The idea that corresponding visual attributes from sketch stimulus and
memory sources are processed in analogous computational maps in the visual
cortex is speculation, of course, but is, I claim, plausible and consistent with
known physiology.
5.3.8 Percepts as Hybrid Images: Further Evidence.
There are a number of phenomena in the recorded literature on perception
"going beyond what is given", which are usually interpreted as demonstrating the
role of expectancy, "set" or unconscious inference on perception. However such
explanations seem to me to be deficient in that they address only the question of
how the added information is derived and say little about how it is represented.
What is the mechanism by which knowledge, inference etc. alter the stimulus
derived representation from which conscious experience is derived? If it is possible
that hybrid images are routinely generated, unconsciously in perception then much
of the traditional literature can be interpreted in terms of the above model. A few
examples must suffice.
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It is well known that when ambiguous or neutral figures are presented
tachistoscopically for fractions of a second the shape that subjects report or record
can be distorted by the way prior expectancy is manipulated (Carmichael et Al.
1932, Vernon, 1952). Bruner and Postman (1949) asked subjects to identify
ordinary but hand painted playing cards exposed for a fraction of a second in a
tachistoscope. Unknown to the subjects a few of the cards had the incorrect colour
for their suit, black diamonds or hearts, red spades or clubs. The authors recorded
four types of response to the incongruous cards. The first they call a "dominance"
reaction in which the subject reports with assurance that a red six of spades is
either a normal (black) six of spades or is the six of hearts depending on whether
the colour or shape is dominant. Another type of response they call "disruption" in
which the subject fails to resolve the stimulus and does not know what it is
(although at the same exposure time he can identify normal cards). In a third type
of response the incongruity is "recognised". However in a fourth type of response
there is a "compromise". For example, a subject may report that (a) the red six of
spades is either the purple six of spades or the purple six of hearts; (b) the black
four of hearts is reported as a "greyish" four of spades or (c) the red six of clubs is
seen as the "the six of clubs illuminated by red light". The authors conclusions are
simply summarised as "perceptual organisation is poweifully determined by
expectations based upon past commerce with the environment". Whilst this is
undoubtedly true, it is interesting how neatly the results also fit a triple
representation, percept-image gating mechanism, provided it is admitted that
perception can involve automatic imagery completion. By the above model the so-
called "compromises" are hybrid images formed when a weak elicited mental
image and a weak stimulus percept are sufficiently matched to allow fusion, red
plus black generating purple or gray. When the image is stronger than the percept a
dominance reaction is recorded. When the percept is much stronger than the image
the incongruence is noticed. "Disruption" occurs, I suggest when both stimulus and
memory derived image representations are equally strong and cause mutual
interference without time for resolution. Sketches, such as the Goya Procession
(Illustration XXII) would probably cause disruption if presented tachistoscopically.
However for longer perusal, stimulus-memory conflict may be useful, forcing the
cognitive system into imaginative searches for inventive depictive-descriptive
matches.
Experiments demonstrating the influence of knowledge or experience on
perceived colour also fit a hybrid image explanation. Thus Bruner, Postman &
Rodrigues (1951) coloured a tomato, an orange and a banana an identical
intermediate shade of yellow-red. Their subjects were asked to match the colour of
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each fruit in turn using an adjustable colour mixing disc also within their field of
view. The results showed that the visual matches were clearly biased towards the
expected or remembered colours of the fruit.
The hybrid image model also accounts for the perception of the "hard to
see" figures such as the Porter's (1954) "Hidden Man" (Illustration XXXII). The
head and shoulders of a man is often unrecognised until its outline is pointed out.
The old explanation of this perceptual experience is an unconscious inference like
change of "set" or expectancy. However this does not explain why the figure
changes not only descriptively but spatially as well acquiring an illusory volume
that was not seen before. This illusion results I suggest only after a template match
between mental image and flat stimulus-percept in the comparison buffer has
generated a hybrid-image with depth and volume added from memory.
More controversial is a hybrid image account of spatial perception. It is
well known that three-dimensional visual experience cannot be easily explained by
the two-dimensional information contained within static, monocular retinal images.
Most of the debate has concerned the relative weights to be assigned to information
"pick-up" from changing stimuli (Gibson, 1979) or to unconscious hypotheses
about the real world (Gregory, 1980). However given that the visual system
extracts or infers three-dimensional depth information one way or another, how is
this incorporated into the internal "21/2D" representation available to visual
experience? Experiments conducted long ago by Thouless (1931) indicate that
under normal viewing conditions the perceived sizes of objects at varying distances
from the eye and the perceived shapes of objects tilted at varying angles to the eye
do not remain constant as is implied by the terms size and shape "constancy" but
that they "regress" in visual experience away from the stimulus towards their
expected real relative dimensions. In one experiment subjects were asked to match
the perceived shapes of circles or diamonds viewed at an angle against a chart of
possible shapes. Thouless found that perceived shapes were matched to a
compromise shape that was intermediate between the known shape (eg. a
symmetrical circle or diamond) and the true stimulus a perspectival ellipse or
flattened diamond. Thouless termed this result, "phenomenal regression towards
the real object". His results also fit a image gating theory of perceptual
construction where a flat elliptical stimulus and a circular memory image are fused
after gating into an intermediate hybrid.
The relevance of the above hybrid image interpretation of perception to the
sketch is as follows. Even if it is accepted that traditional sketch attributes assist
invention by acting a specialised templates for superimposed imagery, it does not
follow that such support for imagery is always necessary or even desirable. On the
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other hand it may be that due to its perceptual origins, imagery by its nature
functions best with visual support. If imagery is an automatic component of the
perception of real objects, which is primarily evoked when the stimulus is noisy or
impoverished, then a knowledge of percept-image interaction will be relevant to all
visualising media however far removed they may appear to be from the humble
sketch. It does not follow that all the attributes of the sketch are necessarily useful
and must be retained in a new medium, nor does it follow that new stimulus
attributes in new media as yet untried, will not prove to be powerful visualising
tools. It is possible that the three dimensional component of sketches is a
consequence of hybrid image formation. Anyone who has been taught life drawing
will remember that at first even after much painful effort a drawing will remain
obstinately flat. Then one day quite suddenly a simple outline drawing with no
shading or other "cues" to depth will acquire illusory volume and solidity.
According to the model this experience is due a successful hybrid image match and
the sudden passing of an unconscious image by the "guardian" of the gate of the
Comparison Buffer.
5.4 Conclusions
5.4.1 Biology of the Sketch.
The above theory makes a narrow, specific claim and a broader but more
general claim for the explanatory usefulness of the hybrid image model. The strong
claim is simply that the imagined component of artists sketches and the "Image in
the Clouds" theory of the viewer's contribution to art (Gombrich, 1962) can be
made more specific and more clearly understood by applying recent knowledge of
percept-image interaction to the traditional attributes of sketches. We can roughly
divide artists' sketches into two classes according to way in which their attributes
support mental imagery. Sparse sketches provide fairly unambiguous but
incomplete, recognition cues with appropriate spaces for superimposed imagery.
An example is Millet's "Curtain of Trees" (Illustration XXIV). (Note that the
original contains very faint lines representing branches which do not duplicate well
- perfect partners for memory images without rivalry). Noisy sketches on the other
hand initiate multiple "recognition by parts" search loops which in turn elicit
repeated image-percept match attempts (e.g Goya's "Procession" Illustration
XXII).
Some of the reasons why inventive imagery may need perceptual support
are summarised below.
1. The attention shifting type of image generation benefits from a visual
framework against which imagined patterns can be held.
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2. The retrieval of stored information for image generation is facilitated by
perceptual object and scene "parts" which act as look-up keys to long term
memory.
3. Mental images fade and need continual refreshment. This is facilitated if
a visual stimulus "skeleton" is present, upon which they can be superimposed.
4. Unlike percepts, mental images are rarely ambiguous and are hard to re-
interpret. Hybrid image theory explains why the stimulus component is necessary
to represent multiple alternatives.
5. Mental images are either low frequency (blurred) or contain a smaller
range of frequencies to normal percepts. The percept component may be necessary
to supply the missing spatial frequencies.
6. The spatial and temporal storage capacity of the resources used for
mental imagery are limited and need support from visual stimuli.
The more general claim is that both the advantages and the disadvantages of
mental imagery as a visualising tool in the arts, stem from the perceptual origins of
imagery. For our hominid ancestors, day to day surOva) by buntthg, ply?.t
gathering and avoiding predators was probably more important than long distance
planning. The use of visual memory in the visual system evolved primarily to
complete confusing percepts. Imagery capacity developed in the brain, from top-
down re-entrant signals. These provided stored information, which was used by
our hominid ancestors to supplement, rather than to replace, information from the
immediately sensed environment. In hunting, for example, glimpses of game
would often be of short duration, poorly illuminated and partially concealed or
camouflaged. The ability to spatially superimpose memory images upon such a
glimpse would have obvious advantages in guiding a spear throwing arm.
Gradually mental imagery became separable from visual stimuli to be used for
forward planning and visual invention. The image precursors used for perception
were automatic and unconscious. In order for imagery to become useful for
invention, the brain had also to evolve mechanisms providing voluntary control of
imagery. It is possible that the evolution of this ability was facilitated by the
Baldwin effect (Richards, R. 1987). This is a postulated Darwinian mechanism by
which a learned behaviour pattern advantageous to a species can accelerate the
evolution of neural development. Individuals which possessed neural connectivity
which made learning to use imagery easier would be favoured by natural selection.
In this way the uncontrolled top-down components of perception gradually evolved
a secondary function for controlled visual planning. However because the
biological time-scale for this development has been brief (Leakey & Lewin, 1992),
imagery has never lost its dependence on primarily visual mechanisms and neural
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resources. The first steps in the Baldwin effect would have been the observation of
stones and marks on the walls of caves which accidentally invited perceptual
completion into objects, animals or human figures (Windels, 1949). From these
developed the first line drawings, percepts which provoke and later anticipate
imagery. According to this theory paleolithic cave paintings are Baldwin effect
imagery catalysts. The earliest known sketches are percepts which function as
cultural stepping stones in human cognitive evolution. Today despite enormous
advances in the technology of creating images, the widely variable human ability to
imagine non-existent visual situations still depends for support upon a medium little
different from the early charcoal marks on cave walls. One reason for this could be
the belief that visual invention needs better physical images. This may not be true.
In one sense sketches are not images at all but specialised visual stimuli which
support images.
This third function of sketches is summarised below as Hypothesis Three.
5.4.2 Hypothesis Three.
Sketches are percept-memory hybrids. The incomplete, physical attributes
of sketches act as a stimulus for percepts which invite completion from memory
and imagination. This results in the generation of transient mental images which
after a matching process are transformed and spatially superimposed upon an
internal representation of the sketch.
The mental construction of such semi depictive percept- memory
compounds assists visual invention by two related mechanisms.
1. Sparse or simple sketches act as a "screen" with spaces reserved for
projected mental imagery. The physical (light derived) components stabilise
memory components and reduce the cognitive effort required for refreshing them.
This supports and amplifies those imagined components of an idea which need
rapid mental manipulation for refinement.
2. The attributes of ambiguous and crowded sketches elicit a two phased
recognition mechanism which results in a stream of temporarily superimposed
mental imagery. In the first phase it is proposed that sketch indeterminacies initiate
a search loop for position and size invariant stored object (and scene) descriptions
(see Chapter 4). In the second phase it is conjectured that interleaved, twinned
maps of spatial location enable provisional "object hypotheses" to be tested by an
alignment match between sketch percept and appropriately scaled and orientated
mental images generated from the stored representations of objects and object
parts. Depending on the extent of the match, this leads by a gating mechanism to
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either image suppression and replacement or to the synthesis of compound percept-
image hybrids.
178
6. VISUAL SEGREGATION AND SELECTIVE ATTENTION.
"Everyone knows what attention is. It is the taking possession by the mind,
in clear and vivid form, of one out of what seem several simultaneously possible
objects or trains of thought. Focalization, concentration, of consciousness are of its
essence. It implies withdrawal from some things in order to deal effectively with
others, and is a condition which has its real opposite in the confused, dazed,
scatter-brained state which in French is called 'distraction'."
William James. (1890)
6.1 Introduction
Hypothesis Four states that "Sketches amplify inventive thought by
isolating and representing separately those attributes of visual experience that are of
special relevance to a particular task. This assists the user to attend selectively to a
limited part of the task, freeing otherwise shared components of cognitive capacity
and reducing the complexity of preparatory visual processing."
Evidence has been produced so far to support the idea that sketch attributes
are used -
1. to translate between descriptive and depictive forms of representation in
a cycle of additive enrichment,
2. to facilitate multiple access to long visual term memory,
3. to provide perceptual stimuli which provoke and support superimposed
mental imagery.
Design or composition by successive refinement, implies the solution of
difficult visual problems in stages. As the difficulty and inventiveness of a task
increases, it is to be expected that an artist will wish to focus her or his mind
selectively on various partial aspects of the total task. Sketches support this need by
segregating and representing separately components of the objects in which the
artist is interested, before they are later integrated to simulate the appearance of
more complete objects.
The use of lines to represent the self-occluding contours (silhouette edges)
of objects is a familiar example. In retinal images and photographs lines do not
exist at object edges. In the mentally processed construction of visual experience
we may be aware of the location of object edges if we attend to them, but they are
not normally experienced separately. Rather they have become submerged in the
constructed experience of solid objects. For our hominid ancestors, the recognition
of objects and their three-dimensional shape was probably more important for
survival than the relatively fleeting two-dimensional views presented to the retina.
Thus even though the extraction of such contours might be an important stage in
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early visual processing (3.4.6), their explicit representation in the final percept is
not necessarily biologically useful. However artists and designers who need to
imagine and manipulate view dependent object shapes and their relationships, must
learn to attend to the very information that the visual system has extracted and
used, but suppressed from consciousness. It has already been mentioned (3.4.6)
that some psychologists believe that it is not by accident that outline drawings
resemble the output of the postulated early stages of human vision (Frisby, 1979).
Thus it is worth considering whether one of the functions of linear outlines in
sketches is to preserve for selective thought some of the results of such unattended
early stages of visual processing.
The limited representational scope of sparse sketches facilitates the
concentration of visual thought on one part of a problem at a time. Later of course
such separated partial solutions will have to be integrated and re-assessed within a
fuller context. However the advantages of this segregation are not always obvious.
It is likely that most line sketches are used to think about form without
(temporarily at least) worrying about colour. However, it is also possible that line
drawings are used as convenient spatial frameworks on which to mentally
manipulate imagined colour. For example because working line drawings represent
neither surface tonality nor hue, it cannot be assumed that their creator is not also
thinking about (and imagining) colour. Turner's spidery line drawings covered
with written notes about colour show this (Wilkinson, 1975). We cannot resolve
such questions by reading an artist's mind. It is necessary again to compare visible
attributes of sketches with existing theories of visual processing and ask the
question "Do the segregated, visually incomplete attributes of sketches really
facilitate focused visual thought or are they simply an unhelpful consequence of the
needs for convenience and speed ?". Two a priori considerations suggest that in
some circumstances at least, they do indeed support selective thought.
The first consideration is that according to the late construction theory of
perception (4.2.6) much of the visual analysis which our brains perform is not
directly available to visual experience. Unstructured patches of colour and
luminance are presented to the retina complete with perspective distortion. They
are experienced as visual objects separated from their backgrounds with the
perspective replaced, or partly replaced, by their true sizes and shapes with depth
and three dimensional shape added. In addition luminance and chromatic variations
are transformed and segregated into reflectance colours, firmly attached to
surfaces, with separately perceived illumination bathing those surfaces (4.2.1).
This is the information that our hominid ancestors needed from their visual
systems. However, artists who may wish to manipulate new visual experience or
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designers who must manipulate the appearance of an imaginary object, need access
to those segregated components of images which the brain's visual system normally
conceals. As already suggested, the history of human image making from the
discovery of perspective to today's chemical and electronic media has been largely
devoted to the creation of artificial stimuli that mimic or capture the unstructured
light pattern presented to the retina by real objects. When realism is experienced it
is a product of the human visual system and is not explicit in the image (2.3 &
Gombrich, 1962). The visual system evolved to meet the needs of our hominid
ancestors, not the needs of contemporary artists. For example, in order to generate
and manipulate illusory space by perspective, it is necessary to perceive and
manipulate the projected distortions on the retina which the visual system
suppresses. To illustrate to others the intended effects of illumination upon a
coloured surface, painters must learn to consciously perceive and manipulate that
segregation of image luminances into perceived surface and incident illumination
which is normally assigned to the pre-conscious brain. Thus there is a need in the
visual arts to make commonly unattended products of vision available for conscious
control and selective thought. This is an effortful skill that must be learned (see
Pratt, 1984 and 3.4.6).
The second consideration (discussed below) is that taken as a class across
different artists and styles, working sketches can be sorted into categories which
mirror to a remarkable degree what is known about the modular division of labour
within visual system. If this is not accidental, then it suggests at least that the
attribute segregation found in sketches, shares some functional purpose with
perceptual processes. However the early division of labour in the visual pathway is
believed to be automatic and with different processes operating in parallel
(Treisman, 1986). It appears to occur quickly and effortlessly in perception before
the separately analysed attributes are reconstructed into the conscious experience of
real objects. Therefore we must not make the mistake of assuming that the function
of separated visual attributes in the sketch is simply to by-pass or simplify these
early perceptual analyses. It seems more likely that their function is to make
perceptual attributes that are normally unattended salient and more easily available
for conscious manipulation. Whether the attributes emphasised in a particular
sketch are derived directly from memory or from the effortful examination of real
objects, sketches, unlike the images of "realistic" media, record such selective
attributes for mental manipulation. Otherwise they would have to be continually re-
extracted every time they are examined.
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6.2 Objects and their Attributes
The fundamental end products of conscious perception are objects and
events. The traditional media of sketches do not support temporal change
(movement) so event structure is not represented. However it is likely that future
sketching systems will allow event representation. It is therefore worth noting one
of the most obvious forms of perceptual segregation - the freezing of a moment or
a series of moments in time. The normal percept of an object, even a static one, as
Gibson has emphasised, is constructed from a moving flow of retinal images. The
very fact that a sketch (or a finished work of art) does not move allows a kind of
contemplative visual analysis that would otherwise be impossible. On the other
hand, for film and many kinds of object design (such as Fashion) visualising
movement is crucial and, according to claims outlined in this chapter, new
sketching media (eg inter-active video) will require new ways of representing
movement extracted from object variability.
The perceived attributes which objects possess can be classified in many
different ways. Treisman (1986) has reviewed in detail attempts to relate such
classifications to experimental evidence about perceptual analysis or
decomposition. Her terminology will be respected here. Any decomposed product
of perceptual analysis, conscious or pre-conscious will be referred to as an
attribute. Object attributes are further divided into three kinds, dimensions,
features and parts..
6.2.1 Dimensions
"A dimension can be defined as a set of discrete or continuously vaiying
values of which only one can and must characterise any non-composite stimulus to
which the dimension applies (i.e. it is in the relevant sense modality and at the
right level of description)" (Treisman 1986 page 35-3). Treisman distinguishes
simple dimensions which cannot be further decomposed from "emergent"
dimensions which are themselves derived from simpler dimensions. However it is
not at all clear what are the rules by which simple dimensions can be combined to
make new emergent dimensions which are "psychologically real". Dimensions such
as those that characterise shapes commonly occur in nested hierarchies. For
example points have locations and intensities, lines have in addition orientation and
length, surfaces have, in addition to these, shape, area and texture. Some
dimensions, such as those of colour vary continuously, others (according to this
definition) may comprise a large number of discrete values
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6.2.2 Features
Sometimes objects appear to differ in some binary attribute (such as open or
closed contour), or they either possess or do not possess a particular attribute. Such
attributes are here termed features. Treisman makes the point that continuous
dimensions of physical stimuli may be categorised by the visual system into
discontinuous domains, constituting features in perception. An important example
is the perception of the "unique" colour sensations red, green, blue, yellow
(Hering, 1964). These are often treated as if they were dimensions, but as Hering
pointed out they are really features (Hering, 1964). Hue dimensions, which are the
"emergent" perceptual constructions from the wavelength dimension of the
stimulus, are derived from varying mixtures of these features, red-blue, blue-
green, green-yellow, yellow-red as described in the Natural Colour System
(Swedish Standards Institution, N.C.S. Colour Atlas 1978). The failure to
recognise how little colour experience may correlate with the measured attributes
of the physical stimulus is sometimes called the "stimulus error". The history of
the stimulus error in the colour theories of artists is discussed by Fish (1981). The
point made in that paper, relevant to this Chapter, is that whilst artists are
interested in attributes of the perceived colour, in traditional media they are often
forced to manipulate (and hence attend to) non-matching attributes of the stimulus.
The "stimulus error" is embodied in natural language when we frequently refer to
colour experience by the names of pigments. I suggest that having successfully
identified the perceived colour attribute of interest, a different notation, in a
sketching system, unrelated to the stimulus would assist visual thought.
6.2.3 Parts
Parts are the spatially localised or articulated components from which most
objects are constructed. Parts differ from dimensional values, in that parts are
neither mutually exclusive nor obligatory. (A perceived chair must have a size but
can optionally possess arms). Object parts are usually articulated according to
certain topological rules (arms and legs of the body) or located in specified spatial
relationships (eyes, nose and mouth on a face). A point important to sketch
function that Treisman omits, is that, in picture perception especially (and probably
all perception), the dividing line between what constitutes an object and what
constitutes a part has a variable locus in the object-part hierarchy. Where this locus
lies depends upon the current scope of attention. When a painter composes a
landscape the whole scene is perceived as a single object, in a portrait the object is
the head, to an oculist the eye etc. The importance of what constitutes a whole
object in a sketch lies in the evidence that when attending to object detail it is
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easier to make simultaneous judgements about two attributes of a single object than
it is to make simultaneous judgements about two objects (Duncan 1985, Kahneman
& Treisman, 1984). It is suggested here that one function of the sketch is to
declare (avoiding the attentional conflict present in real scenes) the object-part
relationships appropriate to specific tasks.
6.3 Integral and Separable Dimensions
Amongst the many visual tasks that sketches are used for, we can safely
include that of making judgements of similarity and difference (studying
relationships) between specific attributes of colour or spatial structure in an
imagined scene or object. Even if it is possible to make such judgements by
attending to the attribute of interest when it is combined with other irrelevant
attributes, there are grounds for believing that the irrelevant attributes will make
the task harder (see next section). Segregation of such attributes in a sketch could
then be regarded as helpful but not essential. However if it is found that the
perceptual system combines some attributes in a holistic way so that one attribute
alters judgements made about another, then segregation for accurate visual
comparison becomes a necessity rather than a luxury.
Shepard (1964) noted that some physically distinct unitary dimensions
interacted perceptually in just such a manner. Similarity judgements on such
dimensions fit a Euclidean metric. This means that judgements of similarity when
two objects differ in two such dimensions is proportional to the root mean squares
of the differences on each of the individual dimensions (the shortest distance
between two points in Cartesian coordinates). In contrast analysable dimensions
contribute independently to judgements of similarity and can be represented by a
city-block metric, (i.e. with no diagonal short-cut between them.)
Garner (1974,1978) has elaborated the distinction further. He distinguishes
integral dimensions (Shepard's unitary stimuli) from separable dimensions and
also from what he calls configurable dimensions. Garner's integral dimensions
interact so that performance is improved when the dimensions are perfectly
correlated and unimpeded selective attention to either is impossible, causing
interference when the dimensions vary orthogonally. Separable dimensions can be
attended to separately but judgements of similarity are not facilitated when both
dimensions covary. As a measure of the separability between two dimensions
Garner used a speeded classification task. The mean time taken by subjects to sort
stimulus cards according discriminatory levels of a specified dimension was
measured in three conditions. Either the stimuli varied in one dimension only or
both the specified dimension and the irrelevant dimension covaried and were
correlated or the two dimensions varied orthogonally (i.e. each level of one
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dimension was combined with each level of the other dimension). If the stimuli
were separable (it was reasoned) the sorting times would be equal in all three
conditions. On the other hand if they were integral sorting times with the
correlated irrelevant dimension should be shorter (facilitated) than with no
irrelevant dimension but should be longer (hindered) in the orthogonal condition.
Using this criterion (Garner & Felfoldy 1970, Felfoldy & Garner 1971) found that
Munsell colour Value and Chroma (Lightness and Saturation) and colour Hue and
Value were integral dimensions. They also produced the expected Euclidean metric
in dimensional scaling measures. Also integral were the horizontal and vertical
positions of a dot. On the other hand the size of a circle and the angle of a line
drawn across its diameter were separable. Using the same criterion Gottwald and
Garner (1975) claimed that colour and form were separable. The orthogonal
condition is described as a "filtering" task because the subject attempts to filter out
variation in the irrelevant dimension. This finding has implications for sketch
function, since any non correlated variation in an irrelevant integral dimension can
be expected to require filtering and hence to cause interference. For example
irrelevant, uncontrolled variation in chroma or hue can be expected to interfere
with judgements of colour brightness ("tone value" or "lightness") in a chromatic
sketch. However, the inverse conclusion for separable dimensions, that for
example comparisons of form should not be hindered by irrelevant colour
variation, must be qualified.
The criteria for dimensional separability depend upon the task. For
example, it is found that the ability to filter out an irrelevant dimension in the
speeded classification task, is not always repeated in simultaneous comparison
(same-different) tasks. Now although sorting is relevant to sequential sketch
comparisons, simultaneous dimensional comparisons within a sketch are of greater
interest. For example despite the separability found by Gottwald and Garner for
colour and form, they have been shown to show dimensional interference in a
simultaneous comparison task (Egeth, 1966, Hawkins & Shigley, 1972). Santee
and Egeth (1980) found that when subjects were required to make speeded
classifications in the Garner conditions, they were able to attend selectively to form
when the irrelevant dimension of size or shading was varied. However subjects
were not able to filter out irrelevant size or shading disparity in a comparably
designed simultaneous comparison task. In another experiment they demonstrated a
monotonic increase in "same" reaction times as a function of irrelevant disparity in
a successive comparison task. The authors conclude that dimensions which are
separable by the Garner criteria, can still show mutual interference in simultaneous
matching. This shows that the ability to attend selectively to a particular stimulus
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dimension is not simply a function of the particular dimensions employed, but is
also a function of the particular task and processing strategies required of the
subject.
6.4 Normalisation and Visual Comparison
The evidence that the time to match random two dimensional shapes is
directly related to irrelevant differences of size or orientation, has been discussed
in chapter 4 (4.3.6, Bundesen & Larsen 1975, Bundesen et Al. 1981). So also has
the well known evidence that the time to match perspective views of three-d shapes
is linearly related to the angular difference in orientation (5.2.6 Shepard &
Cooper, L., 1982). The common explanation of these results is that different
values of an irrelevant dimension of the internal representations of the comparison
stimuli have to be normalised (or equated), by a time consuming transformation
process, before the same-different judgement can be made. It was suggested that
this was evidence for a "template" or spatial array type of matching process, one of
the many processes available for object recognition in sparse sketches (4.3.6).
Dixon and Just (1978) have suggested that such a necessary normalisation of
irrelevant attributes may be a principle which can be used to explain interference in
a much wider range of selective "filtering" tasks from Garner's orthogonal
"speeded classification" to mental rotation and other types simultaneous
comparison. "We suggest that irrelevant disparity may produce these various
inteiference phenomena because subjects mentally equate the two stimuli on the
irrelevant dimension before deciding that they are identical along the relevant
dimension." The authors investigated the time to make "same" judgements about
the height of two ellipses with width as the irrelevant dimension and the time to
make hue judgements with tint as the irrelevant dimension. Their results supported
their normalisation hypothesis. However Santee & Egeth's results mentioned above
shows that the suggestion that speeded classification and simultaneous comparison
involves a common process cannot be true. However these authors agree that their
results support normalisation of irrelevant dimensions even when: (1) the levels of
the irrelevant dimension may be accessed easily through a set of encoding features
(such as the names of geometric figures) and (2) the stimuli are presented in a
successive comparison paradigm.
The important conclusion is that, in sketches, eliminating variation along
irrelevant dimensions should facilitate several types of visual judgement about a
dimension of interest. There are two types of reason for this advantage. Either the
relevant and irrelevant dimensions are integral making selective attention to one
difficult (Garner implies "impossible" but the results do not support this extreme
conclusion) or the irrelevant dimension must be mentally normalised before a
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judgement is possible. Whether a particular irrelevant dimension will cause
interference depends not only upon the dimensions concerned but also upon the
task. Simultaneous similarity judgements within a sketch are particularly
susceptible to "filtering" interference.
It is of course quite true that in the visual arts there may be few if any
"irrelevant" visual dimensions. For example, in painting, colour and form are
usually equally important and if they interact then it is especially important to
visualise the projected object with both attributes present. This is of course true of
the final synthesis. However it is argued here that in the early inventive stages of
visual design, the need to attend to difficult parts of a task singly and the need to
preserve options in some dimensions makes those dimensions temporarily
irrelevant. Evidence in favour of this position can be found in traditional working
practices.
6.5 Theories of Selective Visual Attention
The sketch is both a product of and a support for visual attention. The
ability to concentrate the mind on a difficult component part of a visual problem
implies the ability to mentally manipulate, analyse and re-interpret information
which has already been perceived or imagined. The need to attend selectively is
undoubtedly part of this problem.
Selective attention is distinguished in the literature from divided attention,
by the task. In experiments on divided attention two (or more) tasks must be
attended to at once and the interference which occurs is often used to provide
evidence about whether the two tasks compete for shared resources in the brain
(5.3.2 & 5.3.3). With selective attention the task is to filter out, ignore or avoid
interference from irrelevant or distracting information. The remarkable but
imperfect capacity of the brain to focus visual processing on a limited part of the
information provided by the eyes (perception) or by memory (imagery), has
another obvious function. Many of the neural resources used by the visual system
have limited capacity. Therefore it is necessary to have a mechanism which can
select important or interesting parts of the information in the sketch hybrid image
for detailed processing by those resources which are in short supply. Attention is
also important as a mechanism which allocates information for voluntary control
and "conscious awareness". What this means is considered separately in Chapter 7.
I believe that sketches have special attributes which support such focused attention
at different processing levels within the brain and that, in this respect at least, they
are superior to photographs and other realistic images.
There has been an on-going debate about whether visual attention is based
primarily on
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1. Visual attribute discrimination (e.g. Allport, 1971, 1980)
2. Spatial selection based on processing a single limited part of the visual
field at one time (e.g. Hoffman, J. and Nelson 1981, Posner 1980, Posner et Al.
1982, Tsal, 1983)
3. Selection based on objects, with objects defined hierarchically as
discussed above (e.g. Neisser, 1967, Treisman and Gelade 1980, Kahneman &
Treisman, 1984, Duncan, 1985)
Currently the evidence seems to support selection based on all three of these
aspects of vision but in different contexts and for different purposes. (For reviews
see Humphreys and Bruce 1989, Kahneman & Treisman, 1984, Duncan 1985,
Kosslyn and Koenig, 1992, Posner et Al. 1994).
A visual attribute theory of attention has been suggested by Allport based
on the idea of a number of analysers working in parallel. If two discriminations
depend upon the same analyser then mutual interference occurs, otherwise attention
can be divided between the attributes. Allport's theory is actually not incompatible
with either spatial or object based theories of attention. The problem of selectively
attending to attributes and their relevance to the sketch has been discussed already
(6.3).
To understand the relevance of spatial and object based theories of attention
to the sketch and how they may be mutually supportive it is helpful to consider the
functions of different attention mechanisms. The fovea is the only part of the retina
capable of high resolution. Overt visual attention involves movements of the eyes,
usually in saccadic jumps, in order to target interesting, but necessarily limited,
parts of the visual field upon the fovea. Covert orienting of attention occurs when
limited parts of the visual field receive preferential "focused" treatment without eye
movements, drawing upon an internal scanning mechanism with limited resources,
the "window" of attention (Kosslyn, 1994 233-234). Such "orienting" of spatial
attention can be selective not only to direction within the visual field but also to
different perceived distances within a given direction (Downing and Pinker 1985).
Object recognition and detailed analysis appears to occur only after such a
focussing of resources. Logically an efficient attentional mechanism demands two
quite different processes. Given that the whole of the visual field cannot be
processed in depth simultaneously, the nervous system provides a mechanism
which can perform just enough processing in parallel over a wide field to select a
smaller region of interest for identification and further more detailed analysis. The
visual system is capable of directing not only overt movements of the eyes to a
selected spot, but also covert movements of focal attention across an internal map
of the visual field. But when visual capacity has been thus focused a different
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attentional capacity is required which can analyse in greater depth objects of
interest and can also control scanning movements of attention for information
extraction. Over many years, evidence has accumulated for two such attentional
systems. A fast low resolution, automatic system is driven by the periphery of the
visual field. It selects without identification, targets for further processing. Then
there is a slower high resolution system which allows inspection and recognition of
objects within a limited spatial region and which can be moved with voluntary
control. Convergent evidence from several sources suggests two corresponding
channels controlling input information - a sustained and a transient channel. During
a saccade initiated by the transient channel, the sustained channel is inhibited to
prevent overlapping signal interference from the slower sustained channel
(Breitmeyer & Ganz., 1976). These two channels correspond partly with the
magno and parvo cellular pathways which later in the processing sequente
segregate movement, depth and perhaps figure-ground processing, from colour
processing and high resolution object detail (5.3.5, Hubel & Livingstone 1987,
Livingstone & Hubel, 1987). There is evidence that there are also two separable
modes of control over such movements of the "mind's eye" (Posner & Boies 1971,
Posner & Snyder 1975, Jonides, 1980 1981) a fast automatic exogenous system
and an endogenous one which can be voluntarily controlled.
Recently separate anatomical attention networks in the brain which fit this
distinction have been identified (Posner & Rothbart 1992). The posterior attention
system involves portions of the parietal cortex (also associated with visual neglect
- see 5.3.2) and parts of the thalamus and mid-brain, known to be used in the
control of eye movements. This system is involved in directing attention to relevant
locations as in visual search, in binding information to spatial locations to produce
object perception and in selecting a relevant scale for examining visual input.
The anterior attention network involves areas of the mid prefrontal
cortex that together appear to be active in a wide variety of situations involved in
the detection of events. In experiments with humans this detection is often
signalled by a verbal response. However this is simply one form of evidence that,
in contrast to the posterior system, the anterior system is associated with conscious
experience of the information attended to. Thus the anterior system is thought by
(Posner at least) to be responsible for conscious awareness of an attended object or
location. As studies of visual neglect have shown, awareness of a signal depends
upon the posterior system (parietal cortex) which must feed attended information to
the anterior system (The two systems are richly interconnected). However it not
the posterior system itself which produces awareness. This is demonstrated by
studies which dissociate the act of orienting to signals from their detection. Thus it
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is after attention has been engaged by the posterior system to a location of interest
in a sketch, that the anterior system is activated in a mode which supports
awareness and is necessary for the discrimination of colour, form and meaning
(Petersen et Al., 1989). The distinction between automatic and voluntary is
discussed further in Chapter 7 (7.3). The point made here is that the functional
separation between automatic and voluntary modes of processing may be an
important reason for segregating sketch attributes. Even if the anterior system
allows the sketch user to discriminate between relevant and irrelevant attributes in
unsegregated images, the posterior system can cause involuntary processing and
movements of attention of which he/she may not be aware.
Posner has used the metaphor of a spot light with a "zoom" lens for guiding
research into spatial aspects of attention. Movements of attention define sequential
locations of limited area within the visual field (or an imagined field) to which
object attributes can become bound. As with a spot light the area selected is
preferentially activated for further processing. It is likely that this provides the
mechanism by which the links between stored spatial structure (the "where"
system) and stored object attributes (the "What" system) are established in sketch
hybrid images (see 5.3.5). There is evidence that in addition the system can control
the size of the attended field (the zoom lens analogy) at the expense of spatial
resolution. Thus a wide attended field has a low spatial resolution whilst a smaller
attended field (1 degree or less) supports a higher resolution. Watt (1988) and
Kosslyn et Al. (1992) discuss the advantages of a system which can use, in
sequence, a fast low resolution wide field information followed by higher
resolution information from a more limited field, for analysing position and spatial
structure. Only one location can be attended to at a time. Not only is information
at that location processed in greater depth but information at other locations is
suppressed (Posner, 1992).
It is interesting to consider an implication of Posner's account of the
Posterior Attention Network for the percept-image hybrid theory of sketch
structure presented in Chapter 5 (5.3.7). When the "spot-light" of attention moves
covertly over a mental image or to a peripheral part of the field of view as the
result of a foveal cue (as in some of Posner's experiments) it seems inevitable that
the spatial sensitivity of such "mind's eye" movement will be handicapped by the
low resolution and poverty of the framework against which the movement must
occur. It is possible that the perceptual skeleton of the sketch hybrid image
provides the necessary landmarks for accurate overt eye movements, which in turn
ensures more accurate "mind's eye" movements over mentally superimposed image
components. In fact Brandt et Al. (1989) provide evidence that subjects move their
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eyes when scanning mental images internally. Thus skeletal sketch percepts may
provide a mechanism for harnessing overt and more accurately guided movements
of attention to mental images (as in Illustration XXIV).
Object based theories of attention have been supported by Neisser (1967),
Treisman (Treisman & Gelade, 1980, Treisman & Schmidt 1982, Kahneman &
Treisman 1984) and Duncan (1985). In outline these theories agree that perceptual
analysis of a visual scene takes place in two successive stages. According to
Neisser (1967) the first "pre-attentive" stage analyses aspects of the visual field
segmenting it into candidate objects on the basis of Gestalt laws of grouping,
figure-ground separation etc. The second stage, focal attention, analyses an object
in more detail and attempts a recognition match. The pre-attentive stage occurs in
parallel across several objects in the whole visual field, whilst focal attention is
limited to a single object and region at one time and can only analyse in sequence
objects at different locations. According to Treisman's feature integration theory
(Treisman & Gelade, 1980), the early pre-attentive stage consists of a number of
parallel processes which extract simple features of objects such as orientation,
colour, size and shape. In Treisman's model, these features are represented by
separate maps, presumably corresponding to specialised modules in the visual
cortex. Whilst individual features can be detected in parallel, conjunctions of
features must be searched for sequentially. The second stage consists of sequential
attention to objects at different locations with the function of binding separately
detected features to specific locations. Treisman suggests that focal attention opens
an object "file", which can be used for comparison with stored object descriptions,
for recognition. There are problems with the details of Treisman's theory. For
example there is evidence that more than simple features can be detected in parallel
or without focal attention. Humphreys et Al. (1989) have shown conjunctions of
form elements can be detected in parallel when the distractors are homogeneous.
They suggest that whether or not sequential focal attention is needed to detect
conjunctions of features depends upon the way in which background objects are
grouped.
In support of object based theories, it has been shown that when subjects
are given a task which requires attention to one of two overlapping objects they
have difficulty reporting or remembering attributes of the un-attended object even
though both objects occupy the same spatial field (Rock & Gutman, 1981). Duncan
(1985) used brief, small fovea! (1 degree) displays, consisting of two overlapping
objects. He showed that two judgements concerning the same object can be made
without loss of accuracy, whereas judgements which concerned two different
objects cannot. He showed elegantly that neither the similarity nor the difficulty of
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the required discriminations, nor the spatial grouping of the relevant information
could account for the results. It appears that focal attention deals, if not with whole
objects, then at least with chunks of information grouped by "Gestalt like"
processing into candidate objects. Duncan concludes, modestly, that the ability to
attend simultaneously to several sources of information, is at least in part a limit on
the number of separate objects that can be seen.
Also relevant to the problems of attending to objects in sketches is the
discovery of negative priming effects by Tipper et Al. (Tipper 1985, Tipper &
Driver, 1988). These authors showed their subjects briefly displayed line drawings
of two common objects superimposed upon each other in different colours (red and
green). They measured (by successive increments) the minimum time needed by
their subjects to correctly name the red objects. Subjects were instructed to ignore
the green objects. Their results showed that this procedure not only facilitated the
later naming of pictures of objects of the same category as the attended objects (ie
showed "priming") but that it also interfered with the naming of the ignored
picture categories ("negative priming"). In a final test they showed blank cards
immediately after the red and green test pictures and asked subjects the surprise
question "what category was the green (ignored) object?". Subjects' responses
were only correct at chance level, showing they were not aware of the ignored
object category. The authors explain their results by a spreading inhibition of
response at the level of a symbolic, stored representation of object meaning.
Whatever the explanation of these results the fact that such negative priming for
unattended parts of complex images can occur is another reason for segregating
components of a complex visual task. It implies that although it is possible to
attend selectively to some components within a complex, or detailed sketch whilst
ignoring others, the ignored components may limit, without our awareness or
control, the flexibility and inventiveness with which we may wish to re-interpret
those same components at a second viewing.
The relevance of object based theories of attention to sketch attributes also
lies in the implication that some visual processing of attributes which are perceived
as belonging to the same object is obligatory. Interference with selective attention
to the attributes of interest would then be unavoidable due to the impossibility of
filtering out distracting or irrelevant attributes of the attended object. Evidence for
attentional interference from the results of such automatic object processing is
discussed in Kahneman & Treisman (1984).
The well investigated "Stroop" task is often cited to illustrate automaticity
of certain visual processes. The subject is asked to identify the colour of the ink in
which a word is printed. If the meaning of the word is inconsistent with the colour
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of the ink (i.e. the word "RED" printed in green ink) then naming the colour of the
ink is delayed compared to when the word is consistent with the actual colour or
has no colour meaning. Petersen et Al., (1989) have shown with PET studies that
in the inconsistent condition Stroop interference activates the Anterior (i.e.
conscious) Attentional System in the brain more than in the non-interfering
conditions. However much subjects may practise ignoring the irrelevant meaning
of a word, it continues to interfere with their response. The shape of the word is
believed to quickly and automatically activate the node representing its stored
meaning before the rival colour meaning node can be accessed by the perceived
colour. Stroop type conflict has been demonstrated in a wide variety of other tasks.
For example, Paivio (1975) measured the times to decide which of two objects or
animals was the larger in real life size. In the congruent condition subjects were
shown sketches of the two objects (eg a zebra and a table lamp) with the larger
object depicted as larger. In the incongruent condition the larger object is depicteti
smaller than the other. The results showed that decision times were slower for the
incongruent than for the congruent pairs. The involuntary processing of irrelevant
perceptual information makes it harder to make judgements based on memory.
Paivio (1986) quotes these and similar experiments to support his dual coding
theory of memory representation. However the results also suggest an involuntary
mode in the hybrid image model of sketch perception I developed in Chapter 5. In
the incongruent condition involuntary scaling of generated images to fit the sketch
percepts would distort the relative sizes of the memory images. (This is not
Paivio's suggestion but my own.)
Kahneman & Treisman (1984) quote other experiments which show that
Stroop interference is greatly reduced when the colour and the word are separated
and not seen to belong to the same object. The authors quote a number of further
experiments which also demonstrate the relative ease of filtering out irrelevant
objects and the difficulty of filtering out parts or properties of an attended object.
They state "Attention to irrelevant parts of objects is obligatory" and that "The
major conclusion is that it is essential to distinguish selection of inputs or objects
from selection of properties. As we have seen observers are capable of efficient
rejection of irrelevant objects, but the irrelevant properties (and perhaps parts) of
an attended object cannot be prevented from contacting their nodes and from
activating irrelevant responses. The distinction between selection of objects and
selection of properties (or analysers) seems salient and fundamental; yet is often
ignored in psychological research and theory".
This quotation is given because of the bearing it has on my suggestion
(6.2.3) that sketch attributes declare the object structure. I mean by this that the
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Gestalt laws of grouping and the figure-ground rules are used explicitly or
intuitively to emphasise, for selective attention, a particular structure in the object-
part hierarchy. For example the Cezanne landscape sketch (Illustration XVIII)
demonstrates the linking by similarity of separated curved and angular parts of
trees and houses. One of the several functions of such drastically segregated visual
rhyming is, I suggest, to declare to the automatic attentional processes of the
posterior neural network, that the whole landscape is to be considered as a single
object. This according to object based theories of attention should facilitate the
simultaneous attention to the parts of different trees, rocks and houses which are at
this stage not declared as separate objects. At the same time it interferes with the
selective attention to individual trees, houses etc., which was, presumably, of less
importance to Cezanne at this stage of his thoughts. In contrast the two faces of
Cezanne's son (Illustration XIX) are obviously "declared" as separate objects. In
many sketches of course the object-part structure is more ambiguous and depends
upon the mental bias of the sketch user.
Another way of thinking about the visual "rhyming" of colour dimensions
or components of form is to treat it as a kind of normalisation. It would then be
tempting to view the normalisation of irrelevant visual dimensions and the
difficulty of filtering irrelevant integral dimensions, as a consequence of the same
pre-attentive processes which group parts into objects. The prediction which would
follow is that, if we want to compare corresponding features in similar objects,
then we should remove or equate ("rhyme") corresponding irrelevant features in
our sketches. Duncan's results with foveally imaged boxes and lines suggest that
this is so. However this conclusion would be premature. We need more research
into visual comparisons between the kind of object parts and features that are
typical of representational sketches. In general the theory of object based attention
seems to reinforce the idea that, whenever an artist needs to attend selectively to a
component attribute of an object, irrelevant attributes will involuntarily hinder
visual thought.
The capacity to generate representations of segregated visual attributes in a
sketch shows that, with skill, selective attention to such attributes in natural objects
is possible, although as we have seen, there is usually a cognitive penalty. I believe
that the parallels between the attentional division of labour found in, for example,
a series of sketches of the same subject and the kinds of modular division of labour
recently discovered within the visual system, is no coincidence (see Livingstone
1988). Cowey (1985) has even suggested that one of the biological reasons for
having many modular visual regions in the cortex may be to facilitate attentional
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switching between visual attributes. Some of these parallels will now be briefly
considered.
6.6 Separating Colour and Form.
Perhaps the most obvious characteristic of sketches as drawings is that, like
the primate visual system, they commonly separate the representation of colour and
form.
The word "colour" is used ambiguously in common speech (and by some
scientists !) to either include or reject black, grey and white. ("Is that a colour
film?" answer "No its black and white", but "What colour is coal?" answer
"Black"). Here, to avoid this confusion following the usage of Colour Science, the
meaning of the word "colour" will include the hueless monochrome colours and
the terms Chromatic and Achromatic used to distinguish colour experiences
containing hue (redness, greenness, yellowness, blueness etc.) and optionally
blackness and whiteness, from those which only contain varying proportions of
black, white and grey (Hering 1964). There is a debate about how many
dimensions of perceived colour there are (Evans, R. 1974, Hunt 1977, Fish 1981).
There is agreement that there are at least three dimensions of variability for surface
colours under constant illumination with a fourth variable (Brightness) related to
changes in illumination. However some authorities believe that there is a fifth
dimension - "Brilliance", (Evans, R. 1974) or "Colourfulness" (Hunt 1977). (For
discussion of the relevance to art see Fish, 1981). However in addition colours
have "modes of appearance", opacity, surface, volume, lustre, mattness shininess
etc. (Katz 1935, Beck 1972). The point is that to the normally sighted all real
surfaces must have a colour and this must have a value at least of lightness (or
black-whiteness) and a brightness (related to how strongly it is perceived to be
illuminated) and it must have a mode of appearance. Only values on the
dimensions related to its chromaticity such as Munsell Hue and Chroma are
optional. Therefore it is the cultural familiarity of drawings which conceals from
us the intrinsic oddness of a representational system for visual surfaces and three-
dimensional form, which offers no values for any of these colour dimensions or
attributes (Rawson, 1969). Three functions for the contour lines in drawings have
already been suggested. They act as intermediate descriptive-depictive signs to
catalyse the mental translation of representational type. They highlight fragments
of object contours which act as look up keys to memory by "recognition by parts".
They provide skeletal frame works which provoke and support superimposed
imagery. Now a fourth function emerges. By representing only the edges of
surfaces or silhouette fragments of objects they avoid all representation of the
illumination and reflectance of surfaces. Yet still they describe form.
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Of course, as the hybrid-image theory of the sketch suggests, outline
drawings may have imagined colour superimposed in spatial register with them.
However such colour thoughts are likely to be optional or fleeting and unlikely to
cause the type of involuntary competition discussed above (6.5). Watkins and
Schiano (1982) have investigated this voluntary super-imposition of imagined
colour onto black and white outline shapes. They found that such imagined colours
can facilitate or hinder the later recognition of the same shapes presented with real
colours. The implication is that colours, although only imagined on a sketched
object, will be stored with that object in long term memory and may influence the
later ability to recognise and to think about similar object representations actually
coloured.
The inverse segregation can occur in colour sketches where any
representation of form is vague and even the spatial location of colours is hard to
determine. Turner's justly famous watercolour sketches furnish many examples
(Illustration XXXV).
Often the segregation between colour and form occurs only in the temporal
succession of sketching acts so that it is not apparent in the finished sketch. Thus it
is common practice to manipulate spatial structure by drawing before later adding
colour. As Livingstone (1988) has pointed out, colour added to a drawing need
only roughly fit surface outlines yet still appear to adhere to perceived surfaces.
She points out that this is a predictable consequence of the fact that the
parvocellular colour pathway in the cortex (e.g in the cytochrome oxidase blobs in
V1) has a lower spatial resolution than the parallel form processing path from the
interblob regions of area Vi.
Sometimes the opposite temporal segregation is used. Thus the painter Dufy
frequently mapped out his first ideas in spatially vague areas of colour, later
drawing on top (Werner, 1987).
Dufy believed in the value of attending separately to colour and form.
"Once when I was sketching by the harbour I noticed a bright, red blob moving in
a line across my field of vision. Only later did I realise it was a small girl in a red
dress .. I have ever since been convinced of the possibility of thinking separately
about colour and form" ("Dufy" Channel 4 Television documentary 1982).
To an artist or designer the fine adjustment and mental manipulation of
spatial and chromatic relationships are each very demanding tasks. They may be
facilitated in the early stages of visual composition by attending to them separately.
The working methods of many artists and designers suggest that they know this
intuitively. Ruskin in his advice to students of drawing put it in the following
words
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"You may, in the time which other vocations leave at your disposal,
produce finished, beautiful and masterly drawings in light and shade. But to colour
well requires your life. It cannot be done cheaper. The difficulty of doing right is
increased - not twofold nor threefold, but a thousandfold, and more - by the
addition of colour to your work. For the chances are more than a thousand to one
against your being right both in form and in colour with a given touch: it is
difficult enough to be right inform, if you attend to that only; but when you have to
attend, at the same moment, to a much more subtle thing than the form, the
difficulty is strangely increased,- and multiplied almost to infinity by this great
fact, that, while form is absolute, so that you can say at the moment you draw any
line that it is either right or wrong, colour is wholly relative." Later of coloured
sketches "Give up all the form, rather than the slightest part of the colour" (Ruskin
1907)
We have already seen that Garner regarded form and colour as separable
dimensions but that studies using a different task suggest mentaN liolmalisatim
must occur on the unattended dimension before making simultaneous comparisons
of form with irrelevant colour or vice versa (Egeth 1966, Hawkins & Shigley,
1972). Slightly different results were obtained by Schroeder (1976) following a
lead proposed by Garner (1974). Garner had suggested that colour should interfere
with form more than the reverse because a "form cannot exist without a colour but
the reverse is not true". In a series of experiments Schroeder required subjects to
match form or colour alone when both dimensions varied. The results were clear.
When colour was made irrelevant it interfered with the ability of subjects to make
form judgements, but the reverse was not true.
6.7 Segregating Surface Colour Dimensions
When surface colour is represented in a sketch it may be helpful to
segregate some of its dimensions. Theoretically artists might want to think
selectively about any of the 3-4 dimensions of surface colour, about illumination
induced surface brightness, or about any one of many aspects of colour modes of
appearance.
6.7.1 Luminance Contrast without Chromaticity
Typically monochrome studies in pen and wash or charcoal for example
show combined attention to surface tonality and light and shade. Because Munsell
value, hue and saturation are integral dimensions, separation of value from hue
and saturation, is almost obligatory for selective thought. Yet there has been very
little published discussion of the possibility that achromatic studies may enhance
6. Visual Segregation and Selective Attention 	 197
the perception of the subtleties of, for instance, reflected light and shadow and
form from shading.
Livingstone and Hubei (1987) produce psychophysical evidence that
luminance contrast without chromaticity supports (besides stereoscopic depth and
movement perception) perspective depth perception and figure ground separation in
pictures, but that all these perceived attributes evaporate when only hue contrast is
present (ie at equiluminance). This they ascribe to the fact that these processes are
performed by the "colour blind" magnocellular pathway in the brain. Whilst some
of their claims need validation, there are interesting, testable, consequences for
designing new sketching systems. Their results imply, for example, that coloured
lines in sketches need strong luminance contrast with the ground to depict spatial
structure. Portraits with greatly altered hues (as in Fauvism), succeed in depicting
their sitter only because the luminance relationships are preserved.
6.7.2 Other types of Colour Attribute Segregation
Clear examples of other types of colour attribute segregation are harder to
find in rough sketches. However in post-impressionist painting, (which has been
influenced by sketch attributes) there is evidence, of an emphasised attention to
colour hue, by the suppression of variation in colour saturation and tonality
(Wilenski, 1944). One reason for this may be that paint has only a relative
reflectance range of about 1 to 27 (3% for ivory black; 80% for titanium white),
whilst in nature the range is far greater. Before Impressionism colour saturation of
the darker colours was lost by adding black. Since impressionism, figurative
painters have learnt to heighten chromatic experience by compressing the total
range of luminance and saturation at the expense of shadow.
6.8 Segregating Spatial Attributes.
There are several ways in which visual attributes related to spatial structure
may be segregated in sketches.
6.8.1 Segregating "what" from "where"
The distinction in the visual system between seeing where something is in
three-dimensional space and recognising what it is has already been discussed
(5.3.5). The distinction is supported by evidence about the components of visual
working memory (mainly by studies of divided attention), in evidence about the
resources available to, and shared by, perception and mental imagery and in
neurophysiological evidence about the visual pathway.
Experiments by Sagi and Julesz (1985) suggests that knowing "what" even
a single feature is requires time consuming processing and focal attention. Only
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knowing "where" a target is mediated by automatic parallel processes. This
distinction is reflected in the visual pathway within the brain (5.3.5).
The analogy of a labelled map with flexible pointers to large stores of
information, some of which can itself be mapped in greater detail, was made
earlier. It has also been pointed out that there are elegant functions for this
separation.
1. A single stored object representation can, with suitable transformations
be mapped repeatedly onto many different locations, like leaves on a tree or figures
in a crowd. (This is also an aspect of descriptive to depictive mental translation).
2. Fast movements of attention can be implemented to activated, but only
partly analysed, regions of the visual field, before slower detailed analysis and
memory matching is necessary (focal attention). It also follows that it is possible to
contemplate the nature of an object without simultaneously worrying about its
spatial context.
3. Two kinds of mental image generation are made possible. Generation by
attentional scanning of a spatial representation and generation by retrieving stored
object attributes from memory (Kosslyn & Shin, 1994).
4. The separation allows us to reconcile otherwise conflicting evidence for
spatial based and object based attention, with two anatomically distinct attentional
networks in the brain (although this is still speculative).
Rueckl et Al. (1989) have made an interesting computational model to
investigate why location and object identity are processed by separate visual
systems. They designed a "neural net" computer model which was set the task of
learning to recognise simple shapes placed at random locations within a two-
dimensional grid. The model performed this task much more efficiently if the
hidden layer of "neural" units (connecting input units to output units) were divided
into two types, those responding only to location and those responding only to
object shape, than if all the hidden layer units were of the same type responding
both to location and to shape.
Of course, in the brain, the two systems must be flexibly linked. Otherwise
there is an explanatory problem. Object recognition often depends upon the spatial
relationships of parts. I suggest this is solved by redefining the object-part
boundary as discussed above. After descriptively represented part relationships are
mapped into a "zoomed in" coordinate system on the spatial location map, the parts
can be scanned at new object locations.
Not surprisingly, sketches can often be classified according to whether they
emphasise what the subject matter is, or whether they describe where the subject
matter is within the plane of the picture or within the volume of represented space.
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Where spatial location is of primary interest, object identity is neglected. In the
contrasting type an artist appears interested in describing an object and the features
by which they are recognised, but is not interested in their spatial location. This
distinction is illustrated in some of Cezanne's sketch books. The lines in his
sketches for landscape composition describe with precision the locations and the
spatial intervals between edges and fragments of rocks and trees with little attention
to the objects themselves (Illustration XVIII). On other pages of his sketch books
well observed details of faces and other objects float in random juxtaposition on the
page (Illustration XIX).
Thus it is reasonable to suggest that the capacity to plan and visualise
spatial composition is increased by the generation of sketches which outline spatial
structure, omitting object detail. An inverse advantage can be postulated for easily
located object detail. It may be easier to describe, recognise and re-describe an
indeterminate object if involuntary spatial search processes are avoided. Computer
graphic systems based on the vector method of representation typically also
separate the representation of location and object shape (Hopgood et Al. 1983).
However the advantages to sketching have yet to be fully explored (e.g. for
depictive to descriptive translation (9.4.4)).
6.8.2 Sketching and Spatial frequency Channels
Another form of spatial segregation, which is sometimes found in sketches,
also has parallels in the visual system. It is the segregation of different spatial
frequency ranges of luminance contrast. In realistic images the rate at which
changes of light and dark varies with distance varies widely. It can occur slowly
and gradually over wide areas (defined mathematically this is a low frequency
luminance contrast). Alternatively changes between light and dark regions may
occur more abruptly over smaller regions, corresponding to higher frequency
luminance contrast. The existence within the visual system of a number (at least six
and perhaps as many as nine) of parallel spatial filters, selective for frequencies
with a bandwidth of about 1.5 octaves and sensitive to orientation, is well
documented (see Ginsburg, 1986). Low frequency channels respond to gentle
changes of luminance with distance and have wide receptive fields. High frequency
channels respond to sharp contrast changes and fine details and are associated with
smaller receptive fields. The evidence for orientation tuned band-pass spatial filters
in the mammalian visual system is reviewed by Robson (1975) and Ginsburg
(1986). In normal percepts and realistic images a continuous range of spatial
frequencies are super-imposed upon each other and we do not normally notice
different spatial contrast frequencies separately. However there are times when an
6. Visual Segregation and Selective Attention
	 200
artist or designer will wish to attend selectively to either the sharp high contrast
detail, at edges for example or to the gradual blurred contrast changes which define
tonal masses.
Cognitive scientists have tended to concentrate on simulating by computer
the functions these parallel spatial frequency channels may have in the early edge
extraction and grouping stages of visual analysis (Marr & Hildreth 1980, Watt
1988). The different algorithms used by these and other authors is beyond the
scope of this study. Both the above authors assume that the outputs of band-pass
filters at different spatial frequencies must be combined in the early stages of
vision to find edges but their theories about how this is achieved are different.
Thus it must be pointed out, that while fine line sketches may capture higher
spatial frequencies than less detailed, smudgy ones, it is necessary to use both high
and low frequencies to distinguish object edges from the many other types of
luminance boundary present. Mathematically "Convolving" a black and white
photograph with a plain Gaussian filter (Watt 1988) produces an image very
similar to a Seurat drawing. A high frequency and low frequency spatial
mathematically filtered photograph of Groucho Marx is illustrated for comparison
(Illustration XXVII).
There is evidence that it is possible to attend selectively to different spatial
frequencies (Graham, N. Kramer & Haber, 1985, Shulman & Wilson, 1987a,
1987b) but with a penalty. The hypothesis here is that frequency segregation makes
it easier, and that it frees attentional resources for other cognitive tasks useful for
visual invention.
In the array of luminances presented to the eyes by normal scenes high,
medium and low spatial frequencies are mixed and are processed in parallel. In
sketches high frequency segregation manifests itself in delicate line drawing
representing sharp edges and fine detail with little or no representation of gradual
shadow or global luminance contrast (example). Low frequency segregation is
beautifully demonstrated by the tonal studies of Seurat. Surface texture and local
detail are suppressed whilst the global subtleties of tonal structure and broad
masses created by gradual gradients of luminance contrast over wide areas is
emphasised.
6.8.3 Forests or Trees ?: Global or Local Precedence
Because a low spatial frequency filtered image selectively represents
gradual changes of luminance over wide areas, smudging out fine detail, it can be
looked upon as one way of attending to global characteristics of a scene as opposed
to local detail. However spatial frequency provides no information about the
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perceived (descriptive) hierarchy of meaningful objects and their parts discussed
above. There is thus another type of global-local distinction which depends upon
whether or not we wish to attend selectively to the overall shape and structure of
an object or to its perceived parts. As suggested above (6.5) the preliminary
perceptual structuring of the sketch stimulus field into candidate objects and parts
is involuntary, but can be manipulated by the way the sketch component marks are
grouped and related. However it is also worth considering how sketch attributes
can facilitate (without completely separating) global or local judgements with
minimal interference from temporarily irrelevant structure. There is a large but
rather complex literature which can be drawn upon.
In a widely quoted series of experiments Navon (1977) investigated how
global and local attributes interacted in pattern perception. He showed subjects
letters or simple geometric forms which were themselves formed by grouping
together smaller versions of the letters or geometric forms. In a typical experiment
upper-case 'H's were made by grouping either smaller 'H' s or 'S's and 'S's made
by grouping smaller 'S's or 'H's. The stimuli were thus of two types, consistent in
which the local parts had the same form and name as the global shape and
inconsistent in which the global and local attributes differed in their form and
name. Subjects were asked to make speeded identifications of such stimuli under
two instructions (a) to identify the global form and (b) to identify the local form.
Navon found that identification of the global forms was always faster than that of
the local forms. Further, although it made no difference to global identification
whether the local elements were consistent or inconsistent, local identifications
were significantly slower when the global form was inconsistent with them than
when it was consistent. Thus there was a sort of Stroop type interference of
irrelevant global form on attention to local parts but not vice versa. Navon had
considered that his results supported a general principle of "global precedence" in
which the processing of global attributes precedes, or occurs faster than, the
processing of local features. However this conclusion has since been shown to be
premature.
Navon had considered the possibility that global precedence might only
hold for stimuli within a limited size range so he ran another set of experiments
using stimuli of two sizes with identical results for both sizes. However Kinchla
and Wolfe (1979) using a target search task showed that global judgements were
faster than local only if the global stimuli subtended a visual angle less than 6°-9°.
For larger global stimuli and when local stimuli were a constant fraction of global
size, local judgements were faster. Kinchla and Wolfe suggested that there is an
optimal size of about 2° for which forms will be preferentially processed with
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higher or lower level forms processed later. Their results support a principle of
optimal size precedence. Ward (1982) has suggest that these results can be related
to the work of Larsen and Bundesen (1978) suggesting that size normalisation
precedes shape matching judgements (4.3.6). The principle would be explained if
the frame used for shape feature detection has a preferred size (about 2°) and
shapes are accordingly mentally adjusted to that size. However, in another set of
experiments Lamb and Robertson (1990) showed the visual angle at which the
transition from a global to local advantage occurs, varies with the average angle in
a block of trials. Thus the transition takes place at a larger visual angle for a large
stimulus set than for a smaller stimulus set. It is as if the visual system can , with
practice, set itself to favour a certain visual size for global object perception. The
authors conclude that attention plays a major role in determining the relative speeds
of processing global-level and local-level information.
The principle of optimal size precedence is relevant to the question
discussed in 2.6 about how the physical size of a sketch should relate to the real or
imagined size of the object it represents. Artists probably instinctively adjust
switches between desired global and local levels of attention, by varying the visual
angle of a sketch as the eye is moved towards or away from the plane of the paper.
However because the plane of the traditional sketch surface is so salient it is
possible that the visual system will compensate for such distance related size
changes with "phenomenal size regression" (4.2.1) thus counteracting the required
attentional level change. The rapid "zoom" facility, possible with machine
sketching systems, highlights the importance for system designers of understanding
the connection between visual size, object attention and global or local precedence.
However the question remains open until controlled trials in realistic contexts are
performed to confirm or refute the applied theory.
Another limitation on the principle of global precedence was shown by
Martin, M. (1979). She found that Navon's global precedence results were only
obtained if the global features were made of many small local elements. When she
tried stimuli in which the global features were made of fewer and somewhat larger
local elements the opposite effect was obtained. Local judgements were faster and
unaffected by the identity of the global form, whereas global judgements were
interfered with by an inconsistent local form. Ward (1982) suggests that her data
support a principle of "conspicuity precedence" in which the most conspicuous or
salient features in a visual scene will be processed first. Here conspicuity is used in
a sense defined by Engel, F. (1971, 1974). Thus object features that are brighter,
that stand out more from their background, that are seen in more detail (ie foveal)
or are better formed in the Gestalt sense will attract attention and be preferentially
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processed. One of the many ways in which sketches differ from more realistic
("stimulus bound") representations, is that they usually provide added salience
(conspicuity) to objects, parts or attributes of interest using Engel, F.'s factors -
enhanced contrast, greater isolation etc. Here it is useful to make the distinction
between visual segregation between sketches as discussed above and visual
segregation within a sketch which is implied here.
The above factors affecting the precedence level of perceived structure are
characteristics of the sketch stimulus itself. The implication (to me at least) is that
they bias attention by their effects upon early involuntary processes which direct
attention (Posner's posterior attention network). There is another line of research
which demonstrates the influence of the observer's cognitive state. For example
Hoffman, J. (1980) using a memory scanning task obtained results which also
disagreed with the global precedence hypothesis. He found mutual interference
between global and local levels of visual structure regardless of which level was
attended to. He also found that when subjects had to divide attention between two
levels, responses to targets at both levels were made equally quickly, but more
slowly than when attention was allocated to a single level. Hoffman, J. concluded
that the ease of processing a given level of figural detail depends both upon the
"quality" of the information at that level and on the processing capacity allocated
to that level. Following this finding Ward (1982) investigated how a previous level
of processing (in the global to local continuum) biases the current processing level.
He found a robust "level-readiness" effect whereby processing at a given level is
faster if previous processing has also been at this level. He suggested that
interference between levels depends upon a conflict between the degree of salience
at one level and the allocation of attention to another. He proposed a two-state
model of attention switching, to explain his results. These results seem to me to be
relevant to the strategy pursued by a sketch user when thinking about a design or
work of art at a particular level of spatial detail.
As already pointed out there is a distinction (related to the depictive-
descriptive distinction) between global and local levels defined in terms of spatial
frequency (degrees of fuzziness) and defined as here in terms of object structure.
However in practice, selective attention to a particular spatial frequency and
attention to a particular level of object structure will over-lap, since, for example,
attention to low spatial frequencies which blur fine detail is also likely to facilitate
attention to global structure. Shulman and Wilson (1987), set their subjects the
Navon task of identifying either the global or local letters. However on some trials
they superimposed a sine wave grating of a particular spatial frequency on the
local-global display. After the trial subjects were asked to make a present/absent
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judgement on the probe. The results showed an increased detectability of low
frequencies during global processing and of high frequencies during local
processing. This suggests another explanation of some of the global precedence
findings, because there is evidence that the low frequency channels are faster
(higher temporal frequency) than high frequency channels (or are associated with
receptive fields which have faster channels (Graham, N. 1981)). When an image is
progressively blurred, the highest spatial frequency components are removed first,
with progressively lower frequency components being removed as the blurring
continues. This suggests another way by which a machine sketching system might
assist visual attentional precedence control, which is worth testing. Not many
sketch users, after all, have Seurat's powers to filter out unwanted spatial
frequencies (Illustration XXVII).
6.9 Discussion and Conclusions
6.9.1 Selective Attention and the Sketch
There is ample evidence that the visual system in man and other primates
segregates different attributes of perceived and remembered visual information
using dedicated resources which interact in complex ways. It is also clear that the
brain possesses a number of neuro- anatomical resources that serve different parts
of the task of attending selectively to one component only, of the available visual
information (Posner et Al. 1994). We can attend selectively either to different
objects, to different visual attributes or to limited regions of a visual field. The
systems which control such orienting of attention can behave both as a moving
"spotlight" facilitating limited but fixed areas or as a "zoom-lens" processing
selective levels of the global to local hierarchy of visual structure. This hierarchy
may be defined spatially in terms of band-width spatial filters or in terms of a
descriptive structure of objects and parts. In addition we can attend separately to
colour and to the various dimensions and attributes of colour. Much of the
literature can be fitted to a framework in which attention mechanisms have evolved
to select objects or candidate objects.
Evidence has been presented which shows that irrelevant dimensions,
attributes and objects interfere in different ways and to different degrees with such
selective tasks. The main hypothesis is that sketches by separating out attributes
and parts, by removing variation in irrelevant dimensions, re-scaling sizes,
controlling salience etc, can lighten the cognitive effort necessary for selective
thought. Attention theorists still debate whether the need for selective visual
attention is due to capacity limits, with the early need to filter out irrelevant
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information, or to the need to resolve processing response conflicts caused by
involuntary parallel processes. There is evidence for both.
Whilst in the early stages of composition or design, it may be necessary to
think selectively about one or more partial attributes of a visual problem, it is also
necessary to integrate all the visual attributes and parts into a unified whole. Where
previously separated attributes interact as they usually do (eg. colour and form)
further manipulation will be necessary. In painting, for example, it is rare to find
that a composition developed in colourless sketches does not change its form when
colour is used (see "Les Demoiselles D'Avignon", Illustration XIII). Fashion
designers sometimes design a single garment shape to be implemented in fabrics of
different colours. Sometimes also in the Fashion industry the buyer (Bates et Al.
1988, Makirinne-Crofts et Al. 1992) wants see a particular garment style in a
different fabric. On the other hand Fashion designers frequently tell you that their
ideas start with the fabric which they need to handle (see also 2.4)
Both "forests" and "trees" can have precedence in early sketches. Picasso's
global ideas for "Les Demoiselles d'Avignon" were influenced by new local ideas
for representing human figures (1.7.1). One must not forget either that in
figurative sketches there is often an implicit structural redundancy which can be
interpreted at different levels of structure. If obscure lines in Goya's "Procession"
represent a figure (global) then it probably has a head, arms and legs (redundant
local part). If a mark is seen as a face (local) then it is equally likely to belong to a
figure (redundant global part) with trunk, arms and legs (Illustration XXII).
In such cases integrating visual attributes implies a many to one relationship
between an attribute selected early in the thought process and one selected later.
The role of selective attention in inventive visualising can perhaps best be
understood in stages
1. Effortful selective attention is paid to source material to segregate, by
memory or observation, visual attributes of special interest or importance.
2. Records of selected attributes (sketches etc) are used to facilitate
selective manipulation and visual thought. A variety of mechanisms are available
for instance:-
- Attribute isolation or filtering (colour dimensions, spatial frequency etc).
- Normalisation of irrelevant attributes for comparison
- Global / local level selection by optimal size, grouping, object - part
salience etc.
3. Separately considered components are re-integrated, usually in stages,
for a final synthesis. Thus early idea drawings by the late designer Jean Muir
described global attributes of a garment. Later drawings added details about
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buttons, collars, pleats stitching etc, integrating global and local levels of attention
(Muir 1984).
4. Through this process the artist's mind may "back-track", returning to
reconsider an earlier decisions. This may then lead to further stages of selective
segregation and re-integration until both global structure and local detail of the
whole design can be visualised together. (Do late changes to detail then implicate
further modifications to the global design?).
The need both to visualise attributes selectively and to integrate all
components into a satisfying whole suggests that neither the traditional
impoverished attributes of sketches nor very complete and "realistic"
representations solve the whole problem. Especially relevant to the sketch is the
concept that the capacity to divide attention between features, depends upon
whether those features are perceived as parts of the same object. Visual
composition in the arts is largely a question of manipulating the relationships
between the separate components of an image or imagined object until they appear
to cohere into a meaningful whole. Perhaps this mysterious process can be seen as
a an unconscious cultural adaptation of innate object construction mechanisms in
the brain.
The ideal system would facilitate the types of attribute segregation discussed
above and their separate manipulation whilst at the same time it permitted a later
more detailed image resynthesis to occur, in successive stages, as partial decisions
are taken. This possibility is considered further in Chapter 9.4.
We are now in position to re-state hypothesis four.
6.9.2 Hypothesis Four
Sketches amplify inventive thought by isolating and representing separately
those attributes of visual experience that are of special relevance to a particular
task. This assists the user to attend selectively to a limited part of the task, freeing
otherwise shared components of cognitive capacity and reducing the complexity of
preparatory visual processing.
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7. METACOGNITION AND CONSCIOUS CONTROL
"The beast does but know, but the human knows that it knows" John Donne (1628)
7.1 Introduction
Hypothesis Five states that "Sequences of sketching acts support the
conscious awareness of one's own cognition. This assists creativity, providing
voluntary control over highly practised mental processes which can otherwise
become stereotyped. Unforeseen percepts from untidy or accidental stimuli can
elicit unconscious processes which break the mould of habitual thought, whilst a
temporal record of recent ideas makes it easier to change one's mind at appropriate
stages."
Metacognition is a term used by psychologists to refer to a knowledge of
and awareness about one's own cognitive processes. Ct is sometimes divided icto3 a
number of sub processes (Matlin 1989). For example Meta-Attention is the
awareness of how ones attention is allocated or divided and Meta-Memory refers
to one's awareness and knowledge of one's own memory. One can know
something without being aware of it and one can be aware of knowing something
without being able to access the information (the "tip of the tongue" phenomenon).
Many of an artist's personal visual skills are based on knowledge acquired from
long experience, but which is not available to conscious expression. Such "tacit
knowledge" influences visual invention but is not available for verbal report or
even voluntarily controlled action. Studies of the working methods of designers
(Lawson, 1990, Malcirinne-Crofts et Al. 1992) and of fine artists (Arnheim 1962a)
confirm the importance of such tacit knowledge.
MetaCognition is a form of consciousness. The nature of consciousness is
such a controversial subject that even now in the post-behaviourist era with
concepts of "mind" and internal representation at the centre of cognitive
psychology frequently the word is not mentioned in the index of text-books (e.g
Eysenck, 1984, Kosslyn 1980 Baddeley 1990). However the unconscious-conscious
distinction is implicit in many of the topics discussed. Thus in the preceding
chapters it was found to be impossible to avoid the explicit or implied distinction
between conscious and unconscious processes. For example
- The late construction theory of perception is actually a theory of
perceptual consciousness. But what internal operation or attribute distinguishes the
visual processes we are aware of from those that we infer to occur outside
awareness?
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- In theories of visual recognition, the distinction between those automatic
memory access processes which occur unconsciously and those which are initiated
with conscious intention is unavoidable.
- The most interesting but least discussed attribute of mental images is that
they are usually conscious (or at least often conscious) visual memories which can
be voluntarily controlled. This distinguishes them from the reservoir of
unconscious stored visual representations of which we are not aware but which we
infer to explain the facts of recognition. Kosslyn (1980) gives credence to Freud's
theory that one of the functions of mental imagery is to make memories conscious,
but he takes the idea no further (see 5.2). If it is true, then it follows that since
mental imagery is important to invention then conscious awareness must be also.
(But there is also evidence for unconscious imagery 7.2.9)
In the following sections I will treat awareness and volition (as in
voluntary versus automatic processing) as connected but separable topics. I first
discuss briefly some existing theories of consciousness, including my own theory
of consciousness as a "cognitive monitor". Then I review some relevant literature
about the difference between automatic and voluntary cognition and discuss the
reasons why the related pairs of opposing concepts (1) automatic versus voluntary
processing and (2) conscious versus unconscious processing, are relevant to visual
invention and the sketch. This will lead to what is, I hope, a plausible extension to
current theory, in order to explain how sketch attributes support the complex but
limited capacity processes of visual awareness. It is postulated that the (unsolved)
problems of the nature of visual creativity and the nature of visual awareness are
interdependent.
The core of this chapter is that sketches are cultural inventions which
facilitate an interchange between conscious and unconscious types of visual
knowledge and that this internal dialogue is necessary for visual planning and
creativity.
7.2 Consciousness: Theoretical Issues.
7.2.1 The Imperial Psychology's New Clothes.
"Was it too early then to talk about the Imperial Psychology's New
Clothes?" Mandler, G. (1975)
One reason why many (but not all) psychologists have been reluctant to use
consciousness as an explanatory concept in cognitive theories is the historical
failure of conscious introspection to provide reliable experimental data about
mental processes and the difficulty in finding objective criteria for conscious
awareness. Miller, G. (1962) recommended a ten year moratorium on the use of
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the words "consciousness" and "voluntary" in psychology, long after the demise of
behaviourist strictures on "mind". For most theorists the ban has lasted much
longer, although many discussions of attention (Treisman & Paterson 1984, Posner
1980a, Julesz 1985) and some of short-term memory (Marks 1983, last chapter of
Baddeley, 1986) all but admit they are also about the conscious - unconscious
distinction. With the exception of a few bold theorists (e.g Shallice, 1972,
Mandler, G. 1975, Posner 1980) consciousness had been regarded as a
philosophical rather than a scientific problem (e.g. Ryle 1949, Nagel 1974,
Churchland, 1984, Rosenthal 1986, Dennett 1991). More recently however (from
the eighties onwards), the ice has started to thaw over the topic. Consciousness is
attracting the attention of many more cognitive psychologists (Pope & Singer (Ed.)
1978, Underwood & Stevens 1979, 1981, 1982, Davidson & Davidson (Ed.)
1980, Marcel & Bisiach (Ed.) 1988, Hamad 1982, Johnson-Laird 1983, Marcel
1983b, 1988, Mandler, G. 1985, Jackendoff 1990, Milner & Rugg 1992, Baars
1988). Despite the rebirth of scientific interest in the subject (it was a serious topic
in the time of William James, W.), no commonly accepted functional theory of
consciousness has yet emerged. There are probably as many theories as there are
theoreticians.
As Marcel (1988) has pointed out psychology needs to treat consciousness
seriously if only because it is implicit in many of the experimental methods on
which it is based and in many cases it is consciousness which is actually being
examined. For example if verbal introspection is disallowed, button pressing
certainly is not. Yet button presses are often used to perform the same function as
introspective speech acts conveying fragments of consciousness "this is when x
looks the same as y" etc. Marcel concludes that "In sum.. .we should acknowledge
that what we are studying either is or involves consciousness".
7.2.2 Distinguishing Awareness from Volition.
There is no agreed definition of consciousness and many theorists regard it
as a collection of concepts. For example Wallace, B. and Fisher, L. E. (1983) list
seven different definitions.
One blurred but important distinction is especially relevant to this
discussion. Conscious awareness (as opposed to "non-awareness") and Conscious
control (ie voluntary as opposed to automatic processing) are related concepts
which are frequently discussed separately. Awareness presupposes the
representation of information which is either sensory in origin (perceptual
experience) or internal in origin (metacognition, memory recall). Both types of
awareness are difficult to investigate objectively because they are either purely
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private experiences or un-provable hypotheses about other peoples experience.
Models of awareness which avoid the trap of an infinite series of minds, but allow
some regression within the mind are not impossible to construct (see Johnson-
Laird, 1983). Thus one can imagine that Robert Welch in designing the Yamazaki
Collection (Crawford, 1983) was aware that he was planning grooves on a coffee-
pot and aware that he was aware he was planning grooves and perhaps aware of his
strategy that led to this awareness but probably exited from the mental loop here. It
may be the very existence of automatic processes and the limited capacity of
working memory which provides the necessary exit from such a regress.
A little regression is not without its uses. Being aware that one is aware
allows an extra, higher level strategy for making decisions which would not
otherwise be possible (see Johnson-Laird, 1983, 1988). One can illustrate levels of
awareness recursion (fuzzily) with some purely hypothetical reflexive inner
dialogue by Robert Welch (1986)
Level 1. question "I need grooves in this table-ware to collect the light.
What shape of profile should the grooves have?" (Illustration XIV)
Answer "They could be sharp or rounded. I will sketch them vaguely and
add a little visual note to show two alternatives."
Level 2. question "Shall I continue to think about grooves (level 1) or do I
now know enough to shelve the problem until I have clearer ideas about global
shape ?"
Answer "Yes probably but I mustn't forget that the grooves will alter the
look of the global shape and vice versa, so I may have to think again about them
before long" (Illustration XIV)
Level 3 question "Is my whole approach to this design problem correct,
(level 2) or should I on principle clarify a set of global shapes before worrying
about local surface structure ?"
Answer "Sometimes that might be true but with this project surface relief is
going to be too important to leave to the later stages" (exits to level 2 again)
The concept of voluntary as opposed to automatic cognition is a
distinction more open to experimental attack. However it also involves conceptual
difficulties (see Allport 1980). Awareness of a cognitive process and voluntary
control of a process appear to be separable in so far as we can be aware of a
mental event such a headache or a bad smell from our neighbours drains without
being able to exercise any voluntary control over the inner experience. Less
obviously, an artist may be conscious of an ingrained thought pattern when
designing but cannot necessarily interrupt it voluntarily when required. The
separability between conscious awareness and conscious volition may be more
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apparent than real. If it exists it is certainly uni-directional. For it is difficult to see
how either an overt or covert cognitive actions can be "voluntary" if we are not
also aware of them. Tentatively then we can say that "voluntary" actions are those
which are controlled and monitored by something referred to as "awareness". Yet
we may be aware of some processes we cannot control and which are therefore
automatic. However it has frequently been claimed (Miller, G. 1962, Posner
1980a, Johnson-Laird 1983) that we are aware only of the products of thought
processes rather than the processes themselves.
In this connection, Hilgard's (1980) distinction of two basic kinds of
conscious awareness the passive mode and the active mode may be useful. The
passive mode according to Hilgard includes perceptual awareness when no
response is required, daydreaming, listening to music etc. In contrast the active
mode involves the need to plan, to make decisions and to act upon those decisions.
Clearly purposive sketching is more likely to be classed as active mode awareness
rather than passive mode but the distinction is blurred. There is surely a grey area
in which the mode depends upon how we define planning and decision taking.
Thus the apparently passive contemplation of a sketch can conceal volitional
decisions related to judgements and mental imagery which are hard to classify as
passive or active on Hilgard's criteria. Moreover they may be an important part of
the concealed processes used in creation (7.4.3).
7.2.3 The Problem of Criteria
Allport (1988) has claimed that there are no general criteria for
consciousness, because (he claims) there is no such general phenomenon. Later in
the same paper however he seems to relent slightly and in suggesting that
consciousness may be understood by studying the way behaviour is integrated he
tacitly admits that there is such a phenomenon. It is true that although we know
when we are visually aware ourselves, we cannot use the kind of objective criteria
for other peoples awareness that are traditionally demanded for other types of
experimental observation. Allport discusses three criteria that have been suggested
in the literature. The criterion of potential for action attempts to distinguish
conscious from unconscious information by whether or not it is available for overt
actions (such as speech or button pressing) as well as internal thought. A memory
criterion suggests that the ability to remember events is evidence for awareness of
those events. According to the "confidence criterion" (Cheeseman & Merikle,
1985) the subject must not only be able to indicate correctly a stimulus identity, he
must also indicate confidence in his or her own report. The trouble with all these
(and other) criteria, Allport claims, is that there are always cases where they can
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modify and "interrogate" long range plans, to initiate (but not to implement)
memory retrieval and to "comment on one's current activities". Lastly it has a
special role in "trouble-shooting" structures not normally represented in
consciousness. This last function is echoed in an otherwise curiously limited
proposal by Kosslyn and Koenig (1992). They suggest that consciousness is a sort
of "Parity check" which assesses whether or not the mental system is functioning
properly.
Marcel (1988) considers the causal status of consciousness in the sense that
when someone does something for a reason, that reason is one of the causes of the
action. Beliefs and intentions he implies must become conscious if they are to
modify behaviour. Phenomenal awareness enables a certain kind of self-
monitoring. For example in the condition known as "blind sight" patients who are
apparently blind in part of their visual field can nevertheless correctly "guess" the
position and sometimes the shape of stimuli presented in their "blind" field. Their
lack of visual awareness prevents them from knowing that they can see and
therefore of using (unconscious) visual information for any intentional goal related
actions. Moreover "if one cannot consider courses of actions consciously, then one
would be almost unable to carry out planning of action". Marcel points out that we
need access to a moment-to moment representation of our environment, our
ourselves and our immediate past. Without such a representation we would be
unable to make plans which are not rigidly dependent upon our immediate
circumstances. Marcel even hints in an off-hand manner at the fact that such
representations may include cultural inventions such as number systems and
writing. Another function discussed by Marcel (1988) is the role played by
metacognition in learning. Knowing that one knows and what one knows, Marcel
claims, is essential for reflecting on phenomenal experience or in selecting between
competing cognitive processes. "Unless one can pay attention at an appropriate
level to one's own sensations or actions, one will have great difficulty learning a
new essentially arbitrary, skill which is based on that level of representation".
Some of the most interesting work on metacognition has related to learning in
children. It may illuminate by analogy the problem of visual invention and novel
problem solving by mature artists. Thus Leslie (1987) has proposed that infants
acquire an internal representation of the world in two stages. In this view the infant
starts by acquiring a first-order representation as described by its sensory
apparatus. Only later does it develop a second-order representation which includes
knowing that it knows or perceives. This ability frees the child from the belief that
what it perceives or imagines necessarily represents reality. It underlies, according
to Leslie, the capacity to play with symbols where possible non-existent worlds can
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be imagined and in which one thing can stand for another. It also, in this view,
allows the child to develop a theory of mind and to conceive possible models of
other peoples minds and beliefs. Many of the behavioural characteristics that
distinguish humans from other primates are neotonous (primate infant
characteristics adapted by evolution for adult purposes (Morris, 1967)). Thus we
can look on sketching in the visual arts as "playing" with imaginary worlds for
adult purposes. The child's "second-order" representation is now facilitated by
cultural sign systems in order to access and manipulate tacit visual knowledge.
In agreement with Mandler, G., Marcel believes that cognitive tasks which
are not biologically given, must be made conscious in order to be acquired. The
"intention to perform a non-habitual or non-stimulus-driven task needs to be
conscious". Even if many of the mental processes used to perform a task are
unconscious, the constraints and instructions which define it, together with the
intended result needs to be made conscious otherwise slips of action (automatisms)
will result (Reason, 1979).
Oatley (1988) considers the ability to change one's mind is an important
function of consciousness. He classifies consciousness into four aspects. His
"Hehnholzian" consciousness refers to perceptual experience. According to the
late construction theory of perception - supported here - conscious percepts are
constructed from the "conclusions" of inference-like processes driven by sensory
and memory data as Helmholtz suggested. Oatley's WooIrian consciousness is
equivalent to James, W.s' (1892) "stream of consciousness" consisting of an
undirected stream of mental images, so well described by the writers James Joyce
and Virginia Woolf. (In Chapter 5 I have, in effect, proposed that Helmholtzian
and Woolfian modes of consciousness have a common origin and that in sketches
they are used collaboratively as a single mode.)
Vygotskyan consciousness is Oatley's term for that aspect of consciousness
in which one uses mental representations to solve practical tasks. Drawing on
Vygotsky's studies of children talking to themselves as they solve problems
(Vygotsky 1978) Oatley draws attention to a mode of consciousness in which inner
speech and mental imagery combine to provide a "simulation space in which we
can plan and t,y things out". He agrees with other theorists that it is the goals and
results of inference processes that are manipulated in consciousness rather than the
inference processes themselves. We cannot manipulate the goals of unconscious
processes. This overlaps with Marcel's version of self-monitoring and task
analysis. Oatley' fourth mode he calls Meadean consciousness. The term refers to
Mead's theory that consciousness has a social origin. According to Mead, tacit
continuous monitoring goes on whenever we speak. We understand what we are
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saying to others because as we speak we are also speaking to ourselves. He
postulates that consciousness is an internalised representation of what started as
external relationships with other people. Humphrey (1983, 1986) has developed a
similar theory (but with the reverse emphasis) as the result of his studies of social
behaviour in primates. Humphrey believes that a primary function of consciousness
is that by making an individual animal aware of its own mental processes it is
better able to understand and predict the goals and behaviour of other individuals
within a group. (Scrivener and Clark, S. 's (1992) study of the dialogue which
occurs between two individuals during collaborative sketching is relevant to this
theory)
Oatley suggests that these four modes of consciousness are used
collaboratively "to create new pieces of cognitive structure". This need arises
because human intentions commonly have multiple goals which can conflict with
each other. It follows from this (if I understand him correctly) that a special type
of cognitive process is needed which can back-track on mental actions in order to
resolve conflicts by re-assessing goal priorities and forming new plans. In his own
words "What is needed is a cognitive process for rewriting plans, or for
rearranging goal priorities, when the unexpected occurs" and later "It is the
voluntary ability to use the mind as a simulation space to try out possible actions
before committing a new piece of plan to action that is hinted at by the Vygotskyan
and Meadean types of consciousness.". Oatley does not discuss the limited capacity
of consciousness to perform this function nor does he discuss visual alternatives to
Vygotsky's inner speech or how plans and goals might be represented mentally.
Although there no agreement about all the functions of consciousness,
amongst theoreticians who treat consciousness as a serious topic, there is at least a
consensus of opinion that without consciousness the human mind can deal only
with familiar, routine situations without the unexpected or the novel. The
postulated functions of framing plans, cognitive trouble-shooting, self-monitoring,
dealing with the unexpected and changing one's mind, are sufficient grounds for
linking conscious awareness with the sketch. A theory about how sketches support
such conscious functions in visual invention is discussed later in this chapter.
7.2.5 Consciousness and the Brain.
The discovery of several types of brain damage which cause separable
deficits of awareness has made the nature of consciousness an almost unavoidable
topic in neuropsychology (see Marcel & Bisiach, 1988 Weiskrantz, 1986 1988,
Milner & Rugg 1992, Farah & Ratcliff 1994, Gazzaniga, 1988, Bisiach 1992).
For example it has been demonstrated that damage to primary visual cortex can
7. Metacognition and Conscious Control 	 216
leave intact the ability to respond instinctively to the damaged part of the visual
field without awareness of vision (Weiskrantz 1986). A loss of conscious
recognition of objects or faces may leave intact an ability to recognise without
awareness (covert recognition) (Young, 1994). Similarly cases of amnesia caused
by brain damage showing retention in implicit memory tasks of the "forgotten"
information are well documented (Schacter, 1992). Also in unilateral visual
neglect patients can show proof of semantic processing of parts of a drawing they
will not admit to seeing, even when they can trace round the outline of the drawing
with a finger (Bisiach 1992, Wallace, M.A. 1994, Marshall & Halligan 1988).
The accumulation of evidence that selective damage to specialised modules
of the brain can divorce normally integral conscious and unconscious processing
functions locally demonstrates two important points.
1. Specific neural architecture is necessary for conscious awareness.
Although this architecture is probably distributed over many processing functions
and parts of the brain, this does not preclude the likelihood that there is a separate
"conscious mechanism" as Posner (1980a) has pointed out. It suggests (to me at
least) that there are specific (if yet undiscovered) cognitive resources, (functional
processes and representational systems) which when allocated and switched on
("triggered" Shallice 1972) make otherwise unconscious processes conscious. What
that may mean is discussed later.
2. The extreme handicap suffered by patients with limited loss of awareness
of a cognitive capacity they still possess (to some degree at least) demonstrates the
functional importance of consciousness for effective cognition. This point cannot
be taken for granted, because it is sometimes argued that consciousness is a kind of
illusion which does not correspond to any specific function of the brain (Dennett,
1991) or that it is an epiphenomenal consequence of the need to integrate many
parallel processes (Allport, 1988).
There is also a growing interest in explaining consciousness in
neurophysiological terms (e.g. Edelman 1989, Crick & Koch 1992). Edelman's
theory, despite his excellent title is very hard to follow. It is based on his "Theory
of Neuronal Group Selection" which explains learning and perceptual
categorisation by assuming an internal reward system which causes a Darwinian
type selection of behaviourally successful synaptic connections. He claims (with
much neuroanatomical detail) that conscious awareness has the biological function
within the brain of relating an internal state maintenance system to a perceptual and
response system. Crucial to consciousness, he suggests, are the re-entrant
connections between processing modules. Crick and Koch (1990) have suggested
that visual awareness may have a function integrating the many processing
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functions, thought to occur in separate parallel modules, and that it may be related
to some recently discovered synchronous "gamma oscillations". Crick (1994) has
argued that it is essential to study consciousness at a neural level even before we
have a clear concept of what it is for. Most cognitive scientists would probably say
this approach is premature and defend the functionalist view-point that like other
mental processes consciousness (if it is to treated seriously) must be modelled at a
higher level of representation and process.
Although their theories are quite different, both Edelman and Crick agree
that consciousness is a separable process which uses theoretically identifiable
neural resources. Posner has indicated that he agrees with this (Posner 1980a,
Posner & Rothbart 1992). The weight of informed opinion now seems to be in
disagreement with Neisser's (1976) claim that no such separate processing capacity
exists and his rather unfair misrepresentation of the functionalist approach - "many
current models of cognition treat consciousness as if it were a particular stage of
processing in a mechanical flow of information. Because I am sure that these
models are wrong, it has seemed important to develop an alternative interpretation
of the data on which they are based".
An eloquent plea that only a greater understanding of the brain can resolve
this issue has been made by Francis Crick (1994).
7.2.6 Consciousness and Attention
The concepts of attention and of consciousness are clearly connected but are
not equivalent. In many texts the term attention has completely replaced the word
consciousness which is never used. The distinction must be made between two
usages of the term "attention". It can mean the process of directing, "orienting" or
selecting, limited parts of the available information for more detailed or further
processing. This process may be either automatic (and unconscious) or voluntary
and consciously controlled. However the contents of this selective process, the
second meaning of attention, (sometimes called focused attention) appears to be
correlated with the contents of conscious awareness. Theoretically a distinction still
exists in that "focused attention" might imply merely selective processing
conscious or unconscious. However there are now firmer reasons for believing that
selective attention is indeed a mechanism for directing conscious awareness (Julesz
1985, Posner 1980b, Posner et Al. 1994) and that it is associated in the brain with
the anterior attention network but not the posterior one. Posner and Rothbart
(1992) discuss the evidence for this. These include PET studies which show that
the anterior attention network receives increased regional blood flow in tasks
believed to require conscious attention. Interesting in this respect is the
7. Metacognition and Conscious Control
	 218
involvement in the anterior system of a part of the prefrontal cortex - the anterior
cingulate gyrus since this is very close to the anterior cingulate sulcus a part of
the brain which is believed to be necessary for volition ("free will") (Crick, 1994
page 267).
If Posner and Rothbart's intuition about the connection between attention
and awareness is correct then theories of attention are either theories about
consciousness or the control of consciousness. Thus in Treisman's "integrative"
theory of attention, focal attention sequentially integrates at each occupied location
the object attributes output by many parallel "pre-attentive" processes. The
distinction, between "pre-attentive" and "post-attentive" processing, is virtually
synonymous with a distinction between "pre-conscious" and "conscious"
processing (Julesz, 1985), although the word "conscious" is not in Treisman's
vocabulary (see Chapter 6).
Posner and Rothbart (1992) conclude that "the study of attention is
fundamental to understanding consciousness". Thus if it is correct, as argued in
Chapter 6, that sketches support selective attention then they are also likely to be
supporting conscious awareness.
7.2.7 Consciousness and Working Memory
Once it is accepted that the contents of selective attention are also the
contents of conscious awareness then theories of working memory (such as the
Baddeley & Hitch model discussed in 5.3.6) must also be linked to consciousness.
Indeed most of the evidence for the different components of Working memory in
this model come from studies of the amount of interference that results from doing
two tasks at once. These are also referred to in the literature as studies of divided
attention. This does not mean that all the resources of working memory are used
in consciousness. However most theorists would probably agree that consciousness
requires a short term memory capacity and that this is almost certainly supplied by
components of working memory. Both percepts and images are usually treated as
conscious experiences although many of the processes with generate them are
unconscious (discussed in Chapter 5 & by Marcel 1983b). The resources that they
share almost certainly include the two components of visuospatial working memory
discussed by Logie (1995). It is not clear whether visuospatial memory is also used
by unconscious processes, a point that surely needs more investigation.
Another link between the Baddeley & Hitch model of working memory and
consciousness is shown by the role posited for the central executive in voluntary
attention. This will be discussed below.
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Baars (1988) has published a theory of consciousness which is related to
theories of working memory. He calls his central idea "the global work space"
with which he identifies the contents of consciousness. This is a special sort of
memory which acts as a central information exchange for correlating and
integrating information from many sources. It is connected to many specialist
processing systems which are unconscious and operate in parallel. These can either
cooperate with, or compete for, access to the global workspace. He considers that
the role of attention is to provide control mechanisms for access to this work space
(thus controlling the contents of consciousness). He believes that some but not all
of the contents of short term memory are conscious. A crucial distinguishing
component of Baar's theory is the idea that consciousness is analogous to a cerebral
information broadcasting system which makes selected output from specialised
automatic processors generally available for other processors (such as the language
system) to use. Only selected and meaningfully integrated information is made
generally available in this way. According to the theory, such co-operative shared
information has a special role in learning to solve new problems and in responding
to novel events. Coincidentally, the global work space theory is consistent with the
hybrid image theory of sketch perception (Chapter 5) if it is assumed that the gate
which selects sensory or memory derived image components is also a gate between
unconscious and conscious representations. Then the gate in my postulated triple
buffer system is a gate between unconscious working memory and Baar's "global
work space". The Cognitive Monitor theory of 7.2.9 is also broadly in agreement
with Baar's theory except that it places a greater emphasis than Barr does on the
sequential and simultaneous recording of cognitive events for control and back-
tracking.
7.2.8 Control Theories of Consciousness
Tim Shallice (1972, 1978, 1988) has suggested a computational model
(based on cybernetic analogies) which postulates that consciousness is a
supervisory system which can activate and set the goals for modular automatic
action systems. Shallice's "action systems" are postulated to be specialised
processing modules which connect perceptual systems to "effector" systems. The
latter are automatic neurally implemented programs for performing either motor
actions or,- more importantly for this chapter - internal processing, and which can
run in parallel. Action systems which are also parallel and automatic, activate the
effector systems, providing them with specific goals and parameters to modulate
their operation. Action systems are compared to hierarchically organised computer
programs with a main action system activating multiple sub-subservient action
7. Metacognition and Conscious Control 	 220
systems, which in turn may control multiple effector systems. Conflicts between
action systems are handled by an automatic "contention scheduling" process by
which the most strongly activated action system inhibits others and thus becomes
dominant. Thus only one action system (and by implication one goal) is strongly
activated at a time avoiding the problems posed by many goals which may conflict.
(I assume that the "dominant action system" is similar to the concept of "focal"
attention referred to by Treisman, Posner and others, though Shallice does not
make this clear). Shallice distinguishes two types of input to an action system. A
"specific input" which is necessary for its on-going operation and a "selector
input", consisting of an activation input which can initiate it, and an input which
sets its goals. Consciousness, according to Shallice's model, provides the "selector
input" for the dominant action system. It includes a short term memory system to
store the "selector inputs". Brilliant as Shallice's model is, I feel it is incomplete in
at least two respects.
1. It surely is not sufficient to "set an action system a goal". One needs to
specify also how the goal is represented and to explain how the results of an action
system's operation are compared with the goal and parameters in the stored
selector input. Some kind of comparison process is needed which can be used to
modify an action system's parameters in order to correct and re-run an action
which has not achieved its goal. Shallice (1972, 1988) is rather vague on this point
although it is implicit in his model.
2. Shallice's model concentrates on the output aspect of cognition. As
Shallice himself admits (1972) it does little to account for perceptual awareness.
Shallice provides some tantalising hints that visual awareness (in Hilgard's "passive
mode") is related to an action system which "maximises perceptual input from a
part of the world determined by its selector input, combining both motor movement
(e.g. eye movements) and resetting of the perceptual system". I assume that by this
Shallice means that perceptual awareness is the result of a perceptual "action
system" which requires continuous monitoring and revision, using stored selector
inputs. The "Cheshire Cat effect" (Chapter 5) would be an example of "contention
scheduling" between rival perceptual "action systems" from the two eyes with the
supervisory system's selector input determining which ocular representation is
dominant and conscious.
In a classic paper Norman and Shallice (1980) have developed the Shallice
model to explain the difference between "willed" and automatic behaviour. This
will be discussed in the next section. The concept of an action system is related to
the concept of memory schemas (see Rumelhart & Ortony, 1977 and Chapter 4).
Its application to sketching is also discussed later.
7. Metacognition and Conscious Control 	 221
Johnson-Laird's (1983, 1988) computational theory of consciousness is
along similar lines to Shallice's but more generalised and with a greater emphasis
upon self-awareness. Johnson-Laird compares the functions of consciousness to
those of the operating system of a digital computer with a massive number of semi-
independent dedicated processors which operate in parallel. Turing's proof that any
computation that can be performed by parallel processors, can in principle also be
performed by a serial computer is one of the bases of the Functionalists' belief that
mental behaviour can be usefully modelled with algorithms that run on machines
quite unlike the human brain in many respects. Johnson-Laird is a functionalist.
The brain is massively parallel in most of its information processing mechanisms.
The chief advantage of this is speed. Johnson-Laird argues that there is a division
in the brain between a high level operating system and a large number of
dedicated, hierarchically structured parallel processors. (It seems to me that
Johnson-Laird's parallel processors are virtually identical to Shallice's "action
systems". Following current modelling fashion they could also be thought of as
self-adjusting neural networks. They are also similar to Fodor's (1983) automatic
cognitive modules). Once triggered and given input data, goals and parameters,
these parallel systems run automatically and are unconscious. Only the results of
their computations are accessible to consciousness. Despite its many advantages
parallel processing generates special problems of supervision and control. "Deadly
embrace" can result if two systems are mutually dependent upon each other's
output. The timing of the output from several parallel systems needed by another
system may have to be carefully co-ordinated. Sequential processing is of course
forced when the output from one "action system" is needed as input for another.
As in Shallice's model, a system of multiple, parallel hierarchical action systems,
is assumed to need an operating or supervisory system (which is identified with
consciousness) which can coordinate the timing of action systems, has access to
their results (but not their processes), has access to a model of intentions for setting
goals and can "monitor" other systems. In his own words "These advantages (of
parallel processing) depend upon a hierarchy of control governed by an operating
system that can monitor the other processors, and on limiting its interactions to the
exchange of information so that it is unable to gain access to the internal
operations of other processors. Our introspective conceptions are accordingly very
different from their unconscious counterparts; we tend to force intrinsically parallel
notions into a serial strait-jacket." Probably Johnson-Laird, Shallice and Baars
would all agree that consciousness is related to selective attention and that it
depends upon limited capacity sequential processes and a special purpose short
term memory.
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The trouble with both the control theories of consciousness, as presented so
far, is that they do not pin-point exactly how the processes of conscious awareness
differ from unconscious processes. Why could not the operating systems described
by Shallice or Johnson-Laird (as in a machine operating system) be, at a higher
level, just as automatic and unconscious as the systems they supervise? Why do we
have to be aware of the operating system and what in any case does that mean? The
answer, according to Johnson-Laird lies in the capacity for self-awareness "which
underlies the unique subjective experience of consciousness" (1983, page 470). He
explains that the human (or primate) operating system differs from that of any
existing machines in that it uses for its control and monitoring operations a model
of the self which includes (by implication) sub-models of the mental processes that
it models. This model, Johnson-Laird states must be recursively embedded
allowing, in principle, infinitely higher levels of self-reflection (as I tried to
illustrate in section 7.2.2). In practice, he suggests, the degree of self-reflexive
recursion is limited by the capacity of short-term memory. However, as other
theorists have pointed out, the conclusion that self-awareness is sufficient or
necessary to characterise conscious awareness is very debatable. It is easy to agree
that a model of one's self is a necessary component of human thought and also that
models of individual cognitive processes are necessary components of conscious
control. However it is not clear, to me at least, why a model of the self needs to be
either explicit or conscious. Could not the posited model of the self, or self
awareness, be simply the combined influence of the immense store of buried
episodic memories of past experiences that can be drawn upon in fragments when
needed? More to the point, why should the use of such a model in the monitoring
and control of high level actions distinguish conscious from unconscious mental
events? Important though it is, I am not happy with the choice of self-awareness as
the key distinguishing characteristic of consciousness. I have therefore chosen to
discuss separately another candidate characteristic of consciousness which I
consider to be especially relevant to sketch function.
7.2.9 Consciousness as a Cognitive Monitor.
The word "monitor" appears repeatedly in theoretical discussions of
consciousness (e.g. Johnson-Laird, 1983, Marcel, Bisiach, Umilta in Marcel &
Bisiach, 1988, Edelman 1989) and for good reason. However, it is rare to find a
clear non-tautological explanation as to what monitoring in this context means. In
the above control theories and others (e.g. Umilta, 1988), conscious processes
differ from unconscious ones in that they are "monitored". Presumably this implies
that, (in contrast to automatic processes which run to completion without
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interruption and in a predetermined way), the output from a monitored process is
continuously recorded and compared with a similarly represented, desired or
anticipated goal by some hypothetical higher level "monitoring" process. Moreover
it must be possible for the monitoring process to guide the monitored process by
continuously adjusting its input parameters, using feedback from its output. Both
Umilta (1998) and Bisiach (1988) stress the importance, in conscious control, of
the capacity to interrupt a process once started. However a feedback and control
model of monitoring is not sufficient to distinguish "conscious" from
"unconscious" since many automatic or semi-automatic processes (unattended
steering of a car for example) imply such control. A self-guided robot such as
"Shakey" (Boden 1987) can make a plan for moving from one room to another and
then correct its behaviour if it encounters unexpected obstacles. Yet no one would
claim it was conscious. However if we are to avoid homunculus theories of a mind
"monitoring" the mind A.I. models of monitoring may provide useful metaphors.
For example, Sussman's early (1975) A.I. program HACKER is often
quoted in relation to conscious control (Marcel 1988, Shallice 1988, Oatley 1988).
HACKER was intended to model skill acquisition and could learn to solve brick
stacking tasks with very few ground rules. It had a rudimentary ability to "acquire
skills", readjusting its operating rules by re-writing parts of its own code in
response to task failure. Cognitive theoreticians point also to its two modes of
running sub-routines - a "normal" mode and a "careful" mode which is used after
its mistakes. In "careful" mode a detailed episodic record is kept in a special
memory system known as "chrontext" on the state of its task world and on its
actions and their effects. In careful mode chrontext can then be used to monitor,
line by line, the success or otherwise of revised program rules. Shallice (1988)
comments that "If human episodic memory had a similar evolutionary function then
the basic input to episodic memory would need to be the schema (action systems)
selected in contention scheduling (action conflict resolution) with their bound
variables [and maybe, in addition, some state-of-the-world information]" .
Shallice's further explanation of this important idea is not very clear. I therefore
propose to develop it briefly in order to clarify the nature of "cognitive
monitoring" and to show why I believe it is especially relevant to sketch function.
I suggest that a special purpose dedicated short term episodic memory for
cognitive actions is a crucial, perhaps the crucial, distinguishing component of
conscious mental events. It behaves as a sequential "cognitive event recorder"
which combines the properties of memory and process controller. I will call it the
"cognitive monitor". It is similar to and influenced by Shallice's "Attentional
Supervisor", Johnson-Laird's "Operating System" and the Baddeley and Hitch
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"Central Executive" (as described by Baddeley 1986, 1990, Hitch 1980). At the
implementation level, I would expect it to be associated with Posner and Rothbart's
"Anterior Attentional Network", especially with the anterior cingulate gyrus &
sulcus which as already mentioned is a region of the cortex linked to voluntary
control by neuropsychologists. I would also expect the cognitive monitor to have
strong connections (in the brain) to the hippocampus which is known to be
necessary for the storage of longer term episodic memories. I assume that the
cognitive monitor provides very short term, active records of cognitive events
which are sometimes but not always encoded passively (via the hippocampus) as
longer term episodic memory fragments. I have only reluctantly chosen yet another
name for such a conscious control system aware that there are already too many.
However whilst acknowledging the debt this proposed "cognitive monitor" owes
to all the above authors my inferences about its function, described below are
expressed differently. I hope but cannot be sure, that the authors mentioned above
would agree that this is roughly what their theories imply. If not then the following
represents yet another personal view.
The cognitive monitor supervises an action schema (Shallice, 1988) which
is a stored representation of a plan for performing a mental task. Following
Johnson-Laird (1983) it is assumed that the schema is a complex hierarchy of
possible routines and sub-routines many of which can be activated in parallel.
Many possible paths are possible through the schema and its operation and output
depends upon the parameters provided to the routines at different levels in the
hierarchy. A highly learned and much used path through this hierarchy of neural
processes will run automatically without supervision to its final outcome with sub-
routine triggers and parameters supplied by default. Such a process is like a train
running through a complex railway system in which all the signals and points have
been set in advance. It is very fast and efficient because it operates without any
interruptions or checks. On the other hand its output is stereotyped depending only
upon the initial input and starting parameters. Because no record is kept of its
intermediate inputs and results it operates unconsciously. According to this theory
conscious awareness depends upon access to a record made by a dedicated
recording system which must be simultaneously activated when an action is
performed. When we are not conscious of our mental actions this is simply because
we have no short term memory of its intermediate goals and results.
The cognitive monitor has two posited roles which normally operate in
tandem, a passive recording role and an active processing role. In its passive role it
records for later use what is going on whilst an action schema is being activated.
Its records must include :-
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1. Neurally implemented codes which signify which cognitive routines
(Shallice's action systems) are being triggered and when (in what sequence). I
assume (as does Shallice) that routines which result in overt motor acts and
routines with purely internal processing functions are equivalent as far as the
cognitive recorder is concerned. The collected records of these codes describes one
of many possible paths through the hierarchy of processing routines in an action
schema.
2. The input parameters and data which modulate and quantify how a
particular routine works. (How far and in what direction to move an arm for
example or where and how large to project a mental image)
3. The stage by stage results of triggered routines either in terms of overt
movements or internal information. The format in which action results are
recorded is an open question and is probably mode dependent. I suggest that for
visual processing the results would be recorded as sequences of percepts, mental
images or percept-image hybrids which as described in Chapter 5 are posited to
share a common format. That is they will be represented as sequential 21/2D spatial
maps linked to hierarchic descriptive labels. Thus when consciously moving a
pencil whilst drawing a difficult line, we are briefly recording a cognitive "video
film" of the hand and the pencil as it moves. Evidence that the brain does record
and sometimes store for long periods such temporal (moving) sequences of images
is provided by reports made by brain surgery patients of vivid imagery experiences
of past events when certain parts of their exposed cortex are stimulated (Penfield
and Perot, 1963). This briefly stored cognitive "video" sequence is also used, I
suggest, for integrating the output from successive saccades (Chapter 4) and is the
representation underlying visual awareness. (We are not aware of single saccadic
"snapshots" but of the results of integrated sequences).
I will call a stored sequence of such triple records related to a conscious
action a "cognitive record". A tenet of the theory proposed here, is that sequential
sketching acts support the generation of cognitive records. As generally agreed by
the authors I have quoted, I also assume that in making such Cognitive records, the
monitor does not have access to most of the details of the many routines and sub-
routines of a particular action schema. However it does have access to the
triggering conditions and the partial results output by many of the sub-processes
within an action schema. It should be noticed that this model suggests an extra
function for the gate which allows, for example, only one of two rivalrous images
(the Cheshire Cat effect or my postulated percept-image gate - Chapter 5) to be
conscious. The gate is a mechanism for choosing between alternative perceptual
"results" (unconscious conclusions) for entry on the cognitive record.
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In its active role the proposed cognitive monitor must have the following
processing attributes :-
4. It must have access to a stored representation of goals related to the
action schema currently monitored. This would include a general model of
intended outcome plus numerous sub-goals attached to specified sub-processes.
Moreover the goals must represented in the same format as the results. If the
results have been represented as mental images, so also must be the goals. If the
results have been recorded as verbal propositions, so also must be the goals (e.g. "I
am trying to answer a question about ----"). It seems likely that one way of
representing schematic intentions, is to use as a prototype a stored mean of
successful past cognitive records, but with alternative parameters for varying sub-
goals. The idea that mental images of an intended outcome can be used as goals
was suggested by James, W. (1890) and has been developed by Baars (1988,1993)
as "goal-images". The model described in 5.3.7.2 for matching percepts and
images can also be used to explain how perceived (or imagined) results in visual
problem solving might be matched with an unconscious "goal-image" before entry
to the conscious cognitive recorder. Evidence that mental images can become
unconscious as a task becomes over-learned is provided by Pani (1982), using a
percept-image matching task. Pani also showed that the mental image can become
conscious again if the task difficulty is suddenly increased.
5. It must have access to a model or schema of the action about to be
monitored. This is a concession to Johnson-Laird's "model of the self" in that it
assumes in effect that when we tackle a mental task we have a model with default
parameters (as in "frames", Minsky 1975) based on past experience of the
structure of the processing tree itself. The model is used as a prototype for
selecting alternative sub-processes at processing nodes and for setting sub-goals.
6. The cognitive monitor must include a mechanism for comparing the
stage by stage results of an action schema with the corresponding goals and for
comparing the processing path with the action model. The basis for such a
comparison would vary greatly with the type of action and might involve eliciting
other outside procedures such as image inspection or memory retrieval. The results
of the comparison process must lead to a decision about the degree to which a
specified goal has been or is being achieved and whether or not to deviate from the
action model.
7. It must have a mechanism for interrupting action schemas (see Umilta,
1988)) and for using the results of the above comparison process to do one or
several of the following, (either after an interruption or continuously whilst the
action schema is active).
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a. change the operating parameters of a pre-selected sub-process
b. switch to an alternative sub-process amongst those available at the
nearest node (branch point) in the schema hierarchy
c. Reset one or more of the goals or sub-goals of the action schema.
I am trying here to suggest a process which goes beyond the type of
automatic back propagation learning that can be simulated with neural net
computations for example. The purpose of the cognitive monitor (or supervisory
attention or central executive) is to modify the behaviour of a highly practised set
of processes, in conditions when it breaks down due to unexpected input data or
unfamiliar goals. In these cases the intervention of an external higher level
processor is necessary.
Although I have for logical clarity separated the recording (passive) and
control (active) functions of the cognitive monitor it is possible that its neural
implementation in the brain could combine memory and processing in the same
structures (Crick, 1994). Thus the records of input triggers might also be used to
activate the processes they represent. In which case the analogy with Sussman's
HACKER re-writing parts of its own code is appropriate. Note that it would be
neither efficient nor necessary to store fully explicit mental images. Only the
image's source location in memory and its generating parameters would be
necessary in the cognitive record, since, by definition, the cognitive monitor has
access to the visuospatial components of working memory used to house images
and the image generation processes. (L,ogie (1995) has suggested, from recent data
on dual task performance, that the central executive is involved in image
generation and manipulation.). However there is one reason for assuming that the
recording and control functions of the monitor, even if they have a shared format,
can be separated. It would offer an explanation for the Hilgard distinction between
passive and active consciousness or between awareness and volition. With passive
awareness (as in unmotivated visual awareness) the monitor would be exercising its
record functions, (making selected perceptual constructs available for other
monitored action schemas such as speech) without using its control functions to
interfere with the processing path. The monitor could also make cognitive records
to a varying depth in the tree of processing possibilities, allowing independently
varying degrees of automaticity, awareness and voluntary control. This is a
consequence of the model. Whether in reality there is such a thing as passive
awareness or whether it is will be found that apparently involuntary awareness
conceals (weakly recorded) control functions, is in my opinion, an unresolved
empirical question.
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Clearly there are many disadvantages to processing with an activated
Cognitive Monitor when implementing an action (or thought) schema. By any
description what it would have to do is complicated and must be "expensive" in
processing facilities and memory capacity. This explains the limited capacity of
consciousness and is one of several reasons for the limited span of focal attention.
Moreover the recording and process "re-setting" functions of the monitor would
take time so a consciously monitored "run" through a schema hierarchy would be
slower than an unconscious run though a preset path with the monitor switched off,
even if there was no parallel to sequential conversion (as in controlled versus
automatic visual search). Also because the monitored process must learn its way by
trial and error through the many possible paths in the schema the monitored
operation will be erratic and less certain in its outcome. For these reasons, as soon
as a particular monitored path through the schema is regularly repeated with
successful results, the path and its parameters are stored, to be activated habitually
as required with the monitor switched off. The penalty for this is that such
automatic processes cannot adjust to novel input or to unexpected goals. The
constituent sub-processes cannot be re-arranged or re-written to learn new or
inventive procedures. Because there has been no "official" episodic record of the
procedural stages the intermediate results and parameters of an automatic process
are not available for other controlled processes such as verbal reports, mental
judgments or problem solving, to use as input. Many mental processes, such as
those involved in the early stages of vision and those used for long term memory
retrieval, have no access to the cognitive monitor. Only the end results of their
paths through their habitual action schemas are conscious. However some of the
partial results and sub-processes of mental action schema acquired by and available
to artists can with difficulty be monitored. They are open to metacognition.
The above explanation attempts to summarise what I hope is a fair inference
about the implied meaning of "monitor" "central operator" etc, synthesizing and
extending a little the views of some principal theorists, in a way with which I hope
they would not disagree. The above model attempts to relate theories of
consciousness as a control system with theories of conscious awareness. Thus I
believe it to be consistent with Marcel's (1983b) discussion of perceptual
experience as a process of top-down "recovery" of the results of automatic,
unconscious visual representational systems which are not themselves available to
consciousness. This "recovery" proceeds in the opposite direction to what would be
expected by any theory which posits that perceptual experience and the immediate
results of visual processing are identical (Marcel calls this the "identity theory").
According to Marcel (1983) what we are "aware" of when we see an object or
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scene are not the results of the visual "action schemas" (using Shallice's
vocabulary), which structure the stimulus and access memory for meanings and
identities, but a synthesis constructed by recovery after these processes have
occurred. I am simply suggesting that records from the proposed cognitive monitor
are candidate structures available for this purpose. Marcel's experiments suggest
that the last items to be recorded - high-level meaning and object identity are the
first to be recovered, and the results of first processes (local shape and colour) are
the last to be used (see Chapter 4).
7.3 Automatic and Voluntary processes.
7.3.1 Criteria for Automaticity.
Before discussing what use such cognitive monitoring is to inventive
thought and how it is supported by the sketch, it is necessary to consider further
the distinction between automatic and voluntary processes.
Originally the conceptual distinction was made in relation to theories of
attention. Posner and Snyder (1975) proposed that the following criteria be used to
distinguish an automatic process from one that reflects the operation of conscious
attention:- (1) it should not lead to conscious awareness (a concealed tautology ?)
(2) it should occur without intention (3) it should not interfere with other
concurrent processes. Experimental confirmation of the distinction was provided by
Neely (1977) in a study of the priming effects of a category name followed by a
word which was either related or unrelated to the prime category (as "bird"-
"robin") and which belonged to an expected or an unexpected category (as "bird"-
"window"). The results suggested that semantically similar words automatically
activate long term memory and that false expectations cause conscious interference
with the automatic process. The evidence for automatic memory access is relevant
to sketch theory for two reasons:
1. Theories of recognition suggest that sketch object parts access memory
automatically, without control and can therefore have unintended or unexpected
visual retrieval results. This suggests a mechanism by which accidental sketch
stimuli can have serendipity consequences for inventive thought (Chapters 2 & 4).
Uncontrolled mental processes can have constructive consequences (7.4.2).
2. Although an automatic process may not interfere with another one its
results can. Thus, when task irrelevant information is present whilst sketching, it
may cause automatic retrieval interference which cannot be avoided by conscious
attentional filtering (6.3). Clearly we need criteria for distinguishing sketch stimuli
which are likely to cause automatic interference from those that can stimulate
visual thought.
7. Metacognition and Conscious Control 	 230
7.3.2 Learning and Automaticity
However more recent work has shown that the above distinction is not clear
cut. For example the Stroop interference effect (6.3) was believed to demonstrate
the effects of automatic memory access to word meaning. There is now evidence
that focal attention can also influence the effect (Kahneman & Treisman, 1984) and
it appears that there are many degrees of automaticity. Some processes are always
automatic and others acquire varying degrees of automaticity by practice and
learning. This is predicted by the cognitive monitor model. The monitor is
assumed to record and control an action schema by acting at many branching nodes
of a hierarchic tree of processes and sub-processes. The degree of automaticity
would be related to the level within the hierarchy at which the monitor has no
further access. Thus a completely automatic process would be initiated at the main
root of the tree and only the final results recorded. A partly automatic process
would result if monitoring ceased at certain processing levels or was forbidden at
particular nodes. Any degree of partial automaticity is then possible with some sub-
processes and sections of the processing path running automatically and others
controlled. The consensus view is probably that prolonged practice causes a
process to become automatic to varying degrees and that automaticity is far from
being an all or nothing attribute. Acquired automaticity has the advantage that it
allows a learned process to be performed concurrently with others. However
studies of divided attention suggest that there is always some residual interference
when two highly practised tasks are performed concurrently (Baddeley, 1986
L,ogie, 1995). Difficult, novel tasks on the other hand require a limited "central
capacity" and are more likely to interfere with other concurrent processes
(Baddeley, 1990 page 123).
Thus whilst an experienced driver can simultaneously talk and drive, it is
much harder when one is first learning to drive. Moreover as soon as a novel event
occurs, such as a child suddenly running across the road, then even the experienced
driver would probably stop talking and concentrate on a (possibly novel) procedure
to avoid an accident. Shiffrin and Schneider (Schneider & Shiffrin 1977, Shiffrin
& Schneider 1977) studied the effects of learning on the speed of visual search.
Subjects were asked to memorise 1-4 letters (the "targets") and then had to decide
as quickly as possible whether a member of the learned set was present in a
presented stimulus array of 1-4 letters . For example, in one series of experiments
the targets were consonants from the first half of the alphabet and the background
items (the "distractors") were consonants in the second half. At first the time to
detect a target letter increased linearly with the number of distractors suggesting a
controlled sequential search. Both response time and accuracy were affected by the
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number of targets and the number of distractors. However Shiffrin and Schneider
then gave their subjects continuous practice. After 1,500 trials they had become
very fast and accurate and there was no effect of either the number of targets or the
number of distractors, showing an acquired parallel search mechanism. However if
at this point the targets and distractors were switched then the effects of the learned
automaticity was very detrimental and performance was worse than when they had
just started. Even after 2,100 further trials they were still not up to the level of
performance they had reached when they had switched.
Within the limited process of visual search Shiffrin and Schneider's results
demonstrate clearly both the advantages and the disadvantages of acquired
automaticity. The effects of practice result in a fast and efficient process that
operates equally smoothly with large or small target and distractor sets. In contrast
the controlled sequential search seems slow and inefficient. However as soon as the
task context is changed the inflexibility of the acquired automatic process becomes
a positive hindrance to learning the new context. In contrast the controlled
processing used when learning the task is flexible and relatively unaffected by the
altered conditions of the task.
Clearly the mental processes used by artists and designers for difficult
visual invention and problem solving are of a different order of complexity from
those used in simple visual search. Nevertheless it is likely that successful artists
acquire through experience habitual (and effective) thought processes which
characterise their individual style but which also possess some of the disadvantages
possessed even by partial automaticity for handling novel situations or learning
new approaches to difficult problems.
7.3.3 Habits and the Control of Action
As already mentioned Norman and Shallice (1980) have developed the
Shallice (1972, 1978) model of consciousness and used it to explain the difference
between willed and automatic behaviour. In the model the output from sensory or
perceptual systems passes first to a "trigger data base" which in turn activates the
"source schemas" which are similar to the "action schemas" described in section
7.2.9. The function of the trigger data base is to represent and to store the
combination of trigger conditions (sensory inputs and inputs and parameters for
other internal processes) necessary to activate a given schema. Multiple sets of
trigger conditions are assumed, corresponding to multiple action schemas which
can be activated sequentially or in parallel. In the model, decisions about when two
or more actions can be safely performed, in parallel or co-operatively, and when
they cannot be because they are in conflict, is handled automatically by a
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"contention scheduling" system. This processor assigns priorities and sees that
conflicting, lower priority actions are temporarily inhibited. This system is
described in terms of "horizontal threads". Superimposed on the contention
scheduling and action schemas as a "vertical thread" is a "Supervisory Attentional
System or (SAS)" which represents the influences of motivation and attention and
can alter the "activation values" of the action schemas. Unlike the proposed
Cognitive Monitor, the SAS does not have a recording function (although see
Shallice 1988 quoted above). The authors explain that there are two levels of
control with the higher level Supervisory System biasing the selection of actions by
the contention scheduling system. "The result is three modes of the control of
petformance: automatic, contention scheduling without deliberate direction, and
deliberate conscious control. Will becomes the application of attentional resources
to the control of action".(Norman & Shallice, 1980). The model is important
because it is the first to offer mechanisms (although rather general ones) to account
for the complex mixture of automatic and consciously attended actions that occur
in everyday life. Completely automatic behaviour occurs, Norman & Shallice
suggest when we perform a well learned action, such as brushing away an insect,
without awareness of either the action or its initiation. However they suggest it is
also possible to be aware of performing an action "without paying active, directed
attention to it". This they claim corresponds to situations in which the contention
scheduling system handles the control of action without the involvement of the
Supervisory Attentional mechanism. Such actions, containing awareness without
conscious control William James, (1890) called "ideo-motor acts". There are
surely many Ideo-Motor acts occurring when a skilled artist sketches.
Norman and Shallice apply their model to a number of phenomena. One is
the ability of highly trained people to perform two apparently demanding tasks at
once. For example highly skilled pianists have been shown to be able to sight-read
and play music at the same time as shadowing spoken speech (Allport et Al. 1972).
The Norman and Shallice model explains this learnt ability as the running of two
practised schemata by the low level contention scheduling system, with little load
on the Supervisory Attentional System. Another is absent-minded "slips of action"
(well known to me personally) which have been documented and analysed by
Reason (1979). Such slips are labelled as "capture errors". The Supervisory
System, occupied by a different task, fails to over-ride the contention-scheduling
system which triggers a schema appropriate to the perceptual input but inconsistent
with the long term plan, which is presumably the province of the Supervisory
System. Action slips are mentioned here briefly because it is worth considering the
likelihood that action slips of thought without obvious overt consequences but
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damaging to creativity, may frequently occur unnoticed during the planning stages
of a visual task. Clearly the danger is greatest when two difficult visual tasks, or
two aspects of the same task are competing for the capacity of the SAS (or
Cognitive Monitor) at the same time. As Norman and Shallice point out, with slips
of overt behaviour one's friends or colleagues will act as surrogate Supervisory
Systems pointing out the error. However private action slips of thought when for
example the wrong part of an image is automatically processed whilst
contemplating a visual idea may be harder to detect. This reflects back to the
theme of Chapter 6 which documents the evidence that irrelevant attributes may be
automatically processed in an over complex representation of a visual task.
7.3.4 The Central Executive and Random Generation.
In Chapter 5, the Baddeley and Hitch model of working memory was
outlined briefly to discuss the role of its sub-components in visual perception and
mental imagery. The super-ordinate component of the model is the central
executive which despite its importance is not well understood. In Baddeley's own
words it has tended to become a vague explanation for a rag-bag of mental
processes that seemed to share the requirement for some general super-ordinate
non-modal working memory capacity. In a fascinating discussion (Baddeley, 1986,
1990) has suggested that the central executive may be equated with the Supervisory
Attentional System and "perhaps with consciousness". One of his reasons is that it
seems to explain some old but hitherto unexplained experimental data on how
people generate random sequences of numbers and letters. This apparently trivial
task is actually quite difficult. The experiments he describes (1986, pages 229-234)
have a bearing I believe on the processes used in visual invention and how they
might be supported by visual media. In a series of experiments Baddeley asked his
subject to generate random sequences of letters or numbers in a variety of
conditions. In a typical experiment 12 subjects were asked to generate sequences of
a hundred random letters at four rates. Three different measures of randomness
showed the same results. There was a neat linear relationship between the degree
of randomness and hence the amount of information generated and time allowed
for a response. At the time Baddeley was puzzled- "The results were all that I
might have hoped for and yet how should one explain them ?"
In terms of the Norman and Shallice model an explanation is as follows.
The supervisory System is attempting to control a set of memory retrieval
processes. As already discussed these tend to be automatic. They are likely to
produce sequences which are strongly associated in memory such as alphabetic
sequences and common acronyms. "Indeed the very process of retrieval is likely to
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strengthen such associations producing an increasingly stereotyped output.. to
prevent this the subject must perpetually intervene to break up developing patterns
and to favour weak schemata, a task which requires him to monitor the occurrence
of prior responses and to attempt to maintain some kind of long term strategy."
Implicit in the Baddeley (1986) discussion of the common attributes of the
Supervisory Attentional System and his Central Executive is the suggestion that it
(the Central Executive) must represent both control functions, being able to
activate and interrupt other mental processes and a general purpose short term
memory. However he does not spell out exactly what must be stored to control
automaticity, as I have tried to do, in outlining the functions of the Cognitive
Monitor. For example it is implicit in his account of random generation, which get
harder after about eighteen items, that a monitoring memory for sequences already
generated must be available for inspection before the next item is selected. This
would be contained in the cognitive record proposed in section 7.2.9.
Such mental monitoring is also implied, I suggest, when an artist is seeking
a new solution to a problem of visual structure and must make a conscious effort to
avoid adequate but uninteresting solutions, relying on highly practised but
stereotyped thought patterns.
Having reasoned this way Baddeley went on to show that tasks known to be
associated with the central executive, such as speeded card sorting and memory for
chess positions interfered with random number generation in ways which suggest
that they compete for the same limited capacity resource.
7.3.5 The Frontal lobes and the Dysexecutive Syndrome.
Other evidence that the central executive is involved in volition and is
necessary for the control of inflexible and stereotyped behaviour comes from the
study of the disabilities of patients with damaged frontal lobes. Evidence that a part
of the frontal lobes (the cingulate gyrus) is involved in controlled attention and in
volition has already been mentioned. These recent studies are consistent with
numerous earlier studies of the variable and rather mysterious deficits showed by
patients with less well localised lesions in the frontal lobes. One particular class of
deficits Baddeley has labelled as the Dysexecutive Syndrome, because the
symptoms suggest a deficit in the Central Executive. Such patients tend to be
deficient in judgement and initiative and have great difficulty tackling novel
problems which would be relatively easy to other patients (Luria, 1969). Shallice
(1982) has shown that they perform very badly on tasks which require forward
planning. A characteristic of the syndrome is a lack of flexibility and the tendency
to persist with a pattern of behaviour or thought after it is been shown to be
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inappropriate. In the Wisconsin Card Sorting test, the subject is given a pack of
cards containing various numbers of different types of symbols in various colours.
The task is to sort the cards according to a given dimension and then when that has
been accomplished to sort again on a second dimension and so forth. Frontal
patients find this extremely difficult. In general they often have difficulty both in
initiating new activity and in discontinuing an activity once started. This produces
the apparent paradox that on the one hand they are easily distracted and on the
other hand show unnatural perseverance. This would be explained if the
Supervisory System (Central executive) is not functioning properly. The patient
cannot then interrupt or redirect an activity controlled by the contention scheduling
system and has difficulty starting a new one. According to the Cognitive Monitor
hypothesis the patient would also be missing the cognitive records necessary to
back-track in order to correct mistakes (and is unaware of faults in the active
schema). Using a battery of tests, including random generation on subjects of two
different age groups, (including as subjects his own relatives) Baddeley (1986)
provides evidence that the Central Executive is a component of working memory
that is especially liable to decline in performance with increasing age.
In summary, there is evidence that a dedicated processor with limited
capacity, probably involving the frontal lobes or anterior cingulate gyrus is
necessary for high level planning and for monitoring and re-learning well practised
but partly automatic actions and thought processes. An obvious deduction is that
original invention and problem solving in the visual arts will put heavy loads on
such a cognitive supervisor in addition to loading the visuospatial and visuo-
descriptive memory systems discussed in Chapter 5. However we must not
underestimate the power and creative complexity of highly practised but
unconscious processes in the visual arts. As an artist or designer becomes older the
capacity of his or her central executive may decline (according to Baddeley) but the
store of unconscious visual thought patterns will become increasingly larger, more
interesting and more appropriate to an individual's style and skill as experience
enriches the long term store of tacit knowledge. One must therefore expect to find
a cognitive balance in the working practice of experienced artists or designers
between the conscious monitoring and interruption of habitual patterns of thought
and the fast and efficient triggering of automatic, but stylistically interesting, visual
routines (Ullman, 1984) acquired from long experience within a specialised
domain.
7. Metacognition and Conscious Control	 236
7.4 Consciousness and Creativity.
7.4.1 Hofstadter's Notion of "Sphexishness"
Part of the inspiration for this chapter comes from one of Douglas
Hofstadter's entertaining essays entitled "On the Seeming Paradox of Mechanizing
Creativity" (Hofstadter 1985a). Until now I have avoided discussing "creativity" as
an aspect (or function) of sketching because the term seems to cover too many
different aspects of the human mind. I have preferred instead to refer more
specifically to "invention" and visual "problem solving". However Hofstadter's
discussion of the role of consciousness in creativity is so relevant to the role of
metacognition and the central executive in sketching that it is worth briefly
considering the literature on creativity in a wider context. Usage here follows
Bruner's (1979) definition of creativity as "An act that produces effective surprise".
This is a succinct statement of a consensus view that creative thought must fulfil
the two conditions of (1) being useful (effective) in the sense that it fulfils a need,
solves a problem or answers a previously unanswered question and (2) contains an
element of newness or unexpectedness (e.g. Sternberg, R. 1988). In her book "The
Creative Mind" Margaret Boden (1992) distinguishes two senses of creativity. In
the psychological sense ("P-Creativity") creative ideas or discoveries need only be
novel to the individual mind that produces them and it really doesn't matter how
many other people may have had the same idea already. In the historical sense
("H-Creativity") creativity applies to ideas or inventions which are "fundamentally
novel with respect to the whole of human history". In the context of the type of
private sketching that is the subject of this study, it is probable that P-Creativity
matters more to a sketch user than H-Creativity. This does not imply that H-
Creativity is not a very desirable consequence of the mental processes supported by
the sketch. When sketching is used to support the users cognition in the early
stages of visual invention it is likely that an artist is more concerned with her or his
own private thoughts than with how new an idea is in the H-Creative sense.
However the nature of sketch indeterminacies is such that, in principle, H-
creativity may occur simultaneously with P-Creativity. For example, Kandinsky's
"discovery" of abstraction in painting (see the quotation in 7.4.3), which could
have been evoked by a sketch, might well be classified, with the benefit of hind-
sight, as H-Creativity, since Kandinsky can claim to be one of the inventors of
abstraction in art. However it is clear, from his own words, that he saw the
insight, initially at least, as only relevant to his own painting and hence as P-
Creativity.
Whilst Hofstadter agrees that "Creativity is part of the very fabric of all
human thought, rather than some esoteric rare, exceptional and fluky by-product of
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the ability to think", (Hofstadter 1985) (Boden's P-Creativity) he also considers
that it is quite wrong to treat creativity as something (e.g "the divine spark") that is
beyond intelligence. The crucial component he believes is "the ability to watch
oneself as one deals with the world, to perceive in one's own activities a pattern,
and to be able to do so at many levels of abstraction". Although expressed in the
concealed "homunculus" terminology that I have tried so hard to avoid, this is very
close to saying that the Shallice- Baddeley Central Executive (my Cognitive
Monitor) is the cognitive basis of creativity.
Hofstadter's comic term "Sphexishness" is a metaphor based on the
behaviour of the wasp "Sphex". This insect shows a complex, sinister and
apparently purposeful predatory behaviour. "It lays its eggs in the body of a
paralysed cricket which it stores in its burrow for the grubs to feed on when they
hatch. Its routine is to leave the cricket on the threshold, inspect the burrow, then
come back to bring the cricket inside." However "if the cricket is removed a few
inches while the wasp is inside, once again it will move the cricket up to the
threshold and re-enter the burrow for a final check. The wasp never thinks of
pulling the cricket straight in. On one occasion this procedure was repeated forty
times, with the same result." Hofstadter lists twelve different examples of a
continuum from the most sphexish to the least. It starts with a "stuck record" and
ends with "Styles in art which become dated and routinized to the point of no
longer being creative. This happens to every style, but at the moment of its
happening, there are always some people who are breaking out of the rut and
creating totally new styles." All human beings, thinks Hofstadter have an ability to
spot "unanticipated patterns" of unanticipated types in unanticipated places and
times. Whenever they "get into some kind of 'loop' they quickly sense it". The
ability to break out of such ruts he implies is a function of consciousness or
metacognition - the ability to record and control ones own thought processes.
7.4.2 Unconscious Knowledge and Creativity.
In contrast, the importance of unconscious or "tacit" knowledge for visual
invention must not be underestimated. It is obvious that the unconsciously stored
mental processes resulting from a life-time's practice are not only an advantage,
they are a necessity, for most useful visual creativity. If this were not so artists
would suffer from a double disadvantage as they grow older. Not only (as
Baddeley tells us) would the monitoring capacity of their central executives be in
decline, but also they will be accumulating ever more "Sphexish ruts" to bar their
way to new invention. Although mathematicians and some poets may produce their
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best work when young, we still have to explain for example the inventiveness of
Titian, Monet, Cezanne and Picasso well into old age.
Just as one is grateful that one does not need to think how to move one's
pen each time one scrawls a signature, nor explain why the result is so easily
recognised, so surely a concert pianist can concentrate on monitoring her or his
interpretation of a Mozart concerto, knowing that the fingers movements will
automatically follow their musically imagined goals. Whilst painters and designers
may know that a certain colour relationship "works", they can rarely make the
decision process conscious or explain why a minuscule colour difference can
destroy such a relationship. Hofstadter tacitly recognises this when he admits that
what he calls "mental ruts" are also unavoidable attributes of the inventive mind.
"Each of us - even the Mozarts among us - exhibits a "cognitive style" that in
essence defines the ruts we are permanently caught in... Far from being a tragic
flaw, this is what makes us interesting to each other. We celebrate individual
styles."
Psychologists commonly classify long term memory into three kinds
(Norman and Rumelhart, 1975). Semantic memory represents facts or beliefs
about the world which are not tied to specific times and places. In the visual arts,
knowledge of the tradition within which one works, of techniques and materials
and of the work of other artists, are examples of semantic knowledge important to
most practitioners. Episodic memory is the stored memory of personally
experienced past events. One form of episodic memory, important to visual
creativity, is the memory of one's own past inventive acts, their circumstances,
their objectives and their degree of success. (I have already suggested that a crucial
component of conscious awareness is a short term episodic memory for thought
processes, but that this is not necessarily passed to long term memory). The third
type of memory, Procedural memory is the memory about how to do things, and
is normally associated with skills (such as riding a bicycle) which can only be
acquired by repeated practice. All three types of memory refer to a large capacity
long term storage that is unconscious. In order to make fragments of such
information available for use, it must be "retrieved". Retrieval processes are
themselves unconscious, but at least in the case of semantic and episodic memory
the information "recalled" as a result of such retrieval must be conscious to be
useful. Visual recognition is a form of semantic memory retrieval, which according
to Hypothesis 2 (Chapter 4) is an important sketch function. Procedural memories
on the other hand can be both retrieved and used without conscious control. A
question pertinent to sketching is "Is tacit knowledge in the visual arts of the
procedural kind and if so, can it be usefully made conscious?". When procedural
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knowledge refers to explicit motor skills such as juggling or riding a bicycle, its
legitimacy as a separate type of memory seems well founded. However when
applied to the pattern of thoughts underlying the act of drawing, for example its
meaning is less clear. Skilful draughtsmen appear to be using unconscious
procedural knowledge in the way that they draw, since as with hand-writing, a
common style can usually be recognised in drawings by the same individual
(Rawson 1969). At the same time those who sketch are surely aware of each mark
as they make it and are consciously in control of the important variables of the
sketch. In the act of drawing, Semantic Memory, ("what does this look like?")
Episodic Memory ("what did I draw yesterday?") and Procedural Memory ("why
is an artist's drawing style so recognisable"), seem to be intimately combined in
complex and poorly understood ways. A similar conclusion can be drawn about the
invisible mental processes underlying visual invention.
We have seen that automatic mental processes, in contrast to voluntary ones
have the advantages of speed and (providing they are not in conflict) of being able
to operate co-operatively in parallel. What Hofstadter seems to have temporarily
forgotten is that, when highly learned, specialised skills become automatic, they
may operate in parallel at a lower non-creative level in the processing hierarchy of
visual thought. By doing so they become valuable tools, which release precious but
limited resources of the conscious monitor to be concentrated at a different level
(usually higher) of processing at which conscious control is needed to support
creativity. Thus, it is insufficient to ask "how does the mind break out of its ruts?".
One must ask in addition "at what level of mental processing are automatic habits a
handicap and at what level are such habits essential subservient skills". For
example in the education of a Fashion designer the ability to draw the human
figure, in a rather specialised way, is regarded as an essential skill. When such a
skill becomes highly learned it "finger-prints" the individual style of a designers
sketches (Illustrations VIII, IX). However far from being a "rut" which hinders
mental invention, the automaticity of such drawing styles releases cognitive
attention where it is needed - to the form and fabric of the garments. It is at this
level where habitual thought may be a handicap. Thus conscious control (in the
form of concentrated attention) at one processing level, is dependant upon effective
automaticity at others, or it will become diluted, as when we attempt to perform
two unlearned tasks at once.
7.4.3 Conscious and Unconscious Thought Combined.
We need to understand how the act of sketching can support the
"antisphexishness" of cognitive invention, without hindering valuable supporting
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automaticity. The literature on creativity is full of anecdotal support for a role for
unconscious thought in creative invention. Usually these relate to novel insights, or
unexpected answers to difficult problems, suddenly coming to mind without any
apparent conscious effort. Amongst the most widely quoted are Kekule's reported
idea for the benzene ring suddenly occurring after dreaming (or day-dreaming)
about a snake biting its own tail, the words of "Xanadu" coming to Coleridge in an
opium induced reverie and Poincare suddenly thinking of a fundamental
mathematical series while boarding a bus (Vernon, P.E. 1970, Sternberg, R. 1988,
Boden 1992). Most accounts of such sudden intuitions suggest that they are the
result of unconscious processing which occurs after extensive conscious mental
effort (on the same problem) has been temporarily abandoned. Poincare in a
widely quoted paradigm, distinguishes four phases of creativity (Vernon, P.E.
1970, Boden 1992). A initial process of preparation involves conscious effort to
solve a problem by familiar methods. A second phase of incubation occurs
unconsciously whilst the conscious mind is elsewhere. It may last minutes, days or
even months. Poincare suggests that during this phase ideas, patterns and analogies
are being unconsciously combined with a freedom denied to conscious rational
thought. This then results in a sudden illumination, in which the results of these
unconscious processes become unexpectedly conscious. Finally a process of
conscious verification is necessary to explore the new idea and build on its
implications.
It is possible that the influence of Poincare's model has exaggerated the role
of unconscious processes. It may be that during the phase of "incubation" many
conscious processes occur which are later forgotten when the sudden "illumination"
occurs. Nevertheless there are so many analogous accounts, by both artists and
scientists, of their inventive thought processes, that Poincare's model deserves to
taken seriously. However, at least one widely used example - Mozart's supposed
account in a letter of how musical ideas come suddenly into his head - is probably
a forgery (Boden 1992). Ghiselin (1952) quotes the American poet Amy Lowell -
"An idea will come into my head for no apparent reason; "The Bronze Horses, for
instance. I registered horses as a good subject for a poem; and, having so
registered them, I consciously thought no more about the matter. But what I had
really done was drop my subject into the subconscious, much as one drops a letter
into the mailbox. Six months later the words of the poem began to come into my
head, the poem - to use my private vocabulary - was 'there". Besides a faith in the
power of unconscious thought, what stands out in both Poincare's and Amy
Lowell's accounts is their metacognition, their high level of awareness of their own
creative strategies.
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Does the Poincare paradigm of constrained conscious effort followed by
unconscious and less constrained thought apply also to the visual arts? Arnheim
(1962), in his introduction to his account as to how Picasso created "Guernica"
suggests that it does. However he also emphasises the role played by a
restructuring of the problem situation or what the Gestalt psychologists termed
"productive thinking". If unconscious automaticity is necessary to facilitate the free
"combination of ideas", then it is also necessary to consciously struggle for a clear
image of the "goal situation". "Sudden flashes of discovery" may be partly the
result of unconscious processing but "the evidence seems to indicate that these
happy solutions do not appear unless intensive conscious wrestling with the
problem precedes them. Rather than assume that special creative powers dwell
below the threshold of consciousness, we might point to the premature freezing of
orientations and connections that may occur in conscious thought.. " (Arnheim
1962).
Suddenly we have come a full circle, with the plausible but paradoxical
implication by Arnheim, that conscious effort is needed to elicit unconscious
processes, one of the effects of which is to avoid the very "sphexishness" which
according to all the evidence is the product of unconscious habits. A possible
resolution of this paradox lies in the fact that although the procedures used by
2/7/C01736021S processes may be automatic and "sphexish", the results that they turn
up may be unexpected and novel. A candidate for such unconscious serendipity,
suggested by Johnson-Laird (1988), is memory retrieval. Although retrieval has
been thought to involve both voluntary strategies and automatic processes, the
process which connects a retrieval cue with the stored information it accesses, is
automatic. My own theory is that conscious efforts at retrieval may constrain the
results of automatic and perhaps parallel memory search procedures, in ways
which lower the chances of accidental serendipity combinations of retrieval
products. Thus when attention is displaced from the retrieval process, novel results
are more likely. A possible mechanism for such serendipity results from
unexpected memory retrieval, is that the automatic memory search process "runs
on" after a "find" in contrast to a conscious sequential search which stops when a
required item is found (Shiffrin & Schneider, 1977). In a classic well-replicated
study of automatic memory search, Sternberg, S. (1966) obtained memory search
results which have never been well understood. Briefly, he found that the time to
detect whether a target digit was a member of a previously memorised set of digits,
had a neat linear relationship to the size of the memorised set, suggesting a process
of sequential search. The surprising finding was that, unlike a search consciously
attended to, the search times for found and not found target digits were identical,
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suggesting that the search process continued to the end of the memorised set even
after the target had been found. In computer programming terms it was as if the
memory search loop had no "If found then exit" clause. Whatever the explanation
for this finding, if a similar unconscious "running-on" occurred in more open-
ended retrieval searches it might partly account for the otherwise mysterious
unattended "Eureka" effect. (Sternberg, S. 's explanation is controversial. See
Baddeley, 1990 for a discussion).
Automatic mental image generation may also have serendipity effects.
According to the theory of hybrid-image formation outlined in 5.3.7, the
preliminary sketch percept-memory image matching process is assumed to occur
unconsciously. A sketch percept only becomes conscious after the percept-image
matching and gating process has occurred. The conscious results of such automatic
image processing may be another source of "antisphexishness" in the sketch.
Sudden visual insight may be elicited by new arrangements of familiar
representations. Thus James Watson (1968) "suddenly" Ns words) saw htn,) pufint
and pyrimidine bases could be paired, by playing with cardboard models of these
molecular bases of cellular inheritance on a table top, (leading to the famous
double helix structure of D.N.A). Similarly, as an example from the visual arts,
Kandinsky described how in 1908 an accidental experience led to his sudden
"discovery" a abstract art. "I was returning, immersed in thought, from my
sketching when on opening the studio door, I was suddenly confronted by a picture
of indescribable and incandescent loveliness. Bewildered I stopped, staring at it.
The painting lacked all subject, depicted no identifiable object and was entirely
composed of bright colour patches. Finally I approached closer and only then
recognizes it for what it really was - my own painting standing on its side on the
easel... One thing became clear to me - that objectiveness, the depiction of objects,
needed no place in my paintings, and was indeed harmful to them" (Read, (.35.g.
7.5 Conclusions
7.5.1 Sketching as a Cognitive Monitor
There is a growing consensus that conscious attention is necessary for
learning new tasks, for coping with novelty and for breaking the mould of habitual
thought patterns. Drawing on the work of Norman & Shallice, Baddeley, Johnson-
Laird, Baars and Hofstadter (amongst others) I suggest that the brain implements
an executive "Cognitive Monitor" which records and controls (by interruption and
re-direction) a pathway through a stored hierarchy of procedural "action" routines
used for visual thought (7.2.9). With constant repetition this pathway becomes
optimal and is hence repeated. As it is thus learned it becomes "automatic" -
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meaning that once started it runs without conscious control and no longer uses the
cognitive monitor. The advantages of this are that it runs faster and can operate in
parallel with other routines, releasing the cognitive monitor for other less familiar
problems which require new, unlearned processing pathways. If Hofstadter is
correct, (I argue he is partly correct), creativity must put a heavy load on the
cognitive monitor to break out of "sphexish" mental ruts. In the visual arts
creativity is, partly at least, a form of problem solving in which well practised
ways of perceiving and imagining visual relationships no longer work. The mind is
searching for a solution to a visual problem in which either the solution or the
problem or both have not been encountered before. Since sketches are, by
definition, used to support visual invention, one way by which we would expect
them to do this, is by extending the limited capacity of the Cognitive Monitor (or
"Central Executive" or "Supervisory Attentional System" or "Global Work
Space").
This hypothesis is complicated by persuasive, if circumstantial, evidence
that unconscious mental processing is also an important component of creative
discovery. There is no reason to believe that the visual arts are an exception to this
rule as Kandinsky has testified (7.4.3). Having observed the growth of creativity in
many art students over thirty years, I agree with Arnheim (7.4.3) that the evidence
suggests that when an unconsciously generated insight into a difficult visual
problem occurs, (Boden's P-Creativity), it normally does so only after a prolonged
conscious effort to solve the problem has previously occurred. The problem then is
to understand how sketches and sketch attributes can simultaneously support the
conscious "anti-sphexing" of inventive thought while at the same time eliciting
(like Cozens' blots and Kandinsky's mis-oriented painting) unconscious (and so
presumably automatic) processes to achieve the same end. My solution to this
apparent paradox is to suggest that there are two- different kinds of automaticity
involved which operate at different levels of the problem solving hierarchy. At a
high level, the level at which problem solving strategies are chosen, and the
(perhaps lower) level at which the decisions- taken define the degree of
inventiveness, acquired automaticity due to practice may be a handicap and need
the services of the Cognitive Monitor for metacognition. However at another level
we can infer the existence of acquired sub-ordinatc slave processes which can
access stored knowledge automatically and w-hich included essential stylistic skills,
which must operate unconsciously in order to free the inetacognitive resources of
the monitor for its high level task. It is argued that en-monitored memory retrieval
and unconsciously generated imagery may operate- more freely than when the
cognitive monitor is operating, producing a richer source of visual memory
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permutations. Thus we may explain the occurrence of sudden insight, when not
consciously thinking about the problem coi-icerned, by supposing that the slave
retrieval and imagery systems continue to operate after the conscious monitor is
switched off (e.g. as in sleep or mounting a bus) or is directed elsewhere.
How do sketch attributes support such a balancing act between conscious
and unconscious thought? Consider the demands that novel visual tasks place on
conscious monitoring and metacognition. It is likely that the cognitive monitor (or
central executive) evolved primarily to facilitate the learning of appropriate
responses and action schemas when novel percepts and events lead to the
breakdown of existing automated schemas. According to this hypothesis, the
monitor was designed by natural selection to interrupt and "debug" (Mandler, G.
1985) unconscious behavioural patterns which are insufficiently flexible to cope
with a novel situation (Baars 1988). Whilst the storage and control capacity of the
conscious monitoring system is sufficient for this purpose, it is not sufficient for
the culturally ancient, but biologically recent, tasks of planning and imagining
possible future objects and events. With experience, artists and designers acquire a
battery of well practised thought processes which operate most efficiently below
the level of conscious awareness. With novel visual problems, such automaticity
can be a handicap. For example Langer and Imber (1979) have demonstrated that
error detection becomes quite poor when skills become automatic. As Baars (1988)
points out (in tacit agreement with Hofstadter) new problems require new processes
or new pathways through learned processes which must become "de-automatized"
and conscious for this to be possible (7.2.9).
One way by which the capacity of such conscious monitoring may be
enhanced, is by the forced slowing down of an otherwise automatic and
unconscious stream of imagery and descriptive propositions, by the sequential
process of overt drawing. Images and propositions become more available for
conscious inspection as a result of trial and error hybrid-image formation described
in 5.3.7. Those ambiguous perceptual parts of a sketch which trigger automatic
memory retrieval mechanisms (4.1), can also support the cognitive records (7.2.9)
so necessary for back-tacking and error correction. Not every one may agree with
Rawson (1969) that the temporal sequence of drawing is visible in finished
sketches. However there can surely be no doubt that in the act of drawing a
sequence of marks is temporarily available as a sequence of reminders to the artist,
of very recent images and statements by the "inner voice". In order to be able to
usefully "change one's mind" a sequential record of immediately past thoughts
must be available, just as E. M. Forster is supposed to have remarked "How can I
know what I think until I see what I write?" so an artist might say "how can I know
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what I imagine until I see what I sketch?". Tulving's theory (1983) of episodic
memory retrieval by "ecphory" may be relevant here. Each visible sketching act in
context is perhaps a cue to a "micro-episode" in a visual thought pattern which
retrieves and makes conscious a corresponding mental episode by combining with
its buried memory trace (4.3.9). There are a number of ways in which the marks
made in rough paper sketches are tagged with such "micro-episodic" markers
available for metacognition. For example,
- A contour line may be drawn very faintly at first, then repeated with
increasing emphasis and contrast, as its indeterminacy is reduced. A set of such
lines is an example of a "forwards" uncertainty reduction record.
- Erasures are often incomplete (e.g. with an India-rubber), leaving faint
traces of earlier lines. Unlike the crossing out, imperfect erasures invite tolerance
and multiplicity in image generation. A set of such erasures might be termed a
"backwards" uncertainty reduction record. (Illustration XXXIV)
- An error or change of mind may be indicated not by erasure, but by a
conventionally understood "crossing out" with zigzag lines (Illustration XIIb).
Unlike erasure such a transparent crossing out records both an initial thought and
an unequivocal change of mind.
- Written notes and labels on sketches can sometimes have metacognitive
functions corresponding to any of the recursively embedded levels of self-
awareness discussed in 7.2.2. For example the designer Charles James, C. wrote
across one of his sketches "Forget all you know and learn something eveiy day"
(Coleman 1983).
Despite these attributes, it has to be admitted that a single sketch on paper
records only poorly and for a short term the sequence of mental acts that the
cognitive monitor needs. However sketches also typically occur in multiple sets on
the pages of sketch books. Such a set is structured like a branching tree with vague
"root" sketches leading to "trunk" and "branches" of the tree preserving different
alternatives, many of which are later abandoned. In a conversation with Christian
Zervos, Picasso revealed his interest in visual metacognition. "It would be very
interesting to record photographically, not only the stages of a painting but its
metamorphoses. One would see perhaps by what course a mind finds its way
towards the crystallization of its dream" (Ghiselin, 1952). In 1954 this suggestion
was taken further, when Clouzot made his remarkable filmed record of Picasso's
sequential thought processes, using the techniques of painting on glass and time
lapse photography. The opportunity to use information technology to improve upon
the usually rather haphazard episodic record of the sketch book is immense and
will be discussed later. Here we are only concerned with understanding the need
7. Metacognition and Conscious Control	 246
for such a record and the way in which sketching might amplify the mind's own
record, which must be kept in order to reconstruct over-learned mental processes
and to find more effective pathways through the tangled hierarchy of possible
images and concepts.
If sketches assist the conscious monitoring and decomposition of thought
patterns that have become automatic, then what are we to make of the extensive
claims that unattended mental processes are important to creativity? (7.4.3). An
obvious conclusion would be that sketching only supports Poincare's Phase 1 of
creativity (conscious problem analysis) and Phase 4 (conscious development of the
implications of an insight). Phases 2 and 3, which apparently occur when the mind
is not consciously occupied with the problem, appear to use automatic processes to
achieve a highly non-automatic result. I have here proposed two candidate
processes which may produce fruitful insights during unattended processing,
namely automatic memory search and automatic image formation. In ways that we
do not yet understand, conscious control may limit cadier thatz extend the novelty
of the results of such processes. A role for untidy, accidental attributes of sketches
in assisting such delayed unattended insights, is suggested by Amy Lowell's
metaphor of posting a subject into the subconscious "much as one drops a letter
into the mailbox". Indeterminate or accidental sketch stimuli can arise whilst
helplessly tackling an unresolved visual problem. Such stimuli may act as "letters"
to poorly understood unconscious retrieval and imagery processes which work
more efficiently when they are not interrupted or controlled by conscious
monitoring. However Amy Lowell's (or Picasso's) knowledge that they are
"posting such letters" is pure metacognition.
The sketching functions outlined in chapters 3-6 all suppose that sketch
attributes amplify the capacity to perform specified, well practised visuo-mental
tasks using successive refinement, within the limits of descriptive constraints.
These tasks are all aspects of the process of thinking about an unresolved visual
problem, of imagining a non-existent object. In this chapter, I have tried to suggest
mechanisms by which sketching is also used to amplify the capacity to adapt and
alter at a higher level, the way such strategies of thought are used. In an open-
ended "dialogue with the self" (Goldschmidt, 1991 Scrivener & Clark, S. 1992)
sketches amplify the capacity of artists to think about thought itself, and to invent
new ways of using the conscious and unconscious processing patterns that sketches
also support.
These tentative conclusions are summarised as the fifth hypothesis about
sketch function
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7.5.2 Hypothesis Five.
Sequences of sketching acts support the conscious awareness of one's own
cognition. This assists creativity, providing voluntary control over highly practised
mental processes which can otherwise become stereotyped. Unforeseen percepts
from untidy or accidental stimuli can elicit unconscious processes which break the
mould of habitual thought, whilst a temporal record of recent ideas makes it easier
to change one's mind at appropriate stages.
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8. TOWARDS A UNIFIED THEORY.
"He who has a hundred miles to walk should reckon ninety as half the journey"
Japanese Proverb.
8.1 Do Five Hypotheses make a Theory ?
This study was conceived as an attempt to improve the design of computer
sketching systems for artists. However the task immediately raised questions
inextricably linked to the nature of visual cognition. Scholars such as Ernst
Gombrich, Rudolf Arnheim and Philip Rawson have shown that sketches, although
apparently impoverished representations, are (in the hands of the skilled at least)
cultural inventions of great subtlety. Since the time of Leonardo da Vinci, artists
have realised that such sparse or untidy representations can greatly amplify the
power to imagine what does not yet exist. However it is only in the last few years
that psychology and neuroscience have begun to provide the evidence on which a
theory as to why Leonardo's intuition that "confused things rouse the mind to new
inventions" is true. We now have evidence that when the brain is used to imagine
new visual objects, it can only simulate visual experience by "borrowing" the
cerebral machinery for perceiving and completing unexpected objects in the real
world. The descending connections in the visual cortex enable the brain to inspect
and manipulate into new structures a stored museum of visual images that would
otherwise be concealed from consciousness. It is for this reason that inventive
imagination can be amplified by generating artificially ambiguous or unexpected
stimuli which act as substitutes for the type of real world surprises the visual
system has evolved to handle.
Until the last two decades, the technology necessary for a realistic but
cheap and easily manipulated imagery medium did not exist. Therefore it has never
been clear historically that a more detailed, accurate and complex representation of
imagined appearance would not have served the visualising function better than the
paper sketch. As indicated in Chapter 1 the possible advantages of traditional
sketch attributes are hard to disentangle from disadvantages imposed by the
physical constraints of the medium. By removing many of these constraints, new
image handling technology forces system designers to re-examine the practice of
sketching in order to decide what representational attributes the ideal visualising
medium should have.
In Chapter 2.3 it was suggested that the invention of photography, far from
making sketch indeterminacies redundant, actually helped to improve their status.
Attributes used hitherto only privately to amplify the imagination of an artist
became, in Fine Art at least, public property to enhance the "beholder's share". In
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All the five hypothetical functions of the sketch are ways of amplifying visual thought
and invention. However they are interdependent in other ways that are not yet clear.
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one sense figurative art has returned to its roots, since the suggestive sparseness of
modern sketches seems also to have been a property of the earliest known
figurative images, 35,000 years ago (White, 1989).
So far, (as shown in Diagram I) the cognitive functions of the sketch have
been described, separately in Chapters 3 - 7, as five hypotheses about the way that
sketch attributes can amplify visual thought. The secondary functions, mentioned
in Chapter 1, of recording and communicating visual ideas, are outside the scope
of this study. (The possibility that future machine sketching systems might
advantageously provide separate, but linked, support for these secondary functions
is a subject for future research.) However this separate treatment of the five
functions is incomplete for two reasons.
Firstly, cognitive functions have the alarming tendency to multiply when
closely attended to. Future workers may well decide that the classification of
Diagram I is too simple because it confuses distinct functions that deserve to be
treated separately. Thus further consideration of Function 1 (mental translation of
representational type) may easily show that it is really two functions. Depictive to
descriptive and descriptive to depictive "translations" are perhaps processes so
different from each other that they deserve to be treated independently and not as
two sides of the same coin. In Chapter 3 I may have given the unintended
impression that these two processes were the "forward" and "reverse" directions of
a single symmetrical process. This cannot be correct. For example to translate a
descriptive proposition into a depictive image, added information, retrieved from
memory, is usually necessary. On the other hand descriptive propositions can be
extracted from a spatial depiction by mental scanning and inspection or by other
"visual routines" (Ullman, 1984). Both processes imply one to many mappings,
but because the first is synthetic and the other analytic the translation process
cannot be symmetrical. Function 4, "Selection", now seems so obvious that
perhaps it ought logically to have been the first function to be discussed.
Selectivity was recognised very early on as characteristic attribute of sketches but
was originally perceived only as a slave function of imagery support. As Chapter 6
shows, the selective attention function has many sub-components. Moreover,
because I was discussing sketch attributes rather than sketch media, I did not do
justice to the idea that well designed sketching systems may play a role in
supporting divided attention. To what extent, for example, do sketching systems
facilitate or hinder the dual task of attending to an imagined image and attending to
a machine sketching interface (or, for that matter, a palette and paints)? Is this
another case of a function multiplying? Finally the monitoring function, the
"discovery" of which has its origins in the claim by Rawson (1969) that drawings
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made by artists record a temporal sequence of drawing acts, leads (in Chapter 7) to
the perplexing subject of consciousness, and is about to give birth to a new
function - Learning. Unfortunately the acid test for this - "Do sketches support
learning in ways other than by cognitive monitoring and metacognition ?" cannot
be applied without further research. So for pragmatic reasons learning, probably an
important function of sketching, is treated here as a slave consequence of the
cognitive monitoring function. The sub-structure of the five main functions is
discussed in Chapters 3-7. However this sub-structure is fluid and must be
regarded as provisional. The multiplicity of hypotheses is an embarrassment,
making it difficult to merge them into a simple simplifying theory. It is even
possible that the search for such a unified theory will prove to be misguided.
Minksy (1985) has claimed that attempts by psychologists and philosophers to find
a few simple principles to unite the many functions of the mind are due to "physics
envy" and is bound to fail because the brain consists of a collection of loosely
collected processors which have evolved to do many different things which have
little in common. This is a rather extremist view point and it is to be hoped that a
useful theory of sketch function will eventually unite these disparate hypotheses by
showing that they are consequences of some unifying and related principles about
how visual media support the mind.
The second reason why Diagram I is unsatisfying is that it suggests that the
cognitive functions of the sketch are discrete and can be considered independently.
Sketch functions are interdependent in complex ways. In this study I confess that
these interdependencies are only dimly understood "as through a glass darkly". In
this chapter some rival candidates for a "unifying principle" of sketch function are
examined.
8.2 Mental Type translation as a Connecting Link.
One possible connecting link between sketch function is the representational
translation process described in Chapter 3 as Hypothesis 1. The two
complementary types of information processing, "descriptive to depictive" and
"depictive to descriptive" translation are to varying extents constituent functions of
the other four functions. It was convenient to discuss type translation in an early
separate Chapter because I wanted to develop the existing rather crude binary
distinctions between description and depiction into what, I believe, is a more
realistic continuum, with several quantitatively varying dimensions and many
intermediate types. It was also important to introduce early the concept of the
descriptively labelled, spatially depictive map as an intermediate data type
fundamental to sketch function. Only gradually did it dawn on me that this data
structure has beautiful and elegant processing advantages that the primate brain
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must have discovered by natural selection long before humans invented its cultural
equivalent. These seem to have been largely ignored in theories of perception and
memory. The suggestion that such an intermediate data type might "catalyse"
depictive to descriptive translation lowering some processing "effort" barrier in the
way that enzymes form intermediate compounds with their substrates to lower the
"activation energy" necessary to initiate a chemical reaction is intended only as an
analogy. By this analogy, cognitive work load or processing "effort" is analogous
to chemical activation energy whilst the instability or fluidity of a visual idea is
analogous to the instability or energy level of a chemical compound. Having made
this analogy it might be fruitful to speculate further and to suggest that Function 2
(perceptual retrieval) and Function 3 (supporting imagery) are subservient
functions of the translation function. According to this conception, the purpose of
retrieving descriptively encoded information about objects and their parts is to
generate an improved depictive image of the sketch subject matter. The purpose of
generating mental images in spatial register with visual components of the sketch,
is to extract and make explicit new descriptive information, which is only implicit
in the spatial image. Depictive to descriptive translation occurs in different forms
and contexts in the sketch. According to Function 2 it may occur automatically at
two levels. The early stages of visual processing in which descriptive structure is
added "bottom-up" to the image are depictive to descriptive translations. That is,
implicit information is made explicit and encoded. Whether the later stages such as
"recognition by parts" is aptly named a theory of depictive to descriptive
translation, depends upon whether information enrichment by retrieval "counts" as
translation. I think it can. After all when we use a dictionary to "translate" a single
word we are also accessing a paragraph of alternative meanings. "Translation" is
not used here in the same sense as "deciphering". Mental image generation as
described in the Kosslyn theory is descriptive to depictive translation occurring in
two stages (both one to many mappings) -
1. A stored categorical description of spatial structure is translated to a
coordinate representation
2. The coordinate representation is mapped at varying resolutions onto an
internal (cerebral) spatial array.
According to Chapter 5, both these processes are supported by the
formation of a hybrid image in which a mental image is superimposed upon the
physical marks of the sketching surface. Written notes, especially when tagged to
spatial locations, assist translation processes by acting as memory look up keys for
image generation (Paivio, 1971a).
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Is translation of representational type a unifying link between the cognitive functions of
the sketch with functions 2,3,4 and 5 subservient to function 1?
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A primary purpose of the sketch (implemented by hybrid image formation)
is to discover new depictive and descriptive relationships by overt and covert
movements of attention (using eye-movements and covert scanning). Thus the
discussion of selective attention in Chapter 6 is also concerned with translations of
representational type. Evidence was discussed that serial movements of an
attentional "window" or "zoom lens" are used for conscious information extraction
such as counting, curve tracing and visuospatial comparisons. This type of
controlled inspection and comparison is probably the most important way in which
sketches support depictive to descriptive information extraction. I have discussed
Kosslyn's evidence that image generation occurs in automatic sequential stages and
his suggestion that in one form it can occur by covert scanning using a small
attentional window like an "inner pencil" (Kosslyn et Al. 1988, Kosslyn & Shin
1994). This is the complementary translation process in action, descriptive to
depictive translations being tried out on an internal "sketch-pad". Thus it is
reasonable to assume that many of the functions of which support sketch attribute
selection also support representational type translation.
Finally, type translation is implicit in many of the operations discussed in
Chapter 7. Consider how necessary the proposed Cognitive Monitor would be for
depictive to descriptive translation by image scanning. The monitor would record
temporarily, the scanpath, (scan directions, distances, field "apertures", sub-goals
and attention results) and store the incremental results of sequential processing
(counting for example). (Experimental evidence that unconscious perceptual
scanpaths are indeed stored is provided by Noton and Stark, (1971). Not only
would this record be intrinsic to some types of information extraction, it would
also be necessary for error correction and mental experiment. For example if an
attempted scan path fails to meet an expected goal in one direction the "cognitive
record" can be used to back-track and to correct the direction or to reset the goal.
The distinction between voluntary and automatic processes is also central to an
understanding of descriptive to depictive translation. The widely supported belief
that creative invention has alternating voluntary (conscious) and automatic
(unconscious) stages (7.4.3) may be seen as a collaboration between monitored and
un-monitored processes for the purposes of information translation. Thus when
monitored attention to a depictive element fails to meet a goal, the cognitive
monitor initiates retrieval and comparison processes, which run automatically and
which, as Baars (1988) suggests, may be inhibited by consciously attended sub-
goals.
It is therefore tempting to suggest a "unified" theory in which functions
2,3,4 and 5 are subservient to function 1, mental type translation as in Diagram
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Are all the hypothetical functions of the sketch ways of supporting indeterminacy or
uncertainty in the early stages of visual invention?
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IV. However this conclusion is premature. Although type translation may run like
a horizontal thread throughout the other "vertical" functions it is surely also true
that sketches mediate many forms of mental information processing which are
purely depictive - manipulating spatial relationships for example, or purely
descriptive such as using imagined language to manipulate categories and
propositions.
In thus increasing the emphasis upon representational translation, it must be
remembered that two types of descriptive to depictive and depictive to descriptive
translation are involved. One is the purely visual translation process discussed
above, involving the hypothetical categorical and perhaps coordinate visual
information implicit in theories of recognition (Chapter 4 section 4.3). The other is
the translation from verbal description to visual imagery (Paivio 1971a). This
translation is implicit in many of the written notes found on sketches (Illustration
XXIII). As Denis and Cocude (1989) have shown, people can generate and
successfully scan spatial images from purely verbal descriptions. Following
Kosslyn (1994) it is assumed here that this process uses "association memory" and
is mediated by the same stored descriptive and semi-descriptive representations that
are used for recognition. Such a process would include the translation from
"categorical" (left cortex) to "coordinate" (right cortex) representations of spatial
structure (Kosslyn et Al., 1989, Kosslyn et Al. 1992).
It is clear also from the written notes on sketches and the evidence for
verbal thought whilst sketching (Goldschmidt 1991, Scrivener & Clark, S. 1992),
that verbal working memory is also used in sketching. In the next section (8.3) I
therefore include the "articulatory loop" and the "phonemic store" from the
Baddeley and Hitch model of working memory (Baddeley, 1986) as resources
supported by the sketch.
8.3 Is Visual Indeterminacy a Common Principle?
The role played by visual indeterminacy or vagueness may signpost another
direction in which a common principle for sketch functions can be sought (see
Diagram V).
Each of the functions imply a degree of indeterminacy, as noted below.
Function 1 
Indeterminacies support mental translation. Pentimenti, for example, are
one of the means by which the mind's internal descriptive representation of shape
can be mapped to its multiple depictive alternatives.
Function 2
Skilfully used, visual indeterminacies can promote perceptual retrieval. The
subtle indeterminacy of incomplete contour fragments provides, I have suggested,
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improved conscious access to unconsciously stored structural descriptions.
Complete contours being too narrowly specific would actually limit rather than
assist this retrieval process (Illustration X). This is necessary to interrupt
inappropriate automatic cognition and to trigger and support the "surprise"
monitoring machinery of the brain's control system.
Function 3 
The indeterminacy of incomplete drawings or colour studies is necessary to
leave room on the perceptual part of a sketch for its superimposed imagery. Thus
empty spaces or randomly textured areas need not be accidental but fulfil valuable
cognitive functions.
Function 4 
Selectively representing some visual attributes only, whilst leaving others
indeterminate, supports the capacity for focused thought. Such segregated visual
attributes, (contours without surface detail, colour without drawing etc), can
simultaneously leave room for imagery (Function 3). Such indeterminacy is
implicit in the need to leave some decisions for a later stage of design, preserving
multiple options for the unrepresented attributes.
Function 5 
In Chapter 7 it is suggested that sketch actions support the sequential
recording and subsequent correction of cognitive acts. Here sketch indeterminacies
can act as branch points for experimental back-tracking and error correction. They
assist the brain to monitor its own progress and to find novel pathways through a
complex tree of possible decisions. For example a contour category is often
represented in a sketch by a number of different but roughly parallel lines varying
in emphasis (contrast). This provides a visual "audit trail" which can be used by
the monitor to return to a decision point and select a different alternative and to
then consider the consequences for a new imagined structure (Illustration XXXIV).
For all five functions, the most useful indeterminacies will be those which
provide an element of appropriate surprise. An understanding of what exactly
"appropriate" means here is one of the tacit skills of visual thought. However
indeterminacy is only one of the functional attributes of the sketch and is perhaps
only incidentally a common factor. The view supported here is that indeterminacy
is simply one of the consequences of more fundamental underlying principles such
as the one discussed next - support for visual consciousness.
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The functions of the sketch as support for visual consciousness. Is this a unifying
principle?
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8.4 Sketch Function and Visual Consciousness.
8.4.1 Is conscious control a unifying principle?
Another possibility, and it is only speculative, is that a unified theory of
sketch function might be based on the role of the sketch in metacognition and
conscious control as discussed in Chapter 7. Thus the primary function of the
sketch is to amplify the limited capacity of the brain to make tacit visual and
semantic knowledge available for conscious manipulation into novel structures. In
other words are all the five functions of the sketch forms of support for visual
consciousness? (Diagram VI)
Thus it is possible that Function 1 (Chapter 3) is not only to "catalyse"
mental translation but also to make over-learned and automatic types of
descriptive/depictive translation conscious and available for voluntary control.
Although the processes of memory retrieval itself do not become conscious,
Function 2 might be related to the generation of visual surprise which increases the
awareness of the results of perceptual retrieval (the difference between recall and
recognition). Similarly, the hybrid images of Function 3 may improve the
conscious awareness and control of mental imagery. Function 4 is support for
conscious selective attention - Posner's anterior attention network (Posner &
Rothbart 1992). Function 5, as discussed in Chapter 7, is support for the awareness 
and mental monitoring of the sequence of cognitive acts during visual thought.
There are at least two sorts of tacit knowledge possessed unconsciously by
artists and designers. The first is stored knowledge about the nature of art or
design. Some of this is general or cultural and shared with others, but much is
private and personal and cannot be easily shared. Such knowledge is acquired by
experience, is different for each individual and certainly includes an enormously
large but not easily tapped, reservoir of remembered images. It has been shown
experimentally, for example, that if subjects are shown 2,500 colour slides, for
only ten seconds each, they can still recognise 90% of them several days later!
(Standing et Al. 1970). This knowledge is tacit not only because it is not easy to
retrieve, but also because much of the information it contains is only encoded in
memory implicitly. However the task of consciously recalling on demand,
specified examples from this vast reservoir of visual information, is much harder.
This depends, in part, upon the difference between recall and recognition (see
Baddeley 1990). It requires cognitive effort and special skills to make such tacit
visual knowledge explicitly available. If such knowledge can be represented
explicitly and made available to conscious covert attention (the "mind's eye"), it
can be used more freely for inventive manipulation into new structures, in new
contexts. A second type of tacit knowledge, perhaps even more important to visual
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invention, is a huge "cerebral data-base" of automatic mental processes (Shallice's
"action systems"). Although some of these are innate, it is the many visual skills
acquired by practice and experiment which characterise an individual artist's style.
Throughout their careers, artists and designers acquire new cognitive processes
related to perceiving, recognising, imagining, drawing, composing and inventing.
As these processes or sub-processes are successfully repeated they become
increasingly automatic and unconscious. There is strong evidence for the belief that
visual thought and action are dependant upon the use of such acquired routines,
which the brain implements efficiently and in parallel without awareness (7.3.2).
The goal contexts which trigger such automatic processes can themselves become
automatic to various degrees (Baars, 1988). However as soon as the normal
conditions for triggering such unconscious mental habits include unexpected, novel
or ambiguous stimuli or when the goal image is itself novel, then automaticity can
become a handicap and even, in some situations, become a danger (Reason 1979).
As Langer and Imber (1979) have shown with letter sorting tasks, when a mental
process becomes unconscious as the result of practice, subjects can no longer
report the number of steps in the task and are unable to monitor their own
effectiveness. In order to cope with unexpected stimuli, I argue that humans and
other mammals have evolved the Cognitive Monitor which records and assesses
the intermediate results from a complex hierarchy of cognitive processes, and can
redirect them before they progress too far in an undesired direction. Thus, when
necessary (e.g. when there is a percept - goal-image mismatch), the monitor can
interrupt a faulty process, back-track and change parameters or re-compose the
processing sequence. The evidence suggests that it is novel, experimental thought
processes which most need such selective support, because of their reliance on
limited capacity resources. It is conjectured that all the five functions discussed in
Chapters 3-7 are different aspects of the same global function, namely external
support for a sophisticated visual monitoring system. Thus we can suppose that
percept-memory hybrid images are mapped into a limited capacity spatial array
because this supports novel types of depictive to descriptive translation by
recording and monitoring the movements of a spatially selective scanner (Posner's
anterior attention system). The perceptual retrieval system maps object shape and
colour into a limited capacity visual memory, (distinct from the spatial map (Logie
1995)), because there is a demand to make novel, un-expected but monitored, links
between spatial structure and object detail. A new reason for the limited capacity
of conscious working memory suggests itself. The capacity of spatial and object
memory cannot exceed the instantaneous "frame" capacity of the cognitive recorder
which must record sequences of visual images and their goals. It appears that not
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A automatic processes can be closely monitored. Therefore there is a need for a
mechanism which can suppress unwanted slave processes and initiate others. It
makes sense to suppose that the conscious monitoring system evolved primarily to
provide a mechanism for learning new procedures for handling unexpected or
incomprehensible percepts and events in the immediately present environment.
Conscious processing control of visual memory has evolved to be activated and
supported by a continual stream of unexpected and un-comprehended (hence
ambiguous) perceptual stimuli from the natural world. As the cultural need to
imagine non-existent objects and future events increases, the danger of automated
internalised action "thought slips" occurring also increases. Internal percept-like
simulations of imagined objects cannot produce the kind of ambiguity and surprise
necessary to elicit closely monitored processing (5.2.5). Thus like the proposed
mechanisms for hybrid-imagery (5.4), the Cognitive Monitor (or "Central
Executive"), is imperfectly adapted by evolution for monitoring and reconstructing
over-habituated processes applied to imaginary objects. Thus a cultural invention is
needed to provide artificially, the ambiguous and surprising visual stimuli which
trigger a consciously monitored processing mode (Baars 1988, page 145-8
discusses an analogous theory in relation to speech processing). Note that two
apparently contradictory functions of the Leonardo type indeterminacies are now
beginning to converge. If Hypothesis Two (outlined in Chapter 4.1) is correct,
then an indeterminate or incomplete sketch contour would be expected to elicit
automatic perceptual retrieval mechanisms which access a greater variety of visual
memories than would an unequivocal one. As was argued in section 4.3.10 "The
evidence is consistent with the view that confused and untidy sketch attributes
stimulate creativity because they elicit the automatic recognition matching
processes in a set of nested search loops which activates many more components of
long term visual memory than would either a complete and unambiguous image or
a very sparse one." Moreover it was further argued in Chapter 6 that the absence
of some types of irrelevant visual attributes was necessary to inhibit otherwise
unstoppable processing distractions. It is proposed (as a consequence of hypothesis
5, section 7.1) that the Leonardo indeterminacies also activate consciously
controlled "anti-sphexish" thought processes. Automatic ("intuitive") retrieval and
conscious processing are not contradictory functions. As suggested in 7.4.3,
automatic memory retrieval is a necessary slave process of consciously controlled
visual thought. When visual surprise occurs in the natural environment, the twin
processes of automatic retrieval and of voluntary image - percept matching can
collaborate. Moreover the two processes can run in parallel which would not be
possible if both were consciously controlled. When, over a longer time period,
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accidental sketch "surprises" are processed by the cognitive monitor, they can be
simultaneously "posted" as uninhibited retrieval cues to unconscious memory (to
repeat Amy Lowell's metaphor).
8.4.2 Resources of Working Memory for Visual Thought
It is worth considering how consistent the above proposal is with the
theories of resources available for visual thought as proposed, for example, in the
Baddeley and Hitch model of working memory (Baddeley 1986). Diagram VII
attempts to outline how the components of this model can be related both to the
hybrid image model of sketch function (Diagram III) and to the Cognitive
Monitoring function discussed in Chapter 7.
As described in Chapter 5 the Baddeley and Hitch model proposes a
"Central Executive" resource which can control and monitor a number of
separate, "servant", short term stores and associated processes. Baddeley (1986)
provides evidence linking the Central Executive to focal attention and to volition.
The Baddeley Central Executive also bears several similarities to the Supervisory
Attentional System (SAS) of the Norman and Shallice (1980) model of volition.
In Chapter 7 (7.2.9) I proposed a additional function, that of recording, for the
purposes of control and correction, a short-term record of cognitive actions. I call
this revised and extended, combined Central Executive and SAS, the "Cognitive
Monitor".
Baddeley-H itch model posits two visuospatial working memory
components, the Visuospatial Sketch Pad (a spatial memory system which
supports movements of attention and can be interfered with by visual tracking
tasks) and a short-term Visual Store store used for object shape and colour
processing (Logie & Marchetti 1991, L,ogie 1995). These two parts of the
Baddeley model map quite well onto the depictive and descriptive components of
the "hybrid image" model of sketch function discussed in Chapter 5 (5.3.7) and
illustrated in Diagram III. In Diagram VII these components are simplified into the
ellipses labelled "Hybrid Spatial Image" and "Hybrid Visual Description",
although I have had to compress the triple buffer structure of these into single
components. Logie (1995) might not agree that the more passive visual store was
"descriptive" but that difference would only be one of definition. In fact he is
rather vague about the representational format of these two components. I assume
that my "descriptive" store must include coordinate based definitions of object
structure, but that if, as Logie (1995) maintains, representations cannot be scanned
or spatially transformed in this resource, then they cannot be "depictive" as defined
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in Chapter 3. Logie associates movement with the spatial working memory
component in two ways -
1. It can be used for the mental representation of imagined movement and
movement planning
2 It supports movements of attention allowing high resolution processing of
small sequentially represented parts of a neurally implemented spatial medium.
Logie (1995) also discusses evidence that the Central Executive is necessary
for image generation, refreshment and transformation. However it is surely (on the
basis of the evidence he quotes) still an open question whether image generation
and transformation processes should be considered as part of the Central Executive
or merely as additional slave processes which can be controlled and monitored by
the Central Executive. In this model (Diagram VII) the latter hypothesis is
adopted.
As proposed in the Kosslyn model of mental imagery (Kosslyn, 1980,
1984) (and my hybrid image model of Diagram III) the spatial components of an
image are mapped onto a medium with an array format which supports movements
of "focal attention", (Kosslyn's (1994) "window of attention"). This is assumed to
be physiologically implemented in those parts of topographically mapped visual
cortex which are now known to be shared between perception and imagery
(Kosslyn et Al. 1993). Besides providing a mechanism for binding spatial locations
to object description (Treisman & Gelade, 1980), movements of attention have two
other functions which, in the model, are controlled and monitored by the Cognitive
Monitor :-
2. Movements of attention are one of the mechanisms by which new
descriptive information may be extracted from a depictive image. A well
investigated example is that of curve tracing (Jolicoeur et Al. 1986).
3. As Kosslyn (1994) has suggested, covert movements of focal attention
can also be used to mentally image a new shape or structure without recourse to
memory, as if drawing with an imaginary pencil.
Also included in Diagram VII are the two Verbal components of the
Baddeley and Hitch model, a passive "Phonemic Store" or "Phonological Cache"
(Logie 1995) and the "Articulatory Loop" which refreshes by rehearsal the
contents of the Phonemic store with a type of sub-vocal speech. Because there is
evidence that these two stores are used in written as well a spoken language, (e.g.
Baddeley & Lewis 1981), they are relevant to the function of written notes found
on sketches and to the implicit use of verbal thought whilst sketching. Just as
Freud proposed that mental images are a mechanism for making unconscious visual
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memory conscious, so it is also likely that "inner speech" is a mechanism for
consciously manipulating descriptive categories and propositions.
During visual thought, as Diagram VII outlines, the Cognitive Monitor is
assumed to be able to activate and to monitor the processes of memory retrieval,
image generation and manipulation and movements of focal attention on the Hybrid
Spatial Image. Whilst doing this is keeps a continuous record of processing results
in the form of depictive images linked to, or labelled by, descriptive information.
Movements of attention linked to memory access can thus result in depictive to
descriptive translation. Image generation linked to memory access and to Kosslyn's
"categorical to coordinate" translation (Kosslyn et Al. 1992) is one route by which
the Cognitive Monitor may "supervise" descriptive to depictive translation.
During verbal thought, control of the Articulatory loop and the monitoring
of briefly stored words in the Phonemic store are assumed to be supported by the
written notes on sketches and perhaps also by the act of writing such notes.
Depictive to verbal translation is assumed to be mediated by visual descriptive
information which can be translated and made conscious by an "associative"
memory system in Long term memory (see last two paragraphs of 8.3). Not shown
in the diagram is the immense reservoir of stored Semantic Knowledge which such
verbal-visual translation processes can tap. A telling point made by Jackendoff
(1990) explains why some verbal thought will always accompany the sketch. The
contents of verbal memory and the articulatory loop can easily be communicated
and recorded by direct translation into overt speech and writing. Unfortunately
says Jackendoff we have no "television monitor in the middle of our foreheads" for
similarly translating our mental imagery into external physical imagery. Language
is necessary, not only for communicating our thoughts to others, but also for
clarifying our thoughts to ourselves (Jackendoff 1983).
8.4.3 Support for an "Inner Artist".
According to this tentative model, sketch attributes support the Cognitive
Monitor both directly, by assisting the recording of cognitive actions or indirectly,
by supporting the servant processes that the monitor must control. The evidence
that the internal processes used for imagining and planning future objects and
events depend upon those neural processes within the brain, which are biologically
better adapted for perceiving and acting, is still growing. For example PET studies
by Parsons et Al. (1995) have recently shown that when subjects solve a visual
discrimination problem of the type usually believed to require mental rotation
(Shepard & Cooper, L. 1982), differentially increased blood flow occurs in exactly
those regions of the motor cortex and cerebellum which are activated by both the
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imagined or the actual movements of a hand. It appears that mental rotation uses a
neural resource that is also used when one physically rotates or plans to rotate a
real object. For several years, Baddeley and his colleagues (1986) have coined the
terms "Inner Voice" and "Inner Ear" for the articulatory loop and the phonemic
store, to capture such an apparent equivalence between covert and overt verbal
behaviour. It is equally tempting to think of the covert movements of attention as
movements of an "Inner Eye" and the neural medium which support such
movements as an "Inner Sketch Book". Now the Parsons et Al. PET studies (1995)
suggest that we may extend the metaphor to include an "Inner Hand" capable of
generating and manipulating imagined objects. (It is perhaps taking the metaphor
too far, to suggest that it also wields an "Inner Paintbrush" loaded with imagined
colours and operates an "Inner Video Projector" running moving sequences from a
visual library). At first glance, there appears to be a problem with applying such a
metaphor to the imagined drawing capability of the "Inner Eye" (focal attention).
Real drawing results from movements of the hand and pencil not the eye. However
further thought suggests that even here the metaphor is not inappropriate. When we
draw, the pencil point follows the focused movements of our eyes over the surface
of the paper as they trace an imagined object. If our eyes emitted "drawing rays"
they might leave a trace resembling a sketch, as the classic studies of eye
movements by Yarbus (1967), have shown. It is interesting to speculate that
physical movements of a pencil may support the invisible cognitive recording of
imagined movements of attention for later thought.
The manipulation and perception of physical media and images is
performed by the publicly observable "Outer Artist" with real eyes, real hands,
ears, a voice and a real sketch book and pencil. But to understand the sketching
acts of this "outer artist", one must infer the existence also of a metaphorical
"Inner Artist" which controls and monitors those internal neural processes and
representations which precede and accompany the inventive images and actions of
the "Outer artist", during visual thought. The Cognitive Monitor, as described in
Chapter 7, fills this role.
The use of the term "Inner Artist" as a functional metaphor for the Central
Executive or Cognitive Monitor (when used in the visual arts) cannot of course be
taken literally. It too obviously resembles an "homunculus" theory. There can be
no recursive mind within the mind. The Cognitive Monitor is postulated to be a
neurally implemented recording and control mechanism which can be activated
automatically and to varying degrees by unexpected or confusing data from the
sense organs or from acts of memory retrieval. Because the Cognitive Monitor is
itself controlled automatically by the neural environment (data from stored
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memories) and the physical environment (data from the sense organs) we are not
conscious of the processes which activate it. To make it produce unexpected and
inventive ideas, to make it seem like an "Inner Artist" external stimuli are
necessary. This is why designers and artists sketch. The metaphor is used here to
emphasise the fact that the brain is using, for imagining and planning the future,
cerebral resources and processes which were designed by natural selection for
perceiving and responding to the immediate present.
Genuine creativity combines appropriate forward planning with novelty or
surprise. The cognitive mechanisms available to the brains of artists for mentally
manipulating non-existing future objects in inventive, unexpected ways did not
evolve for that purpose. They evolved rather for coping with surprise,
indeterminacy and incomprehension which results when stimuli and events in the
immediate environment cannot be matched with stored memories. In this situation
highly practised, automatic cognitive processes fail and new processing structures
must be learned by internally monitoring and controlling the parameters of more
flexible but experimental action sequences. The processing systems available for
such conscious monitoring have limited capacity. To etIstsre that the itlfarmaticstt (th
which such systems act is consistent, the brain provides a hybrid image constructed
from repeated attempts to match current stimuli to stored experience. Thus the
environment itself provides stimulus support for the mental manipulation of stored
processes. This is a kind of biological improvisation, in which an existing
cognitive mechanism becomes adapted to a new culturally derived function.
Sketches are cultural inventions which "capture" the use of this percept-memory
monitoring system from competing internal processes, providing artificial
substitutes for the environmental surprises that normally elicit its operation.
No less an authority on vision than H.B. Barlow (1981) has remarked that
the homunculus or "mind's eye" "has such a grip on our ability to conceptualise
what is going on" when we mentally inspect an image "that I think it will be better
to ask precisely what he is doing before declaring that he is redundant". The
cognitive monitor which I claim is necessary for visual invention has many of the
characteristics of a mind within the mind. This "Inner Artist" is apparently 
controlling an "inner voice" and an "inner sketch book". The latter resembles an
erasable sketch-pad which the monitor can either scan by moving a variable sized
attentional "Inner Eye" (focal attention), or "paint on", generating pictures by
collaging together fragments of images cut from a vast but private visual library.
Kosslyn (1994) has suggested that mental images can also be created by mentally
moving the "window of attention" over the "visual buffer" (the inner sketch-book).
In this respect at least the Inner Artist is unlike the real or "outer" artist who needs
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devices such as pencils to record the movements made by their eyes. The inner
voice can likewise be monitored by the "inner ear".
However despite all appearances, the theory is not a recursive
"homunculus" theory because the proposed Cognitive Monitor is activated and
controlled automatically, in response to stimulation from the internal and external
environment. We are not aware of the details of the cognitive monitor's processes,
only of its results in the cognitive record. Nor are we aware of the many
processing systems that are competing for the monitor's services. Thus Posner's
Posterior Attentional System (6.5) is an automatic system which can "capture",
without voluntary control, a region of the visual field for the Cognitive Monitor.
Despite the complexity of its operation the "inner artist" has at its core an
automatic process. Only by modelling this in detail can the homunculus paradox be
avoided.
Whether or not an attempt to find common principles underlying all the
functions of the sketch will prove successful, conscious visual experience is clearly
a primary concern of the visual arts. It is not surprising that visualising methods in
the arts should exploit mechanisms used by the brain to provide conscious control
of unconscious visual knowledge. It is also inevitable that such a theory of the
sketch should be incomplete, because the nature of conscious awareness is so
poorly understood. However it is also clear that there is a great deal of highly
relevant evidence and theory about the brain, vision and memory, that has until
now been little used in the design of new systems and media for artists.
8.5 Conclusions
The human brain provides an enormously adaptable but sometimes faulty
capacity to use stored information to perceive, recognise and respond to visual
objects, scenes and events in the real environment. It is at first rather puzzling that
this impressive information processing power is, relatively, so poorly developed
for using stored information to manipulate and act upon imaginary or future objects
and events. A plausible explanation for this, suggested by converging evidence, is
that the cultural need to visualise future objects is too recent to have allowed much
biological evolution of the brain. The cultural need to imagine must therefore
"borrow" neural resources that evolved for handling the endless surprises,
ambiguity and complexity, with which stimuli from the immediate environment
assaulted the senses our hominid ancestors. It is likely, for example, that neural
resources, such as area V1, used to represent topographically, information from
the eyes, have a short duration, "fast fade" performance, because they evolved to
handle the rapidly changing, short duration images sent from the retina to the brain
by the saccadic movements of the eyes. This resource is less well adapted to
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support the vaguer and less easily refreshed images generated from memory
(Kosslyn 1994). For this reason mental images need perceptual support to assist
their maintenance and regeneration.
Like the textured and stained walls of neolithic caves, or the glowing
embers of the fire into which Dickens' hero David Copperfield would stare, rough
sketches provide artificially, stimuli which can substitute for some of the variety
and surprise of the real world. In so doing they assist the brain to adapt resources
intended by natural selection to be used for perceiving and acting to the cultural
purposes of imagining and planning.
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9. SKETCHING AND COGNITION: SOME IMPLICATIONS.
"Variations on a theme are the crux of creativity" (Hofstadter 1985b)
"Perhaps we can now see what is required of the computer: it must be
(lovely word) idiosyncratic, and either behave like a human brain, or allow more
interaction and participation with the user - more democracy, more fuzziness"
(Brian Reffin-Smith, 1984)
9.1 The Uses of a Theory of the Sketch
The criteria implicitly used by most psychologists for assessing the
usefulness of a theory, have been summarised by Gordon (1989) as follows
"1. Theories should offer economical accounts of a range of facts. A theory
is of not much use if a description of it is as long as that required to describe the
relevant phenomena
2. Theories should attempt to explain phenomena, or at least suggest causal
links between them
3. Theories should be testable. They should be stated in such a manner that
deductions can be derived and tested empirically"
In Chapter 8 an attempt was made to apply the first two of these criteria to
the five hypotheses about sketch function to see if indeed the hypotheses were
sufficient grounds on which to base a "theory" of the sketch. The uncertain
conclusions were that the outlines of a theory may be starting to emerge from a
description of the ways in which the sketch supports working memory and the
conscious control of thought patterns which need working memory.
It is the third criterion which concerns this chapter. How can the theory be
tested ?, or rather, following Popper (1959), has the theory been framed in such a
way that it is easy to see what empirical tests could be done to invalidate it? In
particular, since the stated aim is to advance the design of sketching systems for
artists, how can the theory be used by system designers? The theory or at least its
constituent hypotheses does make predictions which could be tested by controlled
experiments in the laboratory by professional psychologists. It also contains
hypotheses about cognition which make testable predictions. For example the triple
buffer, hybrid-image theory of perception developed in Chapters 4 and 5 predicts
the conditions under which the perception of impoverished stimuli will cause
subjects to report hybrid visual experience. But the purpose of these theoretical
suggestions was not to produce a new theory of cognition, but simply to make
sense of an otherwise confusing experimental literature such as, for example, the
apparent conflict between results which show percept-image interference and those
which show reinforcement. The psychology of visual experience is as much in
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need of better theories to explain the mass of data that already exist as it is of yet
more experimental data. The literature on cognition is littered with descriptions of
experimental results which, even after many years, have never received a clear
explanation. For example, it would be difficult to think of a better test experiment
for the triple buffer hybrid image theory of perception than the Bruner and
Postman experiments performed forty years ago, on the perception of
incongruously coloured playing cards (5.3.7.4). The results reported are exactly as
predicted by the hybrid-image theory. It seems to me that the standard explanation
of such "perceptual compromises" in terms of "unconscious inference" or
"expectancy" completely fail to explain why a hybrid experience should be
reported, or how it could be represented in the brain. Unfortunately I cannot prove
that this and other experimental results that support the theory proposed here, were
not used in framing it. In fact many were noticed only after the model was framed
so I cannot see why they cannot be treated as "retrospective" experimental tests of
the hybrid image theory. Other functions have also passed such "retrospective
tests". For example only after I had framed the "inner artist" cognitive monitoring
function of the sketch (Chapter 7) did I spot a paper by Annette Karmiloff-Smith
(1990) on inventiveness in children's' drawings. She found that, below a certain
age, children could only draw "funny pretend" objects by omitting parts of familiar
objects they already knew how to draw. Older children however, were able to plan
and execute drawings of imaginary people or houses with unusual shapes and with
parts from other objects combined inventively. Karmiloff-Smith concluded that the
difference was due to the fact that the younger children drew automatically without
being able to monitor how they were drawing. The older children on the other
hand have a "more explicit representation of their skill and so are able to control
and alter their productions in ways which the younger children cannot". Applied to
adults these experiments support the theory that skill monitoring is an important
component of inventiveness. One purpose of this study is to examine how existing
theories of cognition can be developed (for they have had to be developed) to make
testable predictions, not only about cognition, but also about the effective design of
new machine systems. I claim, for example, that although speculative, the model
for hybrid-image formation (5.3.7) does make testable predictions about how
visualising systems may encourage or discourage inventive imagery.
Thus the usefulness of the theory depends upon what predictions it makes
about the relative effectiveness of different existing sketch attributes, systems and
media and upon what predictions it makes about desirable improvements to such
systems. Since there is no certain way of either measuring or defining
inventiveness in the visual arts, perhaps the best way of experimentally testing
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these predictions is to use them to design several different sketching systems and to
simply ask artists to assess their relative usefulness. This clearly would be a very
long second project. Meanwhile the theory of cognition relevant to the sketch will
be advancing and changing. Here there is only scope to illustrate how the five
related hypotheses which form the core of this study might be applied.
Four uses of the theory spring to mind:-
(1) To assess the effectiveness of traditional sketch attributes and media to
support visual thought and invention. For example, do the hypotheses provide
some of the criteria necessary to distinguish, from amongst those sketch attributes
which result, sometimes accidentally, from the properties of a medium, the
desirable from the undesirable attributes?
(2) To assess the cognitive effectiveness of recent machine systems to
support the visualising needs of artists in the early stages of visual composition. Do
existing systems, as is sometimes claimed, eliminate the need to sketch altogether,
allowing a designer to pass straight from a concept to its detailed and realistic
representation? In a least five respects, according to the theory, the following
statement is ill-founded.
"Vivid computer graphics replace architects' pencil sketches and
handcrafted models with realistic moving images" (Cover of the Scientific
American February 1991)
(3) To provide criteria and a philosophy for designing, improving and
assessing new sketching media. This is necessary to exploit the growing capacity of
computer image processing technology in ways which enhance without interference
the visual capacity of the human mind.
(4) To provide clearer and more explicit guide-lines to students of art or
design about the cognitive purposes of sketches and how to exploit them. There is
now convergent evidence that metacognition of one's own thought processes is an
important component of learning. It is not the skill of drawing that matters in the
sketch as much as the skills of visual thought which the sketch attributes support.
9.2 Assessing Traditional Media
So far, the properties possessed by sketches in traditional media have been
treated in terms of the evidence they provide for the thought processes used by
artists for visual invention. Only when there is a plausible theory about why such
thought processes need sketch support, is it possible to assess how well traditional
media provide such support. There is now a partial answer to the question raised in
Chapter 1 about how one can distinguish functional from incidental attributes of
sketches. The medium of the sketch, marks made on paper by a variety of
pigments and hand held marking devices, is very old. It has hardly advanced in
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five hundred years. Conceptually, attributes which are meaningless and purely a
consequence of the medium - the sketch "hardware" in contemporary jargon - can
be distinguished from sketch "software", those attributes which carry a culturally
derived meaning, independent of the medium. As already discussed, the sketch
medium, although it is certainly not "the message" (McCluhan, 1969), has an
important role in generating subtle surprises and ambiguities, which may be
promoted serendipitously to carry part of the message. Part of the skill of sketching
lies in knowing intuitively when such medium based message carrying effects are
desirable and when they are not. Thus the wobbles and accidental directions of a
manually controlled pencil line, the smudges of partially erased charcoal,
accidental blots of ink and the vagaries of watercolour as it runs or soaks into the
many different types of paper available, can all be used to assist invention by one
or more of the cognitive mechanisms I have discussed. However despite the
richness and subtlety of cognitive function that this ancient medium performs, it is
surely far from ideal. In fact when compared to the technologies used routinely for
storing, manipulating and disseminating linguistic and symbolic information or for
storing, manipulating and viewing very depictive images, the paper sketch appears
very primitive. An alien visitor from outer space would surely think the continued
use of paper and pencil for visualising future objects an astonishing anachronism.
Today (1996) the sketch-book still has an advantage, in that it is cheaper and more
easily portable than most other visualising media. However these practical
advantages will soon disappear as the image quality, performance to cost ratio and
cost per stored sketch of small, portable, battery driven image handling systems
improve. Compared to modern electronic media, paper and pigment is passive in
that the marks made on it are much harder to modify and control. The sketch-book
provides only unstructured storage of an image. Compared to an electronic "paint"
system paper, even with skilled manual support, provides a feeble and inflexible
medium for manipulating the stimulus components of the sketch hybrid image.
Some of the deficiencies of the paper sketch in performing its role as support for
the mind are discussed briefly below.
Sketch attributes support a one to many descriptive - depictive translation
(Chapter 3) by the use of semi-determinate sign systems. It has been argued that
these access non-verbal, unconsciously descriptive, visual memory and that
superimposed written notes elicit the "inner voice" and assist mental imagery
generation. The use of semi-depictive signs to represent visually tolerant categories
is fraught with difficulty, although in skilled hands "pentimenti" and lines
representing contour fragments can be used to great effect. The pentimenti used so
successfully by Toulouse-Lautrec for example to represent a rearing horse
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(Illustration XXIX) would never do to represent the larger tolerance needed by
Ingres to represent a pointing arm (Illustration XXVIII). Although often necessary,
written notes on sketches have the disadvantage that they cannot be easily moved
or made temporarily invisible. Their interference with depictive components is
inevitable. This is a consequence of the fact that unlike marks made on machine
media, those made on a paper sketch have no sub-surface processing support.
Unfortunately the mass technology of representation has become polarised
in contemporary culture, towards the very descriptive (the printed word) or the
very depictive (television and photography). Yet it has been known since the time
of Aristotle (Yates, 1966) that human thought occurs at the interface between these
two widely separated modes of representation, where as I have tried to show,
intermediate types of representation are needed. Words (concrete ones at least)
achieve most of their meaning by the mental images they elicit for the "inner eye"
and pictures are useful to us to the degree to which we can extract from them
descriptive propositions for the "inner voice". Despite the fact that the need to
translate between verbal and pictorial information systems is central to our culture,
research into alternative non-polarised systems which support this mental dialogue,
has been sadly neglected. To support such an internal dialogue when visualising
imaginary objects, artists are too often forced to improvise their own language and
medium. To do this it is usually easier to use primitive but cheap and familiar
media than to grapple with a complex technology which, though powerful, is often
unsympathetic. The design of existing machine systems for artists still seems to
take for granted the linguistic-pictorial polarity which controls its market.
In the hands of the skilled, the subtleties of line, the variety of cross-
hatching and the unexpected range of colour and form provided by pencil, crayon,
ink and paint have provided an enormous range of techniques for serendipitously
accessing hidden visual knowledge and for inventive perception (Chapter 4).
However, using traditional media it is difficult, and sometimes impossible, to
manipulate meaningfully the position, size, orientation, shape or colour of sketch
components. This is not only because erasure is difficult (though it may be) but
because the medium does not support the necessary back-up copy of the visible
components and there is no necessary record of the hierarchic structure of the
represented scene, its objects, parts and attributes. In order to flexibly move, re-
scale, repeat or modify any component of an image a concealed back-up,
representation of that component is necessary.
Perhaps it is because the visible components of the paper sketch are
relatively inflexible that, (as suggested in Chapter 5) they are used, consciously or
unconsciously, as the stabilising skeleton of a hybrid image, in which the users
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mind supplies the transient labile parts (as superimposed imagery) for rapid
manipulation. Is this too a rather less than ideal arrangement, or are there reasons
why an attempted machine improvement must fail? It is argued in Chapter 5, that
an important function of the sketch is to create appropriate spaces for superimposed
mental imagery. It is possible that future visualising systems, will attempt to
eliminate the vague uncertainties of the user's own imagery by providing detailed
machine generated substitutes from some vast, but specialised, pictorial data base
(Gray 1992). Even if this is not the intention, disciples of the Gibson-Hagen theory
of picture perception, which denies a central role for mental structures (4.2.2), are
unlikely to support a visualising system which deliberately encourages such mental
components (Smets 1992). At present the likelihood that a machine system could
ever rival the imagery generating capacity of the mind seems remote. Moreover
although it may be possible, it will surely never be desirable to "replace"
artificially the unseen imagery of the human mind since, this is the crucial and
unique source of individual experience - mysterious and unspecifiable but the life
blood of the visual arts. However it certainly does not follow that an improved
sketching system should not provide an ancillary image generating system. This
would be based upon a pictorial data-base, partly public and partly privately
collected, and controlled by each artist-user. There is nothing in the imagery
support function of the sketch which suggests that the only useful source of the
image components is the user's long term memory. There are clearly many ways
that the imagery support function might be improved, provided this function is well 
understood.
It was proposed in Chapter 6 that sketches support selective attention, by
separating and temporarily isolating, different parts and attributes of the object
represented. Thus a sequence of different sketches facilitate without distraction,
different partial aspects of a visual task. Traditional sketches perform this function
well for some kinds of selection but less well for others. Thus the contour line is a
superb 30,000 year old invention, which facilitates the mental manipulation of
form without the distraction of surface reflectance, chromaticity and texture.
However other selective attributes are harder to control. A precise and
concentrated attention to colour subtleties is actually hindered by the system of
mixing paints on a palette since attention must be divided between the palette -
where colours are seen in the wrong context - and their mental image in the desired
context. Mental interference is here to be expected from the fact that the colour
image of the task and the colour percept of the palette compete for the same
resources in working memory (Logie, 1995). Passive media can provide little
support for the selective representation of attributes such as spatial frequencies that
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need visual skill and cognitive effort to extract (6.8.2). Integral dimensions, such
as colour value and saturation are by definition impossible to attend to selectively,
although there are good reasons why artists might wish to (6.3). An active image
processing medium could provide image filters to support these and other kinds of
visual selectivity discussed in Chapter 6.
Another implication of the selectivity function as described in Chapter 6 is
that it would be an advantage if the segregation of selected visual attributes were
quickly and easily reversible. It was pointed out that whilst it may be advantageous
to separate, for example, colour from form or global from local structure for
selective thought, it is equally important to be able to re-combine them to explore
their interaction in an integrated whole. For this purpose also the passivity of
traditional media is a disadvantage.
The passivity of traditional media is an even greater handicap in the fifth
function - metacognitive monitoring - discussed in Chapter 7. However, before
improvements can be designed, it is important to understand how, according to the
theory, sketches support inventive metacognition. The very act of drawing or
colouring a perceived stimulus may facilitate the conscious control of visualising
processes, which might otherwise have become automatic by over-learning.
Artists' paper sketches often preserve the faint, only partly erased tracks of earlier
mark making (Illustration XXXIV). Understanding how such attributes may
serendipitously support the cerebral resources of the "Inner Artist" is essential for
improved system design. Despite the claims of Alan Rawson (1969), it is far from
clear that variations of mark-making (emphasis and weight etc) in artists sketches
provide the temporal record, within a single sketch, necessary to amplify the
capacity of the "inner artist's" own record for cognitive back-tracking and
correction. Immediately after he sketched the "Nude with four left arms"
(Illustration XXVIII) Ingres would have known the order in which the different
alternatives were tried and hence the direction in which his "mind's eye" was
moving. However days later he might easily have forgotten and despite the claims
of Alan Rawson (1969), I can see nothing in the sketch which preserves that
important information. It is probably for this (unconscious) reason that most
documented studies of working practice reveal sequences of many unfinished
sketches for a single project rather than many alterations on a few (1.7.1, 1.7.2).
The opportunities for improvement are numerous. There aren't that many
successful "nudes with four left arms".
9.3 Assessing Machine Systems for Artists.
There are now many computer based machine systems specifically intended
to assist artists or designers to manipulate and to visualise an as yet non-existent
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object. These can be roughly divided onto two classes, vector based solid
modelling systems and raster based computer "paint" systems.
Vector based graphics systems represent images as two or three dimensional
coordinates, structured as lines, edges, surfaces (e.g. as polygon nets) and
volumes. These can be mapped and displayed at any scale, orientation or position
on a raster display, or drawn on a pen-plotter. Solid modelling versions use
perspective computation to allow the user to inspect the two dimensional projected
views of stored three dimensional models of possible objects. Arrays of normalised
coordinates are used to represent the three-dimensional structure of possible
objects. Rigid shapes and other structures with a numerically defined geometry are
much easier to represent in this way than the complex surfaces of flexible materials
or the organic forms of natural objects, such as trees or the human body. For this
reason solid modelling systems have to date found their main visualising
applications in engineering structures, architecture, car styling and product design
where the techniques used to represent three dimensional structures numerically
have been mastered and experimental visualisation by building models or
prototypes is either too time consuming or expensive. However research into solid
modelling is advancing quickly. For example research in Japan and the U.S.A has
shown that it is possible, in principle, to use materials science to simulate
numerically the different folds and drapes of garment materials. So true solid
modelling systems for the Fashion design industry may be available in the future.
Current systems for fabric garment design are not truly three-dimensional, but
solid modelling systems for shoe design have been is use for at least 15 years (e.g.
Gerber systems).
Visualising systems for architecture, for example, allow the user to inspect
the simulated three-dimensional appearance of a projected building from any
selected view point. Simulated movement of the view-point within the interior may
provide visual insight impossible using other types of representation, such as scale
models. The object of most of such systems is to reproduce, with the greatest
possible realism, the array of luminances and chomaticities which would be
presented to the eye of an observer standing in a particular position under specified
lighting conditions. Simulating the lighting and reflectance of all surfaces visible
from a particular view-point is, naturally, an extremely complicated processing
task. Current graphic techniques use either "ray tracing" or "radiosity" algorithms.
The former calculates the chromaticity and intensity of an imaginary ray of light as
it strikes and is reflected from each visible point from the surface on its calculated
path to the eye. The latter calculates the light intensity of each surface in a scene as
a function of the intensity of all other surfaces. It is remarkable how well some of
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these algorithms can perform (Illustration XXXVIII). Great computing capacity is
needed and many variables, with unknown degrees of randomness must affect the
result. In a natural scene, illuminated by diffuse light from the sun, every surface
scatters varying proportions of selected wavelengths on to other surfaces in
directions which in turn depend upon their variable specularity and texture.
From the view-point of simulated realism, one of the problems with
conventional solid modelling systems is that they depend upon fixed view-point
monocular perspective to calculate a series of static view points of the numerically
represented models. Such views are un-realistic (as are photographs) whenever
they are viewed, as they normally are, from the wrong angle or distance and with
the normal eye and head movements. "Virtual Reality" systems, although still
immature attempt to overcome this particular obstacle to realism by generating
twin stereoscopic images assigned to miniature monitors worn over the head and
eyes. By including sensors of gaze direction, controlled by the head, and hand
positions, it is possible to generate the experience of movement in a simulated
environment and of manipulating with hand movements, virtual representations oi
three-dimensional objects with a hand held input device. Clearly such systems will
have immediate applications in games and in skill training systems such a flight
simulators. Although currently too crude to replace existing modelling systems
their visualising applications in the arts are being seriously researched (Smets
1992, Gray 1992).
There is no doubt that advanced solid modelling systems and perhaps their
virtual reality offspring, will find an increasing number of applications in the near
future (Greenburg 1991, Gray 1992). Clearly existing systems can fulfil useful
functions in the visualisation and marketing of a design in its later refinement
stages. The fact that they are "false indices" (C.S. Pierce, see section 3.3) may
even give them a marketing advantage, Pseudo-photographs as used, for example,
in the collaging of imaginary objects with real photographs of the environment in
which they are intended to be seen. However as I argue in the next section, such
systems will need to be drastically re-designed if they are to improve upon the
cognitive functions of the paper sketch. For the objective of such visualising
systems is to generate the most the detailed and convincing simulation of the
"ambient light flow" which would be projected on the user's retina by an imagined
object or scene as if it actually existed. This has little to do with the cognitive
functions of the sketch. How does one make a "virtually real" object vague and
incomplete? It is possible to imagine future three-dimensional visualising systems
which respond to the movements of the user's head and hands, but which are also
fuzzy and incomplete representations. However as long as the designers of such
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systems interpret "reality" as meaning "very detailed and complete visual
representation as close to the light pattern reflected by real objects as possible"
then "indeterminate virtual reality" seems a contradiction in terms. The obvious
application for such very realistic interactive imagery is in training, as in flight
simulation systems or in creating virtual environments for engineering
development. Detailed, non-selective realism is appropriate to the late stages of
design and prototype illustration, but not to the early inventive stages. There is
little evidence that such systems are intended to assist descriptive to depictive
translation, for example, and it is clear that their data structures have not so far
been designed to allow links between depictive and verbal constraints, or to
address the problem of meaning with, for example, semantic nets or frames
(Chapter 4). Yet, with present knowledge, the opportunity clearly exists for them
to do so. Some of the selective functions of Chapter 6 are already possible, (if not
convenient) with existing systems (e.g. "wire-frame" displays (outline form)
without colour). However both the designers of such systems and their skilled
users would probably be astonished by the suggestion that untidy incompletion or
spatial fuzziness would assist the imagination, or that detailed realism can be a
hindrance to the spatial imagery of imagined alternatives with which a prematurely
over-specified image may compete (Chapter 5).
It must be remembered that the concept of "projected" imagery, and the
idea that pictures support it, is regarded as "mischievous nonsense" by Gibson
(1979 Chapter 15) and, it can be assumed, by his "virtual reality" followers. In
short, detailed solid modelling systems have great potential (as they are improved)
for refining and illustrating the later stages of those three dimensional designs
which have already reached a degree of certainty and precision. They also have a
potential for constraining, or at least by-passing, the user's inventive imagination.
If they are used, as is sometimes advocated, to side-step the cognitive functions of
rough sketches then there is (it seems to me) a danger that the very detailed
"pseudo-index icons" that they generate will seduce their designer users and the
companies who employ them, into believing that their products are more inventive
or more appropriate than they really are.
Solid modelling and virtual reality visualising systems require a detailed
numeric model from which to derive their computed images. It will therefore
always be tempting (i.e. cheaper) to design by modifying an existing stored model
than to conceive and input a radically new one. This is the approach of the design
stylist rather than the innovator. Yet it is claimed that with such systems, architects
(for example) can put aside their sketch-books and "work through the entire
preliminary design process - sketching and exploring aesthetic alternatives, refining
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their designs and generating realistic images for analysis" (Greenburg, 1991). For
this to be true future systems will have to be radically re-designed. There is
nothing in the proposed theory which suggests that the functions performed by
traditional sketch attributes cannot be performed better by modern technology.
Indeed it is very unlikely that future machine systems will be designed to simulate
all the media bound attributes of paper sketches. What is contested is the
proposition that very realistic machine generated representation will make the
cognitive functions themselves redundant; that for example it will no longer be
necessary to use mental imagery, because the machine generated alternative is so
much clearer. This implies that "virtual reality" will obviate visual imagery by
facilitating the easy manipulation of the designed object itself (the "virtual" object)
as oil paint can for a painter or clay for a potter. I believe this proposition to be
based on a false conception of the visual arts. Although it is true that many painters
manipulate their ideas directly in paint upon the canvas (Chapter 1) it is also true
that paintings have become themselves substrates for cognitive imagery. This way
of working, without sketching, seems to have become popular historically as
finished works of art, augmenting the "viewer's share", acquired many of the
privileged attributes of sketches (Chapter 2).
There is clearly a danger in all systems which use a model to automate
some of the processes which determine the appearance of an imaginary object. The
viewers share can become discounted and the user's inventiveness thereby distorted
or constrained. Certainly this danger can be avoided, but only if it is well
understood by those who design the system.
Vector based modelling systems have a theoretical advantage over raster
based systems in that the numeric model on which they are based can be
structured, (in principle at least) to reflect much of the mental structure so essential
for visual thought. Thus scenes, objects, parts, surfaces, edges, colour dimensions
and textures can, in principle, be represented separately and displayed or not
displayed as required. This distinction between stored visual data and visible image
is also reflected in the Kosslyn model of mental imagery (5.2.2) in which
unconscious "deep" descriptive representations of object structure are used to
generate conscious images in a spatially depictive medium. The advantages are
many. A single normalised representation can be used repeatedly in different
positions. Attributes of interest (e.g. colour, detail, parts) can be varied
independently within a constant skeletal structure. Especially important, is the fact
that a sub-surface representation is an essential prerequisite for the machine
representation of the non-visible cognitive components of the sketch. This however
does not mean that such representation will be easy (8.2.4).
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A great disadvantage of existing solid modelling systems, for sketching
purposes, is that the internal model is tedious to input. Manipulations of a view
dependent appearance, (the purpose of the sketch as defined in Chapter 1), are
indirect. The user manipulates the model and the machine generates the display.
However this may be incompatible with a sketch's purpose in which appearance is
imagined first, and then later the structure necessary to generate such appearance.
In the early stages of design or fine art the images used to support visual thought,
must be not only flexible and tolerant, but in many cases view dependent. Thus a
means is needed to manipulate quickly and easily perceptual views which can
support the users internal imagery. This is likely to be too vague initially to be
used to generate a machine model. Moreover as already mentioned, the visual
complexity of only a few types of designed objects are within the scope of current
solid modelling technology.
Freehand sketching is easier and less constrained in raster based machine
"paint" systems. Most computer graphic systems represent the displayed image as a
"bit-map" - a list of binary coded numbers corresponding to the colours of the
"pixels" or grid units into which the screen is divided. Vector based systems
provide only indirect access to this bit-map but interactive raster based systems for
artists provide a library of functions based on the direct manipulation by the user of
the bit-map controlling the screen image. A powerful but very expensive system,
using specialised hardware - Quantel's "Paint-box" (1980) has been influential as a
design prototype for numerous other derivative but less expensive raster graphics
systems which run on desk-top computers. I myself have introduced many
hundreds of undergraduate students of fine art and design to such systems,
particularly Noble Campion's "Cameo Paint" and "Cameo Image" software. In
doing so I have been forced to reflect upon the advantages and disadvantages of
using machine systems for sketching, and upon some of the extraordinary
implications for art education. Two of the tentative conclusions I have come to are
that
1. Future machine assisted drawing and colouring systems have the
potential to perform some of the functions of the sketch much more effectively
than traditional media. In the near future, inexpensive portable machines - perhaps
with light weight touch sensitive screens and connected to digital cameras - will
inevitably compete with the popularity of the sketch-book, though perhaps never
completely replace it.
2. That for complex reasons, partly theoretical and partly commercial, the
design philosophy used in most existing machine "paint" systems hinders their use
as inventive sketching systems. Moreover they are not appropriately designed for
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use in education. Their influence upon the teaching of visual skills and the growth
of creativity in the inexperienced could even be harmful.
One reason for the first conclusion is the active flexibility of digitally stored
images which can be copied, manipulated and recombined ("collaged") much more
easily than their paper parents. In this sense the electronic medium which can
store, process and generate digitally encoded images provides an as yet unrealised
opportunity for a close co-operation with the neural medium of the user's brain,
which also encodes, stores and processes descriptive and depictive images
dynamically. Unlike an image on paper, images or parts of images, represented as
bit-maps, can be copied to disk at intermittent stages of a sketching task, allowing
easier back-tracking and recording than is possible with paper (function 5).
The digital representation of colour also allows many colour handling
processes not possible with paper and paint but which are potentially useful
enhancements of sketch function. Colours are represented by numeric triads which
control the intensity of the red, green and blue phospors on the screen of the
monitor. In some systems every pixel in the image has a separate R,G,B value in a
table. More typically the screen pixels are mapped indirectly to R,G,B values in a
numbered "colour table". A colour can be re-used exactly simply by pointing with
a stylus to part of an existing image. (The inconvenience of re-mixing a colour
exactly in oil-paint is illustrated by Bonnard's habit of mixing his colours on a
sheet of glass, which was preserved under water over-night for re-use). Changing
the R,G,B values of a colour table number, changes the colour of all the pixels in
the image with that number. This allows a provisionally sketched colour to be
adjusted in context, a great advance over the divided attention caused by the colour
mixed out of context on a palette. (Unfortunately in their eagerness to simulate
traditional media most "paint" system designers have chosen to use a pop-up
imitation palette for adjusting colour by selection from a chart or even (Quantel's
paint-box) simulating pigment mixing). The desk-top software "Photo Shop"
(written for the Apple Mac) is intended for the manipulation of digitised
photographs. It allows the specification of colour tolerances but these are not used
to generate indeterminacy in the image but to compensate for indeterminacy. Thus
tidy "flood-fill" operations are possible up to a boundary of all colours within a
certain range. Clearly the algorithms used to process colour tolerances could be
adapted for the inverse purpose, i.e. to allow the many to one mapping implicit in
specifying colour categories (function one) and for applying colour with some
random variability (functions 3 and 5). However they were not designed for this
purpose.
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Another reason for conclusion (1) is the capacity to manipulate and collage
digitised photographs, combining the potential advantages of "contingent"
representations with cognitively generated ones (see Chapter 3). Since Delacroix
and the invention of photography (Scharf 1968), artists and designers have used
photographs as source material when, or if, it suited their purpose, although this
practice was strongly criticised in some circles (Wilenski, 1945). More recently
artists such as Richard Hamilton and Andy Warhol have been interested in
exploring the representational nature of photographs in the "no-man's land"
between painting and photography. This is a subject matter of cultural importance.
However until 1980 (Quantel's Paint-Box) artists who wished to explore the
potential of combining the index qualities of the photograph with the expressive
icon qualities of paint had to use the slow technology of the photographic enlarger
and paper collage. Hamilton who states that he "sketches with photographs" was
converted to the new medium in 1986 when he was invited with other artists to
record a session with Quantel's paint-box for the BBC. ("Painting with Light" BBC
2 1986). He has now invested in a Quantel paint-box system which he uses
regularly in his studio. However, the cultural questions raised by this way of
working in which the "evidential" qualities of an index is manipulated as if it was
an icon have hardly been answered (3.3).
Manual drawing and colouring with a raster paint system, using "mask
rasters" which are intended to simulate "brushes", is cleaner and tidier than on
paper with no "muddying" of the colour by those that are overlaid. Many other
operations such as "flood-fill" are also much tidier than their paper counterparts, or
at least they encourage neatness since the slightest (one pixel gap) in a drawn
contour causes disastrous colour leaks. In order to understand the numerous
drawing and colouring functions provided by such computer "paint" systems, it is
helpful to remember that Quantel's influential system (and similar products) was
originally designed for television graphics and to be used by mature designers who
had learned their craft using traditional media - pencil, pen and inks, poster-paints,
stencils, air-brushes and cut and pasted photographs etc. It is likely that their
products had to be presented in a format where order, neatness and clarity were
expected. Perhaps also the style of animation graphics was influential, where for
technical reasons neatly enclosed shapes filled exactly with flat colour are
necessary. Thus the design philosophy was to provide an electronically
implemented tool-box which would simulate, as closely as possible, the traditional
tools (pens, brushes, air-brushes, stencils, cameras) and media with which the
designer users would be already familiar. The logic of the functions provided by
this, and other paint systems, can also only be understood if it is assumed that they
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are intended to simulate, enhance and accelerate the generation of those attributes
of visual art believed, by the system designers, to be desirable and to avoid those
seen as not desirable. Thus no attempt is made to simulate the untidy attributes of
paper sketches, such as wobbly lines, colour application which flows erratically
over a boundary, random but subtle variation of colour and texture, incomplete
contours, smudges and blots and the imperfect erasure of an India-rubber. Yet, as
argued here repeatedly, these attributes can have important cognitive functions.
However simply imitating such media based attributes, begs the question raised by
the "tool-box" simulation approach. Why should such a flexible and powerful
machine medium be designed to imitate a much more limited one? One is reminded
of tank commanders at the beginning of the second world war who continued to
use the tactics and command vocabulary of equestrian cavalry, or of those Chinese
Han dynasty pots made to imitate bronze (Honey, 1945). I will refer to this design
philosophy as the "Imitation Bronze" approach. Computer based image handling
systems are not "paint systems", they do not have any "brushes", they do not use
"cutting and pasting" and they cannot mix colours. They do offer a new medium
with colour and form handling possibilities which are unthinkable in any other
medium.
The Imitation Bronze approach may be comforting to an older generation
of artist users, but it may also result in software which fails to exploit the capacity
of a new medium as fully as a younger and perhaps less prejudiced generation of
artist users deserve.
The usefulness of raster based image processing to designers, has been
advanced by the marketing of specialised systems adapted to specific kinds of
design. One such system is "MicroDesign" produced by the Microdynamics
Corporation of the U.S.A. for the Fashion design industry. Although it has no
solid modelling capabilities, this system allows the realistic mapping of different
fabric textures and colours onto a digitised photograph of a modelled garment,
convincingly imitating the shadows and distortions of the patterns caused by the
folds of the fabric (Illustration XXXVI). The manufacturers correctly claim in their
brochure that "MicroDesign enables designers to modify sketched or photographic
images and to alter design concepts by changing colours, patterns and textures.
Designs can be transported electronically for use in desktop publishing. Completed
designs can be used in catalogues, leaflets or advertisements. Text can be added to
any picture making MicroDesign an effective sales tool". However their claim that
it is more than this is controversial. "MicroDesign is a tool for unlimited creativity.
Designers can produce and develop concepts quickly with many variations in
colour, texture and dimensions. Microdesign is as easy to use as an artist's sketch
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pad but can communicate ideas faster and more vividly than ever before". The
rather vague implication behind the advocated use of both design specific solid
modelling systems and design specific raster systems, is either that sketching is
faster and easier with a machine system or that, with the improved visualising
capacity of pseudo-photographs, rough sketching is an unnecessary stage of the
design process which can be advantageously skipped, passing straight from the
early descriptive concept to the manipulation of very realistic pseudo-photographs
or virtual models.
Raster based machine systems allow the free manipulation of very detailed
digitised photographs and other images with perfect erasure, very tidy colouring of
complex shapes (provided they are neatly outlined) and magnified "touching up" of
small detail. Therefore they have a natural application for illustrating the late
stages of a design and for design styling, where existing designs in the form of
digitised sketches, photographs or even video tapes can be modified. However they
are not well designed to provide the subtle unexpected variation and controlled
confusion which assists invention. It is of course possible to sketch with a machine
system and to generate manually many (but not all) of the functional attributes of
sketches. However the system designs fail in most respects to exploit the machine
potential to improve support for sketch functions as much as they should.
Recently government sponsored research (in which I have participated), has
investigated the use of computing in the Fashion design industry in the U.K,
continental Europe and the U.S. It was found (Makirinne-Crofts et Al., 1992) that
computer systems intended for the Fashion industry (such as Microdynamics'
"MicroDesign"), although in widespread use have not replaced the use of paper
sketches and sketch-books by designers. Typically the machine system is operated
by a trained specialist, who is not a designer, to produce illustrations and brochures
for marketing purposes. When rough sketches are needed in machine readable
format, they are "scanned" into machine memory, as unstructured bit-maps, from
their paper medium. Most designers probably feel intuitively, that the advantages
of digitised machine imagery are still out-weighed by the convenience of the
sketch-book in the inventive early stages of design.
Besides its cheapness and portability, paper has several other advantages as
a sketching medium over existing machine systems. Only very expensive systems
can rival the subtlety, spatial resolution and chromatic texture of paper. Many
Fashion designers like to spread many sketches over a large wall or table top for
easy comparison (e.g. Muir 1984). Existing technology does not facilitate this.
Although the much prophesied "paperless revolution" has taken longer to arrive
than expected, such hardware problems are probably temporary. The next
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generation of parallel processing micro technology may use the heralded flat
"plasma" monitors which may allow designers to compare and discuss wall sized,
multiple image, electronic displays of design ideas from a single portable sketching
system. The competitive spread of global markets for design ideas combined with
the rise of global information networks may in the near future, make it almost
obligatory for designers to keep sketch stages of their design ideas, in machine
readable form. Real progress in providing improved support for the sketch, will be
made less with improving the hardware than with re-thinking and re-designing the
software, to provide appropriate support for the hidden processes of visual thought.
I conclude that although the mark making freedom essential for any
appearance based sketching system is only possible with raster based systems, the
lack of any meaningful stored representation of the sketch structure and semantics
makes it impossible for them to support the five cognitive functions of the sketch
any better than paper media. Moreover because machine displayed images fail to
generate the spontaneous, accidental subtlety, and surprise of paper media, they are
in some respects kss supportive of the "inner artist" (function 5) than tvaditionak
media. This does not mean that there are no reasons for sketching with machine
media. There are many, as it is still desirable to manipulate electronically digitised
sketches for illustration and communication. But because a purely raster based
system typically discards much of the implicit structure represented in the act of
sketching, much of the system potential for assisting invention, can not be
exploited. A scanned-in bit-map from a paper sketch is just as useful for these non-
inventive functions.
A new type of sketching system is needed, which combines the surface
image manipulating freedom of the raster "paint" system with the descriptive
structuring of visual ideas, that is only possible with a rich but flexible sub-surface
data structure. This should be linked at a later stage of research to a design
specific, user built, data base. Experience already available from linguistic "expert
systems", which simulate some aspects of creativity may well be applicable to such
visual systems. That it is possible to apply the ideas developed for task specific
expert systems, based on propositional rules and descriptive data, to inventive
drawing systems with a highly personal style, has been shown by Cohen with his
"Aaron" series of programs (Cohen 1974, 1982, Boden 1992). "Aaron" is not a
sketching system and it is not an interactive medium. The infinite variety of
drawings it produces, as a result of Cohen's own image making rules, are much
too personal in style to be useful to designers or other artists (Illustration
XXXVII). Nevertheless the software techniques Cohen has invented to generate
various types of drawing with surprising variety, are surely applicable to some of
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the functions of a task specific "one to many" sketching system. Cohen states that
the software he has developed over the last twenty years is intended to "investigate
the nature of representation" (private communication 1991). I assume that most
artists have a similar goal when they sketch but they are rarely prepared to make
their unconscious rules of invention so explicit. Non-interactive expert drawing
systems may provide part of the answer to the question "What components of
visual thought (if any) can be automated ?". They leave completely open the
answer to the question "What components of visual thought is it desirable to
automate?". Although the methods developed for expert systems may be useful for
machine sketching systems, I believe that an attempt to design a machine which
can simulate human visual invention would be misconceived. Much more
interesting, is the possibility of using the methods of artificial intelligence to
amplify, by harmonious cooperation with an artist user, the human brain's own
capacity for visual processing.
9.4 Some Suggestions for the Design of Improved Systems
9.4.1 Sketching as a Mind-Machine Synergism.
It is beyond the scope of this study to analyse all the implications of
cognition for the design of new sketching systems. Here I propose only to outline
briefly some ideas for future research. The most promising approach, I suggest, is
to research the design of a Mind-Machine Synergism in which a model of the
mental representations and processes of visual thought is used to design matching
representations (data structures) and processes (machine algorithms) within the
machine. The term "synergism" has been chosen to express the hope that the
performance in terms of appropriate visual invention of mind and machine co-
operating on a visual task will be greater than the sum of the mind's contribution
and the machine's contribution, because the system has been designed to amplify
but not to replace the user's thoughts. This is more than can be expected from
existing raster based "paint" systems, the output of which can be no more than the
sum of contributions from the machine and the user's brain. This is a consequence
of the "partitioned approach" to C.A.D. system design, dubbed by Negroponte the
"idiot slave" approach (Negroponte, 1972). An improved approach would be to
find ways to integrate the best of the "tool-box" algorithms with some of the
techniques developed for "expert systems". However the purposes of such a
"mind-machine synergism" would be quite different from either of these
methodologies.
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9.4.2 Machine Representation of Visual Structure
Sketch attributes work by supporting private representations of imagined
scenes and objects within the users mind. Apparently vague, they possess physical
attributes which support and interact with the highly structured mental
representations of their user. Neither the solid modelling systems nor the raster
graphics systems, described above, can provide much support for the users'
cognition because they lack suitable data structures and interfacing procedures.
Wherever the evidence suggests that a cognitive task depends upon limited
mental capacity that needs sketch support, a non interfering interfacing mechanism
will be needed which allows the machine to represent, (and hence support but not
substitute for), a particular thought process. The well designed system would
lighten the user's work load and amplify mental capacity without distorting or
constraining the user's goals. The raster graphics "tool-box" approach allows little
representation of the user's mental structure of the object represented. Whilst the
user "sees", in the minds eye, a complex, but often vague structured hierarchy of
imagined scenes, objects, parts, surfaces, edges, colours, lines and suggestive
marks, the raster system only "sees" (i.e. represents) lists of codes representing
coloured pixels. An improved system would combine the surface mark making
flexibility of the raster "paint" system with the image structuring possibilities of the
modelling system. A machine representation of structure, combined with a much
richer mind-machine data sharing mechanism, is a an essential step towards
machine participation in the flexible manipulation of the image structure as the user
actually sees it (see Function 4, Chapter 6). This implies a complex image data
structure and user interface, but is not incompatible with the rapidly rising capacity
of contemporary hardware. Machine support for all five of the sketch functions is
handicapped by the lack of such an internal structure, available to but separable
from, the representation of the visible sketch. Within (initially) a task specific
domain (e.g a Fashion sketching system for one kind of garment) it should also be
possible to represent in machine data some of the implicit structural schemata
which have been shown to be important in sketch recognition (4.3.8). The
implementation of this possibility needs to be researched. One approach would be
to design structures on the lines of Minksy's (1975) "frames" with slots for default
parameters. Palmer (1975c) has also suggested possible structures to model mental
schemata of object appearance. The descriptive to depictive translation function
suggests that in addition it may be fruitful to research the possibility of adding task
or object specific semantic nets such as those which have been used for quasi-
intelligent verbal processing systems. For example the "ACME" and "WordNet"
systems use a symbolic net of associated concepts to model analogical thought
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(Holyoake and Thagard, 1989). Further, but I believe rewarding, complications to
the machine data structure will be needed to represent the many types of sketch
indeterminacy. For example, before it is closely defined, an object's contour may
need to be represented not by one line but by many, within a specified tolerance.
Thus a vector representation of multiple contour lines would have internal pointers
to either a "shape tolerant" machine "pentimenti" generating procedure or to user
generated alternatives. Lines would be classified according to visual meaning.
Edges for example could be assigned to shapes and surfaces in ways which allow
alternative interpretations, (e.g to represent the fact that contour lines switch their
affinities if a perceived figure-ground relationship changes). These in turn might be
linked to multiple labels. Similarly, vector data structures representing contour
lines must allow for both visible and invisible (cognitive or imagined) contour
fragments. If these are represented internally as parts of the shape definition then
shape colouring and movement operations are possible without losing the
perceptual advantages of imagined boundaries.
A few possibilities for representing colour may serve to illustrate the
general point. Luckily much of the research needed for descriptive to depletive
colour translation already exists in the literature. Thus the raster machine
representation of ROB values can be mapped to the C.I.E. (Commission
Internationale de l'Eclairage) system of colour specification and then in turn to the
Psychophysical variables for the C.I.E. Standard Observer (Dominant wavelength,
Luminance and Chromatic purity (Le Grand 1968, Chapter 8)) which in turn have
been mapped (more controversially) to appearance notations systems such as
Munsell or the Natural Colour System (Hunt, 1977). Unfortunately none of the
well calibrated systems are very familiar to artists or designers, who often have
their own vaguer terminology. However adding user control of colour terminology
and user control of colour tolerances with machine assisted mapping to less tolerant
colour dimensions (e.g Munsell Hue, Value and Chroma) would be comparatively
easy and allow sketch spatial components to be represented internally categorically
with a specified range. There are several ways in which such a "vague" colour
could be visibly expressed in a particular region of the visible part of the hybrid
sketch image. One method would be to use entries to colour tables, which map in
turn to a selected portion of colour appearance space (in either 1, 2 or 3
dimensions) and then to the corresponding screen ROB values. The use of very
large colour tables would be a possible mechanism for representing and
manipulating in situ spatially separate regions with descriptive colour tolerances
(colour vagueness). Thus even if they had the same RGB values, separate colour
regions would have different table entries for independent in situ manipulation.
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Attached to the RGB values of each table entry would a tolerance factor calculated
from the user defined colour description.
By using such large colour tables, at least three ways of mapping a selected
descriptive colour category to its many depictive instances can be envisaged.
1. Upon request the machine could generate from the colour description a
series of partly random, spatially variegated pixel structures within a shape with
soft or hard edges, and any of several alternative contours (defined by concealed
pentimenti). To some extent this might imitate naturally coloured surfaces, which
when digitised by a camera or scanner always have a scattered pixel variation.
Pressing a key could provide endless variations of the surface colour, texture and
edges as defined by the sub-surface tolerances. Note that the sub-surface
representation of pentimenti offers a mechanism for optionally allowing an applied
colour to overflow a visible boundary as it does on paper.
2. An alternative command would allow the user to sample, either
sequentially or at random, any number of example colours within a specified range
or which are implied by an attached colour description. Thus sample colour
"instances" within a required tolerance can be assessed as possible alternatives
before a more specific decision is taken. I regard the method of adjusting a
coloured area in situ without the distraction of having to select from a "pop-up"
colour menu, a requirement which follows from the selective attention function of
the sketch and the limited capacity of visuospatial working memory.
3. Thirdly, the specified colour description may not displayed at all (it must
be removable), with only an optional label used to indicate that a colour
description has been assigned. The purpose of this option would be to allow space
for imagined colour (see Watkins & Schiano 1982) In a true mind - machine
partnership the machine software must be designed sometimes to work without user
assistance (when the user's attention is needed elsewhere), sometimes
collaboratively with user interaction and sometimes to withdraw, to allow non-
interfering space for the user's imagery.
The data structures needed for implementing such a descriptive to depictive
mapping of colour will be complex and need careful thought. For example the
system must also allow the user to attach multiple colour descriptions to a chosen
region, with an easy mechanism for switching from one description to the next. It
is likely that a user will often be unable to decide whether a given part should, for
example, be "pale green" or "pale blue". After attaching both descriptive labels to
the part or region, the user after experimenting with the above descriptive mapping
system, might then "prefer" three possible blues and three possible greens,
eliminating several other colours, but wish to preserve some other possibilities
9. Sketching and Cognition: Implications.
	 286
within the descriptive ranges. Thus a mechanism for priority listing of colour
possibilities and for marking colours for later appraisal would be needed.
I have chosen colour as an example because it is relatively easy to see how
existing machine colour structures might be altered and enriched to allow greater
support for Functions 1 to 4. Support for Function 5 implies that each time a
colour instance is considered it is recorded in a way which allows later back-
tracking to review and edit colour thoughts. The example also shows how the need
to preserve descriptive tolerances in a way which supports successive refinement,
multiple priorities and mind-changing, implies surprisingly complex and carefully
designed machine data structures.
In principle, similarly improved descriptive and depictive data structures,
with appropriate translation algorithms, should be applicable to the representation
of spatial structure. Clearly there will be many difficulties in designing such data
structures and even more in designing user interface techniques which do not
interfere with the need to sketch quickly. Perhaps it will be considered rather
perverse to propose that a visible image on the screen that is apparently sparse, and
impoverished in its surface representation should need a data structure, richer and
more complex in some respects than a very detailed and precise image. However
the potential advantage of such a sub-surface representation is that it defines not
one image but many, with a correspondingly expanded power to assist visual
thought. The sub-surface structure of the visible sketch must be easy to enter and
manipulate. It would need to have many default values linked, in some systems
perhaps, to design specific semantic nets. It is particularly important that this sub-
surface structure - a descriptively labelled depictive map, linked to a temporal
record of sketching acts - should be easily available to the user for editing and
monitoring. Thus a "sketch" would have two different mechanisms of user
interaction, preferably but not necessarily on separate screens. I suggest, as
signposts to further research, that at least four different but richly interconnected
types of information structure would be necessary, accessible through a multi-
modal interface.
9.4.3 The Visualising Support System.
The data structure (and its associated library of manipulative algorithms),
which is intended to assist the artist user to imagine the appearance of new visual
ideas, is here termed the "Visualising Support System". It is used primarily to
support Functions 2 and 3. This data structure corresponds to the most common
type of sketch, where the user needs assistance to visualise an idea as it would been
seen from a single view point. Because the sketching system must allow the
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representation of indeterminate attributes with assigned of tolerances and
descriptive categories there will be many possible "surface" representations of a
particular sketch subject matter, even when limited to one view-point. Individual
sampled instances of such sketch appearance, (the 21/2D hybrid image) is here
termed an "Appearance Instance". A user controlled display would support the
user's super-imposed imagery and provide a fast mark-manipulating interface. Its
function (as with paper sketches) is to generate visual stimuli which support and
amplify the perceived and imagined components of the user's depictive imagery. It
is displayed upon a surface upon which the user can project and manipulate
internally generated images of imaginary objects. All surface image making
activities would be displayed in a way designed to support this mental task with as
little attentional distraction (pop-up menus etc) as possible. Nothing on the screen
or within the periphery of the visual field, should interfere with the sketch imagery
function or distract attention from the users global or local imagery task.
One of the most important components of this module to research, will be
the collaborative, "mind-machine" processes which up-date this "surface"
representation. As its visible components are up-dated by manual drawing and
colouring, a mechanism is needed to simultaneously edit the implicit structure,
attribute tolerances and descriptive notes in the "sub-surface" representation of the
sketch, the Cognitive Structure Map, which are only displayed when needed.
This will be one of the tasks of the multi-modal interface described below.
9.4.4 The Cognitive Structure Map
This is a machine implemented "engineering diagram" of a user's visual
concept, used to manipulate and generate multiple "Appearance Instances" of the
user's visual imagery. A second interactively controlled screen would display, (and
provide interactive user control of), the machine's representation of the descriptive
spatial structure (relationships between scenes, object parts and attributes etc) and
the chromatic structure (using user preferred notation systems). The structure map
would probably take the form of a descriptively labelled viewer-centred map or
drawing in which the user could see and manipulate descriptive and non-visible
(i.e. cognitive) depictive components of the sketch. The structure of the image in
terms of objects, parts, edges, attributes and colours would be displayed
diagrammatically and with labels. Descriptive or depictive notes could be attached
to different elements of the structure and recalled optionally by pointing to the part
or attribute concerned. This would obviate the goal conflict which occurs in paper
sketches between the need to add descriptive labels to the sketch and the need to
avoid attentional conflict with super-imposed imagery. In addition the structure
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map would provide spatially linked access to a task related data base of communal
and user chosen depictive and descriptive information. The fact that so much of the
information that artists and designers need when sketching, is only useful if it can
be attached to meaningful parts or attributes of the sketch, is another reason why
the structure map is necessary. Thus, instead of pinning a random piece of fabric
to a sketch, a Fashion designer might simply attach the index or look up key to a
detailed depictive-descriptive fabric data-base. The structure map would provide
the designer with rapidly inter-changeable access to fabric data and allow a range
(using the category representation system mentioned above) of fabrics to be
mapped onto the appropriate garment part, using a MicroDesign style fabric
mapping method. When the user manipulates or edits the structure map directly,
rather than by editing instances in the Visualising Support System, this will
sometimes result in corresponding alterations to the displayed visualising image,
allowing the user to see immediately the visual consequences of the change.
However other information attached to the structure map will only show on the
displayed image indirectly, such as for example, when it manipulated. Thus a part
previously inseparable from an object may become detached and moveable. The
operation of erasure becomes more complex but also more powerful. Thus a part
or region can be erased from an "appearance instance" without necessarily
removing its representation in the structure map thus making it easily regenerated.
Also, if the erasure is one of several alternatives, of multiple contour lines for
example, then the user could alter the priority and displayed emphasis of the
temporarily erased part (e.g. by making it fainter). Finally an erased part can be
erased from the structure map itself but can still be recovered by back-tracking to a
sketching branch node using the action monitor. Naturally a carefully thought out
data management system will be needed to see that these different ways of editing a
sketch structure are consistent with each other.
In some tasks, vectors corresponding to visible or invisible contours might
be adjustable in meaning with respect to the figure ground structure of the object.
Such structural ambiguities would need double representation. It is suggested that
as with colours contours, shapes and other object attributes can be represented
descriptively, with machine generated algorithms to sample depictively such
descriptive attributes within user tolerances. Thus every structure map of an early
stage of visual thought would generate many different sketch depictions or
"Appearance Instances" of the concept. Appearance Instances could be generated
at random (to create serendipity "awareness surprises" (Chapter 7)) and gradually
reduced in number by successive refinement. Here I am suggesting that image
handling technology can offer, within a single stored data structure, improved
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control over the stages of the successive refinement that, on paper, would require
many pages of a sketch book. At different stages of refinement the artist user may
wish either to save a sequence of sketch structure maps (each of which can
generate multiple depictive alternatives) for later refinement or she or he may wish
to save particular appearance instances or better, a number of refined or severely
pruned versions of the structure map. Thus the structure map is an intermediate
representational type of the kind I have argued is essential to visual invention
(3.5). The difference from paper sketches is that whereas on paper the translation
function must be performed by the same spatial array as the perceptual and
imagery functions, with undesirable side-effects (such as written notes interfering
with spatial imagery), machine image processing offers the possibility of separating
them and at the same time vastly improving the selectivity function discussed in
Chapter 5. (Illustrations XIV and XXIII show attempts to use the same sketch to
fulfil both depictive and structural functions at once.) Of course the effectiveness
of this idea depends upon having an efficient mechanism for updating, in both
directions, the effects of editing either of the two representations. All the "data
structures" here proposed, are envisaged as program "objects", the properties of
which are given by the procedures ("methods" in object oriented programming
language) with which they are packaged. There are nearly always two ways, as a
consequence of the "mind-machine synergism" approach, in which the Structure
Map can implement the one to many mapping of descriptive structure to depictive
instances. One is to automate the mapping process under user supervision. The
other is to provide assisted mechanisms for users to enter sketch variations
themselves. In a practical system both machine and user generated alternatives
would have to be catered for. For example when pentimenti (multiple alternative
contour lines) are indicated to express an indeterminate edge, a machine algorithm,
which can generate these from a user's contour prototype, might be useful,
provided the user has easy access to the various parameters which determines the
way it performs. However there must also be a way of saving and representing
economically user drawn pentimenti representing a single object edge or edge
segment. This would of course produce extra interfacing demands. Whilst
sketching the user must be able to effortlessly register with the structure chart
when a contour line is a new edge segment and when it is an alternative to an
existing one. Where the domain of a descriptive category is well defined,
automated "instance" generation quite feasible and is used routinely, for example,
in generating different "weights" (shape variations) for type face designs and has
been used experimentally in generating shape variations for glass-ware design.
Descriptively encoded colour is an obvious case for automatic instance generation.
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For example, a user might enter (or pick) "grey-brown" on the structure map and
attach it to the corresponding structure component (part, surface, area, ground) and
is then able to view as many instances as desired on the sketch depiction (at
random or systematically). The usefulness of such procedures can only be
determined experimentally and will depend upon the degree of task sensitivity with
which they are designed. Recently I have been experimenting with the usefulness
of a curve interpolation algorithm, Overhauser's Parabolic Blend, (Rogers &
Adams 1976, pages 133-138), for predicting and representing the invisible but
imagined components of fragmented contours, which as suggested in Chapter 4
may be useful in inventive retrieval. These would be visible for entry or editing on
the Structure map but not usually on the Sketch Depiction. By using a separate
colour table entry for such imagined contours, with the same RGB values as the
background colour, such invisible contours can remain available for shape
colouring and moving operations.
9.4.5 The Action Monitor: A Record of Sketching Acts.
It was argued in Chapter 7, that one of the functions of the sketch was to
support the users' awareness of their own thought processes. This ability has been
shown in some tasks, at least, to be necessary to assess one's own cognitive
performance and is implicated in theories of creativity. It has already been argued
that whilst unconsciously automatic mental processes have an important role in
creativity, they can also inhibit the discovery of novel directions for visual thought.
To avoid such "sphexishness" the brain supplies a limited capacity monitoring and
control system which I call the cognitive monitor. I have, perhaps controversially,
related this hypothetical processor to models of voluntary, as opposed to automatic,
mental processes and to Baars' "global workspace" theory of consciousness (Baars
1988). It is also clear that paper sketches do a rather poor job of supporting this
monitoring facility. By recording the sequence of sketching acts and allowing easy
editing access to this record, machine systems could be designed to support the
user's visual monitoring and awareness much more effectively than they do at
present.
Many raster "paint" systems provide a "record" facility which can, on
demand, preserve a file of the movements of the user's actions, which can then be
replayed and interrupted at a certain point. However the usefulness of such
recodings is usually limited by the lack of any meaningful structure for back-
tracking and the poor editing facilities offered to the user. In fact it is not usually
clear what the function of such records is. (Quantel's recording system is
sometimes used for animation). The use by Scrivener and Clark, S. (1992) of a
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sequential record of descriptive and depictive sketching acts to investigate the
nature of co-operative design, on remote work-stations using a shared interface,
has been mentioned already. They made the interesting observation that an
automated file structure based on pauses of a certain length, usually coincided with
meaningful sketch actions. However these actions needed to be classified and
related in detail to the descriptive and depictive components of the user's visual
thought. What is implied by the visual monitoring function of the sketch is that the
user's short term memory of what he is doing and thinking in a particular task can
benefit from spatial and temporal support.("How can I know what I imagine until I
see what I sketch?"). In the schematic system proposed here, this function is
managed and recorded by the Action Monitor. The Action Monitor records
operations on both the Cognitive Structure Map and the Visualising Support
System and would generate a hierarchic event data structure. Because the function
of the action monitor is to assist artist users to back-track on their own thought
process and to re-consider earlier decisions, the natural structure of the sketch
monitor files is not a single sequential file, but a densely branched tree of actions
linked at important (user selected nodes) to stored structure maps and depictive
instances. Because, like the search trees in a chess playing program, monitor files
would have the tendency to become unmanageably large, it would need a well
designed, machine assisted, user controlled editor with the capacity to prune un-
wanted pathways, to compress a complex sequence of actions and to select which
structure map nodes and appearance instances should be preserved. The nature of
the depictive parts of such a record and its editing is beautifully illustrated in
Clouzot's film (1954) of Picasso painting on glass. The value of such sequential
records was in fact discussed by Picasso with Roland Penrose before the film was
made (Penrose 1962).
9.4.6 A Multi-Modal Mind-Machine Interface
The sketching system advocated here, implicates a much richer machine
representation of the spatial structure, visual attributes and descriptive information
attached to sketches. Therefore a more sophisticated interface will be needed than
the type usually provided with machine "paint" systems for example. The accepted
interfacing wisdom for CAD systems, judging by current practice, (Shneiderman,
1987) seems to be that when the user's main task is visually controlled then the
machine operating task should be also. However the hybrid-image hypothesis of
Chapter 5 indicates clearly that such a single-mode approach to interfacing is
misguided. Only spatially guided input which is compatible with the user's task
related mental imagery should be used. When attention must be divided between
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cognitive tasks, especially when one of these tasks is non-spatial, then it is easier to
perform the two tasks in different modes (Brooks 1968, Baddeley and Lieberman
1980). One of the implications of Chapter 6 is that a multimodal interface would
assist the user to divide attention, where necessary between visuospatial thought
and the simultaneous input of descriptive labelling or structuring operations. When
David Hockney, Howard Hodgkin, Richard Hamilton and other artists were
experimentally sketching with Quantel's paint-box for the BBC, they seemed to
have very little difficulty with simultaneously commenting verbally on what they
were doing ("Painting with Light" BBC 2, 1986). This is consistent with research
into divided attention tasks which suggests separate (parallel) processing modules
for the "inner voice" and the "inner eye" (5.3.6). Thus cognitive theory suggests
that speech recognition systems (provided they have reached the required
reliability) may solve some of the divided attention problems which will certainly
arise, if the desired descriptive-depictive machine interaction is to be harmoniously
implemented. An analogy with driving a car suggests foot-pedals might also be
useful. An implication of the fact that percepts and images use shared resources, is
that the working memory mode of any interfacing task which is not supportive of
the user's sketch imagery task should be in a different mode from that task. Thus
visuospatially contingent colour should be adjusted with a non visuospatial
interfacing mechanism such as pen pressure and angle (such pen are available) or
voice recognition. Clearly a greater sharing of visual structure between mind and
machine will need a richer, more complex interface. I see no escape from this
conclusion.
9.4.7 Descriptive and Depictive Domain Specific Data-Bases.
Although the sketch cognitive structure map will support written notes and
labels, a task specific sketching system would be much more useful if it were
linked to a well structured data base of technical and client or user, task specific
information. Information directly attached to the structure map would be specific to
a particular visual task and the set of depictive appearance instances which it can
generate. Information in the data-base on the other hand would support the
descriptive and depictive information sources, which artists or designers need or
draw upon, to support and stimulate their creative thought and which are
potentially common to many different sketching projects. Clearly designing such a
data-base is a major task, since its usefulness will depend not only upon the quality
of the information (variable and visual) provided, but also upon the sensitivity of
the design of its structure, its access keys and its dictionaries, to the needs of the
user. It has been suggested that human concept formation is a product of the re-
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organisation of human memory (Baddeley, 1990). A goal of sketching systems is
to amplify inventive concept generation in the minds of artists. It follows that
machine support for an artist's long term memory must also support the
meaningful re-structuring of concept related information. I suggest that initially it
will be most practical to implement two data-base modules a descriptive verbal one
and a structured depictive store of digitised drawings, illustrations and
photographs.
Typically, descriptive labels in the structure map would contain index
references both to the descriptive data-base and to a design specific version of the
user's favourite word processor. With extensive subject cross-referencing this
would have the obvious advantage of eliminating the need to repeat notes used on
many sketches and of enabling fast editing of notes attached to labelled sketch
attributes and parts. One can envisage design specific versions of popular word
processors and data-bases with "Structure Map" entries in their option menus.
Designing the visual data-base is an even bigger task, since pictorial
information is much more demanding of machine memory. However a sketch
related pictorial data-base becomes more attractive as cost/capacity performance of
the appropriate technology improves. Currently laser disks (CD ROM) are
available which provide fast access to an entire video film. Unfortunately they are
read only devices. However historically the increase in machine capacity has
always over-taken the development of appropriate soft-ware to use it (Michie &
Johnston, 1984). So now is the time to consider how artists might routinely exploit
not only private stores of digitised images, but also public libraries of digital
photography and video available on global networks. Sketch references to private
image libraries would include access to the user's previous sketches and to
illustrations, photographs and edited video passages, that have been used, or might
be used, to supplement memory and refresh hazy mental imagery. All sketches and
sketch structure maps relevant to a single task, or a set of related tasks would be
linked into an easily edited tree structure which documents the history, including
the "blind alley ways", of a user's ideas. Designers refer frequently to their own
earlier ideas both successful and unsuccessful. For example Fashion designers
sometimes report that they keep drawers filled with used sketch-books for later
reference (interviews for Makirinne-Crofts et Al., 1992). Robert Welch (1986)
keeps an barn loft filled with prototypes of uncompleted designs, which he visits to
stimulate his ideas for new products.
Another reason for including sketch structure maps, with each family of
related sketches in the data base, is that the structure map provides the information
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necessary for retrieving separately, significant sketch components and their
attached descriptive information.
Because of their "index" nature, untampered photographs present a
completely different problem of representation from structured sketches. Their
disadvantage is that they contain no structure. Such images would be much more
useful, I suggest, if descriptive structure is added to them by the machine-mind
partnership. On the other hand, in so far as such cultural indices duplicate patterns
of light reflected by real objects, they provide a valuable reservoir of those kinds
of visual surprise that only nature can offer and which, I have suggested, is
necessary to awaken inventive consciousness (7.4.3 & 8.3). The kinds of image
processing necessary to make them compatible with sketches should, I believe, be
properly considered to be functions of the photographic data-base or at least its
interface with the sketch structure map, and not (as in machine "paint" systems)
part of the user's depictive image handling function. How much of this image
structuring can be assisted by machine and how much must be performed co-
operatively, will depend upon progress in image analysis and "machine" vision.
Machine procedures can, for example, provide filters for colour dimensions
supporting selective attention to hue, saturation and lightness relationships as
discussed in 6.7. Also the photographic interface should be able to provide spatial
frequency filters which simulate the spatial frequency filters of the human brain,
supporting spatial attention as discussed in 6.8.2. Other structuring functions such
as the isolation of edges, can be assisted by machine (Marr 1982, Watt 1988) but
still need the user's cognitive recognition systems to supply the "top-down"
components needed for meaningful structure. Thus a mind-machine sharing
algorithm is indicated. Finally the user's eyes and brain are needed, (using
machine assisted masking techniques) to segment a photograph into its usable
objects and parts for future collaging, re-scaling and linking to sketch structure
maps. The data-base management system would sort, classify, label and outline,
for user inspection, all such pictorial components. In other words the data base
would have attached to it an image processing interface which assists the user to
enter appropriate pictorial structure maps, linked to and compatible with, the
cognitive structure maps of a relevant family of related sketches. Task related
depictive information could then be accessed and manipulated by the user as
meaningful sketch components, (via the Structure Map and the Data-base indexing
system). It would be worth researching the possibility of using such structured
photographic components as temporary semi-transparent overlays, to be re-scaled
and oriented to overlay sparse depictive sketch instances, as a means of refreshing
or supplementing (but never replacing) the user's mental imagery.
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9.4.8 Two Separable System Components
One of the reasons for sketching directly at the machine interface (as
opposed to sketching on paper) is the opportunity to capture quickly the spatial,
chromatic and sequential structure of ideas, in such a way that they can be
interactively re-processed later on at leisure. It would not be necessary and
probably not feasible to implement the whole of the above system in a single unit.
Rather it makes sense to divide the system into two interdependent but optionally
separable components (Diagram VIII) -
1. A light-weight, portable sketch entry system but with a large secondary
memory capacity. This would support user control of the Visualising Support
System, and would automatically record the raw data needed for the Cognitive
Structure Map and the Action Monitor. Whilst sketching the user would be able
to complement machine updating of the structure map and the action monitor files
with simple non-spatial commands (tactile or verbal). When necessary the user
would have to interrupt his view of the visualising screen to, view and correct
structure maps and monitor files. It would need a user interface as versatile as
current technology can provide with manual pressure sensitive stylus and key-board
plus digital camera and perhaps a voice recognition system and "data glove". This
would be the "field" unit, to be constantly on hand wherever or whenever its artist
or designer user has an idea or finds a visual motif.
As the machine records and files sketching "acts" the interface would be
designed to allow the easy entry of depictive "tolerances" (degrees of vagueness)
for sketch attributes as they are entered (contours, shapes, positions, sizes,
orientations, colour dimensions etc). In addition, as and when convenient, the user
would switch to a representation of the sketch Cognitive Structure Map to edit
visual structure, add alternatives, edit tolerances and insert descriptive notes and
labels with meanings known to the studio system. This last process of
communicating private information to the machine (quickly before it becomes
unconscious) is a price which must be paid, (as when giving instructions to a
human assistant), for the use of machine processing capacity to support those
mental processes which are normally private. Whether or not artists and designers
will feel this price is worth paying will depend, of course, on the quality and
usefulness of the added imagery and descriptive structure that it enables..
2. This in turn will depend upon the power, appropriateness and adaptive
flexibility of the second component, the library linked Sketch Development
System. Records and files from the above portable sketch entry system would then
be "developed" in the studio which would contain a the sketch Development
System. It is inevitable that in the rapid sketch entry of "first thoughts", the sketch
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user will sometimes omit many of the necessary links between sketch "surface"
components and the underlying descriptive structure. It is therefore essential that
there will be ample facilities to up-date Cognitive Structure Maps, re-assign links
to the corresponding set of sketch appearances and to add further attribute
tolerances and descriptive notes, later, as and when they come to mind. The post
processor would also provide interactive processing links (mind-machine
synergisms) to the user's idiosyncratic, private libraries of depictive and
descriptive information and (ideally) to net-worked public libraries of application
specific, pictorial and verbal data. I have included here descriptive to depictive and
depictive to descriptive translation systems linked to the library data-bases. The
former would provide machine (post sketch entry) support for the user's mental
imagery generation system. It would develop, by user controlled access to the two
data-bases, the one to many mappings implicit in the users' category labels,
tolerances, written notes and abbreviated references encoded in the structure map
attached to each sketch. Thus a single sparse rough sketch could by post-processing
or studio mind-machine development generate a large family of descent images as
the user's ideas are refined. The latter (the depictive to descriptive processor)
would exploit image analysis techniques to assist the user to segregate raw
depictions and edited stills or sequences of video imagery into their most relevant
visual attributes and components. Not only would this system support selective
attention, (Function 4, Chapter 6), but it would allow user controlled manipulation
and analysis of a rich source of "natural surprise" (Chapter 7.3). This processor
would be designed to support (but not replace!) the user's perceptual and
attentional image descriptive processes and would include reversible attribute
filtering as suggested in Chapter 6.
Finally the development system would be used for re-structuring, editing
and pruning the sets of structure maps, sketch instances, sketch fragments and
written notes which belong to a particular sketching session or project and which
have been recorded in a branching sequential tree, the Action Monitor File, by the
sketch monitor. By re-playing and editing the monitor files, a temporal record of
the user's thought processes whilst sketching, would become structured into a
branching hierarchy of possible ideas, which will need drastic pruning as the ideas
become clearer and more constrained. As mentioned above, each structure map
with its descriptive tolerances will represent many sketch instances any one of
which can be generated at will and specified economically by simply recording its
descriptive parameters. Thus editing a sketching session would be more like editing
a film than a drawing, except that the images generated, would become
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progressively sharper and richer (more descriptive and more depictive) as the
session progresses.
9.4.9 Outline Schema of a Mind-Machine System
Diagram VIII shows how these components might be linked in a sketching
system. Throughout this study I have concentrated on the functions of sketches in
the very early stages of design or visual composition. I have argued that existing
computer raster "paint" and solid modelling systems are more useful for the later
than the early stages of visual creation. However digital image handling technology
is well suited to the combined support of both the early and the late stages of
visualising in a single integrated system.
The "Portable Sketch Entry System" is intended to combine the
manipulative freedom of the electronic raster "paint" system (the Visualising
Support System) with a super-ordinate, vector based representation of both the
visible and invisible structure of the sketch subject matter (objects, parts,
attributes, surfaces, edges etc) and descriptive tolerances specifying multiple
options for the sketch components (the Cognitive Structure Map). The Structure
to Appearance Translator implements a one to many mapping from the structure
map tolerances to the many implicit images (simple or complex, clear or confused)
which can be displayed (and edited) by the visualising support system. This is
envisaged as combining two methods of translation. Where feasible machine
algorithms will optionally generate multiple attribute exemplars within a specified
tolerance (see 9.4.2). However it must always also be possible for the user to
specify and record in the structure map chosen alternatives (as is sometimes found
in paper sketches Illustration XIV). The Structure to Appearance Translator is also
used to segregate or filter image components in order to generate on request some
of the many possible partial images which support selective attention, as discussed
in Chapter 6. This process would always be reversible. Any individual image
generated by the Appearance Translator is here termed an Appearance Instance.
Visual parts and attributes within any Appearance Instance may be unitary, as
when only one of multiple contour lines (pentimenti) are displayed, or multiple as
when many pentimenti are overlaid. As any Cognitive Structure Map can,
depending on the specified tolerances and options, be translated into a small or an
astronomically large number of Appearance Instances, there must be a easily used
facility for the user to file, for later consideration, a limited sub-set of those
specific instances of special interest (as discussed for colour in 9.4.2). One of the
advantages of having the structure map linked to a machine implemented
appearance translator, is that each appearance instance can be encoded simply by
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reference to a specific cognitive structure map and a record of the attribute
parameters used by the translator to generate a specific image. Thus any image
generated can be recorded easily for later "regeneration".
The sketch entry system also supports the Action Monitor which files
depictive and descriptive sketching acts as described in 9.4.5. Similar encoding
economies are also possible for the information monitored. Each action monitor
file, which would normally correspond to a single sketching "session" related to a
single task, has a one to many logical relationship with a set of structure maps.
However this set of data records are related to each other and can be regenerated
by a stored sequence of editing actions. However because the purpose of the
monitor file is to facilitate mental back-tracking and re-thinking, an Action File
would have the structure of a complex tree with multiple branches. This could
easily become unwieldy and uneconomic. Therefore a user control editing system,
with a dedicated interface would be provided. This would allow the editing of
priority branch points (for re-considering earlier ideas etc) and the "zapping" (after
security back-up) of unwanted branches of the action tree.
Thus the sketch entry system will generate and save a hierarchy of three
types of file, all of which will represent sketch ideas with some uncertainty or
vagueness. The action monitor file allows the review and replay of a family of
cognitive structure maps and a priority set of recorded "appearance instances" (ie.
sketches for visualising). However, because it represents degrees of attribute
"vagueness" each Cognitive Structure Map supports many possible appearance
instances which are unlikely to have been envisaged by the user during the early
stages of sketch entry, when there will have been the most indeterminacies. In fact
only a very small amount of indeterminacy, if repeated locally will result by
permutation, in an astronomically large number of possible sketch instances (see
discussion Chapter 1.5). This ensures that the system can generate those media
related "perceptual surprises" which are so thin on the ground in existing machine
software design. A second phase of visual contemplation in which more descriptive
and depictive information can be referred to, and more detailed visual options
considered, will therefore be needed. The studio based Development System
would support the extensive and detailed testing of preliminary ideas. Many more
of the options, implicit in unexplored branches of the action monitor files, can then
be sampled and further, as yet unconsidered, visual implications, implicit in the
structure map, considered and developed. Visual ideas will become refined and less
vague as "branches" in a recorded sequence of the monitor action tree are pruned,
and visual or descriptive options in the structure map are edited. As the user's
ideas becomes clearer, so links to the studio data-bases (9.4.7) will make, initially
9. Sketching and Cognition: Implications.
	 299
rather sparse cognitive structure maps, gradually richer, with attached depictive
and descriptive detail. It is at this later point that the techniques of solid modelling
and very realistic image handling may be applicable. Drawing upon its links to
images and models in the data-base, a late stage Cognitive Structure Map might
then be used to supplement, but not to replace, the user's mental imagery by
generating a stream of task associated physical imagery.
9.5 Conclusions.
Research into the human brain and its astonishing capacity to support visual
thought and invention, will continue to be one of the most exciting and
controversial areas of research in the next century. Obviously the theory I have
tried to document, is tentative and incomplete. I had hoped to implement a
sketching system or at least some small part of one to illustrate my ideas. Alas the
literature I felt relevant to this task has proved to be so extensive that, even after
reading 1070 books and papers, I know have only skimmed the surface of the
subject matter. Thus this study is intended to be used as a conceptual frame-work
for others to develop and apply as they see fit. It is certain that the study of
cognition, especially visual consciousness, will continue, in the next twenty years,
to provide exciting and unexpected insights into the visual arts and the design of
machines to assist them. Artists and designers deserve better support from
information systems than they have yet received. System design based on rule-of-
thumb knowledge and the Imitation Bronze approach is far too flimsy a foundation
on which to base such an important task. I hope therefore that this study will
influence others to look at the literature of cognitive science and to see if they
agree with me that this vast, barely tapped, reservoir of ideas is not only relevant
but necessary if we are ever to design better, more sympathetic systems for the
visual arts.
Predicting a future software famine, Michie and Johnston (1984 page 20)
quote figures to show that since 1965 the growth of computer hardware
performance to cost ratio has outpaced programmer productivity by a ratio of
250,000 to 1! But there is another even more important comparison to be made,
for which they quote no figures. How fast have both software and hardware
capacity outpaced the growth in our knowledge and understanding of the user's
own mental processing capacity? The successful application of information
technology to the design of machine visual processors for artists must surely be
linked to a better understanding of those unique and irreplaceable biological
processors that they are designed to support. The Congress of the United States of
America have apparently declared the 1990s the "Decade of the Brain" (Kosslyn
and Koenig, 1992). It is to be hoped that this new initiative, applying ever more
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powerful technologies and human resources to discover how the human brain
works (dubbed "Cognitive Neuroscience") will also lead to a better understanding
as to how machines can be used not to replace, but to enhance, mental
inventiveness in all those directions which support and enrich our culture. If the
theory presented here is correct, then the reason why visually inventive people
need to sketch is itself a product of the brevity of our culture and the pace of
technological change. Natural selection has had too little time to evolve specialised
neural processes in the brain which are as well adapted for imagining future
artifacts as those which evolved in our hominid ancestors for perceiving and acting
on present events. Instead the modern brain has been forced to "borrow" the
ancestral visual system and adapt it for the purpose of manipulating stored
knowledge to invent the future. It is because of its biological origins that the visual
brain needs culturally invented sensory support. According to this interpretation
very rapid cultural change has led to an improvised and perhaps imperfect
adaptation of the human species' most precious bodily possession. Thus these
culturally "stranded" functions of the brain are very deserving and appropriate
candidates for advanced technological support. But to provide this support it will
not be enough to understand how the human brain works it will also be necessary
to understand why it works the way it does. Without such an understanding we
must frame the best theories that we can. Artists' sketches and their history provide
some of the clues.
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